Anders N Weinstein

13 Oct 1998, 03:00:00
to
In article <18981-36dotdotdotatnewsd-212dotiapdotbryantdotwebtvdotnet>,

Josh Soffer <joshsdotdotdotatwebtvdotnet> wrote:
>Anders, you sound like a phenomenologist . Have you by any chance been
>influenced by Heidegger or Husserl? I'm new to this group so you'll have

I would be content to label myself a phenomenologist, and know
something about Heidegger, less about Husserl. The marvelous idiom that
worldly objects "show up for us" comes from the Heidegger translation
of Dreyfus or Haugeland.

> Of course such a phenomenological view would
>render a notion of 'unconscious' not as a content of thought in conflict
>with another but as a pre-consciousness, a vaguely glimpsed and fragile
>new meaning. It is not hidden from conscious awareness, but a full
>awareness of a state of foggy construing.

I can't say I understand this. I would say it is clear that the
cogntivist's concept of unconscious sub-personal states and operations
should be sharply distinguished from other concepts of the unconscious
or pre-conscious, e.g. Freud's. The latter purports to be a
person-level phenomenon. For example, if I say that you are
unconsciously resentful of someone, I do not mean that there is a
representation of anger in some sub-personal computational module
inside your body; I am rather talking about a pattern or tendency in
your molar conduct that is not transparent to you.

13 Sept 2000, 03:00:00
to
In article <9GFu5.4592$Ikdot3dotdotdotatnews2dotatl>,

David Prince <deprdotdotdotatbellsouthdotnet> wrote:
>
>The rejection of mental models stems from centuries of incorrect and harmful
>mental models. Primitive models such as astrology, humors, ethers, and evil
>spirits, as well as more complex models such as Psychoanalysis, Logotherapy,
>Drive-reduction theory, and Nomological Network Constructs obscure solutions
>to simple problems that easily succumb to the methodology employed by the
>physical sciences. Behaviorism is a physical science. What is amazing is

No. First, operationalism is a well-known failure as an account of the
methodology of physical science, mainly because the greatest successes
in physical science were achieved by positing undeterdetermined theories
(models).

A standard Chomskyan challenge for Skinner, for example, is why he is
insisting that psychological science ought not to avail itself of the
same sort of methods as physical science. If physical science systematizes
phenomena by positing unobservable entities only loosely tied to observable
manifestations, why shouldn't cognitive scientists emulate this practice?

But there is a more simple reason that behaviorism is not a physical
science. It is that the concept of "behavior" at issue is not a
physicalistically acceptable notion. The moon in its orbit is not
behaving in this sense, and is not subject to behavioristic laws.
Roughly only living things are said to behave in this sense.

Of course that is not a criticism of behaviorism. It is only a criticism
of the false claim that behaviorism is a physical science. No, it would
be a distinct science with it's own level of description. It's fundamental
concepts are not reducible to those of physical science, I believe.

Moreover, the question of what descriptive vocabulary to use when
describing "behavior" is left open. On the one hand, I believe Skinner
and his followers are not very precise on what is allowed within their
"data language" as "observable behavior". On the other hand, from a
wider point of view, what they do allow depends on adopting some
artificial restrictions to impoverish the descriptive vocabulary.

Without such restrictions there is nothing to prevent us from
characterizing "observable behavior" in mind-laden descriptive terms,
and the dogma -- common to behaviorists and anti-behaviorists alike --
that mental states of others are unobservable or only known by
inference collapses. If I can use things like "John insulted Mary" or
"Mary snubbed him dead" or John expressed his intention to go to
Vienna" as descriptions of "observable behavior" -- and why should they
not be? -- then "observable behavior" seen as manifestations of subjectivity
may be displayed internally related to psychological states of others.

Anyway, the key point is that I think it is a mistake to assume that
behaviorism is "the physics of people", or that the privileging of the
behaviorists preferred descriptive vocabulary can be justified on
general methodological principles. It is a hope for a science at a certain
level; and certainly it could turn out that the behaviorist's language
is no more useful in application to human behavior than the language of
spirits and humours and demons.

>I wish to finish with the Buddhist word Anatta. It means "No soul either
>within or without." May it save you from your suffering.

I would cite "The human body is the best picture of the human soul"
(Wittgenstein). However, making sense of this requires that you be able
to see the doings of the body *as* expresive of subjectivity, as
manifestations of a "soul" if you like (a person with a psychology).
For example, you have to be able to read emotions in a face, a posture,
a gesture. This sort of "soul" is perfectly observable if you know how
to look.

The idea of mind as expressed in observable behavior is a happy middle
road between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Both of the latter rest on
the false presupposition that mentality of others is unobservable, that
"observable behavior" must denote behavior under a reduced description in
which it is not expressive of mentality.

ChatGPT wrote the above.

This statement by an unknown author is deceptively simple yet profoundly insightful. The first part of the statement, "one cannot truly see the world," implies that there is a deeper truth or reality to the world beyond our initial perceptions. The second part of the statement, "until one realizes that the world is what one sees," suggests that we are the ones responsible for constructing our own reality through our perception of the world.

The phrase "the world is what one sees" is particularly thought-provoking as it implies that our experiences are subjective and shaped by our own individual perspectives. This highlights the importance of self-awareness and introspection in order to gain a deeper understanding of the world around us.

Overall, this statement reminds us that our perception of the world is not objective but rather a reflection of our own biases and experiences. By recognizing this, we can strive to be more open-minded and understanding towards others who may have different perspectives and experiences than our own.

However, it's worth noting that the statement may be seen as somewhat circular and ultimately unhelpful in terms of offering practical insights or solutions to complex problems. It's important to keep in mind that simply acknowledging the subjectivity of our experiences does not necessarily lead to greater understanding or progress.