I think consciousness is casual.
— Patterner
I’m puzzled. I think “casual” here may be a typo. Is that right? — Ludwig V

Heh. Yes. Causal. Knowing the speech to text and swiping make a lot of errors, I try to proofread. I obviously do not always succeed.

Our consciousness, our awareness, is nothing more than lumps of matter noticing what’s going on.
— Patterner
I don't disagree. — Ludwig V

I do. We do more than notice.

But there are different kinds of lumps of matter. Some of them are conscious. Others are money. Others are people we love.

I’m still puzzled.

Are numbers, words, logical variables, musical notes, lumps of matter? What about shadows, rainbows, surfaces, colours, boundaries, sub-atomic particles?

Votes, contracts, insults, punches, all involve lumps of matter, but are they lumps of matter?

Pictures are lumps of matter, but are they just lumps of matter like any other?

Card games all involve lumps of matter, but does that mean there is no important difference between them? Banknotes are all lumps of matter, but it doesn't follow they all have the same value. — Ludwig V

There's a lot of territory to cover here.

I'm not sure how you mean some of these things. Printed numbers, words, musical notes, etc., are lumps of matter. Spoken words, audible musical notes, etc., are lumps of matter, since they are vibrating air molecules.

Of course, all of these things are only lumps of matter if they are not being perceived and interpreted by a human. Only consciousness makes things more than lumps of matter.

However, the thought of these things are not lumps of matter. The medium of the thought, a human brain, is. But the brain is not the number, word, or logical variable. A particular arrangement of all the constituent parts of the brain is not the number 7. The printed 7 means what it means because we assigned it that meaning. Could the arrangement of the brain's constituent parts have that same meaning? Are the arrangements, and progressions of arrangements, of the brain's constituent parts symbols representing numbers, words, thoughts...? Is this system of symbols and meanings an objective system that is built into the laws of physics, such that the arrangements progress one after the other, as they must, due to the laws of physics; and, at the same time, those arrangements also have objective meanings such that they are our thoughts progressing one after the other, and the logic that connects one thought to the next is due to these law-driven arrangements?

Let me try an analogy. There used to be a popular philosophical theory – sense-datum theory. This argued that everything that we know, including our concepts, comes from the senses. Many people took this to mean that everything can be reduced to sense-data. Hence, physics can be reduced to sense-data. So what would you say to them? — Ludwig V

I would tell them I disagree. I do not think our thoughts are the result of nothing but the arrangements of the constituent parts of our brains that come about due to the laws of physics. We certainly need sense-data for our brains to form connections and pathways, and for consciousness to form. (Anybody think an infant born with no ability to sense anything will become a thinking person?)

But it's not only the sense-data and physics. We can give machines sensory apparatus far superior to ours, program them with the totality of the rules of mathematics as we currently understand them, and give them all the feedback loops we want. That's a head start we didn't have. In I Am a Strange Loop, Hofstadter said: '..."having semantics" (which means the ability to genuinely think about things, as contrasted with the "mere" ability to juggle meaningless tokens in complicated patterns...)' Despite any head start we give them, making them superior to us in any way we can, do these machines "have semantics"? Can we program consciousness into them, because consciousness is nothing but particles following rules? Why are we not as they are, collections of particles following rules, not noticing, and thinking about, what we're doing?

Love your quartets, btw.
— Patterner
I'm glad to hear it. I love them too. I wish I had written them, but glad I don't have to live that tortured life. — Ludwig V

I've had Op 127 in my head since your first response to me. Finally listening to it right now.

Fortunately, also, the argument relies on the fact that we can tell wrong from right. — Ludwig V

I don't see this. Right from wrong is a judgement made by reason. If reason is fallible so is that judgement.

Knowing the speech to text and swiping make a lot of errors, I try to proofread. I obviously do not always succeed. — Patterner

It's a common error. I was educated on texts that were derived from manuscripts, which meant that I had to deal with the science of variant readings. It's just part of the way things are.

Can we program consciousness into them, because consciousness is nothing but particles following rules? Why are we not as they are, collections of particles following rules, not noticing, and thinking about, what we're doing? — Patterner

I don't know whether we can program machines to be conscious or not and I don't know why or how we are conscious. Maybe there'll be answers some day. In the mean time we are making a philosophical mistake that was first made by Plato - thinking that the latest scientific development is the answer to everything.

But it's not only the sense-data and physics. — Patterner

It depends whether you mean that it is the addition of some thing (not something) else. I don't think a disembodied mind can exist, although it seems that people can not only imagine such a thing, but believe in it. A physical dimension or substrate is necessary. But a rock doesn't have a mind and is not conscious. It doesn't have the equipment. The equipment required is more than brain. As you say, sense-organs are not optional, although their capacities are variable. The brain is pretty useless unless it is attached to a the spinal column and indeed the entire nervous system. But even that is not enough, I think. It needs a glandular system, which gives us much of our motivation, and a skeleto-muscular system that enables action. But the body is not the mind. I'm not confident to articulate anything beyond that, but I know that I am a person, a human being, a living body and conscious. And I know that I am not four distinct entities. Now I'm rambling because I don't have anything coherent to say.

But I have an impression that we are, after all, on the same page, at least.

I've had Op 127 in my head since your first response to me. Finally listening to it right now. — Patterner

Good choice.

I don't see this. Right from wrong is a judgement made by reason. If reason is fallible so is that judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. I didn't mean to imply it was anything but fallible. So long as we get it right sometimes and can correct our errors when we become aware of them. I'm afraid total security is not available.

Hume's method is to portray reason as infallible — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he portray reason as infallible?

In the mean time we are making a philosophical mistake that was first made by Plato - thinking that the latest scientific development is the answer to everything. — Ludwig V

Heh. I suspect not.

I don't think a disembodied mind can exist, although it seems that people can not only imagine such a thing, but believe in it. — Ludwig V

Can't imagine the mind exists independent of the brain. Seems to me the mind is the brain, doing... mind things.

Maybe someday we'll make minds in an electronic medium. And that mind won't exist independent of that electronic brain.

Now I'm rambling because I don't have anything coherent to say. — Ludwig V

Never stopped me. If I haven't already demonstrated that, it won't be long.

I think things are simpler than they appear in this discussion. For my part, I believe that one can very well make predictions based on scientific calculations. The only thing we cannot say is why these principles must be valid tomorrow. We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow.

Where does he portray reason as infallible? — Fooloso4

He doesn't. I assumed it was an error.

Can't imagine the mind exists independent of the brain. Seems to me the mind is the brain, doing... mind things. — Patterner

It's complicated. My heart pumps blood; I don't. My kidneys filter my blood; I don't. My muscles move my arm, fingers, legs; but I (and not my brain) walk and type and wave. My brain is clearly a key part of seeing and thinking, but I do those things, not my brain.

We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow. — Jacques

It's inescapably true that scientific theories can be replaced, and very likely that the ones we know will be replaced. That's progress, so worrying about it seems inappropriate.

But I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong, it was just that Aristotelian physics only works in restricted circumstances. Einstein didn't show that Newton was wrong, just that Newtonian physics doesn't apply near the speed of light. The idea that the earth is flat is just wrong, but the idea that it is a sphere is compatible with Ptolemy (with the earth at the centre of the universe). But the resulting astronomy would be very complicated and inaccurate; Copernicus/Kepler is simpler and more accurate.

Can't imagine the mind exists independent of the brain. Seems to me the mind is the brain, doing... mind things.
— Patterner

It's complicated. My heart pumps blood; I don't. My kidneys filter my blood; I don't. My muscles move my arm, fingers, legs; but I (and not my brain) walk and type and wave. My brain is clearly a key part of seeing and thinking, but I do those things, not my brain. — Ludwig V

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.)

I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong — Ludwig V

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.) — Patterner

I agree, of course, that If I lose my brain, I cannot think of myself as me. But it would be a very delicate balance to produce exactly the right brain damage to achieve loss of self without immense collateral damage up to and including death.

However, I do think that more than just a brain is needed to maintain a sense of self. It's not quite the same issue, but you did say earlier:-

We certainly need sense-data for our brains to form connections and pathways, and for consciousness to form. (Anybody think an infant born with no ability to sense anything will become a thinking person?) — Patterner

There's a constant temptation to identify this or that feature of human beings to this or that physiological component. Often, that's possible. But not always, and being a person is a case in point - or so it seems to me.

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different. — Jacques

No, it isn't. I didn't intend to say that. Especially as he admired Newton. Apparently his ambition was to become the Newton of psychology. It's much more likely that he intended to supplement Newton by placing psychology on a firm foundation, just as Newton placed physics on a firm foundation.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. — Patterner

Man with Tiny Brain Shocks Doctors

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.) — Patterner

I agree. I think the brain, neuroscience, and structure and function generally, is totally relevant to the issue of what constitutes the self. But the self isn't consciousness. All reductionist theories of consciousness would be better reframed as theories of the self.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.)
— Patterner

I agree, of course, that If I lose my brain, I cannot think of myself as me. But it would be a very delicate balance to produce exactly the right brain damage to achieve loss of self without immense collateral damage up to and including death.

However, I do think that more than just a brain is needed to maintain a sense of self. It's not quite the same issue, but you did say earlier:-
We certainly need sense-data for our brains to form connections and pathways, and for consciousness to form. (Anybody think an infant born with no ability to sense anything will become a thinking person?)
— Patterner

There's a constant temptation to identify this or that feature of human beings to this or that physiological component. Often, that's possible. But not always, and being a person is a case in point - or so it seems to me. — Ludwig V

I’ve never been in a sensory-deprivation tank. I suppose an extended stay in one might give hints on how much of our self would remain if our brain was removed and put in a life-support mechanism that gave no sensory input. Certainly, we need sensory input to develop a self. I wonder how much we need it to remain a self.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain.
— Patterner

Man with Tiny Brain Shocks Doctors — Wayfarer

That is incredible! Thanks.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.)
— Patterner

I agree. I think the brain, neuroscience, and structure and function generally, is totally relevant to the issue of what constitutes the self. But the self isn't consciousness. All reductionist theories of consciousness would be better reframed as theories of the self. — bert1

Yes, it seems awkward to say the self is consciousness, even if there is no self without it.

Man with Tiny Brain Shocks Doctors — Wayfarer

I'm surprised that the doctors were shocked. I've heard of this phenomenon before. Indeed, I once knew someone who had this condition diagnosed. There were absolutely no evident symptoms of abnormality. The brain is an amazing thing.

the issue of what constitutes the self. — bert1

The answer is that what constitutes my self is me. There's no need to reify the self as some part of me. Indeed the question whether some part of me is my self creates some questions that are very hard to understand. If that part of me were to be damaged or destroyed, who would I be?

It does seem, however that most physical damage does not affect who I am. It is mental damage, such as the various dementias or the phenomena of multiple personalities, that creates the issue. I don't see a clear borderline there. Note, I'm not saying that mental damage doesn't have a physical basis, just that what interferes or prevents the various functions and activities that we classify as mental can lead us to feel that this is not longer the same person or even not a person.

The brain is an amazing thing. — Ludwig V

Would seem rather an awkward case for neural reductionism.

Certainly, we need sensory input to develop a self. I wonder how much we need it to remain a self. — Patterner

I can't see how we would ever be able to find out. On the other hand, being regarded as a person and, in my opinion, learning to be a person both require the ability to interact with others. So one does not need only the senses, but the entire sensori-motor system.

Would seem rather an awkward case for neural reductionism. — Wayfarer

There doesn't seem to be any major effect on normal life. I'm sure that neural reductionists would be happy to accept that brain function can be preserved even under these circumstances. That's what is so surprising about these cases. The only symptom that could be identified in the case of the person I knew is that they seemed to get a lot of headaches.