Your conclusion has a certain paradoxical appeal. I agree that sometimes we draw the wrong conclusions from what our senses tell us (that's a bit over-simplified, but it will do for now); but surely we sometimes get it right. Similarly, reality is partially intelligible to us and partly not, and we work hard to understand the latter part. You seem very fond of comprehensive statements, but the truth is more mundane than that. For example, you say:- — Ludwig V

i see things in the opposite way to this. You say the truth is mundane. I believe that the truth is not mundane at all, and is way more complicated than any of us can possibly imagine. Quantum physics gives us the tip of this iceberg of complexity. I think our bodily systems greatly simplify a very complex reality, so that we sense extremely complex things as very simple. We've evolved this way, we must start from the bottom up in our understanding as evolving beings, so things must be put into the most simple form possible, to begin our understanding.

Look, we see the sun as rising and setting, when logic tells us the earth is really spinning. There's also supposed to be some sort of spinning motion with electrons around atoms. Do you think that living beings are incapable of 'feeling' that the planet they are on is spinning? Or, do you think it's more likely that all these spinning motions that logic tells us are occurring around us, and within us, are completely compensated for within the living system, to give us a seemingly stable position from which to observe? I think all these complex motions are hidden from the conscious mind, not sensed, because the senses have evolved so as to hide all these complexities from us because they are just too difficult. All that our senses bring to our conscious minds are some very simplistic motions, to begin us on our task of understanding.

And I say "Don't we also say things like "between t1 and t2 this process was going on?" — Ludwig V

Sure, but think about how we describe and understand processes, it always comes down to a matter of one state changing to another. We can name a process, even provide a brief description of it, but what really provides meaning and understanding is how the process takes us from A to B. A is the cause, B is the effect. This is why the truth about the passage of time is not mundane at all, it's actually very complex. We like to think of it as mundane, because this facilitates 'the simple life". In reality life is not simple, so all we're doing with this type of notion is facilitating the deception.

In reality life is not simple, so all we're doing with this type of notion is facilitating the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "this type of notion". But I am sure that the senses do not systematically deceive us. I'm also sure that simplicity is not an option, but a necessity. When someone throws a ball at us, we cannot apply Newtonian mechanics to work out how to catch it. The fact that we can catch it in the time available is amazing; but we can only do it by simplifying. Equally, to do the washing up, we need to know that hot water and detergent will help us to do this; if we had to consider the molecular interactions involved, we would starve before we had clean plates. If we had senses that perceived everything that's going on at the level of electrons, we would be unable to grasp the bigger picture that we need. It's not about deception; it's about pragmatics.

Look, we see the sun as rising and setting, when logic tells us the earth is really spinning. . . . Do you think that living beings are incapable of 'feeling' that the planet they are on is spinning? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a classic example of what I mean. There's a story - I don't know if it's true - that someone observed to Wittgenstein that it is easy to understand why the ancients thought that the sun goes round the earth, because that's the way it looks. To which Wittgenstein replied "How would it look if it looked as if the earth was spinning?" The answer is, exactly the same. There's no deception, just a misinterpretation, based on the assumption that we are not moving. We make that assumption all the time, except when we know we are moving. In this case, there's no easily available perception that would bring it into question, so we interpret our perceptions in that way. Eventually, having paid attention to other perceptions, we work out that the earth is spinning and interpret our perceptions accordingly. Where's the deception?

As to electrons, we are simply not equipped to perceive electrons directly. I'm cautious about pronouncing on the sub-atomic world; I don't understand the physics well enough. I am clear that our senses give us the information they are equipped to gather. By paying attention to our perceptions more closely, we work out that physical objects are very different at small scale. Our perceptions did not deceive us, any more than a normal microscope deceives us when it does not reveal electrons. We misinterpreted them, but now have a better understanding because we paid closer attention to the information they give us.

"Mundane" was perhaps a poor choice. I agree that sometimes the truth is amazing. But I also think that it is sometimes mundane.

But I am sure that the senses do not systematically deceive us. — Ludwig V

Why do you think that the sun appears to come up and go down, when this has been proven to be false? And why does it look like we see the full range of electromagnetic waves as the colours of the rainbow, when this is just a small portion? If this is not a 'systematic deception' than what is it? And how would you describe hallucination if not a form of deception?

I'm also sure that simplicity is not an option, but a necessity. — Ludwig V

That is the essence of deception, it is dome because it is deemed to be a "necessity". Plato also exposed this feature. Are you familiar with what is commonly referred to as the royal lie? Over simplification of something extremely complex, for the person's own good, is deception.

If we had senses that perceived everything that's going on at the level of electrons, we would be unable to grasp the bigger picture that we need. It's not about deception; it's about pragmatics. — Ludwig V

This is a faulty conclusion. There is nothing to prevent an intelligent mind from understanding both big picture and small picture at the same time. What is more likely the case, is that the physical sensing apparatus evolves much slower than the mind, because the brain must allow for vast possibility and rapid changes in thinking patterns, even over the lifespan of one individual. This allows the conscious mind to evolve much quicker than the physical sensing system. So the senses are suited to a less capable consciousness, which human beings had prior to the rapid advancements of the mind, in the last few thousand years. Therefore the senses are presenting very simplistic, over simplified, and underdeveloped images to the mind because the physical aspects of the human sense apparatus were developed when the mind was much less advanced, and the body cannot change fast enough to keep pace with the rapid advancements and evolution of the mind. In other words, the human body still has essentially the same physical sensing apparatus as it had thousands of years ago, but it's mental capacity has greatly advanced. Therefore the ends or purpose of the "pragmatics" you refer to, are greatly outdated, and this is analogous to continuing with a story about Santa Clause when the person is a grown adult, it's nothing but deception.

This is a classic example of what I mean. There's a story - I don't know if it's true - that someone observed to Wittgenstein that it is easy to understand why the ancients thought that the sun goes round the earth, because that's the way it looks. To which Wittgenstein replied "How would it look if it looked as if the earth was spinning?" The answer is, exactly the same. — Ludwig V

I did not use the word "look", I intentionally said "feel", to avoid this objection. Do you know what it feels like to be spun around? And when you are being spun, isn't it very obvious that the things in your field of vision are not moving around you, but you are being spun? Your example provides no bearing on the issue.

There is a reason why we have a multitude of different senses, different sense organs directed toward different aspects of the world. Each one, is in itself, by itself, very deceptive. Through comparison of what the different senses provide for us, the mind can reduce the deception. But reduction is not elimination.

As to electrons, we are simply not equipped to perceive electrons directly. I'm cautious about pronouncing on the sub-atomic world; I don't understand the physics well enough. I am clear that our senses give us the information they are equipped to gather. By paying attention to our perceptions more closely, we work out that physical objects are very different at small scale. Our perceptions did not deceive us, any more than a normal microscope deceives us when it does not reveal electrons. We misinterpreted them, but now have a better understanding because we paid closer attention to the information they give us. — Ludwig V

What you say here is a direct indication of the point I am making. There is a whole "sub-atomic" world which our senses are hiding from us. But you misrepresent, or misinterpret the actual problem. You say the senses are "not equipped" to provide us with information about this sub-atomic world. That is clearly false, because it is exactly the case that this is the type of information which the senses are providing us with. The sense of smell for instance, is providing us with information about the interaction of atoms at a molecular level, and this is exactly an interaction of electrons and sub-atomic particles. The sense of sight is providing us with information about the interaction of light (photons) with the electron structure of the various different molecules. And the sense of hearing is providing us with information about the vibrations of the massive parts of atoms.

So it is clearly the case that we are equipped to sense the activities of the sub-atomic world that's exactly what the senses do. However, the problem is that in the relation between the senses and the brain, the information provided through the sense organs is interpreted and represented by the brain, with the principal purpose of remembering, in a very basic and simplistic way. The human being's capacity for memory is very limited so this huge amount of data rolling in at an incredibly high speed must be vastly simplified. This simplification is essentially false memory, created by a very deficient memory system which requires that the sense data be overly simplified, and when the conscious mind looks at the memory as "true" it is deceived. When the conscious mind visits the memory, it is deceived into thinking that the memory is giving an accurate account which it is not. Furthermore, the conscious mind's experience of "the present" is nothing other than what the brain is submitting to memory, limited further by attention, so this is equally faulty and deceptive.

However, the conscious mind in its totality goes far beyond simple experience of the present, and memory, it has anticipations, intentions, desires, will, and judgement to deal with as well. These other aspects, intention and the desire to know, (philosophy), have led the conscious mind to a position high above what the physical body provides for it. That is why we have produced all sorts of instruments for analyzing different aspects of the world, which go far beyond the limitations of the underdeveloped physical system of the human body, like the electron microscope you mentioned. The simple fact of the matter is that the relatively primitive physical body of the human being has not been able to keep up with the rapid development of the conscious mind and its understanding. Therefore to fall back onto the observational capacities of the human body, asserting superiority and "truth" to sensation, rather than moving forward into the realm of what logic dictates, even though this may appear contradictory to sense data, is to fall for that deception.

Why do you think that the sun appears to come up and go down, when this has been proven to be false? — Metaphysician Undercover

This illustrates the depth and complexity of our disagreement. The sun does go up and down, from the point of view of the surface of the earth. It could not be otherwise. The cues that normally allow us to know when we are moving are missing, just as they are missing in an aeroplane. Or better, we are not moving in relation to our immediate surroundings, so we interpret everything from that point of view. When we identified the evidence and interpreted it correctly, we changed our belief. The situation of being spun is quite different because we are being spun in relation to our immediate surroundings.

.....moving forward into the realm of what logic dictates, even though this may appear contradictory to sense data, is to fall for that deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Senses and reason are both capable of misleading us and are our only resources for finding the truth. Junking one in favour of the other is incomprehensible to me.

I have a feeling that the conditions are not such as to provide a basis for progress in this debate. Do you?

I agree with the consequent, but I don't understand the antecedent. If the antecedent is false, then the project of understanding the world is hopeless. Or is there an alternative approach?

I'm not quite sure what you mean here? I can't prove the antecedent here. If I could, I'd be out collecting my Nobel Prize for the "theory of everything."

However, it seems at least plausible, given the successes of physics to date and all of our general experiences, that past states of affairs evolve into future states of affairs based on principles that can be defined deductively. Hence why so many theoretical physicists spend more time with equations than lab equipment, that latter of which often only comes out to test the deductive reasoning against experience.

These descriptions of reality might be fundamentally flawed. But, if they are correct, then it follows that when we think we are seeing cause, we are, in fact, seeing something very similar to our naive conception of causation. The claim that this simply can't be the case thus begs the question about causation.

Hume, at least the way I understand him and have most often seen him interpreted, isn't making an argument just about skepticism. He is saying we cannot see cause as such, because it doesn't exist. He reduces cause to constant conjunction, which is arguably a position that is eliminitivist towards causation rather than just reductive.

Hume's argument for this seems to be grounded in the understanding of the natural world at the time, which involved a set of extrinsic, unalterable laws that somehow guide the interactions of "material," objects. These interactions included action at a distance that could only be observed via the discrete objects that were being acted upon.

Hume's point makes more sense in this context. In this conception of the natural world, the laws do all the explanatory lifting and yet they can never, even in principle, be directly observed. Thus, Hume can worry that the laws might have always been the same to date, but could change at any moment.

Modern interpretations of the natural world tend to be intrinsic. Interactions are due to properties inherit in the things interacting. In this view, there is no set of unobservable laws; the "laws" are simply properties of nature we've been able to describe in a symbolic language. To paraphrase John Wheeler, if you gather together all the formulas (laws) needed for a complete physics, what do you have? A bunch of paper with equations on them.

There's an ambiguity between "follows" in the sense of "comes after" and "follows" in the sense of "is constrained by". It doesn't make any sense to me to speak of the universe being constrained by natural laws. Natural laws are what the universe does given that it is not constrained. Actually, it is neither constrained, nor not constrained; it just does what it does.

There's a similarly weakness in the idea of causation. There's an idea that a cause somehow forces its effect. But that's a category mistake.

I think you're quite right here. "Laws," is probably a bad word to use for the concept, but at this point we're sort of stuck with it.

Likewise, if causation functions similarly to entailment, then it isn't a constraint or something that forces an outcome, except in the same sense that someone's "being a New Yorker," constrains them by excluding their "not a New Yorker."

It's like how we don't generally say "2+2 causes 4," but then if we're considering how a calculator accepts inputs and produces outputs, it's totally natural to say that the inputs cause the outputs. Cause is something we think of in the context of temporal progression.

There is probably a formulation similar to Hegel's dialectical move from the opposition of "being and nothing" to "becoming" that can be done for cause, but I can't think what the right ingredients would be. Entailment + change = cause? Doesn't sound quite right to me, but the best I could think of.

Hi everyone.  This is my first post, and I thought a disclaimer would be a good idea.  I think consciousness is the most fascinating thing there is.  We are the universe waking up to itself!  (Maybe it's the very beginning of a process of one consciousness that encompasses the entire universe.  I know, I know. Lol.  But I like fantasy/sci-fi. Once the Borg get involved...)  I have a good deal of trouble reading about it, because I have no background in these things.  It gets complicated pretty quickly, and I'm soon lost.  So I have to look things up, often things I've already looked up, even multiple times.  And I try another book, hoping for an easier approach.  Which means I've read the beginnings of a lot of books.
But I keep going back, to one after another, and try to get a but further. Bit by bit, perhaps I'm getting there.

This is a pretty big thread, and I've only read the first couple pages.  But I wanted to address this post. My apologies if it's all covered later in the thread.

I'll ask you the same as I ask everyone who asks this question...

Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?"
— bert1

... What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you.

Like if I said "no one has yet answered the question of what is 567,098,098 * 45,998,087" I could clearly tell you what sort of thing I would accept as an answer - I'm expecting some big number - even though I don't know what that number is. Without that framework, I don't see how I could possibly claim that no-one's answered the question yet.

So what's the sort of thing you'd be satisfied with? If I went into my lab tomorrow, had a really good look at some brains, and came back to and said "Brain activity requires consciousness because..." What would you accept? — Isaac

I don’t think the question is: What answer will we accept?  I think the question is: What have you got?  
In What is it like to be a bat?, Nagel says:

It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.

At https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2022.767612/full, Peter D. Kitchener and Colin G. Hales say:

The approach the majority of neuroscientists take to the question of how consciousness is generated, it is probably fair to say, is to ignore it. Although there are active research programs looking at correlates of consciousness, and explorations of informational properties of what might be relevant neural ensembles, the tacitly implied mechanism of consciousness in these approaches is that it somehow just happens.

According to these two quotes, physicalist/materialist/materially reductivist (What term is currently being used?) approaches do not address consciousness, and they explain things nicely without it.  That seems like an important question to me - Why is it happening at all?  If behavior is the result of stimulus & response, even vastly complex webs of S&R, then what use is any awareness of it all, or qualia?  There are machines that can differentiate frequencies of the visible light spectrum to much greater detail than we can, and perform actions based on which frequency they are detecting at any given moment.  There can also be other criteria involved in figuring out which action to take.  

But they don't experience red, and they aren't thinking about what they're going to do.  They just do it, mechanically.  What value is our awareness of, and preferences for, certain perceptions and responses if we are going to respond to all stimulus mechanically anyway? If our awareness of and feelings about anything don't matter, then why do they exist? Why would evolution have selected them?

But none of that answers your question.  I don't know what kind of answer would be satisfactory.  I don't know that we could distinguish a good answer from a bad one.  The problem is hinted at as Peter D. Kitchener and Colin G. Hales continue:

This reliance on a “magical emergence” of consciousness does not address the “objectively unreasonable” proposition that elements that have no attributes or properties that can be said to relate to consciousness somehow aggregate to produce it.

In How to Create a Mind, Ray Kurzweil said:

Although chemistry is theoretically based on physics and could be derived entirely from physics, this would be unwieldy and infeasible in practice, so chemistry has established its own rules and models. Similarly, we should be able to deduce the laws of thermodynamics from physics, but once we have a sufficient number of particles to call them a gas rather than simply a bunch of particles, solving equations for the physics of each particle interaction becomes hopeless, whereas the laws of thermodynamics work quite well. Biology likewise has its own rules and models. A single pancreatic islet cell is enormously complicated, especially if we model it at the level of molecules; modeling what a pancreas actually does in terms of regulating levels of insulin and digestive enzymes is considerably less complex.

We understand how the properties of particles that we are aware of give rise to the macro properties.  Physical properties like liquidity, as well as physical processes like flight. There is no macro property that is not, ultimately, due to properties of the micro, even if we don't think about it that way.

It does not seem reasonable that consciousness would be an exception. The exception.  The mystery is, if the micro properties are not any we are aware of, what are they?  But we can't answer that.  We aren't aware of what we aren't aware of.  And we can't study what we can't study.  If the answer is some kind of panpsychism or panprotopsychism, we can't detect it with any of our senses or devices we've invented to expand our senses. If it was, possible, we'd be studying it, and it would be part of the laws of physics. (Not sure I've worded that very well. But you folks have been dealing with all this far longer than I have, and probably know what I mean.)

If consciousness does not arise from the physical properties we know, and it does not arise from something like panprotopsychism (and I'm sure many here do not believe it does), then what?

Well, I've probably rambled on more than I should have. I only said a couple basic things, but I said them with a lot of words. I sometimes do that. :D If I get any responses, I will likely not understand a good deal of what they're saying. But I'll try.

The cues that normally allow us to know when we are moving are missing, just as they are missing in an aeroplane. — Ludwig V

This is exactly why it's correct to say that the senses deceive. When the sensible "cues" are missing, we draw the wrong conclusion. You say: "The sun does go up and down, from the point of view of the surface of the earth. It could not be otherwise." Obviously, it could be otherwise. It could be that the surface of the earth is spinning in a circle, and the sun is staying put. And if you wrongly assume that you, on the surface of the earth are staying put, because the "cues" of moving are missing, you would wrongly conclude that the sun goes up and down from the point of view of the surface of the earth. Therefore, you failed to account for the motion of the earth in your assumption, and allowed your sensed to deceive you.

Senses and reason are both capable of misleading us and are our only resources for finding the truth. Junking one in favour of the other is incomprehensible to me.

I have a feeling that the conditions are not such as to provide a basis for progress in this debate. Do you? — Ludwig V

If you do not see that reason is far more reliable than sense, and when the two disagree it is far more reasonable to accept reason over sense, then I think you're right when you say further progress is impossible.

If consciousness does not arise from the physical properties we know, and it does not arise from something like panprotopsychism (and I'm sure many here do not believe it does), then what? — Patterner

Hi Patterner, welcome to the forum. I'll answer this question with a simple "stay tuned..."

This is exactly why it's correct to say that the senses deceive. When the sensible "cues" are missing, we draw the wrong conclusion. You say: "The sun does go up and down, from the point of view of the surface of the earth. It could not be otherwise." Obviously, it could be otherwise. It could be that the surface of the earth is spinning in a circle, and the sun is staying put. And if you wrongly assume that you, on the surface of the earth are staying put, because the "cues" of moving are missing, you would wrongly conclude that the sun goes up and down from the point of view of the surface of the earth. Therefore, you failed to account for the motion of the earth in your assumption, and allowed your sensed to deceive you. — Metaphysician Undercover

It decieved him in a context that is almost completely useless to most of us most of the time. So, yes, if one wants to understand the motions of the solar system parts, his assessment is off, in nearly every other human context, he's got a perfect fine interpretation. And one that can be useful.
And reason can also deceive. But since he goes ahead and advocates for using both, I'm not sure what the overhanding problem is.

If you do not see that reason is far more reliable than sense, and when the two disagree it is far more reasonable to accept reason over sense, then I think you're right when you say further progress is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

which was in response to a quote that included...

Senses and reason are both capable of misleading us and are our only resources for finding the truth. Junking one in favour of the other is incomprehensible to me. — Ludwig V

Seems to miss the point. We don't have to give up either. Reason is pretty useless without the senses, at least to any empiricist. IOW the senses are, for example, the foundation of science: in observations.

It decieved him in a context that is almost completely useless to most of us most of the time. So, yes, if one wants to understand the motions of the solar system parts, his assessment is off, in nearly every other human context, he's got a perfect fine interpretation. And one that can be useful.
And reason can also deceive. But since he goes ahead and advocates for using both, I'm not sure what the overhanding problem is. — Bylaw

That is the difference between pragmatics and truth as providing the guiding principle. For reasons unknown, the philosopher seeks the truth. Some people feel comfortable with pragmaticism, and accept without doubt, the principles which currently serve them. The philosopher always wants to move ahead and proceed toward the truth.

Seems to miss the point. We don't have to give up either. Reason is pretty useless without the senses, at least to any empiricist. IOW the senses are, for example, the foundation of science: in observations. — Bylaw

Reread my post, I said "when the two disagree". It seems like you misunderstand the nature of science. The senses are not the foundation of science, science is based in hypotheses, theory. Your empiricist theory has misled you, another example of how human beings allow their senses to deceive them.

We understand how the properties of particles that we are aware of give rise to the macro properties.  Physical properties like liquidity, as well as physical processes like flight. There is no macro property that is not, ultimately, due to properties of the micro, even if we don't think about it that way. — Patterner

That's true. The problem is that physics defines itself in such a way that it cannot recognize anything else. So friendship, love, hatred, tyranny, democracy cannot occur in a theory in physics. One can sometimes "reduce" things to physics, like the aurora borealis or heat. But the beauty of the aurora borealis is not reduced, but eliminated, and there is an argument about whether heat is the motion of molecules or a sensation, which is not something that can be recognized in thermodynamics. That doesn't resolve the problem, but perhaps does something to explain why it exists.

If you do not see that reason is far more reliable than sense, and when the two disagree it is far more reasonable to accept reason over sense, then I think you're right when you say further progress is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

1) If you show me some statistics, I'll consider your hypothesis. 2) The rejection of the irrationality of the square root of 2 by the Pythagoreans was not because of the senses but because of their reason. You will say that they were not rational. So reason guarantees success because failure is labelled as something else. 3) Many people (some theists and some atheists) have believed, and some still do, that belief in God is rational. Many others (including some who believe in God) do not. It certainly is not a matter for the senses. Who's right? 4) The belief that the sun goes round the earth seems to me to be an error in reasoning, not in perception. 5) Reason requires premisses to function at all. Where do they come from? Either they are axioms or they are empirical. 6) Have you never made a mistake in reasoning about something? If so, congratulations. You may be unique.

Seems to miss the point. We don't have to give up either. Reason is pretty useless without the senses, at least to any empiricist. IOW the senses are, for example, the foundation of science: in observations. — Bylaw

I appreciate your support.

Reread my post, I said "when the two disagree". It seems like you misunderstand the nature of science. The senses are not the foundation of science, science is based in hypotheses, theory. Your empiricist theory has misled you, another example of how human beings allow their senses to deceive them. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did indeed. My mistake. However, I thought, as said, that the foundation of science, and the ultimate arbiter of truth, was observation and experiment. Hypotheses and theories are critically important, but when theory and data conflict, it is theory that needs to be changed. I have the (no doubt misleading) impression that a key battle in the establishment of modern science was that principle. Have things really changed that much?

We understand how the properties of particles that we are aware of give rise to the macro properties.  Physical properties like liquidity, as well as physical processes like flight. There is no macro property that is not, ultimately, due to properties of the micro, even if we don't think about it that way.
— Patterner

That's true. The problem is that physics defines itself in such a way that it cannot recognize anything else. So friendship, love, hatred, tyranny, democracy cannot occur in a theory in physics. One can sometimes "reduce" things to physics, like the aurora borealis or heat. But the beauty of the aurora borealis is not reduced, but eliminated, and there is an argument about whether heat is the motion of molecules or a sensation, which is not something that can be recognized in thermodynamics. That doesn't resolve the problem, but perhaps does something to explain why it exists. — Ludwig V

If I understand physical reductionists (and that's an "if", and I guess not all agree with each other), physics' recognition of the things you mention is irrelevant. The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics.

I that's correct, the question is, why do we have this awareness that accomplishes nothing? Why would evolution have selected for it?

That things behaved in such and such a way in the past, is not sufficient to produce the necessity to imply that they will necessarily behave this way in the future. What is needed is another premise which states that the future will be similar to the past. But this again appears to be just a more general form of the same inductive principle, How things have been in the past, will continue to be how they are in the future. So we do not escape the trap of relying on induction, and this does not give us the desired necessity, or certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that is word for word exactly what Hume says. I thought you were against Hume's thesis. :chin:

If consciousness does not arise from the physical properties we know, and it does not arise from something like panprotopsychism (and I'm sure many here do not believe it does), then what?


I'm virtually certain consciousness arises from the sort of information processing which neural networks are good at. Though I'm not going to go into detail about why I am so certain.

Not to say there aren't a lot of unknown details to how consciousness arises, but doesn't information processing seem likely to be the substrate on which consciousness is built?

I've never understood why so many philosophers seem credulous towards panpsychism.

If I understand physical reductionists (and that's an "if", and I guess not all agree with each other), physics' recognition of the things you mention is irrelevant. — Patterner

You are quite right that reduction is a complicated topic. But one thing it clearly means is leaving out what's irrelevant - and that means "irrelevant to physics". I accept that in some sense everything has a substrate in the physical. But that's not as simple as you might think. The obvious case is mathematics, which is the basis of physics. But do we think that physics reduces to mathematics?

What goes on in a computer doing a calculation is, no doubt, entirely governed by physics. But it is also governed by mathematics - that's why we call it a calculation. Of course, humans have organized the computer to ensure that's the case. So the basis of the physical processes in a computer is mathematics and the basis of that situation is that humans have arranged it. Yet the basis of human activity is physics. But physics left to itself does not produce computers.

I'm referring to the idea of a category. Physics explains everything in the category of the physical and nothing in any other category. So most radical reductionists are making a category mistake. The best way I can think of to explain this is by quoting the Wikipedia entry "Category mistakes":-

The term "category-mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949) . . .
The phrase is introduced in the first chapter. The first example is of a visitor to Oxford. The visitor, upon viewing the colleges and library, reportedly inquired "But where is the University?" The visitor's mistake is presuming that a University is part of the category "units of physical infrastructure" rather than that of an "institution". Ryle's second example is of a child witnessing the march-past of a division of soldiers. After having had battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc. pointed out, the child asks when is the division going to appear. "The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division." (Ryle's italics) His third example is of a foreigner being shown a cricket match. After being pointed out batsmen, bowlers and fielders, the foreigner asks: "who is left to contribute the famous element of team-spirit?" He goes on to argue that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body rests on a category mistake.

You said:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.

Not to say there aren't a lot of unknown details to how consciousness arises, but doesn't information processing seem likely to be the substrate on which consciousness is built? — wonderer1

That's not untrue. But philosophers and other academics tend to forget that the nervous system not only passes information to and fro, but also controls action. Life is about information, but not only about information.

"What goes on in a computer doing a calculation is, no doubt, entirely governed by physics. But it is also governed by mathematics - that's why we call it a calculation. Of course, humans have organized the computer to ensure that's the case. So the basis of the physical processes in a computer is mathematics and the basis of that situation is that humans have arranged it..."


Perhaps I am interpreting you overly literally, but as an electrical engineer I would put it differently.

I would say that a computer is constructed such that, in a (weakly) emergent sense, the computer behaves as if it were governed by mathematics/software. However, it would be suggesting overdetermination to claim that the behavior of the computer is governed by mathematics as well as physics. (I'm not sure what "governed by mathematics" would mean.)

I can't speak for what others are thinking when they say that "a computer is performing a calculation", but what I am doing in that case is taking pragmatic advantage of speaking simplistically in terms of the emergent properties a computer was designed to have.

"...Yet the basis of human activity is physics. But physics left to itself does not produce computers."


I'd say physics left to itself produced stars, which produced the elements of which the Earth is composed. Physics occurring on the Earth through evolution produced brains, and brains can reasonably be considered computers. (Though not digital computers.) The operation of brains is still physics and resulted in the production of digital computers. So in a roundabout way physics left to itself did produce digital computers. We just don't tend to think of ourselves as being aspects of "physics left to itself".

Thoughts?

. Hypotheses and theories are critically important, but when theory and data conflict, it is theory that needs to be changed. — Ludwig V

But I'm arguing the fallibility of science in general, because of its reliance on sense data, so this is just circular.

I thought you were against Hume's thesis. — Jacques

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it.

I can only address a little at the moment. Must sleep, and that's not conducive to coherent thought.

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics.
— Patterner

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet. — Ludwig V

I don't know what you mean here.

"...Yet the basis of human activity is physics. But physics left to itself does not produce computers."
↪Ludwig V

I'd say physics left to itself produced stars, which produced the elements of which the Earth is composed. Physics occurring on the Earth through evolution produced brains, and brains can reasonably be considered computers. (Though not digital computers.) The operation of brains is still physics and resulted in the production of digital computers. So in a roundabout way physics left to itself did produce digital computers. We just don't tend to think of ourselves as being aspects of "physics left to itself". — wonderer1

I was going to say much the same thing. If all of our consciousness and awareness, thoughts of the future - all of our mental characteristics - are reducible to the laws of physics, then how do we say physics doesn't produce computers? That's all there is, if that's all our consciousness is. And that's all our consciousness is, because the laws of physics cannot produce something that is outside of itself.

If something other than physics is producing computers - if something other than physics exists at all - it had to have come about other than by physics.

Where do I go wrong with this train of thought?

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi, Undercover, I'm starting to get it. :smile: You agree with Hume about identifying the problem, but you believe there is a solution, now do I have it? I need to reread your previous posts to see if I get your solution and if I agree with it.

I would say that a computer is constructed such that, in a (weakly) emergent sense, the computer behaves as if it were governed by mathematics/software. However, it would be suggesting overdetermination to claim that the behavior of the computer is governed by mathematics as well as physics. (I'm not sure what "governed by mathematics" would mean.) — wonderer1

Well, you're not wrong. My use of "governed" was not satisfactory. But your introduction of "emergent" is part of what I'm trying to say. Emergent properties, in my understanding, do not reduce to, for example, physics. But physics is still what I would call the substrate of them. If the calculations of a computer are to be regarded as reliable, we need to believe that they (non-accidentally) coincide with or represent, or are, mathematics. It's a similar relation to the one that exists when we make the calculation by writing symbols down and moving them around in accordance with certain rules.

I can't speak for what others are thinking when they say that "a computer is performing a calculation", but what I am doing in that case is taking pragmatic advantage of speaking simplistically in terms of the emergent properties a computer was designed to have. — wonderer1

When the machines in a supermarket shout "Unexpected item in the bagging area", are we justified in saying that the machine said something? No, and yes. I interpret the sounds as speech (which they are designed to be) and treat that speech as if someone has said it. But when it sounds like speech and I react to it as speech, why is it wrong to say that something was said?

I'd say physics left to itself produced stars, which produced the elements of which the Earth is composed. Physics occurring on the Earth through evolution produced brains, and brains can reasonably be considered computers. (Though not digital computers.) The operation of brains is still physics and resulted in the production of digital computers. So in a roundabout way physics left to itself did produce digital computers. We just don't tend to think of ourselves as being aspects of "physics left to itself". — wonderer1

Oh, yes, we are indeed star-dust. But not simply star-dust because we can do things that star-dust cannot, like understanding and manipulating physics.

But I'm arguing the fallibility of science in general, because of its reliance on sense data, so this is just circular. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fallibility of science is just a facet of the fallibility of human beings. I'm guessing, but I guess you are taking this line because you want to escape Hume's problem.

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you put your faith in reason because a rational principle would resolve Hume's problem? But reason has two facets. One facet is the theorems and deductions, which give transcendent certainty. Tempting. But the other facet is human beings who try to follow the rules of reason. When things go wrong, we cannot blame the rules which are by definition immune to mistakes and error. So we blame ourselves instead. In other words, reason has success logic. You can trust reason in the abstract sense, but human attempts to apply it are not immune from mistake. When you think you have the rational solution, you may be mistaken. I think of reasoning as a human activity, rather than an abstract structure, so perhaps I have a slightly different perspective from you.

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.
— Ludwig V
I don't know what you mean here. — Patterner

Neither do I. It's a problem and I don't know the answer. I was responding, not well, to you saying:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

Let me try again. The physical events in our brain - let's say - cause (or maybe underlie) our awareness, so although they are not dependent on our awareness, they can't take place without our awareness. I can't imagine why you think our awareness has no causal ability.

That's all there is, — Patterner

I don't know what that means.

If something other than physics is producing computers - if something other than physics exists at all - it had to have come about other than by physics. — Patterner

This is not false. But it is simplistic.

You may have noticed what many people have pointed out, that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

It's also a common problem that one person's music is another person's dreadful row. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

Pleasure and pain are sometimes physical phenomena, sometimes not. All pleasure and all pain is produced by physics. So what's the difference between physical pleasure and physical pain? And what the difference between physical pleasure/pain and non-physical pleasure/pain?

Physics is a human construction - a representation, let's call it - of the world. It is the result of human activity. Do we conclude that physics made physics? Or that physics doesn't exist?

I believe a solution is possible, not that I have a solution. You'd probably have to reread a bunch of my posts to really understand. If we start with the premise that certain aspects of reality (like the temporal continuity discussed) appear to us a unintelligible, there are two principal ways to respond to this. One way is that we can conclude that such an aspect is itself inherently unintelligible. The other way is that we apprehend the appearance of unintelligibility as a product of our approach. In the latter case we reassess and analyze our approach. In the former case, we give up any effort to try and understand, as necessarily fruitless. The former is what I call unphilosophical. Check this post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/802467

The fallibility of science is just a facet of the fallibility of human beings. I'm guessing, but I guess you are taking this line because you want to escape Hume's problem. — Ludwig V

Exactly, because Hume's method is to portray reason as infallible, then demonstrate the fallibility of our assumptions about causation, and induction in general, and conclude therefore that these types of reasoning are not properly called "reason". That is a problem, because it leaves these processes without any category, no means to understand them, therefore no means to address and rectify their problems. Instead, we ought to class them as forms of reasoning which are more fallible than some others, therefore these forms of reasoning have issues which need to be addressed.

So you put your faith in reason because a rational principle would resolve Hume's problem? — Ludwig V

Yes, look what I said early. Hume wanted to place such assumptions as based in some sort of custom or habit, and then not face the reality that reasoning is itself a habit or custom. This is a problem which inheres within Hume's approach to rationalism. He seems to want to give reason a sort of divine, infallible status, as if it were separate from a bodily function of human beings, but this is a mischaracterization of the human reasoning process. So my position is not as you say, to put my "faith in reason", it is to put my faith in the human capacity to adapt, change, and evolve reason in a way which is conducive toward truth.

One facet is the theorems and deductions, which give transcendent certainty. — Ludwig V

This is exactly Hume's mistake, to portray "reason" in this divine way, as something which produces "transcendent certainty". This means that we have to create a divide, a separation within the category of "reason", such that some forms of reasoning produce divine certainty, while others do not. That creates an inconsistency within the category, because what is necessary to some types, the declared "certainty" is not necessary to other types. So Hume's solution is to remove those types which do not create certainty, from the category, leaving only the divine forms, which produce transcendent certainty as qualifying for the category of "reason".

But this is a mistake. There is no such divine form of reasoning which produces transcendent certainty. All forms of reasoning suffer from some degree of fallibility, as activities of fallible human beings, so all forms of reasoning, including deductive, inductive, abductive, etc., ought to be classed together, and they can be judged according to their degree of reliability or fallibility.

When things go wrong, we cannot blame the rules which are by definition immune to mistakes and error. So we blame ourselves instead. In other words, reason has success logic. — Ludwig V

The issue here, is that we, the human beings, are the ones who created the rules for the logic. These rules are just "customs", therefore they are not immune to mistake, and yes we can blame them, when we can demonstrate the faults which inhere within them.

This is where there is a need to differentiate "custom" from "habit". A "habit" is a property of an individual, while a "custom" is attributed to a group of people. There is a difference because all customs are habits, but not all habits are customs. We tend to judge habits as good or bad, and when a habit is a custom, simply being a custom does not ensure that the habit is a good habit. We can say that "correct", and "right" are descriptions based in custom, such that rules and laws which conform to customs provide us for judgement of correct, and right, in our judgements of habits which conform to customs. If you act according to custom you act correctly. But since there is always inconsistency between one culture and another concerning some customs, we must allow a higher standard of judgement (good for example), whereby we can judge some customs which produce correct and right acts according to one culture, as actually not good.

You can trust reason in the abstract sense, but human attempts to apply it are not immune from mistake. When you think you have the rational solution, you may be mistaken. I think of reasoning as a human activity, rather than an abstract structure, so perhaps I have a slightly different perspective from you. — Ludwig V

So the mistake is evident here when you say "reason in the abstract sense". If you maintain your principle, "reasoning as a human activity", this principle itself is an abstract principle. It states a general process, as an abstraction "reasoning", or we could call it "reason". But what it says of this process, as what is essential or necessary to the process, is that it is a human activity. If we look at human activities as fallible, such that this is necessary, or essential to all human activities, then we can conclude that reasoning, or "reason" is necessarily fallible, through deductive logic.

Now we have excluded what you call "reason in the abstract sense" from our category of reasoning, such that it is just a fiction, imaginary, and not an abstraction at all, because it is not supported by any logic. We simply have this name, "reason in the abstract sense", which is really oxymoronic, because it is supposed to point to some sort of abstract reasoning, but it is not supported by any type of abstraction. If instead, we allow some sort of reality to this form of "reason in the abstract sense", we'd have to make up all sorts of fictional ideals, "transcendent certainty" etc., as defining features of it, and what would be the point of that?

Exactly, because Hume's method is to portray reason as infallible, then demonstrate the fallibility of our assumptions about causation, and induction in general, and conclude therefore that these types of reasoning are not properly called "reason". That is a problem, because it leaves these processes without any category, no means to understand them, therefore no means to address and rectify their problems. Instead, we ought to class them as forms of reasoning which are more fallible than some others, therefore these forms of reasoning have issues which need to be addressed.

Ah, wonderfully insightful I think.

I'm not well informed enough about Hume's argument to assess the accuracy of your interpretation of Hume's thinking. But having put a fair bit of consideration into how minds might emerge from brains with the benefits of modern scientific findings, I think Hume having an overly simplistic view of reasoning was unavoidable. If only we had a time machine and could go back and talk to him.

Let me try again. The physical events in our brain - let's say - cause (or maybe underlie) our awareness, so although they are not dependent on our awareness, they can't take place without our awareness. I can't imagine why you think our awareness has no causal ability. — Ludwig V

Well, I don't think that. I am speaking from my understanding of the reductionist view. Again, the idea that everything is reducible to physics. Our consciousness, our awareness, is nothing more than lumps of matter noticing what’s going on. As Annaka Harris put it:

Surprisingly, our consciousness also doesn’t appear to be involved in much of our own behavior, apart from bearing witness to it. A number of fascinating experiments have been conducted in this area, and the neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga describes some of them in detail in a wonderful chapter aptly titled “The Brain Knows Before You Do” in his book The Mind’s Past.

In his book, Gazzaniga says:

We human beings have a centric view of the world. We think our personal selves are directing the show most of the time. I argue that recent research shows this is not true but simply appears to be true because of a special device in our left brain called the interpreter. This one device creates the illusion that we are in charge of our actions, and it does so by interpreting our past-the prior actions of our nervous system.

I think consciousness is casual. But I'm hoping someone who agrees that it is, indeed, nothing but physics, but also thinks it is causal, can explain how they believe both things, since they appear to contradict each other. Because, otherwise, I'm looking at panprotopsychism. Which is an awkward ideas. Even if true, it doesn't seem to be anything about which we can do more than speculate.

That's all there is,
— Patterner

I don't know what that means. — Ludwig V

I'm thinking of my Kurzweil quote. (Hofstadter also discusses it in I am a Strange Loop, but that's a longer quote.) Although it's easier to work with things at higher levels, everything reduces to physics. Ultimately, everything is the interaction of particles and the four forces.

If our consciousness is nothing but the interactions of particles, then the interaction of particles is what produces computers.

I think consciousness is casual. But I'm hoping someone who agrees that it is, indeed, nothing but physics, but also thinks it is causal, can explain how they believe both things, since they appear to contradict each other. Because, otherwise, I'm looking at panprotopsychism. Which is an awkward ideas. Even if true, it doesn't seem to be anything about which we can do more than speculate.


I highly recommend Peter Tse's The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation.

https://www.amazon.com/Neural-Basis-Free-Will-Criterial/dp/0262528312

Confession: I've read the sciency first half of the book and haven't finished the more philosophical second half. So I can't say whether I agree with Tse on libertarian free will or not. However I do agree with him that what he calls criterial causation is what should be under consideration in order to have a scientifically informed discussion of the subject.

I highly recommend Peter Tse's The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation. — wonderer1

Thank you! I just bought it. I hope I'm up for it.

That is the difference between pragmatics and truth as providing the guiding principle. For reasons unknown, the philosopher seeks the truth. Some people feel comfortable with pragmaticism, and accept without doubt, the principles which currently serve them. The philosopher always wants to move ahead and proceed toward the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are philosophers who are pragmatists and pragmatism(s) is(are) philosophical positions inside philosophy, so I don't accept the dichotomy implicit above. It seems possible you are conflating epistemology in philosophy with the correspondance theory of truth.
I was also reacting to what I think is overly binary in saying he 'deceived himself'.

Reread my post, I said "when the two disagree" — Metaphysician Undercover

You're still going to need both and I was supporting what he had asserted around that. I am certainly not saying we can't be fooled by our senses, just as we can by reason. Unless you are a rationalist, there are going to be empirical facets to getting past illusions. You can absolutely decide that X, based on sense impressions, was false, but any demonstration of this will have empirical work around it.

It seems like you misunderstand the nature of science. The senses are not the foundation of science, science is based in hypotheses, theory. Your empiricist theory has misled you, another example of how human beings allow their senses to deceive them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Science is empirical. It is based on observations. People will create hypotheses based on models, which were also built up on research using empirical processes as their center. One of the reasons the scientific process is open to revision is precisely because it is an empirical approach to gaining knowledge.

And, hey, that was a kind of slimy way to talk to me. I was not impolite to you so you didn't need to go ad hom. And before I am told I don't know what ad hom means, yes, you didn't make a formal ad hom fallacy, but it was definitely 'to the man.' And the first paragraph was also slimy though less direct. The philosopher wanting the truth compared to others are comfortable.......Get over yourself and your implicitly claimed bravery. Talk about senses in the sense of sense of oneself getting in the way of things.

I'll ignore you from here on out. My patience for these kinds of little dominance games is pretty much zero.

I think consciousness is casual. But I'm hoping someone who agrees that it is, indeed, nothing but physics, but also thinks it is causal, can explain how they believe both things, since they appear to contradict each other. Because, otherwise, I'm looking at panprotopsychism. Which is an awkward ideas. Even if true, it doesn't seem to be anything about which we can do more than speculate. — Patterner

You could ask @apokrisis about that. He might be able to distinguish different types of cause and tell a top-down story that is consistent with the bottom-up one.

Personally I'm starting to think all causation is psychological.

There are philosophers who are pragmatists and pragmatism(s) is(are) philosophical positions inside philosophy, so I don't accept the dichotomy implicit above. It seems possible you are conflating epistemology in philosophy with the correspondance theory of truth.
I was also reacting to what I think is overly binary in saying he 'deceived himself'. — Bylaw

Fair enough, I'll qualify my statement: "a certain type of philosopher seeks the truth". The one's who do not seek the truth, but seek some useful principles, pragmatists, might still be correctly called "philosophers" by common convention.

You're still going to need both and I was supporting what he had asserted around that. I am certainly not saying we can't be fooled by our senses, just as we can by reason. Unless you are a rationalist, there are going to be empirical facets to getting past illusions. You can absolutely decide that X, based on sense impressions, was false, but any demonstration of this will have empirical work around it. — Bylaw

The point though, is that reasoning is more reliable then mere sensation with memory. Furthermore, some types of reasoning are more reliable than others. The ones dependent on sensory input, like induction, have been demonstrated to be less reliable. So, the further we can get away from being dependent on sensation, the more certain we will be in our knowledge, and we can conclude that sensation tends to mislead us. When it's clear that sensation misleads us, and the further we get away from being dependent on it, the more certain our knowledge will be, how do you conclude that we will always need both?

Science is empirical. It is based on observations. — Bylaw

Yes, and this is obviously the weakness of science. It's the problem of induction which Hume pointed to. That is why the statement of the op is correct, science is irrelevant to the problem of consciousness. This is because we must get beyond the limitations of science to properly understand consciousness, and if we fall for the idea that empirical science is capable of providing such an understanding that would be a case of being deceived by your senses.

And, hey, that was a kind of slimy way to talk to me. I was not impolite to you so you didn't need to go ad hom. And before I am told I don't know what ad hom means, yes, you didn't make a formal ad hom fallacy, but it was definitely 'to the man.' And the first paragraph was also slimy though less direct. — Bylaw

I was referring to a particular instance, as an example, to demonstrate a general point. This is a common procedure. The example happened to be you. I thought perhaps a first hand example of how a person gets deceived by one's senses, might help to prove the point. If you took it as an insult, you shouldn't have because we all get deceived in this way. Anyway, it appears like you did take it as an insult, so I will apologize. I am sorry, no harm was intended.

Talk about senses in the sense of sense of oneself getting in the way of things. — Bylaw

Sorry, your personal example doesn't seem to work. I can't figure out what you're trying to say.

I'm referring to the idea of a category. Physics explains everything in the category of the physical and nothing in any other category. So most radical reductionists are making a category mistake. The best way I can think of to explain this is by quoting the Wikipedia entry "Category mistakes":-

The term "category-mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949) . . .
The phrase is introduced in the first chapter. The first example is of a visitor to Oxford. The visitor, upon viewing the colleges and library, reportedly inquired "But where is the University?" The visitor's mistake is presuming that a University is part of the category "units of physical infrastructure" rather than that of an "institution". Ryle's second example is of a child witnessing the march-past of a division of soldiers. After having had battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc. pointed out, the child asks when is the division going to appear. "The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division." (Ryle's italics) His third example is of a foreigner being shown a cricket match. After being pointed out batsmen, bowlers and fielders, the foreigner asks: "who is left to contribute the famous element of team-spirit?" He goes on to argue that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body rests on a category mistake. — Ludwig V

Thanks for this. Although the concept is familiar, I hadn't heard the term before.

Love your quartets, btw.

If we look at human activities as fallible, such that this is necessary, or essential to all human activities, then we can conclude that reasoning, or "reason" is necessarily fallible, through deductive logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are some complications here, but that is at least close to what I’m trying to say. I think we are already agreed on a similar argument in relation to the senses.

Fortunately, “fallible” means “sometimes wrong”, not “always wrong”. Fortunately, also, the argument relies on the fact that we can tell wrong from right. So between the senses and reason and a suitably critical attitude, we can achieve some knowledge.

I think consciousness is casual. — Patterner

I’m puzzled. I think “casual” here may be a typo. Is that right?

Our consciousness, our awareness, is nothing more than lumps of matter noticing what’s going on. — Patterner

I don't disagree. But there are different kinds of lumps of matter. Some of them are conscious. Others are money. Others are people we love.

I’m still puzzled.

Are numbers, words, logical variables, musical notes, lumps of matter? What about shadows, rainbows, surfaces, colours, boundaries, sub-atomic particles?

Votes, contracts, insults, punches, all involve lumps of matter, but are they lumps of matter?

Pictures are lumps of matter, but are they just lumps of matter like any other?

Card games all involve lumps of matter, but does that mean there is no important difference between them? Banknotes are all lumps of matter, but it doesn't follow they all have the same value.

Let me try an analogy. There used to be a popular philosophical theory – sense-datum theory. This argued that everything that we know, including our concepts, comes from the senses. Many people took this to mean that everything can be reduced to sense-data. Hence, physics can be reduced to sense-data. So what would you say to them?

Love your quartets, btw. — Patterner

I'm glad to hear it. I love them too. I wish I had written them, but glad I don't have to live that tortured life.