Why not? — Luke
By definition, there does not exist empirical criteria for asserting self-unconsciousness in the present. So the proposition "I am presently unconscious" is presumably meaningless when taken in the fullest possible sense. — sime
Granting this, how does it imply that the hard problem is inconceivable? — Luke
Consider what it would mean to say that there is no experiential dimension. Unless that possibility is conceivable, then the hard problem isn't conceivable — sime
Can you really conceive an absence of experience? — sime
For phenomenologists who consider first-personal phenomenological criteria to be the very essence of meaning, the question is circular and makes no sense from their perspective. Which is what i was getting at above. — sime
Dreamless sleep. A time in ones being, where there was no awareness of such. But one wakes up, and continues to experience, despite the lost time.
Perhaps the same in a coma. I'm less sure of that as I have had Dreamless sleep but never been in a coma. — Benj96
So what is your definition of unconsciousness? — sime
Is it a pure postulate, or something that reduces to empirical criteria? — sime
More simply, I can conceive of a point in time before there was any life or conscious beings in the universe. — Luke
If there were no experiential dimension then there would be no hard problem, but since there is, there is. — Luke
How can one that conceives, truly conceive of a state of non-conceivability (ie. a state with no consciousness). — Benj96
You may be able to conceive of a time before conceptions (consciousness and it's thoughts/concepts) but it would be a very inaccurate and biased one. — Benj96
Consciousness cannot know the lack of it. Again, as "knowing" is a process of the conscious. — Benj96
Right, and as I said if there were no experiential dimension there would be nothing else either, so putting the question as to why there is experience is really equivalent to putting the question as to why there is anything at all, or why there is something rather than nothing. — Janus
It means retrieving the information from memory. Mind you, bodily functions such as hunger is not memory based, nor the bowel movement ( I will explain it for those uninitiated, upon request). — L'éléphant
Yes please. — GrahamJ
I touched on this issue in another thread. In philosophy, the accepted belief is the causal theory of perception -- which means the CNS, and which means they accept the duality of existence and consciousness: the physical brain and the mind that perceives of time. Without the temporal perception, we would be like the enteric nervous system -- able to perform a function, but without self-awareness, no time perception, no self.I was expecting a philosophical not a biological answer (eg a definition of what memory means to some philosophers). — GrahamJ
No, that's not correct. The ENS could function without the input from the CNS. It doesn't record information, as we know information. It's not through memory. I don't know how to explain it.I knew about the enteric nervous system (though I'd forgotten the name). If it records some information, and later uses that information to make a decision, I would call that memory, or even a 'mental record'. — GrahamJ
And I think many would agree that rocks and other inanimate objects are also in a "state with no consciousness — Luke
Surely you can imagine a state with no consciousness, at least in other people and objects, and perhaps even a state of the universe at a particular time. — Luke
So, the question could become: 'could all human activities, the whole of civilization and its products have been produced 'blind' so to speak'? Shakespeare would have been a p-zombie just like everyone else; he would have written his plays without being aware that he did so, and the actors would have performed them without being aware of doing so, and the audiences would have attended, without knowing they did, and without experiencing anything at all. — Janus
Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do. — Janus
But, I haven't addressed your question about why some physical states are conscious and others not. This could be taken in two ways; you might be understood to be asking it of all physical states whatever or just referring to the bodily physical states of humans and other organisms. Assuming the latter, then I would say it is because so much awareness would be too confusing. — Janus
If you were asking it of the former, then I would in turn ask whether we know that all physical states are not conscious to some minimal degree. If they were then this would be the panpsychist or panexperientialist answer to the "hard" question as to how 'brute' matter could by virtue of mere configuration and complexity, become conscious. — Janus
Surely you can imagine a state with no consciousness, at least in other people and objects, and perhaps even a state of the universe at a particular time.
— Luke
I can imagine it yes (construct a basic simulation or imagine it, make an analogy), I cannot however experience it. Conscious beings cannot "experience unconsciousness" as it is the lack of experience. — Benj96
We can conceive of it for sure. But that isn't to say the conception reflects the true state (ie accuracy). The conception is instead very much shy of the actual state. — Benj96
Who make this claim? — Luke
This addresses the question of why some bodily states are not conscious, but it does not address the question of why some bodily states are conscious. — Luke
Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do.
— Janus
Who make this claim?
— Luke
I think Dennett claims something along these lines; that experience and consciousness are either epiphenoma or a kind of illusion. — Janus
Good point. I guess there would have to be some advantage to having some bodily states be conscious. We may not be able to answer that question, though. — Janus
I may be wrong, but I believe that even illusionists like Keith Frankish do not claim "that we don't really experience anything at all". I believe they make the more modest claim that qualia do not have the properties of privacy, ineffability, etc. that Dennett mentions in Quining Qualia, or that we should not be misled into the misconception that phenonenal consciousness implies the homunculus view of an "inner show" or Cartesian theatre. — Luke
The article linked in the OP proposes an answer to that question. — Luke
I never understood why there would need to be an homunculus in order for there to be an "inner show". Phenomenologically speaking there certainly seems to be an inner show when I close my eyes, and neuroscience seems to tell us that the "outer show" we see with open eyes is really an inner show. — Janus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.