Why not? — Luke

By definition, there does not exist empirical criteria for asserting self-unconsciousness in the present. So the proposition "I am presently unconscious" is presumably meaningless when taken in the fullest possible sense. In which case, an assertion of self-unconsciousness can only amount to a speculative hypothesis regarding an absence of a previous mental state (or equivalently, of the presence of an unconscious past mental state).

Typically, a person appeals to a present state of amnesia to infer that they were unconscious in the past. Whether or not one accepts the validity of this inference depends on one's conception of memory. An empiricist isn't likely to regard an inability to remember the past as saying anything literal about the past.

By definition, there does not exist empirical criteria for asserting self-unconsciousness in the present. So the proposition "I am presently unconscious" is presumably meaningless when taken in the fullest possible sense. — sime

Granting this, how does it imply that the hard problem is inconceivable?

Granting this, how does it imply that the hard problem is inconceivable? — Luke

We can take the hard-problem in it's broadest sense, as asking what grounds the existence of first-personal phenomenological criteria that are used to understand propositions?

For phenomenologists who consider first-personal phenomenological criteria to be the very essence of meaning, the question is circular and makes no sense from their perspective. Which is what i was getting at above.

On the other hand, scientists working in the natural sciences will either side with the phenomenologist or not, depending on whether they believe the inter-subjective empirical criteria that they use to understand scientific theories to be ultimately grounded in first-person phenomenology or in pure reason. (e.g whether they are ultimately empiricists equipped with a deflationary understanding of truth and an anti-representationalist understanding of their own minds, or whether they are ultimately rationalists equipped with a correspondence understanding of truth and a representational understanding of themselves).

As for Dennett, he sometimes sounds like a rationalist who agrees with the phenomenologist that the question is meaningless, but for opposite reasons, namely due to a narrow interpretation of the natural sciences as denying the question on the basis of it being materially inconsequential (as opposed to be phenomenologically inconsequential)

Consider what it would mean to say that there is no experiential dimension. Unless that possibility is conceivable, then the hard problem isn't conceivable — sime

Can you really conceive an absence of experience? — sime

Dreamless sleep. A time in ones being, where there was no awareness of such. But one wakes up, and continues to experience, despite the lost time.

Perhaps the same in a coma. I'm less sure of that as I have had Dreamless sleep but never been in a coma.

Experts in meditation claim total absence of thought during trance. Again I cannot verify. But it seems possible to continue exist without directly experiencing that existence in a given moment of time. Ie to have "blackouts" or lost time. The failure or purposeful pause of memory.

For phenomenologists who consider first-personal phenomenological criteria to be the very essence of meaning, the question is circular and makes no sense from their perspective. Which is what i was getting at above. — sime

Perhaps the hard problem is inconceivable for phenomenolgists, but I'm not a phenomenologist.

Dreamless sleep. A time in ones being, where there was no awareness of such. But one wakes up, and continues to experience, despite the lost time.

Perhaps the same in a coma. I'm less sure of that as I have had Dreamless sleep but never been in a coma. — Benj96

More simply, I can conceive of a point in time before there was any life or conscious beings in the universe.

Perhaps the hard problem is inconceivable for phenomenolgists, but I'm not a phenomenologist. — Luke

So what is your definition of unconsciousness? Is it a pure postulate, or something that reduces to empirical criteria?

So what is your definition of unconsciousness? — sime

A dictionary definition would suffice.

Is it a pure postulate, or something that reduces to empirical criteria? — sime

I don't believe that we know the meanings of any words based solely on observation or experience; there is always some rationality or reasoning associated with knowing the meaning or use of a word. So...both.

More simply, I can conceive of a point in time before there was any life or conscious beings in the universe. — Luke

How can one that conceives, truly conceive of a state of non-conceivability (ie. a state with no consciousness).

That's like "something" trying to conceive of true absolute "nothingness." It's impossible. As the process of conceiving as well as the conception itself are both "something."

You may be able to conceive of a time before conceptions (consciousness and it's thoughts/concepts) but it would be a very inaccurate and biased one.

Biased toward something trying conceptualise a state it can never be by virtue of the fact it can conceive in the first place.

Consciousness cannot know the lack of it. Again, as "knowing" is a process of the conscious.

If there were no experiential dimension then there would be no hard problem, but since there is, there is. — Luke

Right, and as I said if there were no experiential dimension there would be nothing else either, so putting the question as to why there is experience is really equivalent to putting the question as to why there is anything at all, or why there is something rather than nothing.

How can one that conceives, truly conceive of a state of non-conceivability (ie. a state with no consciousness). — Benj96

I thought we were on the same side. Were you unable to conceive of a state with no consciousness in your examples of dreamless sleep, coma and meditation? One needn't conceive of one's own unconsciousness in order to conceive of unconsciousness; one can imagine other people being unconsciousness. And I think many would agree that rocks and other inanimate objects are also in a "state with no consciousness". Regardless, I believe that one can conceive of one's own unconsciousness; such as before they were born or after they die. Moreover, if a state with no consciousness could not be conceived, then how could you or I understand what the phrase "state with no consciousness" means? It's not a logical contradiction like a square circle. Surely you can imagine a state with no consciousness, at least in other people and objects, and perhaps even a state of the universe at a particular time.

You may be able to conceive of a time before conceptions (consciousness and it's thoughts/concepts) but it would be a very inaccurate and biased one. — Benj96

Whether or not it would be an inaccurate or biased conception, you've acknowledged here that it is conceivable.

Consciousness cannot know the lack of it. Again, as "knowing" is a process of the conscious. — Benj96

Sure, I can't experience being unconscious while I'm conscious, or know "what it's like" in this sense, but that's a different story to whether I can merely conceive of myself being unconcious; to merely imagine it.

Right, and as I said if there were no experiential dimension there would be nothing else either, so putting the question as to why there is experience is really equivalent to putting the question as to why there is anything at all, or why there is something rather than nothing. — Janus

The question "why does phenomenal experience exist" may seem analogous to the question "why does anything exist". I agree that the question can be viewed in this way. I still tend to view it this way myself occasionally. But I believe that the hard problem can be expressed in a way that distinguishes these two seemingly identical questions.

As defined by the IEP article, "the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject."

Expressed in this way, it could be viewed as a question that is not solely about the existence of conscious experience, but about why some physical states are conscious and others are not.

That makes sense to me. So, the question could become: 'could all human activities, the whole of civilization and its products have been produced 'blind' so to speak'? Shakespeare would have been a p-zombie just like everyone else; he would have written his plays without being aware that he did so, and the actors would have performed them without being aware of doing so, and the audiences would have attended, without knowing they did, and without experiencing anything at all.

Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do. Assuming that were so, should we attribute the same illusions to the p-zombie human world? But then, if experience is just an illusion, isn't having an illusion of experience having experience after all? This is reminiscent, in a different register, of the Cartesian 'cogito'.

Also, if there were no experience then there would be no sense of time and memory. Time itself may be an illusion, but it seems impossible to think of a sense of time as an illusion, and memories might be confabulated, but it seems impossible to think of the sense of remembering as an illusion. Those elements, time and memory, seem to be indispensable to creativity, to the production of novelty, and so it seems impossible to imagine p-zombies being able to produce civilization and all its products,

If that were true it would mean that without consciousness humans could never have evolved, and the should also be true of animals. There does seem to be a kind of immanent imperative in being itself to evolve, so maybe that is why there is consciousness, because without it, evolution would be impossible. I won't go all the way to invoking the overarching teleology of entropy as @apokrisis does; that is another conversation.

But, I haven't addressed your question about why some physical states are conscious and others not. This could be taken in two ways; you might be understood to be asking it of all physical states whatever or just referring to the bodily physical states of humans and other organisms. Assuming the latter, then I would say it is because so much awareness would be too confusing. If you were asking it of the former, then I would in turn ask whether we know that all physical states are not conscious to some minimal degree. If they were then this would be the panpsychist or panexperientialist answer to the "hard" question as to how 'brute' matter could by virtue of mere configuration and complexity, become conscious.

It means retrieving the information from memory. Mind you, bodily functions such as hunger is not memory based, nor the bowel movement ( I will explain it for those uninitiated, upon request). — L'éléphant
Yes please. — GrahamJ

The bowel movement is controlled by the enteric nervous system. They call it the second brain -- without input from our self-awareness (the central nervous system), the ENS can function fully on its own. No, it can't write a Shakespeare masterpiece or Vivaldi's Four Seasons, but it's a powerful network of guts and enzymes and bacteria.

Thanks. I was expecting a philosophical not a biological answer (eg a definition of what memory means to some philosophers). I knew about the enteric nervous system (though I'd forgotten the name). If it records some information, and later uses that information to make a decision, I would call that memory, or even a 'mental record'. I don't see the point of restricting to the central nervous system when discussing the mind from a philosophical point of view.

BTW, I think the the immune system is a better example of information processing outside the CNS. It has a very large and long-term memory.

I was expecting a philosophical not a biological answer (eg a definition of what memory means to some philosophers). — GrahamJ

I touched on this issue in another thread. In philosophy, the accepted belief is the causal theory of perception -- which means the CNS, and which means they accept the duality of existence and consciousness: the physical brain and the mind that perceives of time. Without the temporal perception, we would be like the enteric nervous system -- able to perform a function, but without self-awareness, no time perception, no self.

I knew about the enteric nervous system (though I'd forgotten the name). If it records some information, and later uses that information to make a decision, I would call that memory, or even a 'mental record'. — GrahamJ

No, that's not correct. The ENS could function without the input from the CNS. It doesn't record information, as we know information. It's not through memory. I don't know how to explain it.

It operates as a duality. Our consciousness and I - me and my cosciousness - works as a twosome. Just like there's a hard drive in computers, and then using it we access various things. We can experience, we see. So when we are sleeping, we are not unconscious but we are not conscious, not aware of our surroundings. A loud noise or alarm will wake us up. The duality ensures a silent built in alarm is there to wake us up each morning much like the rooster doing the kuk du koo each morning. Because of the duality, we can see ourselves. We can feel, think, know, analyze, synthesize and understand. We can be aware of all experiences. Distanced? I can know myself, be aware, be conscious of myself, see myself, but not distanced from my consciousness, i will not understand me. So the me that is i, perceives the consciousness at a distance from me. Where is this consciousness of mine? Where the thinking, feeling, knowing and understanding is? It is all in the cosmic consciousness. The cosmic consciousness is lord, sum total of all consciousnesses and also the things related no consciousnesses. This is why, the lord knows about our situation. The lord knows all. As a side note though, the lord can only help us in so much as we help ourselves first. If we beg for help, help could come, but overdrawing our account means a fill up later with good actions becomes necessary. The lord is omnipotent, omniscient and all that. So when i say - i am so and so. That so and so is my consciousness. It's only word and word power, much like i am money but lord is the power of money. So money and its power operates as a duality. Me and my consciousness works as a duality and so i can see myself, i can perceive me. The lord is cosmic consciousness and we all together with the things and the emptiness are the cosmic body. The lord is the one living its life. We form the lord in togetherness.

The closest word I could think of is reflex.

I must clarify something here that is significant. The lord being omnipotent etc., the lord cannot do anything to us. The point being that in the cosmic consciousness my consciousness is there. How i walk in life, my destiny is accordingly. My lord part ensures that and the remaining lord part cannot touch me or my life in anyway whatsoever. But my lord part in ensuring my destiny according to my actions, is omnipotent. Same goes for all others and even all things. The cosmic lord is not someone, it is nothing. My goddess of whose i am a second face here in soul form, is not like my acting lord for me either, it's me myself. You are for you. In the nothing, i wrote - a b c d e......It's written on the lord that is nothing. What's written is a b c d e..... should come to me. And no lord or other god or goddess or thing can interfere ever. So lord is nothing. Lord is no one. Lord is our own power to do this or that. Whatever we do, consequence is accordingly to come to us. That is lord. Your lord part, my lord part. All the parts together are not someone or some gigantic power. The power is individual. That is the omnipotence, omniscience, omni etc. Itself, the consequence according to action happens. If a cosmic lord above in the sense of all power could emerge, it would mean life loopholed, world loopholed. Immediate cosmic shutdown has to happen. And cosmos has to begin again.

And I think many would agree that rocks and other inanimate objects are also in a "state with no consciousness — Luke

This is human consciousness dependent. As in determining the consciousness of something based on the state of human consciousness. Hypothetically, if a rock had a very basic consciousness, it would likely be unprovable by human standards/degree of qualification of what consciousness constitutes.

We believe consciousness of primates and dogs for example to be more than that of plants and fungi, and that to be more than that of bacteria, and that of bacteria to be more than that of inorganics or rocks for example. We measure consciousness in its similarity to us (Human-centric consciousness criterion).

But there is no clear cutoff between something that is living and something that is unliving. That boundary is grey as viruses demonstrate. Neither officially living, nor officially dead.

For me consciousness is a steady and gradual emergence in parallel to complexity and degree of control of the agent (beholder of consciousness).

Surely you can imagine a state with no consciousness, at least in other people and objects, and perhaps even a state of the universe at a particular time. — Luke

I can imagine it yes (construct a basic simulation or imagine it, make an analogy), I cannot however experience it. Conscious beings cannot "experience unconsciousness" as it is the lack of experience.

So, the question could become: 'could all human activities, the whole of civilization and its products have been produced 'blind' so to speak'? Shakespeare would have been a p-zombie just like everyone else; he would have written his plays without being aware that he did so, and the actors would have performed them without being aware of doing so, and the audiences would have attended, without knowing they did, and without experiencing anything at all. — Janus

I don't think the question should be why all human activities - including those of recent history - were not produced blind. However, it can reasonably be asked why phenomenal experience developed in the first place. I don't believe that anyone actually is a p-zombie, but I can conceive of such a thing. You might be able to imagine - as the article suggests - that some present-day animals do blindly react to their environments without any self-awareness.

Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do. — Janus

Who make this claim?

But, I haven't addressed your question about why some physical states are conscious and others not. This could be taken in two ways; you might be understood to be asking it of all physical states whatever or just referring to the bodily physical states of humans and other organisms. Assuming the latter, then I would say it is because so much awareness would be too confusing. — Janus

This addresses the question of why some bodily states are not conscious, but it does not address the question of why some bodily states are conscious.

If you were asking it of the former, then I would in turn ask whether we know that all physical states are not conscious to some minimal degree. If they were then this would be the panpsychist or panexperientialist answer to the "hard" question as to how 'brute' matter could by virtue of mere configuration and complexity, become conscious. — Janus

I'm aware this is one possible explanation, but I'm not a pansychist.

Surely you can imagine a state with no consciousness, at least in other people and objects, and perhaps even a state of the universe at a particular time.
— Luke

I can imagine it yes (construct a basic simulation or imagine it, make an analogy), I cannot however experience it. Conscious beings cannot "experience unconsciousness" as it is the lack of experience. — Benj96

In your previous post, you seemed to be arguing that "a state with no consciousness" was inconceivable (i.e. unimaginable). I disagreed with that. However, now you are saying: that "a state with no consciousness" is not able to be (consciously) experienced. I don't disagree with that, as I stated in my last response.

I understand what you're saying. Fair point indeed.

Allow me to clarify. We cannot conceive "accurately" of a "state of inconceivabilty." We can conceive of it for sure. But that isn't to say the conception reflects the true state (ie accuracy). The conception is instead very much shy of the actual state.

In the same way we cannot experience the state of "non-experience" or lack-thereof. We can estimate it from the bias of consciousness. But consciousness (the conceiver) cannot experience the unconscious (inconceived) directly. It can merely imagine the idea of it.

A conscious being is both a "conceiver" and an "experiencer". The difference is that a conception is fictional or constructed/imaginary/not actual whilst an experience is something "actual" or "real".

At least by what I understand.

Can one "experience conception". Yes. They can experience imagination. That isn't to say the experienced (imagination) is the same/as concrete as the experience (something grounded/realised by the self).

We can conceive of it for sure. But that isn't to say the conception reflects the true state (ie accuracy). The conception is instead very much shy of the actual state. — Benj96

How do you know that what I imagine "a state with no consciousness" to be like would be "very much shy of the actual state"?

Who make this claim? — Luke

I think Dennett claims something along these lines; that experience and consciousness are either epiphenoma or a kind of illusion.

This addresses the question of why some bodily states are not conscious, but it does not address the question of why some bodily states are conscious. — Luke

Good point. I guess there would have to be some advantage to having some bodily states be conscious. We may not be able to answer that question, though.

Some claim that we are in fact in such a situation, that we don't really experience anything at all but just have the illusion that we do.
— Janus

Who make this claim?
— Luke

I think Dennett claims something along these lines; that experience and consciousness are either epiphenoma or a kind of illusion. — Janus

I may be wrong, but I believe that even illusionists like Keith Frankish do not claim "that we don't really experience anything at all". I believe they make the more modest claim that qualia do not have the properties of privacy, ineffability, etc. that Dennett mentions in Quining Qualia, or that we should not be misled into the misconception that phenonenal consciousness implies the homunculus view of an "inner show" or Cartesian theatre.

Good point. I guess there would have to be some advantage to having some bodily states be conscious. We may not be able to answer that question, though. — Janus

The article linked in the OP proposes an answer to that question.

I may be wrong, but I believe that even illusionists like Keith Frankish do not claim "that we don't really experience anything at all". I believe they make the more modest claim that qualia do not have the properties of privacy, ineffability, etc. that Dennett mentions in Quining Qualia, or that we should not be misled into the misconception that phenonenal consciousness implies the homunculus view of an "inner show" or Cartesian theatre. — Luke

You may well be right, but I, in my limited reading of Dennett, had got the impression that he thinks that experiencing something is kind of like a mirage or an afterimage that is not real, whatever that could be taken to mean.

I never understood why there would need to be an homunculus in order for there to be an "inner show". Phenomenologically speaking there certainly seems to be an inner show when I close my eyes, and neuroscience seems to tell us that the "outer show" we see with open eyes is really an inner show.

For example, I remember reading about experiments that showed that if someone is upside down for long enough the image of the environment will be inverted to be "the right way up", and that for a while if subjects subsequently stand up they will see things upside down.

The article linked in the OP proposes an answer to that question. — Luke

Right, I only scanned it: I will try to find the time to read it more closely.

I never understood why there would need to be an homunculus in order for there to be an "inner show". Phenomenologically speaking there certainly seems to be an inner show when I close my eyes, and neuroscience seems to tell us that the "outer show" we see with open eyes is really an inner show. — Janus

I understand, and I'm not sure if I'm completely in agreement with Dennett's views. However, the article helped me to understand - as I stated in the OP - "the idea that qualia constitute the self, rather than being something perceived by the self." I think this helps to explicate the idea of the homunculus.

On the homunculus view, there is an "inner self" that has a perspective on the sensory information of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, etc. that are located inside the body. On the non-homunculus, non-"inner self" view, the perspective locates the sensory information of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, etc. in the world instead of inside the body. I take the latter to be a more sensible view.

In the latter case, the body is the self; in the former case, there's a smaller (homunculus) self located inside the (body) self, a step removed.

Right, the idea that we are constituted by our experiences makes sense to me. And I agree that our sensations are located in the world, because I tend to think the world is also a part of the experience-based model, as are our bodies themselves.

I think the source of much confusion lies in this, that experience cannot be inside the brain/ body we know, because it is just a model, a part of our experience, a part of the world-model. It's very hard to talk about this without becoming confused.

This model works well if we assume that the self is no more than the combined constitution of sensations and/or perceptions, but I’m left wondering if there may be more to the self than that. In particular, where does language and one’s internal monologue - one’s thoughts - fit in to this model?

Are one’s thoughts on the same constitutive footing as one’s qualia in terms of their sense of self or are one’s thoughts a step removed or a step “higher” than one’s qualia? Would I still have a sense of self without any qualia but with my thoughts? And is the role played by my thoughts any more important to, or constitutive of, my sense of self than the the role played by my qualia?