You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there — schopenhauer1
As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".
1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction — RussellA
It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by Banno here.
For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.
The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus. — RussellA
Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction.
Triangles are abstractions.
Bachelors are abstractions.
Triangles are abstractions of observations, found in both nature and human-made instances.
Bachelorhood is only found in human-made instances (or conventions if you like) but are nevertheless abstractions.
Both are derived from some initial observation and passed on as definitions. — schopenhauer1
Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction. — schopenhauer1
*Defining it formally with E-languages at least. But I'd include logic as within the E-language category. — Moliere
There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.
There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.
I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.
Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language
The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.
In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions
I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions
Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind. — RussellA
As a side note, I always thought Hume's constant conjunction was itself a psychological mechanism that he simply wrongly did not recognize as such. As even learning the habit of inferencing (even if not "actually" inferencing as some innate mechanism) is a psychological mechanism, is it not? Yes it may not be necessary in what is observed but it is necessary on our reasoning (pace Kant). Clearly it could be the case these habits are false, but then why can we discuss and use them at all? There does seem to be a non-cultural element to it. That itself needs to be verified or falsified. — schopenhauer1
The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language. — RussellA
So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? — schopenhauer1
The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp — schopenhauer1
I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept........I'd say an I-language is public, in principle.................but the I-language would be formed from our social environment. — Moliere
We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity — Moliere
If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.
But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.
As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence. — RussellA
True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.
But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".
Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B". — RussellA
It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy..............I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. — Moliere
This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically. It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge. — Moliere
It comes down to the debate between Chomsky, who argued that language is founded on innate concepts biologically pre-set and the Behaviourists, such as Skinner, who argued that that all language is learnt during one's interaction with the environment. — RussellA
The acquisition of language can provide a paradigm for the entire problem of the relation between learning and development. Language arises initially as a means of communication between the child and the people in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion to internal speech, does it come to organize the child's thought, that is, become an internal mental function. Piaget and others have shown that reasoning occurs in a children's group as an argument intended to prove one's own point of view before it occurs as an internal activity whose distinctive feature is that the child begins to perceive and check the basis of his thoughts. Such observation prompted Piaget to conclude that communication produces the need for checking and confirming thoughts, a process that is characteristic of adult thought. In the same way that internal speech and reflective thought arise from the interactions between the child and persons in her environment, these interactions provide the source of development of a child's voluntary behavior. Piaget has shown that cooperation provides the basis for the development of a child's moral judgement. Earlier research established that a child first becomes able to subordinate her behavior to rules in group play and only later does voluntary self-regulation of behavior arise as an internal function.
These individual examples illustrate a general developmental law for the higher mental functions that we feel can be applied in its entirety to children's learning processes. We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal development processes that are able to only operate when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the child's independent developmental achievement.
From this point of view, learning is not development; however, properly organized learning results in mental development and sets in motion a variety of developmental processes that would be impossible apart from learning. Thus, learning is a necessary and universal aspect of the process of developing culturally organized, specifically human, psychological functions. — Vygotsky, Mind in Society, page 90
Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.
Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge. — RussellA
There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.
There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.
Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind. — RussellA
I would assume Hume takes certain abilities as innate natural instincts, such as hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, desiring and willing. It would follow that rather than learning the instinct of loving and hating from the world, we project our instincts of loving and hating onto the world. — RussellA
The relationship between the learner and the environment can mean very different things. In the Skinner model, stimulus is always on one side and response the other side of events. For Vygotsky, for example, there is a dynamic where the stimulus becomes modified by changes in the learner....................This approach does not cancel the domain of the 'innate' but neither does it make it a realm where 'e-language' can be clearly separated from 'I-language'. — Paine
We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. — Moliere
So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres................................The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.. — Moliere
Hume's argument was that concepts like causation are not inherent in the world but rather are products of our thought patterns or "habits of thought." However, if Hume's philosophy relies so heavily on a priori reasoning, why did Kant feel the need to refute him? — schopenhauer1
I will take the opportunity to argue again that the statement "bachelors are unmarried men " is analytic. — RussellA
Not to be pedantic, but does an unmarried man in a de facto relationship count as a bachelor, or must a bachelor live alone? — Janus
I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention. — Moliere
Hence the dog might understand that it's master will take it for a walk, but not that its master will take it for a walk next Tuesday. — Banno
If I-language only refers to basically syntax (merge/compositionality) and not semantics, then indeed this would not have much to inform analyticity. — schopenhauer1
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