Your example may be reworded as: "a triangle is a plane figure, a polygon, where the sum of the internal angles is 180 deg", thereby defining "a triangle". — RussellA

That's not just a rewording. it's saying something completely different. The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", since we might have given some other name to three-sided shapes. The relevant equivalence is between polygons with three sides and polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180º. This could not have been otherwise. It is not a result of a performative.

A more complete consideration of "gavagai" will I think show that the performative utterances on which your account relies are not up to the task of fixing the referent of a name without ambiguity.

Starting at p102, Paul Horwich's Chomsky versus Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction has a potted history of the issue from Frege through Russell. and Carnap to Quine and Chomsky. However i was unable to follow his account of the difference between P-analyticity and P-analyticity.

Enrico Cipriani provides some additional context and discussion, extending the argument to Kripke. If I have it right, Chomsky takes there to be an innate capacity to recognise analyticity in utterances in order to explain our intuitions.

One example used is that from "John was killed" we can conclude solely on the basis of the meaning of the words, that John is dead. It's not obvious that the only explanation for such an inference is an inherent capacity for a universal grammar. The relation between something's being killed and it's being dead is the sort of thing that Quine's holism explains.

My thinking at present is that the discomfiture between analyticity, necessity, a priority and certainty introduced by analytic philosophy over the last fifty years of last century considerably complicate attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account along the lines of generative grammar.

This should not be surprising. Language grows as much by breaking the rules as by following them.

Yeah, the idea that language is built by an algorithmic process from this or that simple, eb it names or propositions or whatever, just can't get off the ground. Language has to be embedded far more widely in cognition - to the point where cognition and language use are much the same thing.

Understanding that concept is just being able to do that stuff. Including talking.

In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity.

Language has to be embedded far more widely in cognition - to the point where cognition and language use are much the same thing. — Banno

In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity. — Banno

Language surely must be closely linked to cognition. But the devil is in the details. The range of theories between what the brain does and what social interactions do suggest they are only 'the same thing' when some conditions are presumed to be the case.

That prompts me to ask about how you see the scientific method in relation to 'analyticity', as you coin the phrase. Chomsky located linguistics as one of the enterprises of cognitive psychology. Do you conceive of the 'analytic' as prior to such theoretical endeavors?

I have no idea what you are asking.

Noted.

In case anyone is interested, I believe one of his most interesting books in regards to language is his New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind

I'm not much into the detailed technical debates on philosophy of language, nevertheless:

There's an excellent and quite long series of classes given by Chomsky that go through a lot of material, including Quine. But 1) it is very, very long (almost 20 hours) and 2) the audio quality is quite bad, it's very low. Nevertheless, if anyone want to go through that hurdle, which I did once, was quite interesting, here is a link to the first part of the lecture:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3gFaNYluBQ&list=PLJ8I0IGeFhIpD2_2w71jghsDGCfbtSVF4

And it goes on from that one, from what I can recall, I seem to remember he discusses Quine maybe in lecture 2-4, one of those, but, can't be sure.

Language has to be embedded far more widely in cognition - to the point where cognition and language use are much the same thing. — Banno

I don’t want to disagree that there are very complicated (brain/syntactic) processes happening when we use language, or even that there is perhaps some benefit to learning about them. But (as I see it; as Wittgenstein sees it) we are lured into thinking we will learn how our communications (“our sentences”) are meaningful if we understand the brain or how language operates logistically (internally as it were). But there is no “answer” to this desire.

What the brain is able to achieve, its thoughts, concepts and language cannot be [without] the physical structure that enables such thoughts, concepts and language. — RussellA

The reason we want it to be true (meaning to be systematic) is that we want to supplant the vagaries and failures of our ordinary back-and-forth, with certainty, such that it can be studied and deciphered (ahead of time).

But, as @Banno may agree, the criteria for judgment of a concept (say, apologizing or intending or threatening or knowing) show that these practices are meaningful to us, reflect what matters to people for that concept to happen or be what it is, not the understanding of a process. And we learn those criteria, judgments, etc. (by osmosis for the most part) through training and watching and making mistakes and being corrected, i.e., living (language is not normative, life is—conventions are not “agreed to” or “defined”). But, again, maybe I have Chomsky wrong here, however, it is suspect that an “analytic” statement is one that is true without external reference or without us screwing it up (as we do) and as we want, desperately, to find some way not to (with “necessity”); most classically, by taking “us” out of the equation.

We want to create an intellectual (logical, scientific) problem that we might be able to solve, rather than see that actually being able to communicate with people is much more of an ordinarily problematic part of the human condition than we’d like it to be. As Wittgenstein said, “We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.” PI, p. 212 (emphasis added). The “certain things” that we find are the ones that we can maybe solve (e.g., the optical process of the brain) because we do not want to accept the fallibility of people (say, their inability to accept things that are pointed out to them).

The question then is not what is analytic (or “innate” or “generative” language processes), but: why do they matter? what importance would figuring these out have? where do they get us?

In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity. — Banno

Why indeed.

The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", since we might have given some other name to three-sided shapes. The relevant equivalence is between polygons with three sides and polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180º. This could not have been otherwise. It is not a result of a performative. — Banno

1) In Euclidian space, there is equivalence between (a polygon with three sides)
and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180 deg), and this could not be otherwise.
2) In Riemannian space, there is no necessary equivalence between (a polygon with three sides) and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180 deg), and this could not be otherwise.
3) In RussellianA space, there is equivalence between (a polygon with three sides)
and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 75 deg), and this could not be otherwise.

Each space is the result of a Performative Act, first by Euclid, then by Riemann and then by RussellA.

The issue is if a statement can be true in virtue of the meaning of the words alone. But we do not have a consensus on what the meaning of the words means. — Banno

True, there is never an absolute consensus as to what words mean, and words change their meaning with time. But if there was no consensus at all as to the meaning of words, this thread would not be possible, as no one would be able to understand what anyone else was saying.

Words may change, but Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference illustrates the importance of the Performative Act Of Naming in Language in ensuring the stability of language, whereby the reference of a linguistic expression, what it designates in the world, is fixed by an act of “initial baptism”.

Drawing on Gottlob Frege’s distinction between word meaning and word reference, Kripke and Putnam developed a causal theory of reference to explain how words can change while still designating the same thing in reality.

The act of baptism designates a very real physical object associated with something observable. But words may evolve with time, and what establishes the “reality” of an expression is the existence of a continuous causal chain, linked back to the initial baptism.

Language thus maintains a stable relationship with the external environment, ensuring that even though words may change, the expression as a whole remains truthful.

The initial baptism establishes the analytic nature of an expression.

The initial baptism establishes the analytic nature of an expression. — RussellA

Am I mistaken or was Kripke only accounting for meaning in regards to proper names and scientific kinds (like water is H20) which unlike other terms, the meaning and term is always linked in all possible worlds?

One thing I am pretty sure he is saying is that concept formation is a separate issue than his generative grammar.................A natural reaction might also be to question why he so easily separates these two — schopenhauer1

Chomsky refers to concepts, thoughts and language in Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4) Closer To Truth Chats

He says that the relation between thought and language is one of identity

2min - "Language and thought are intimately related . Language has historically be called audible thought , its the mechanism for constructing thoughts over an infinite range which we can then access and use in our various activities"

He says that concepts cannot exist without language

7min - "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property"

He says that communication is a secondary use of language, the primary use of language is thought

16min - "Sometimes language is used for communication, but that is a very peripheral use . Almost all our use of language goes on all our waking hours , most of our language is just thinking, we can't just stop , it almost impossible to stop . it takes an incredible act of will to stop thinking"

IE, Chomsky is saying that concepts wouldn't exist without language, and the main function of language is to have thoughts.

Am I mistaken or was Kripke only accounting for meaning in regards to proper names and scientific kinds (like water is H20) which unlike other terms, are always true in all possible worlds? — schopenhauer1

True, I agree that Kripke limited his causal theory of reference to proper names. Putnam extended the theory to other sorts of terms, such as water, whereas in general the theory may be used for many referring terms.

From Wikipedia Causal Theory of Reference:

A causal theory of reference or historical chain theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms.

In lectures later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names.......... Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection.

I'm wondering if analyticity is required for a generative grammer? I'm potshotting after reading the entries and @invicta's thread -- but I think that the I-language approach more implies that there'd be analytic I-sentence's (or whatever the token of meaning is in an I-language -- also worth noting that the I-language couldn't count as a private language up front, just to steer clear of that confusion).

I'm thinking something along the lines of the formal approach, of a sub-natural-language process which generates natural languages seems like it'd have analytic properties.


However, I tend to believe that the distinction is pragmatic rather than some feature of thought. Even if I grant some kind of mentalese or sub-natural-language generative process I would tend to favor the natural language expressions over this I-language, however it's parsed. (neat distinction though between E/I-language I hadn't encountered before)

7min - "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property" — RussellA

16min - "Sometimes language is used for communication, but that is a very peripheral use . Almost all our use of language goes on all our waking hours , most of our language is just thinking, we can't just stop , it almost impossible to stop . it takes an incredible act of will to stop thinking" — RussellA

I think this is the most interesting theory he holds, and at least prima facie, seem true. Much of language is basically self-talk. It is our thoughts to ourselves: our own reasons, moods, ideas, strategies, everything that is "discursive" in nature.

Tomasello and others might disagree and say that language development is too social to be mainly for just thinking or internal mentation, but rather is meant to be communication first. I think it could be a little bit of both perhaps? But Chomsky would be at odds even with this smorgasbord approach of communication and mentation. I think he has an underlying theory of language development that it was an exaptation, I believe discussed earlier in this thread, whereby the very software of the brain was re-organized in such a way that language and concepts were created by necessity of this one-time "gestalt" brain re-organization.

Biologists generally do not agree with Chomsky, as far as I have read. Most take the anthropological approach that it was a slow development, and mainly based on communication needs.

I can see the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. I can't imagine human beings with anything other than a device that produces thought in linguistic-type forms, inextricably tied with concepts and self-talk.

True, I agree that Kripke limited his causal theory of reference to proper names. Putnam extended the theory to other sorts of terms, such as water, whereas in general the theory may be used for many referring terms.

From Wikipedia Causal Theory of Reference:

A causal theory of reference or historical chain theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms.

In lectures later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names.......... Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. — RussellA

Right but that article still seemed to not mention other terms (not proper names or natural kinds) as being an outcome of that theory. It seems to always be mentioned in conjunction with proper names et al. I am not sure if it has been explicitly broadened to all terms.

I think this is the most interesting theory he holds, and at least prima facie, seem true. Much of language is basically self-talk. It is our thoughts to ourselves: our own reasons, moods, ideas, strategies, everything that is "discursive" in nature. — schopenhauer1

Chomsky also makes the proviso that both the visual system and language need to be stimulated from things in the external world in order to operate successfully.

See Noam Chomsky on Linguistic Theories and the Evolution of Language (Part 3) | Closer To Truth Chats.

8 min "Stimulation is necessary.............if you don't present pattern stimulation in the early days of life the visual system won't function , it has to be set off by different kinds of stimulation and if you modify the kinds of stimulation say horizontal lines instead of vertical lines it will affect the way the visual system develops. That's pretty much like language"

Right but that article still seemed to not mention other terms (not proper names or natural kinds) as being an outcome of that theory. It seems to always be mentioned in conjunction with proper names et al. I am not sure if it has been explicitly broadened to all terms. — schopenhauer1

The article, linked here, discusses the causal theory of names as regards abstract objects.

"For example, the numeral ‘17’ is a name of the number 17. But how can there be a causal relation between a number and subsequent uses of a numeral? In short, how can abstract objects stand in causal relations? It would seem that it is always something concrete that is a cause. In this kind of case, it makes more sense to trace the causal chain back to the dubbing, rather than to the object. For although 17 is an abstract object, the act of dubbing it (first performed by some mathematician, no doubt) was a concrete event that can stand in causal relations to subsequent events."

Whether the process is a Performative Act or baptism, the question remains, what authority has determined that "a triangle is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles", and why do we accept this.

Words may change, but Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference illustrates the importance of the Performative Act Of Naming in Language in ensuring the stability of language, whereby the reference of a linguistic expression, what it designates in the world, is fixed by an act of “initial baptism”. — RussellA

Again, the desire to have all of language work like the very limited process of naming objects—to imagine all words referring to an object, even “meaning” or something “real”—is because we want logical necessity and predictability. If nothing else, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations started with that picture of language and goes on to show that not only does most of language work entirely differently (each concept having its on criteria) but that language was taken out of individual case-by-case contexts by philosophy to ensure certainty, and that it is not the structure of language that is essential but our lives; that what we ordinarily say in a given context is simply a means of seeing what matters to us about our lives; and is the tool to take us out of our fixation (“bewitchment”) of an abstract solution to our failures and limitations.

Indeed. Which is why he refers to Descartes and Cudworth in the tradition, Chomsky is very much an "innatist dospositionalist", experience serves as a trigger for the idea, but the experience is quite fragmentary, and poor compared to what arises in the brain.

He'd say that it would not be possible to explain how experience could possibility lead to such rich concepts.

Apologies if that goes off topic from the OP.

Apologies if that goes off topic from the OP. — Manuel

We're a fair way off it anyway. Think we might have to let it roll.

Some thoughts on I and E language. I-language is indeed not a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, since it is not about sensations unavailable to others, but about the things around us. It is however perilously close, close enough that some of the arguments agains a private language may well apply to it.

It is also very close to Fodor's mentalese; I hadn't appreciated the link between Fodor and Chomsky previously.

It is also close to Evans' notion of "speakers'a denotation" as opposed to "name denotation"; The article on which the notes cites is at http://www.jstor.org/stable/410691 . I'm not sure why we need Evans.

We might more profitably add Davidson, who in A Nice Derangement..., first posits and then rejects something similar, his "first meaning"

As so eloquently points out, all of these appear to be founded on a misdirected view of language. sets the problem out clearly, in agreeing with Chomsky that most of language is self-talk. Shop's, and perhaps Chomsky's, supposition seems to be that since most of our language use is the little voice in your head, then the source and prime example of language use must be that little voice. But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language?

And there's this.

Similarly mentalese is dependent on algorithmic approaches to language. Hence Fodor's idea that mentalese has the form of first-order logic. I see Davidson's argument in A Nice Derangement... as a sort of diagonal argument agains this; and against the lawful behaviour of language in general. When one sets up some nice set of rules to explain language and language use, someone comes along with a nice derangement of epitaphs to display their negation. Perhaps frustratingly for those who require order, language always transcends whatever bounds one might try to place on it.

I'm going to work from the presumption that language is primarily a social activity, and secondarily "private".

I don’t want to disagree... — Antony Nickles

That's no fun.

My ramblings yesterday were unclear. Perhaps I can tidy up a little bit.

Folk tend to talk of names and statements on the one hand and of concepts on the other, as if they were seperate things. So one uses words to give expression to the concept, that concept being a something lurking in one's mind, names by the words one uses. I don't think concepts are like this; or at least, they are not as seperate form words as folk seem to think.

So folk suppose something like that learning the number seven consists in "forming a concept" of seven in the mind of a child. It isn't. The process of learning seven takes place by interacting with things around them, by sharing seven lollies, by working out you will be ten in three more years, by seeing two bikes and five scooters as a group, and by learning all the other numbers as well. That is, it's not the development of a concept but the interaction with the world that counts.

And notice that one checks for understanding of seven by checking these sort of interactions.

"Seven" is not a thing inside a mind, but a capacity to perform certain actions.

And so more generally for pother concepts. They are better thought of not as things but of acts.

And I take it hat this is what underpins "Don't look to meaning, but to use". Hence,

Understanding that concept is just being able to do that stuff. Including talking. — Banno

But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language? — Banno

Quick comment, that's an interesting question. I think Chomsky's idea is that if you introspect into what happening in your head right now, you don't get coherent sentences, sometimes you do, rarely. Usually they are fragments, pieces of words as it were, etc.

This suggests that when we vocalize, we put together these fragments into a coherent whole that another native speaker will understand what we are saying. I suspect that the initial babbling of infants offers a clue of the language faculty growing to maturity.

But your point is worth contemplating.

I'll be sure to look at the articles later, thanks for sharing.

Hmm. I've been mixing my replies to and . My apologies. But why stop now?

I'm wondering if analyticity is required for a generative grammer? — Moliere

I'm not seeing it. Indeed, i find it hard to understand what an analytic statement would be like in an I-language... as

if you introspect into what happening in your head right now, you don't get coherent sentences — Manuel

...then how could you get an analytic sentence...?

I don't see how an I-language works.

Each space is the result of a Performative Act, first by Euclid, then by Riemann and then by RussellA. — RussellA

Sure. But the point remains the not all analytic statements are acts of naming.

But further, when do you, or I, participate in such a formal act of naming? Apart from baptisms and boat launchings, it's not something we commonly do.

Frankly I don't think you've quite got the depth and breadth of Quine's criticism of analyticity. But I do think what you have written here is very good material. Indeed, it is very similar to a short thesis I wrote long ago, mistakenly trying to protect Searle from Kripke.

…it's not the development of a concept but the interaction with the world that counts…. And so more generally for… concepts [other than counting]. They are better thought of not as things but of acts. And I take it that this is what underpins "Don't look to meaning, but to use". Hence,
[as he said] “Understanding that concept is just being able to do that stuff. Including talking.”
— Banno — Banno

I agree that a concept (in Wittgenstein’s sense) is better imagined as an accomplishment (an act of its kind) and not an idea (mental, owned process), and so thinking, knowing, intending, are more like pointing, apologizing, and counting—we judge them based on the criteria that matters to us about them, “that count” as Banno says.

I would make clear that the end to grab onto is not thus that “we” then are “actors” (as a universal or even general rule). We are not now to simply shift to the picture that we control or do these acts or practices. This is not the same game just with a different explanation—the jig is up. We do not “use” words as a different explanation than that we “mean” them (not even in moving from picturing that we express a meaning we have inside us). This casual or individuated explanation still relies on a process (internal or external) that remains the mystery that we imagine we simply need to understand to be certain about communication. (Wittgenstein is merely saying that if you want to know what “I know” means here, look at which of the finite number of versions, or “senses”—a better word he employs than the easily misunderstood “use”—of that word is happening in this context. For example: of the different possibilities of “use”, his, in the PI, is the version of “use” as in “which sense”, which version in the conceptual category. Whew.)

So the picture is not that we are, somehow: intending, thinking, talking, etc. The point is that judging whether these have occurred is not a matter of knowing a brain process or language structure, but: differentiating what is deemed “a thought” from merely quoting, or speaking in platitudes; and intention is what we ask you about when you do something weird; and talking is different than shouting or singing. ALL the rest of it [okay, most of all the rest] is based on the desire to create a problem to fix so we can be sure about us squirrelly humans—Forms, quaila, analytic, factual, real, innate, etc. (or we want to bar ourselves from the possibility of fixing anything).

when we vocalize, we put together these [internal word] fragments into a coherent whole that another native speaker will understand what we are saying. I suspect that the initial babbling of infants offers a clue of the language faculty growing to maturity. — Manuel

We rarely “put together” most of what comes to us unless we are on a first date or creating a speech, much less can use that as a universal description. (The desire though is that we could control what we mean by what we say, even more than we “always” put it together.) The hoped-for picture here is that there is something (thought, meaning, intention, etc.) that we convey or at least that goes into language (or in this instance is in language systematically). However, for example, when Wittgenstein talks about “expression”, it is to point to the moment at which we are responsible for what we have said—speaking “externally” to this extent only; not to infer it is from something internal. We can also say we speak in expressions; that our words are judged (have importance, are meaningful) by the criteria for threatening, entreating, explaining, describing, etc. But it is not some “we” that do these or cause them to happen. As I have said in my last post, you are individually responsible for what you say, but it is not otherwise special in your having said it.

Chomsky's, supposition seems to be that since most of our language use is the little voice in your head, then the source and prime example of language use must be that little voice. But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language? — Banno

More than that maybe even. Is talking to yourself “necessary”? Don’t we sometimes want to not listen to ourselves? Despite our internal ramblings, or, more likely, in giving them too much attention, don’t we nevertheless speak thoughtlessly?

We rarely “put together” most of what comes to us unless we are on a first date or creating a speech, much less can use that as a universal description. (The desire though is that we could control what we mean by what we say, even more than we “always” put it together.) The hoped-for picture here is that there is something (thought, meaning, intention, etc.) that we convey or at least that goes into language (or in this instance is in language systematically). However, for example, when Wittgenstein talks about “expression”, it is to point to the moment at which we are responsible for what we have said—speaking “externally” to this extent only; not to infer it is from something internal. We can also say we speak in expressions; that our words are judged (have importance, are meaningful) by the criteria for threatening, entreating, explaining, describing, etc. But it is not some “we” that do these or cause them to happen. As I have said in my last post, you are individually responsible for what you say, but it is not otherwise special in your having said it. — Antony Nickles

Sure, if you want to be more precise, you can say that we put together what comes to us when we externalize to others what we say, or when we are attempting to get the other person to see what we are trying to say, as I am doing know, replying to what you said.

The rest of it, is pretty much fragmentary and not put together, that's my experience of it anyway.

As for the Wittgenstein comments, I'd phrase it differently. We are responsible for what we say... ok, fine and fair enough. In a sense, we don't take ourselves to be inferring something internal in ordinary conversation.

But I think that the fact of the matter, is that I attempt to tell you what I have in mind, to the extent that when I am saying something, hopefully you will get to see what I say, from my point of view.

That's an ideal of course, we don't reach it, but that's how I understand communication through language.

I don't quite follow what you are trying to say: "But it is not some "we" that do these..."

Yes, I agree, I am responsible for what I say, but what about it is not special?

Woe, heavy. Might need a few cones to work on this.

The hoped-for picture here is that there is something (thought, meaning, intention, etc.) that we convey or at least that goes into language (or in this instance is in language systematically). — Antony Nickles

yeah, and that's not quite right, since there isn't always a "what goes in" prior to putting the words together. Tolkien said the story grew in the telling, Banno says the sentence grows in the saying. It's not always there beforehand.

Which is what is wrong with the picture of language as externalising something that is already there on the inside... It sometimes isn't there until it is said.

It's not always there beforehand. — Banno

Yes, and what we want to be there is in order for us to avoid our having to stand there ourselves (afterwards); to be responsible for the implications of what we said, to answer for being intelligible further, to be held against our own words. Cavell does a reading of Emerson’s essay Fate as a discussion of freewill, and I think it’s there where he has one picture the occurrence of starting a sentence and then realizing that, there, then (in that situation), there is only one way to finish it, of it being out of our control even when we are conscious and careful and choosing our words. I’m a twin, and people ask if we finish each others sentences, but what is happening is that I am starting a sentence that doesn’t need to be finished, by anyone. You “know what the other person is thinking” a lot of the time, it’s just rude to interrupt.

Sure, if you want to be more precise, you can say that we put together what comes to us when we externalize to others what we say, or when we are attempting to get the other person to see what we are trying to say, as I am doing know, replying to what you said. — Manuel

This is a more precise description of the same picture I’m saying is only an occurrence (that we decide what to say), not a universal generalization that can explain or figure out “language use”; I’m saying there is no “answer”. Most of the time nothing definite “comes to us”; we, as with your examples, just want to apologize, or you want to convince me, or I have to say something polite, or we are responding, in situations where we can’t know how it will turn out—so we turn it into something we can control; but we don’t “have in mind” what we say; there’s nothing that specific or unique about us. Communication is much more slipshod and vague and prone to failure than imagining something definite in you, or that happens in some definite way, instead of as many ways as there are things to do with words. I’m saying that the desire for that certainty, that systematizing, that general explanation, is a wish to avoid cleaning up our own mess, or wanting to ensure what “we mean” beforehand, but that desire creates the goose-chase after a solution.

Again, the desire to have all of language work like the very limited process of naming objects—to imagine all words referring to an object, even “meaning” or something “real”—is because we want logical necessity and predictability. — Antony Nickles

Both aspects are necessary in language.

On the one hand, we need predictability, otherwise, if you said to me "the grass is greener on the other side of the hill", and I take "grass" to mean "a large, long-necked ungulate mammal of arid country", our conversation will quickly break down. In order to establish a minimum level of agreement, reference to a dictionary will be necessary. We can then both agree that "grass" is "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop"

On the other hand, no two people's understanding of "grass" will be the same, as no two people will have had the same life experiences. For example, the concept of grass to a South African taxi driver will be very different to that of an Icelandic doctor.

Communication using language, in order to work, must be founded on basic and agreed definitions of concepts, but consideration must also be taken into account that no two people's concepts of the same word will be exactly the same.

Seeing as how the man himself is to honour us, it may be time I came to grips with this issue. — Banno

:100: Definately a worthwhile and invaluable thread.

Sure. But the point remains that not all analytic statements are acts of naming. — Banno

As the question in the OP was "If I were to ask Chomsky a question, it would be "Are there analytic statements?", does this mean that on our side we agree that there are.

But further, when do you, or I, participate in such a formal act of naming? Apart from baptisms and boat launchings, it's not something we commonly do. — Banno

True, I have never launched a boat or baptised a child, as these are things done by others having more authority than me.

But the question remains, who has determined that "triangles have three sides", and why should we accept what they say.

Presumably, it can only be because an Institution or group of people have determined that this is the case, and it would be foolhardy for me as an individual to go against forces over which I have little power.

I may never have baptised the meaning of a word, but it is only sensible to accept the meaning of a word as baptised by those more powerful than me who have come before.