The definition only really has meaning with "You know that p" or "S/He knows that p", where the speaker is different from the knower. — Ludwig V

How does the speaker know that the knower knows? To answer that the speaker has JTB is to kick the can down the road.

In addition, you seem to place far more importance and justificatory weight than I do upon common speech patterns/practices. — creativesoul

I do place emphasis on common speech practices. That doesn't mean that I rule out all technical or specialized language, just that everything needs to have a basis in the shared language.

I'm not sure that our differences are as radical as you seem to think. You misunderstand me about beliefs and propositions. Perhaps I didn't explain myself clearly enough. First, given the lack of clarity about both beliefs and propositions, it seemed better to talk about beliefs without talking about propositions. Second, I don't think that beliefs that are reasons for believing something are clearly distinct from or identical with the belief that they support. From one point of view they are. From another, they aren't. In other words, their beliefs are similar in that they can both be partly expressed by "John should not marry Jane" but different in that Max's belief is expressed in more detail by "Jane is a horrible person, so John should not..." and Jessica's belief is expressed in more detail by "marriage is a terrible practice, so John should not ...". Perhaps it is clearer to say that their beliefs overlap?

Does that help?

I've just had a light-bulb moment. I was thinking that the J clause enabled a chain of transmission to form. The J clause provided assurance that the person I got the information from did know and the T clause provided my endorsement for the next person in the chain.

But the T clause means that every link in the chain has to test the information for itself. In other words, we never get away from first hand evidence.

That isn't quite clear, but it means that while second hand knowledge might be knowledge, third hand knowledge isn't.

But we live and third, fourth and fifth hand knowledge! Nobody could establish the truth of all the information we live by in even a long lifetime. That's why knowledge is so important.

I'm missing something.

Pause for thought.

Does that help? — Ludwig V

No, because you neglected to respond to my reply to you, and instead replied to my response to Michael.

reply="creativesoul;780722"]

You're right. I'm sorry.

What stops you from agreeing with the accounting malpractice charges I've levied against the historical and current conventional practices of belief attribution(including believe that approaches), belief as propositional attitude, and treating naked propositions as if they are equivalent to belief? — creativesoul

Two answers.

First, I don't understand what you mean by "accounting practice" or "malpractice" in this context. You seem to think that philosophy is a kind of accountancy. Perhaps it is, in some ways, but it seems clearly different in other ways.

Second, after our exchange, I decided that it was simpler not to talk about propositions in this context, but simply about beliefs. That way, the amount of confusion in the discussion might be reduced.

This involved accepting that "propositional attitude" was not a helpful way of describing the group of verbs that I was interested in.

You're right. I'm sorry. — Ludwig V

No worries. No need for apologies, it's not like I'm offended or anything. I figured the fact that you copied my reply to Michael and treated it as if it were addressed to you was something you did unbeknownst to yourself while doing it. I hope you did not take the shortness for terseness. It wasn't. I'm just quite busy, and I will be for the next few months.

All that being said, it is very interesting that that has happened here, in this context though. Serendipitous even. If I may: You believed that my reply to Michael was meant for you. Yet I do not think that you would have believed that "my reply to Michael was meant for you" was true at the time. This all points to a curious failure of current convention to be able to properly account for the fact that it is humanly impossible to knowingly hold false belief and/or knowingly be mistaken.

It is for that reason and that reason alone that there are often situations when and where someone would not agree and/or assent to a rendering of their belief at the time they were forming, having, and/or holding it, if it were put into either belief statement or propositional form. <-------That's very problematic for current conventional notions of belief as well as current belief attribution practices. Belief as propositional attitude(which includes belief that approaches) simply cannot take this into account.

For instance, Russell's clock is a perfect example of the aforementioned situation, as is the cottage case regarding the farmer. The person looking at the clock would not agree with and/or assent to the statement "that broken clock is working" although they most certainly believed that that broken clock was working at that particular time. Likewise, the farmer would not agree with and/or assent to the statement "a piece of cloth is a cow" while believing that a piece of cloth is a cow. Now, circling back to the serendipitous mistake you made earlier: I'm relatively certain that the same holds true for your earlier belief that my reply to Michael was meant for you.

It's curious because current conventional notions of belief as well as the belief attribution practices based upon those notions are fatally flawed in their inherent inability to properly take account of such belief in such situations.

As Moore skirted around, we can coherently say something about another's false beliefs and/or mistakes at the time, yet we cannot say the same things about ourselves.

Why?

Because the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude, the conventional practice of treating propositions as though they are equivalent to belief, and the belief that approach are all inherently incapable of properly taking these situations into account. The inherently inadequate linguistic frameworks, schemes, conceptions still being practiced in current convention are exactly what gave rise to Russell's clock, Moore's paradox, and Gettier. Convention has gotten human thought and/or belief historically wrong. Those paradoxes and more are simply logical consequences of the conventional notion of belief that has been at work for centuries.

First, I don't understand what you mean by "accounting practice" or "malpractice" in this context. You seem to think that philosophy is a kind of accountancy. Perhaps it is, in some ways, but it seems clearly different in other ways. — Ludwig V

Well, each and every time that we are talking about that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it, we are indeed taking account of it. The belief that approach works from the notion of belief as an attitude/disposition towards some proposition/statement such that the person who believes the statement believes it to be true. So, it is held that when we say someone believes "X", we are saying that they have an attitude/disposition such that they hold "X" to be true.

That's most certainly an accounting practice at work.

Second, after our exchange, I decided that it was simpler not to talk about propositions in this context, but simply about beliefs. That way, the amount of confusion in the discussion might be reduced. — Ludwig V

I like the attempts to reduce confusion and add clarity whenever possible. For whatever it's worth, the position I argue for/from began with and still has a very strong methodological naturalist bent.

However, it's impossible to address current conventional issues such as Gettier without addressing propositions and how they've been used to represent and/or as equivalent to belief. That said, I've no issue with agreeing, if you do - and I think you do - to no longer focus upon the issues involving propositions and/or propositional attitudes. I think we largely agree there, so we can close that part off and focus our attention elsewhere if you like.

This involved accepting that "propositional attitude" was not a helpful way of describing the group of verbs that I was interested in. — Ludwig V

Okay, we've yet to have broached that aspect in its own right. I'm curious, which group of verbs are you interested in and how exactly are they relevant to Gettier?

Oh, and I just realized that I earlier confused Gettier's Case I, once again, regarding who got the job and who Smith believed would get the job, but I'm hoping you overlooked that due to the earlier clarification I offered after doing the same thing.

The issue with knowledge is that we cannot always check to see for ourselves if something or another is true. Hence, our becoming aware of that and our own fallibility can and ought lead to a bit of skepticism. However, it does not follow from the fact that we cannot know everything that we cannot know anything. It also does not follow from the fact that we are sometimes mistaken that we are always mistaken. Hence, radical skepticism seems to me to be an emotionally based overreaction.


You're absolutely right in pointing out that the nature of human progress requires us to stand on the shoulders of many before us, and it's worth mentioning that there is a significant amount of trusting the truthfulness of the source material inherent to our daily lives. In a society where no one trusts institutions and/or each other, it's only a matter of time before it collapses. Such is and was the danger inherently within American government over the past fifty years such that the legislations passed throughout the last five decades cultivated a society of people that led the up to the likes of Trump.

A real life tragedy of the commons on steroids. Ah, but I digress...

So, it is held that when we say someone believes "X", we are saying that they have an attitude/disposition such that they hold "X" to be true.

That's most certainly an accounting practice at work. — creativesoul

I think I understand what you mean.

There's no doubt, for example, that Gettier writes as if he believes that a belief maps to a proposition which maps to a sentence. He doesn't feel any need to clarify that, no doubt because it is so widely believed.

But I don't see any interesting different between "Smith believed the proposition that p" and "Smith believed that p", so I prefer to cut out the middle man. I feel that there's an ontological idea going on that there must be some object that is believed, just as there's a feeling that there must be some object that is true or false. It seems pure assumption to me and I find it annoying. But I don't pretend that I'm clear about it.

I don't have a list of the interesting words. I seldom get much beyond know, believe, think, say, assert, but I would include suppose, imagine, fear, hope, wonder (both that.. and whether... and why... ). I'm sure you could go on.

I'm hoping you overlooked.... — creativesoul

I don't even remember overlooking anything, so I suppose I must have overlooked it. It certainly wasn't a problem. So no worries.

there is a significant amount of trusting the truthfulness of the source material inherent to our daily lives — creativesoul

That's right. Our problem, I think, is that since the development of mass media, it has become more difficult to trust, because the weaknesses of those we must trust are much more difficult to hide, and yet those who want us to trust them try to build an image of perfection that is very easily shattered. There should be some happy medium of accepting human weaknesses as inevitable without a reaction of disproportionate mistrust.

I feel that there's an ontological idea going on that there must be some object that is believed, just as there's a feeling that there must be some object that is true or false. It seems pure assumption to me and I find it annoying. But I don't pretend that I'm clear about it. — Ludwig V

Not too certain how clear I am about it either, but in fairness to convention...

Historically speaking, it became increasingly necessary for humans to be able to discriminate between contradictory assertions. It is my suspicion that epistemology was born thereof, and is where and when belief as p gained a foothold. It's worth mentioning here that I do not find it's entirely wrong. I mean, there are all sorts of situations when someone would assent to some proposition/statement or another. There are all sorts of situations when someone asserts something or another, makes a knowledge claim, etc. In such situations, the belief that approach works perfectly well enough as an accounting practice.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken.

I'm not fond of speaking in terms of 'objects'. It's fraught with archaic baggage. That's a big part of the underlying problem... the inherently inadequate linguistic frameworks being used to talk about that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it. Language less but meaningful nonetheless human thought and belief are precisely such things.

I find that the very language we use to talk about stuff effects/affects the way we look at the world as well as the way we feel about it while looking. The degree to which this is the case cannot be overstated, but that is a subject matter in its own right.

I don't have a list of the interesting words. I seldom get much beyond know, believe, think, say, assert, but I would include suppose, imagine, fear, hope, wonder (both that.. and whether... and why... ). I'm sure you could go on. — Ludwig V

I find our exchange a bit odd, because unless I've taken you the wrong way, you've repeatedly dismissed several different aspects of the conversation, citing these yet to have been disclosed verbs as what interests you in lieu of whatever aspect was being discussed at the time. In addition to that, I'm reminded of the blanket theory that you mentioned as a preference to piecemeal answers to Gettier, after saying you weren't interested in a theory.

The oddity, I suppose, is that it looks like a performative contradiction.

I suppose this could very well be a direct result of my own continual critical thinking. If it is, my apologies. I've no way to turn it off. Thus, I attempt to direct it towards more practically beneficial subjects. "An eye for detail" barely scratches the surface of that personality 'trait'. But that's already too much about me. Just wanted to soften the critique above. I could be very wrong. You would be the one to know that, if I were.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken. — creativesoul

Yes, quite so. I think that these cases are one kind of embedded belief, in that we (but not everyone) think that beliefs are also appropriately attributed to animals that don't have language. For the record, my belief (!) is that beliefs are reasons for doing something, and are essential to the language practice of attributing rationale to certain actions. One art of this is that we find that sometimes people act as if p were true when it isn't. So if a rational agent acts as if that piece of cloth were a cow, I believe that agent believes it is a cow. Another part is that sometimes they act without taking into account some p that is clearly relevant, and it can be the best explanation that they do not believe that p. I think that "know" does the same job, with the addition that p is true. This contributes to the language practice of passing on information. It may all sound a bit wacky, but I find it very satisfying.

citing these yet to have been disclosed verbs as what interests you in lieu of whatever aspect was being discussed at the time. — creativesoul

You seem to want an exhaustive list. Is it not enough for me to give examples and then say "and other verbs like those"? It's only a kind of ostensive definition. If you think of a case you are doubtful about, we can consider it and decide. I don't have any reason as things stand to work through such a list, unless I find an interesting problem amongst them. The ones I've thought about seem to be pretty straightforward. I refer to them because I assume that the kind of explanation one gives of "know" and "believe" should apply to the other words mutatis mutandis.

In addition to that, I'm reminded of the blanket theory that you mentioned as a preference to piecemeal answers to Gettier, after saying you weren't interested in a theory. — creativesoul

I can't remember what I meant saying I wasn't interested in a theory. This is philosophy, after all.

Hey Ludwig! So, I've been partaking in an international move. Sorry for the delay! I'm curious if you are still interested in continuing this discussion? I'd love to!

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken.
— creativesoul

Yes, quite so. I think that these cases are one kind of embedded belief, in that we (but not everyone) think that beliefs are also appropriately attributed to animals that don't have language. For the record, my belief (!) is that beliefs are reasons for doing something, and are essential to the language practice of attributing rationale to certain actions. One art of this is that we find that sometimes people act as if p were true when it isn't. So if a rational agent acts as if that piece of cloth were a cow, I believe that agent believes it is a cow. Another part is that sometimes they act without taking into account some p that is clearly relevant, and it can be the best explanation that they do not believe that p. I think that "know" does the same job, with the addition that p is true. This contributes to the language practice of passing on information. It may all sound a bit wacky, but I find it very satisfying. — Ludwig V

I'm very sympathetic to the idea that thought and belief are efficacious. The explanation sketched out above makes sense. Given that all knowledge that p consists of belief that p, what you say here sounds about right in that regard.

Although...

We may be talking past one another in a specific way. I'm often making ontological arguments, and I'm not sure if you've been aware of that. For example, my argument against convention is ontological. The conflation of propositions and belief is the charge I've made, and subsequently supported throughout this thread. So, while I agree with saying that beliefs are reasons for doing something(Witt sets this out nicely in a manner that you've continued here), I do not think that beliefs are equivalent to reasons for doing something, and you've said much the same thing a few replies ago.

I've also been inactive for a while. but you certainly had a better reason for being inactive than me. My reason was that I got fed up with some of the downsides to this game and switched to off-line activities, such as reading a book. It's quite simple, really. What keeps me going is an interesting conversation:-

So, while I agree with saying that beliefs are reasons for doing something (Witt sets this out nicely in a manner that you've continued here), I do not think that beliefs are equivalent to reasons for doing something, and you've said much the same thing a few replies ago. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference between the first sentence in the quotation and the second. What does "equivalent to" mean in this context?

There are currently all sorts of offline activities that are more productive for me, practically speaking. I agree with the frustrations that can come with this medium. I can certainly relate. To answer your question...

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking.

I've read back a bit, but I'll need to carefully reread further back in order to better remember what all we had been discussing. I do seem to remember that there were some very interesting aspects that I hoped we would further explore.

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking. — creativesoul

I didn't mean to imply that everyone will necessarily act on every belief they hold. I meant only that a belief is available to the believer to act on as and when they find it appropriate to do so.

One of the actions stemming from a belief may be expressing it in words, which is not doing anything in one sense, but is doing something for my purposes here.

Though doing nothing can be an action. If I know that there's a bomb under your car, doing nothing would count as an action.

I have forgotten most of what we said. So I'm looking forward to seeing what you dig up.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. A similar point could be made about the causal implications of specific facts or events. There's another complicated issue for philosophy about disentangling beliefs that have values built in to them (such as the belief that X committed murder or that COVID is dangerous) and their factual content. — Ludwig V

This was one of the aspects that I thought could be further unpacked and explained in terms of how it applies to Gettier.

Another was the equivalence drawn between atomic propositions and beliefs such that convention has it that "Michael was not born in Germany" counts as a belief of some who believes Michael was born in France.

I think these are related...

Both of these are important and complicated issues. But daunting. It would be interesting to undertake it, but if I ever do, it will have to be later. But if you want to make a start, I would be happy to discuss progress with you.

I suppose one would have to first do some sort of literature search. I don't suppose much has been written about this, but there might be something.