I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine — Moliere
- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know — Moliere
Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions) — Moliere
Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? — schopenhauer1
What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"? — Banno
Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind. — RussellA
What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? — Janus
So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic? — Janus
It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will. — schopenhauer1
You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.
A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill. — RussellA
But that’s what I’m saying, it doesn’t matter how it is labeled- an object manifested the property of rolling by its action with other objects. It may not be judged as round but acts that way. — schopenhauer1
it would be a shame not to ask for clarifications. — Manuel
How is it known that the object is acting as if it were rolling rather than acting in any other way, such as bouncing? — RussellA
It is not known. It is manifested in the interaction of ball with ground. It doesn’t need to be apprehended. The object does as it does in relation to the other object. In this case the object rolls down a hill. Properties of solidity and gravity are manifested in the relation of the two objects. — schopenhauer1
I can't resist. How do you know the object "rolls" down the hill, if, as you say "it is not known"? — RussellA
Whether human or non-human, all objects should be given equal attention;
Objects are not identical to their properties;
There are two aspects to any object the ‘real object’ (RO) and the ‘sensory object’ (SO);
Real objects can only relate to one another via their sensory object;
The properties of objects are also divided into real and sensual;
The real object and the sensory object with their distinct properties or qualities (RQ and SQ) create four basis permutations: time, space (the two Kantian constructs), essence and eidos;
Philosophy has a closer relationship with aesthetics than mathematics or sciences. — Blog on OOO
This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. — RussellA
So 'analytic' for you just means 'true by virtue of some current definition'? — Janus
Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance — creativesoul
The problem for philosophy, who use language as their primary tool, is that language is something self-referential, a Wittgensteinian language game or a Quinean web of belief. If Quine is correct and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic disappears, philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences, where both discuss pragmatic synthetic generalities rather than logical analytic truths. — RussellA
Philosophy doesn't need to be bound by problems. It creates its own problems. It's not even necessarily bound by the university. It created the university. — Moliere
I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul
I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience — creativesoul
I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul
I particularly noted that he's Chomsky) prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level — creativesoul
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