You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there — schopenhauer1

Chomsky sensibly believes that a basic range of concepts are innately represented in the human mind, because, after all, life has been evolving on Earth for about 3.7 billion years.

I would agree about some primitive concepts are innate, such as the colour red.
(1) The first one is to say that most of our concepts are definitions which are defined in terms of primitive concepts. The primitive concepts are either defined as sensory primitives such as RED, SQUARE etc., or as abstract concepts such as CAUSATION, AGENCY, and EVENT etc.

But Chomsky goes too far in arguing that some complex concepts are also innate, such as carburettor
(1) It is of course possible that Chomsky is correct that children are born with innate concepts such as: CARBURETTOR, TREE, BUREAUCRAT, RIVER, etc.; however an incredible amount of evidence is needed to support such an incredible claim.

I will take the opportunity to argue again that the statement "bachelors are unmarried men " is analytic.

Philosophers often use definitions to explain analyticity
(2) Quine suggests that one might, as is often done, appeal to definitions to explain the notion of synonymy. For instance, we might say that “bachelor” is the definition of an “unmarried man,” and thus, synonymy turns on definitions.

Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction in large part because of the problem of substituting synonyms for synonyms
(2) However, Quine attests, in order to define “bachelor” as unmarried, the definer must possess some notion of synonymy to begin with. In fact, Quine writes, the only kind of definition that does not presuppose the notion of synonymy, is the act of ascribing an abbreviation purely conventionally. For instance, let’s say that I create a new word, ‘Archon.’ I can arbitrarily say that its abbreviation is “Ba2.” In the course of doing so, I did not have to presuppose that these two notions are “synonymous;” I merely abbreviated ‘Archon’ by convention, by stipulation. However, when I normally attempt to define a notion, for example, “bachelor,” I must think to myself something like, “Well, what does it mean to be a bachelor, particularly, what words have the same meaning as the word ‘bachelor?’” that is, what meanings are synonymous with the meaning of the word ‘bachelor?’ And thus, Quine complains: “would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible [as those created purely by convention]. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it” (Quine, 1980: 26).

Quine fails to understand the function of a definition.

It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by @Banno here.

For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.

The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus.

As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".

1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".

1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction — RussellA

Nice article that lays out the ideas well!

It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by Banno here.

For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.

The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus. — RussellA

Or if Fodor is correct, we utilize some sort of epistemic a priori mechanism that isn't fully formed definitional concepts. Chomsky tacitly seems to agree with the more extreme view that each concept is innately definitional in various ways (which the article seems to disprove pretty easily) by way of intuition of concepts or by way of syntactic construction.

As a side note, I always thought Hume's constant conjunction was itself a psychological mechanism that he simply wrongly did not recognize as such. As even learning the habit of inferencing (even if not "actually" inferencing as some innate mechanism) is a psychological mechanism, is it not? Yes it may not be necessary in what is observed but it is necessary on our reasoning (pace Kant). Clearly it could be the case these habits are false, but then why can we discuss and use them at all? There does seem to be a non-cultural element to it. That itself needs to be verified or falsified.

I think actually this simply goes back to what I was saying here:

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction.

Triangles are abstractions.
Bachelors are abstractions.

Triangles are abstractions of observations, found in both nature and human-made instances.
Bachelorhood is only found in human-made instances (or conventions if you like) but are nevertheless abstractions.

Both are derived from some initial observation and passed on as definitions. — schopenhauer1

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction. — schopenhauer1

There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.

There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.

I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.

Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language

The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.

In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions

I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions

Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind.

The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language.

I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept. More charitably, because I don't think mentalese makes sense ultimately, I'd say an I-language is public, in principle. Something like neural nets comes to mind, but instead of machine learning it's whatever our learning is that sits in analogue to neural nets. Perhaps different E-langauges have different I-languages, but the I-language would be formed from our social environment as we learn our first language so just by virtue of sharing an E-language an I-language could not be private in the public/private Witti sense. I just wanted to flesh that out a little more rather than assuming it.

Even then, I think I'm taking back some of what I thought before. If the language is public then it is subject to revision and then analytic statements will only be known in a post hoc manner (I am usually skeptical of a priori knowledge). We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity (which really only goes against attempting to define analyticity according to formal characteristics*)

*Defining it formally with E-languages at least. But I'd include logic as within the E-language category.

I often wonder about the relation between machine-learning and human learning. I don't think it's clear what the token of meaning is in terms of an I-language. Neural nets are a model of neurons, but no one knows that human-learning happens at the level of neurons -- it's just a thing we can measure and we make guesses about it. But it could be something else that we haven't been able to measure yet. Say proteins, or codons, or base pairs, or ratios between those -- they could potentially be an I-language in the sense that it's measurable and makes sense of at least a generative grammar.

*Defining it formally with E-languages at least. But I'd include logic as within the E-language category. — Moliere

This element is what confuses me trying to sort out what is 'innate' versus an imposed condition. Are all environmental factors to be dubbed 'structural' factors in contradistinction to what happens in an individual?

I don't get the either/or here. Cognitive psychology has plenty of theoretical claims that differ from the 'taxonomy' Chomsky has objected to throughout his career.

There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.

There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.

I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.

Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language

The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.

In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions

I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions

Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind. — RussellA

Nice, really nice synthesis here! So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? As I said earlier:

As a side note, I always thought Hume's constant conjunction was itself a psychological mechanism that he simply wrongly did not recognize as such. As even learning the habit of inferencing (even if not "actually" inferencing as some innate mechanism) is a psychological mechanism, is it not? Yes it may not be necessary in what is observed but it is necessary on our reasoning (pace Kant). Clearly it could be the case these habits are false, but then why can we discuss and use them at all? There does seem to be a non-cultural element to it. That itself needs to be verified or falsified. — schopenhauer1

The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language. — RussellA

The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp. It is a cooperative learning phenomenon. No cooperative learning, no language. But, I am not sure how much he does actually agree that there is some sort of mechanism in the brain devoted to grammar. I'd have to look up more of his debates and articles. Based on what I have seen, I don't think he does really.

So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? — schopenhauer1

For me, the mechanism linking concepts in the mind and language in the world can be explained by Hume's principle of the constant conjunction of events, illustrated here, in Kant's terms, a posteriori. But the mind's ability to perceive patterns in the world, to perceive the constant conjunction of events is innate, a product of 3.7 billion years of life' e evolution within the world, in Kant's terms, a priori.

I'm not sure that Hume would have denied the innate. He writes in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

I would assume Hume takes certain abilities as innate natural instincts, such as hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, desiring and willing. It would follow that rather than learning the instinct of loving and hating from the world, we project our instincts of loving and hating onto the world.

The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp — schopenhauer1

It comes down to the debate between Chomsky, who argued that language is founded on innate concepts biologically pre-set and the Behaviourists, such as Skinner, who argued that that all language is learnt during one's interaction with the environment.

There seems to be a link between Tomasello and Hume in that humans have an ability to recognize patterns.

Tomasello argued:
The essence of language is its symbolic dimension which rests on the uniquely human ability to comprehend intention. Grammar emerges as the speakers of a language create linguistic constructions out of recurring sequences of symbols. Children pick up these patterns in the buzz of words they hear around them.

Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept........I'd say an I-language is public, in principle.................but the I-language would be formed from our social environment. — Moliere

If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.

But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.

As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence.

We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity — Moliere

True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.

But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".

Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B".

If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.

But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.

As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence. — RussellA

It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy -- conceptually rendered it's nothing like a neural net, for instance.

Starting to think that the speculation of multiplicity is off topic, though. The reason I thought I-languages might be interpreted analytically is because neural nets are, at base, a bundle of computations. Suggesting something like analyticity in a mathematical sense, at least -- in the sense of there being a sequence or an order of some kind which eventually sets up some kind of relationship to full-blown symbolic meaning.

What it seems we'd agree upon is that I-languages are not spoken like normal languages (which actually speaks to why I tend to deny mentalese -- it's like a homuncular fallacy for meaning). I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. Or, at least, while I-language remains unclear it follows that E-languages are a clearer category for including things we can make sense of.

True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.

But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".

Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B". — RussellA

This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically.

It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge.

It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy..............I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. — Moliere

There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.

There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.

Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind.

This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically. It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge. — Moliere

Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.

Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge.

It comes down to the debate between Chomsky, who argued that language is founded on innate concepts biologically pre-set and the Behaviourists, such as Skinner, who argued that that all language is learnt during one's interaction with the environment. — RussellA

The relationship between the learner and the environment can mean very different things. In the Skinner model, stimulus is always on one side and response the other side of events. For Vygotsky, for example, there is a dynamic where the stimulus becomes modified by changes in the learner:

The acquisition of language can provide a paradigm for the entire problem of the relation between learning and development. Language arises initially as a means of communication between the child and the people in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion to internal speech, does it come to organize the child's thought, that is, become an internal mental function. Piaget and others have shown that reasoning occurs in a children's group as an argument intended to prove one's own point of view before it occurs as an internal activity whose distinctive feature is that the child begins to perceive and check the basis of his thoughts. Such observation prompted Piaget to conclude that communication produces the need for checking and confirming thoughts, a process that is characteristic of adult thought. In the same way that internal speech and reflective thought arise from the interactions between the child and persons in her environment, these interactions provide the source of development of a child's voluntary behavior. Piaget has shown that cooperation provides the basis for the development of a child's moral judgement. Earlier research established that a child first becomes able to subordinate her behavior to rules in group play and only later does voluntary self-regulation of behavior arise as an internal function.

These individual examples illustrate a general developmental law for the higher mental functions that we feel can be applied in its entirety to children's learning processes. We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal development processes that are able to only operate when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the child's independent developmental achievement.

From this point of view, learning is not development; however, properly organized learning results in mental development and sets in motion a variety of developmental processes that would be impossible apart from learning. Thus, learning is a necessary and universal aspect of the process of developing culturally organized, specifically human, psychological functions. — Vygotsky, Mind in Society, page 90

This approach does not cancel the domain of the 'innate' but neither does it make it a realm where 'e-language' can be clearly separated from 'I-language'.

Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.

Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge. — RussellA

Cool.

So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres.

Unbrimbled when one removes a brimb from one who has been brimbled, and Tembre's being the Brimbled Brambles.

There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.

There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.

Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind. — RussellA

Heh, the whole reason I liked "I-language" was because I thought it side-stepped the whole mind thing :D.

Where do concepts exist? I'm not sure. Or if it's even quite right to say they exist, or if this is a reification.

Less archaically though -- We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. I'm guessing that we roughly agree that analyticity is when a concept either "contains" another concept or somehow necessitates it or, maybe in the weakest sense if analytic/synthetic are exclusive categories, analytic statements are those which are not synthetic.

The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.

Where do concepts exist? I'm not sure. Or if it's even quite right to say they exist, or if this is a reification. — Moliere

Yep. The argument seems to be that we need a place for concepts, hence the I-language.

So it's based on a misguided spacial notion of "concepts".

I would assume Hume takes certain abilities as innate natural instincts, such as hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, desiring and willing. It would follow that rather than learning the instinct of loving and hating from the world, we project our instincts of loving and hating onto the world. — RussellA

Ah, Hume is more Kantian at second glance here.

Hume's argument was that concepts like causation are not inherent in the world but rather are products of our thought patterns or "habits of thought." However, if Hume's philosophy relies so heavily on a priori reasoning, why did Kant feel the need to refute him? Kant disagreed with Hume's claim that all knowledge comes solely from sensory experience and the constant connection between these experiences. However, it should be noted that Hume's theory essentially describes the process of inference, which relies on a mechanism within the brain. This indicates that some sort of innate mechanism is necessary for his theory, though it may be less modular than the theories of Kant and Chomsky. Nonetheless, the exact nature of this mechanism remains unclear.

The relationship between the learner and the environment can mean very different things. In the Skinner model, stimulus is always on one side and response the other side of events. For Vygotsky, for example, there is a dynamic where the stimulus becomes modified by changes in the learner....................This approach does not cancel the domain of the 'innate' but neither does it make it a realm where 'e-language' can be clearly separated from 'I-language'. — Paine

I agree, sentient life must evolve through interaction with the world in which it exists, which is why it has taken 3.7 billion years for life to have evolved to its current form.

From the Wikipedia article Enactivism
Sriramen argues that Enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being."[66] and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky.[66]

The I-language cannot be separated from the E-language, in the same way that the subject of a painting cannot be separated from the colours and shapes of the paint used in the painting, yet both fulfil different functions.

We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. — Moliere

This answers the OP, "Are there analytic statements?"

So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres................................The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.. — Moliere

Yes, the E-language can be grammatical without making sense.

One advantage of the I-language is that every thought about a concept makes sense, in that meaning within an I-language is self-referential. IE, it is not possible to have a thought about a concept without that thought making sense, having meaning. If I think about the concept triangle, the thought is its own meaning. Unlike the E-language, it isn't necessary to go outside the I-language to find meaning.

The meaning of my concept of pain is the pain itself. As Searle wrote:
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

The SEP article Concepts wrote that "Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts". The Wikipedia article Concepts wrote "Concepts are defined as abstract ideas. They are understood to be the fundamental building blocks underlying principles, thoughts and beliefs". As the dictionary explains thoughts as occurring in the mind, concepts must also also occur in the mind.

As with many words in language, such as evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc, the word "concept" should also be thought of as a ,metaphor, not something that has a literal physical existence.

In an E-language, meaning is extralinguistic, whereas in an I-language, meaning is the I-language itself.

Hume's argument was that concepts like causation are not inherent in the world but rather are products of our thought patterns or "habits of thought." However, if Hume's philosophy relies so heavily on a priori reasoning, why did Kant feel the need to refute him? — schopenhauer1

Hume is a realist about causation, in that although he believes that causation is real in the world it is unknowable. He rejects the idea that we directly know that events in the world are necessarily conjoined, as this would require a priori knowledge, but he does accept that we indirectly know about causation from the observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances.

Kant on the other hand, is also a Realist, but argued that a genuine necessary connection between events is required for their objective succession in time, and using his revolutionary conception of synthetic a priori judgments, rescues the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding.

So yes, Hume rejected an a priori explanation for causation whilst Kant didn't.

But this raises the question, when patterns are observed in the world, how is the mind able to see these patterns. Is the mind's ability to see patterns innate a priori or learnt from the patterns themselves. Who is right, Chomsky's Innatism or Skinner's Empiricism.

Empiricism is a problem of circularity. If I have no innate rules, and I can only learn the rules from what I observe, then, as the Tortoise could have said to Achilles, where is the rule that tells me when I have discovered a rule. Empiricism proposes that there is something in the rule that I observe that tells me this is the rule that has to be followed, but where is the rule that tells me I have to follow it.

Kant expressed the problem of being able to gain all knowledge from observation in B5 of Critique of Pure Reason
Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus establish it a priori. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent?; a hence one could hardly allow these to count as first principles.

It is true that Hume argues we can only indirectly observe causation, and as such is not a priori, but it is also true that he does write about instinct, which is innate and a priori, as being more powerful than thought and understanding. It is perhaps this innate and a priori instinct that allows the mind to observe causation in the first place.

Hume in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat, snow and cold—have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

On the one hand, Hume argues that we only know causation from observation and not, as Kant argues, a priori, but on the other hand Hume many times refers to instinct, which is innate and a priori, and it is perhaps this innate a priori instinct that allows us to see patterns in our observations in the first place.

This answers the OP, "Are there analytic statements?" — RussellA

I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention.

You can eat your cake and keep it?

Some statements are analytic, but only by convention? Wouldn't we thereby lose any advantage to their being analytic, since someone who disagrees with the convention need not be bound by it?

I cannot eat my cake and keep it, and that's not an analytic feature of language.

Yes -- analytic statements lose all their advantages in my interpretation of them. At least for anyone who wants them to be anything more than a convention. I think my interpretation acknowledges why I can understand others who claim P is an analytic statement, and deflates the reason why it is. (I was tempted to go into 7 + 5 = 12 -- but it just seemed too off topic)

So we have that all unmarried men are men. We can put this in a simple deduction. But we don't get to all bachelors are men without relying on convention?

If we take the answer to the above as "yes", we seem to be left with making a fairly arbitrary distinction. Sure, all unmarried men are all of them men, but, by way of a counter instance with the same structure, are all ungrammatical sentences, sentences? If a string of words are not grammatical, then they presumably do not form a sentence...

So "all ungrammatical sentences are sentences" is not obviously analytic, despite the similarity in structure to "all unmarried men are all of them men"; and that we can see this seems in some way to be dependent on some sort of play on words; perhaps even on a convention.

Perhaps we ought be more sympathetic to Quine's suggestions, and think that "all unmarried men are all of them men" also relies to some extent on convention.

And the curious thing about convention is that it requires communality of intent. That's how it differs from mere habit.

Which is anathema to supposed I-language.

So the workings of analyticity exposed here appear incompatible with I-language.

I will take the opportunity to argue again that the statement "bachelors are unmarried men " is analytic. — RussellA

Not to be pedantic, but does an unmarried man in a de facto relationship count as a bachelor, or must a bachelor live alone? Then what counts as living alone? What if his partner spends two days and nights a week in his dwelling? Three? Four?

Not to be pedantic, but does an unmarried man in a de facto relationship count as a bachelor, or must a bachelor live alone? — Janus

It depends on the definition of "marriage"

According to Merriam Webster, "A bachelor is an unmarried man".

But Merriam Webster goes on to say that the definition of "marriage" is changing:
The definition of the word marriage—or, more accurately, the understanding of what the institution of marriage properly consists of—continues to be highly controversial. This is not an issue to be resolved by dictionaries. Ultimately, the controversy involves cultural traditions, religious beliefs, legal rulings, and ideas about fairness and basic human rights.

In the past, "unmarried man" was defined as "a man who has not taken part in a contractual relationship with a woman recognised by the law". By this definition, an "unmarried man" includes a man living in a relationship with another person. Therefore, a bachelor may or may not be a man living in a relationship with another person.

Today, "unmarried man" may be defined as "a man who is not living in a relationship with another person". Therefore, a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person.

The definition " a bachelor is an unmarried man" hasn't changed, but whether a bachelor, being a man, is or isn't living in a partnership with another person has changed.

I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention. — Moliere

The SEP article The analytic/synthetic distinction writes:
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

As regards the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", it is not possible to know whether it is analytic or synthetic until first knowing the meanings of the words used, in the same way that it is not possible to know whether the statement "moja ndio si ndoa mwanadamu" is analytic or synthetic until knowing the meanings of the words used.

Therefore, the first task is to know what the words mean.

You are right that naming is by convention. The set of words "man" and "unmarried" has been named "bachelor", though the set could equally well have been named "giraffe", "mountain" or "sawdust".

Therefore, even before trying to determine whether the statement "bachelors are unmarried men" is analytic or synthetic, we know that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named by convention "bachelor".

So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Hence the dog might understand that it's master will take it for a walk, but not that its master will take it for a walk next Tuesday. — Banno

I just saw this. Yes agree, compositionality (merge). But it brings up an interesting understanding of differences of concepts based not just on syntactic merging of novel complex phrases, but the very ability to abstract. The term "Tuesday" for example is full of abstractions of various types.

Measurement and Counting and Pattern-Recognition: The 7 day week comes from the Babylonians dividing the month up from 28 days of the lunar cycle into 4 parts. The Romans renamed the days after their gods. The Germanic tribes like the Angles and Saxons took the Roman gods overlayed their own gods on top. For example, "Tiu" is their god of war, which corresponded with the Roman "Mars" (Martes still retains this in Spanish and Romance languages for example).

Ordinality: That there is something first, second, third, etc. Tuesday is the third day of the 7 day week.

Pragmatics: It is used to indicate a whole host of things. Not only what is happening on those days in a particular time, space, for particular people, but that it often indicates subtler cultural markers such as being associated with a workday as opposed to a non-work day (in general cases).

Images: The word Tuesday, the memory of an event of Tuesday, a color, person, image of something associated with the day, the embeddedness with other concepts like Monday, week, future, past.

Displacement of Time: That there is a present, future, and a past where this day may fall.



All these things and more are in place in humans and not animals.

I see a main argument here between the empiricists and nativists.

Nativists: There are epistemological tools in the brain that allow for separate modules like "measuring/counting/ordinality".

Empiricists: This is all based on general learning. But what does this mean? This too relies on a brain mechanism (things such as working, episodic, and long term memory, long-term potentiation, etc.). So where is this dividing line?

Is it really a dividing line between computationalism and connectionism in modern day parlance?

Anyways, going back to the dog and Tuesday, it is more than compositionality, these mental abilities (I just called it "abstraction" but that can be a misplacement of a more specific concept) that make it so complex. If I-language only refers to basically syntax (merge/compositionality) and not semantics, then indeed this would not have much to inform analyticity.

@RusselA you may be interested.

If I-language only refers to basically syntax (merge/compositionality) and not semantics, then indeed this would not have much to inform analyticity. — schopenhauer1

Chomsky said concepts wouldn't exist without an I-language, so, the semantic part of an I-language are its concepts.

Primitive innate concepts such as the colour red is one thing, but Chomsky weirdly argued for more complex innate concepts such as carburettors, Knowing that a carburettor is a device for mixing air and fuel means knowing the analytic fact that a carburettor is a device.