I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine — Moliere

The SEP article The Computational Theory of Mind asks "Could the mind itself be a thinking machine?". This brings in the problem of consciousness, in that it doesn't seem that a thinking machine would need to be conscious in order to calculate. Does the fact that we are conscious mean that we are more than thinking machines, or is it the case that consciousness is a by-product of very complex thinking machines.

- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know — Moliere

According to Chomsky, E-language (language) is something abstract externalized from the actual apparatus of our mind and I-language (grammar) is the physical mechanism of our brain. If the E-language is generated by the I-language, then, the E-language won't be over-determining the I-language, in the same way that naming the colour red as "red" isn't an instance of over-determination.

Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions) — Moliere

In a sense, everything is both abstract and concrete. For example, a university is both an abstract idea yet is concretely instantiated in buildings and staff.

Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? — schopenhauer1

Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind.

What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"? — Banno

Cognition is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. The I-language exists in the physical structure of the brain.

Cognition requires thoughts in the brain, but doesn't distinguish between Chomsky's Innatism, where some thoughts result from structures biologically preset in the human brain, from Skinner's Behaviourism, where all thoughts are products of learning from interactions with the environment.

Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind. — RussellA

It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will.

What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? — Janus

If something that was not a mammal had been named "a dog", then the statement "a dog is not a mammal" would be analytic.

So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic? — Janus

The statement "this is cool" is ambiguous, in that cool can mean "low temperature" or "fashionably attractive".

If "low temperature" has been named "cool", then "cool is a temperature" is analytic. If "fashionably attractive" has been named "cool", then "cool is fashionable" is analytic.

Even if the meaning of a word was ambiguous, for each meaning an analytic statement can be found.

It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will. — schopenhauer1

You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.

A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill.

You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.

A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill. — RussellA

But that’s what I’m saying, it doesn’t matter how it is labeled- an object manifested the property of rolling by its action with other objects. It may not be judged as round but acts that way.

But that’s what I’m saying, it doesn’t matter how it is labeled- an object manifested the property of rolling by its action with other objects. It may not be judged as round but acts that way. — schopenhauer1

I may be misunderstanding. You say that the object may not be judged as rolling, but it acts as if it were rolling.

How is it known that the object is acting as if it were rolling rather than acting in any other way, such as bouncing?

it would be a shame not to ask for clarifications. — Manuel

I have a relevant question from before this thread started, that I have not yet found an answer to. Should I put it on the original thread "Guest Speaker: Noam Chomsky" ?

"Many on the Forum seem to believe that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities. As with Skinner's Behaviourism, they believe that everything is learnt from the environment, including language.

What is the best argument we can use to persuade the Behaviourist of the impossibility that everything we know has been learnt from the environment without any foundation of certain innate abilities already built into the physical structure of the brain?"

Sure.

That's why that thread is there, for precisely such questions.

How is it known that the object is acting as if it were rolling rather than acting in any other way, such as bouncing? — RussellA

It is not known. It is manifested in the interaction of ball with ground. It doesn’t need to be apprehended. The object does as it does in relation to the other object. In this case the object rolls down a hill. Properties of solidity and gravity are manifested in the relation of the two objects.

It is not known. It is manifested in the interaction of ball with ground. It doesn’t need to be apprehended. The object does as it does in relation to the other object. In this case the object rolls down a hill. Properties of solidity and gravity are manifested in the relation of the two objects. — schopenhauer1

I can't resist. How do you know the object "rolls" down the hill, if, as you say "it is not known"?

I can't resist. How do you know the object "rolls" down the hill, if, as you say "it is not known"? — RussellA

I think this can be answered in various ways, one of them referring back to Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology.

Whether human or non-human, all objects should be given equal attention;
Objects are not identical to their properties;
There are two aspects to any object the ‘real object’ (RO) and the ‘sensory object’ (SO);
Real objects can only relate to one another via their sensory object;
The properties of objects are also divided into real and sensual;
The real object and the sensory object with their distinct properties or qualities (RQ and SQ) create four basis permutations: time, space (the two Kantian constructs), essence and eidos;
Philosophy has a closer relationship with aesthetics than mathematics or sciences. — Blog on OOO

Let's start a different thread on this though. Now we are venturing into metaphysics.

So 'analytic' for you just means 'true by virtue of some current definition'?

Which is to say, true by use, and to drop the notion of something being true by meaning.

Well. yes, since definitions are codifications of usages.

Yep. So we must drop the idea that a sentence can be true in virtue of the meaning of it's terms alone.

This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. — RussellA

I suppose that I was thrown as a result of you saying that no one would know it's meaning. I should have asked if you believed that the statement has meaning in that case, because "it" referred to the statement. The time frame in question was void of humans. So, I wondered why and/or how you believed that statements could still be meaningful in such a situation.

I would agree that there are no such things as meaningful language or statements in that situation. If we imagine a time in the future when all humans have perished, the once meaningful and true statement "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris" would be neither true nor meaningful.

That's why saying that "no one would be around to know it's meaning" threw me a bit. Still does, but the thread is more about the analytic synthetic distinction, and Chomsky's take on that. So... I'll leave well enough alone...

Thanks for the answers.

:smile:

There is an interesting consequence of Chomsky's temporal/causal rearrangement of grammar and language. As it was traditionally held, performance generated competence. Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance.

It's far more complicated than this snippet, but I found that consequence intriguing.

Chomsky's view also makes perfect sense of baby babble and twin speak, moreso than other traditional views. I do struggle a bit to make sense of the claims that equate grammar, universal grammar, and/or I language to physical structures in the brain.

So 'analytic' for you just means 'true by virtue of some current definition'? — Janus

Yes.

Given the word "mkataba", what does it mean? It has no meaning until someone gives it a meaning. Suppose someone says it means "in a manner that is usually done", but someone else says it means "large hill", who determines what the word should mean. Presumably either an Institution or accepted by common usage . The meaning is decided by convention by the society within which the word will be used. Eventually, once agreed by common convention, it's accepted meaning may be codified in a dictionary.

Similarly with the word "analytic". The fact that we accept that it means "true by virtue of the meaning of the words or concepts used to express it, so that its denial would be a self-contradiction." rather than "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop." must be because of convention.

In para 43 of PI, Wittgenstein wrote "For a large class of cases, though not for all, in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language".

The problem for philosophy, who use language as their primary tool, is that language is something self-referential, a Wittgensteinian language game or a Quinean web of belief. If Quine is correct and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic disappears, philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences, where both discuss pragmatic synthetic generalities rather than logical analytic truths.

As with Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth, where he showed that truth in a language can only be found in a language which is stronger than the language itself, ie, a metalanguage, if philosophy needs to consider analytic truths rather than synthetic generalities, then it must discover how to make the jump from the synthetic linguistic to the analytic extralinguistic.

Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance — creativesoul

Max Verstappen performed well at the 2022 Formula 1 would championships because he was competent driver.

Would anyone say that he only became a competent driver after performing well at the championships.

The problem for philosophy, who use language as their primary tool, is that language is something self-referential, a Wittgensteinian language game or a Quinean web of belief. If Quine is correct and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic disappears, philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences, where both discuss pragmatic synthetic generalities rather than logical analytic truths. — RussellA

*nodding along, petting his cat, evil-like* Yes, yeess, yeeessss!!! :D

Although I'd put it like this -- philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences with the analytic/synthetic distinction. We can make other distinctions, though. Philosophy is very good at making distinctions -- so good at it that we can get lost in them and forget what it was they were originally posited for. I think analytic/synthetic behaves like that: for Kant the whole distinction was to point out the curious category of a priori synthetic knowledge, but somehow we get to analyticity as truth from meaning alone in the circuitous route from there to now.

I think philosophical axiology is what really differentiates philosophy from the other branches of The Liberal Arts and Sciences in this big-picture view of knowledge -- and in this big-picture view of knowledge, the university only defines a small portion of what is known. Philosophy doesn't need to be bound by problems. It creates its own problems. It's not even necessarily bound by the university. It created the university. And questioning the analytic/synthetic distinction is part of that creative spirit that questions not just the distinctions of others, but also its own distinctions.

Philosophy doesn't need to be bound by problems. It creates its own problems. It's not even necessarily bound by the university. It created the university. — Moliere

:100:

Philosophy deliberates on those questions that the natural sciences don't need to think about, yet are still important questions.

Well, I find that there are examples of both. I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience. I've done fairly well in public speeches, including impromptu, using quick outline notes, and well rehearsed written speeches. So, performance with language use(E language) has multiple ways it can considered.

Oral - on the fly. Oral - after practice. Written - on the fly. Written - after editing. Written - after practice. That's just right off the top of my head...

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable.

I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul

Perhaps it’s the capacity for quick symbolic reference and syntactic generation, not necessarily content. E language can’t be acquired but through a brain that has modules for such easy acquisition.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Language_Instinct

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Symbolic_Species#:~:text=The%20Symbolic%20Species%20is%20a,co%2Devolved%20with%20the%20brain.

I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience — creativesoul

I agree that "practice makes perfect".

The more one practices, the more competent one becomes, ie practice generates competency. The more competent one becomes the better one's performance will be, ie, competency generates performance.

As you say, and as Chomsky says, "competency generates performance".

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul

I hit my hand with a hammer and feel pain. I was born with the innate ability to feel pain, it is not something I needed to learn at school. Although I may express my pain using words in an E-language, I don't need an E-language to feel pain. Pain is a concept in my mind.

Chomsky says concepts wouldn't exist without language, and as concepts exist in the mind, this language exists in the mind as an I-language.

Chomsky has said that the relation between thought and language is that of identity:
"Take a look at the human species, what sharply differentiates it from any organic species we know of are two things, possession of language and possession of thought, I have two identifying features of a species. The first question that comes to mind is what is their relation. The simplest relation would be identity ...............language and thought are intimately related. Language has historically been called audible thought"

Chonmsy has said that concepts wouldn't exist without language:
"Even the simplest concepts, tree, desk, person, dog, whatever you want. Even these are extremely complex in the internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto-human history when there was no language they would have been useless. It would have been an accident if they had developed and they would quickly have been lost because you cannot do anything with them"

My feeling of pain is a private concept, full of meaning to me and regardless of others.

As my private concepts make up my I-Language, my I-language has private meaning.

Chomsky is not saying that the I-language uses words, such as "pain", "tree", "circle". He is saying that the I-language has the characteristics of language as generally understood. A syntax of innate rules ensuring that the arrangement of thoughts and concepts are structurally well-formed, and semantic meaning of sense, reference, presupposition, implication in the relationship between thoughts and concepts.

If there was only an E-language and no I-language, inside the mind would be an empty void.

Thanks for the explanation. In what little spare time available I've been watching Chomsky. There's an abundance of interviews old and new. It seems you've fairly characterized the main thrust of his view. I particularly noted that he's prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level. Our views differ there, so it's probably best for me to end it here.

I should clarify that I agree with saying that language and thought are the very same thing at their core. It's just that my explanation of that core is starkly different than Chomsky's I language or innate grammar.

I particularly noted that he's Chomsky) prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level — creativesoul

:grin: