That's not just a rewording. it's saying something completely different. The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", since we might have given some other name to three-sided shapes. The relevant equivalence is between polygons with three sides and polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180º. This could not have been otherwise. It is not a result of a performative.Your example may be reworded as: "a triangle is a plane figure, a polygon, where the sum of the internal angles is 180 deg", thereby defining "a triangle". — RussellA
Language has to be embedded far more widely in cognition - to the point where cognition and language use are much the same thing. — Banno
In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity. — Banno
Language has to be embedded far more widely in cognition - to the point where cognition and language use are much the same thing. — Banno
What the brain is able to achieve, its thoughts, concepts and language cannot be [without] the physical structure that enables such thoughts, concepts and language. — RussellA
In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity. — Banno
The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", since we might have given some other name to three-sided shapes. The relevant equivalence is between polygons with three sides and polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180º. This could not have been otherwise. It is not a result of a performative. — Banno
The issue is if a statement can be true in virtue of the meaning of the words alone. But we do not have a consensus on what the meaning of the words means. — Banno
The initial baptism establishes the analytic nature of an expression. — RussellA
One thing I am pretty sure he is saying is that concept formation is a separate issue than his generative grammar.................A natural reaction might also be to question why he so easily separates these two — schopenhauer1
Am I mistaken or was Kripke only accounting for meaning in regards to proper names and scientific kinds (like water is H20) which unlike other terms, are always true in all possible worlds? — schopenhauer1
7min - "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property" — RussellA
16min - "Sometimes language is used for communication, but that is a very peripheral use . Almost all our use of language goes on all our waking hours , most of our language is just thinking, we can't just stop , it almost impossible to stop . it takes an incredible act of will to stop thinking" — RussellA
True, I agree that Kripke limited his causal theory of reference to proper names. Putnam extended the theory to other sorts of terms, such as water, whereas in general the theory may be used for many referring terms.
From Wikipedia Causal Theory of Reference:
A causal theory of reference or historical chain theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms.
In lectures later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names.......... Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory.
The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. — RussellA
I think this is the most interesting theory he holds, and at least prima facie, seem true. Much of language is basically self-talk. It is our thoughts to ourselves: our own reasons, moods, ideas, strategies, everything that is "discursive" in nature. — schopenhauer1
Right but that article still seemed to not mention other terms (not proper names or natural kinds) as being an outcome of that theory. It seems to always be mentioned in conjunction with proper names et al. I am not sure if it has been explicitly broadened to all terms. — schopenhauer1
Words may change, but Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference illustrates the importance of the Performative Act Of Naming in Language in ensuring the stability of language, whereby the reference of a linguistic expression, what it designates in the world, is fixed by an act of “initial baptism”. — RussellA
We're a fair way off it anyway. Think we might have to let it roll.Apologies if that goes off topic from the OP. — Manuel
I don’t want to disagree... — Antony Nickles
Understanding that concept is just being able to do that stuff. Including talking. — Banno
But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language? — Banno
I'm not seeing it. Indeed, i find it hard to understand what an analytic statement would be like in an I-language... asI'm wondering if analyticity is required for a generative grammer? — Moliere
...then how could you get an analytic sentence...?if you introspect into what happening in your head right now, you don't get coherent sentences — Manuel
Each space is the result of a Performative Act, first by Euclid, then by Riemann and then by RussellA. — RussellA
…it's not the development of a concept but the interaction with the world that counts…. And so more generally for… concepts [other than counting]. They are better thought of not as things but of acts. And I take it that this is what underpins "Don't look to meaning, but to use". Hence,
[as he said] “Understanding that concept is just being able to do that stuff. Including talking.”
— Banno — Banno
when we vocalize, we put together these [internal word] fragments into a coherent whole that another native speaker will understand what we are saying. I suspect that the initial babbling of infants offers a clue of the language faculty growing to maturity. — Manuel
Chomsky's, supposition seems to be that since most of our language use is the little voice in your head, then the source and prime example of language use must be that little voice. But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language? — Banno
We rarely “put together” most of what comes to us unless we are on a first date or creating a speech, much less can use that as a universal description. (The desire though is that we could control what we mean by what we say, even more than we “always” put it together.) The hoped-for picture here is that there is something (thought, meaning, intention, etc.) that we convey or at least that goes into language (or in this instance is in language systematically). However, for example, when Wittgenstein talks about “expression”, it is to point to the moment at which we are responsible for what we have said—speaking “externally” to this extent only; not to infer it is from something internal. We can also say we speak in expressions; that our words are judged (have importance, are meaningful) by the criteria for threatening, entreating, explaining, describing, etc. But it is not some “we” that do these or cause them to happen. As I have said in my last post, you are individually responsible for what you say, but it is not otherwise special in your having said it. — Antony Nickles
yeah, and that's not quite right, since there isn't always a "what goes in" prior to putting the words together. Tolkien said the story grew in the telling, Banno says the sentence grows in the saying. It's not always there beforehand.The hoped-for picture here is that there is something (thought, meaning, intention, etc.) that we convey or at least that goes into language (or in this instance is in language systematically). — Antony Nickles
It's not always there beforehand. — Banno
Sure, if you want to be more precise, you can say that we put together what comes to us when we externalize to others what we say, or when we are attempting to get the other person to see what we are trying to say, as I am doing know, replying to what you said. — Manuel
Again, the desire to have all of language work like the very limited process of naming objects—to imagine all words referring to an object, even “meaning” or something “real”—is because we want logical necessity and predictability. — Antony Nickles
Seeing as how the man himself is to honour us, it may be time I came to grips with this issue. — Banno
Sure. But the point remains that not all analytic statements are acts of naming. — Banno
But further, when do you, or I, participate in such a formal act of naming? Apart from baptisms and boat launchings, it's not something we commonly do. — Banno
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