This is nonsense. Of course you know what it's like to be you. If physicalists have to make this sort of move to salvage their position, they've lost. It's not convincing to anyone. — RogueAI
But that's not his hypothesis (or he's being disingenous). Kastrup's hypothesis is idealism. Idealism claims that this is all the dream of a cosmic mind/god. Mutations, entanglement, physics, the universe, the Big Bang, etc., none of it is real. It's all just elements of the dream. — RogueAI
When I claim that reductive physicalism has a ‘hard problem of consciousness’, I am claiming that it is impossible for that metaphysical theory to explain consciousness: — Bob Ross
I am not claiming that we merely haven’t yet. — Bob Ross
so in order to explain consciousness on this view one has to reduce mental states to brain states. — Bob Ross
[set of biological functions] impact consciousness in [this way]” — Bob Ross
why do those biological functions give rise to consciousness? — Bob Ross
:100: :fire:The brain is part of an organism. Physicalism need not be reductive physicalism. The recognition that a living organism can be conscious, is not reductive. To look at an organism as a whole is not reductive physicalism. To claim that consciousness must come from elsewhere because a physical explanation must be reductive is misguided. — Fooloso4
But that line of reasoning is untenable. There is no way to compare noumena and phenomena in order to determine that the one is not the other. — creativesoul
It very well may be separate metaphysics attribute to things-in-themselves and noumena a knowledgeable reality of their own, but in Kant, having given only 26 pages to objective reality, the implication is that nothing about them has any significance. — Mww
So at this point noumena is a conception understanding thinks but can’t do anything with. — Mww
The mind-independent world is not naturally divided into individual parts — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p92)
I can see absolutely no reason to think that individuation relies on conscious observers. — Janus
The recognition that a living organism can be conscious, is not reductive. To look at an organism as a whole is not reductive physicalism. To claim that consciousness must come from elsewhere because a physical explanation must be reductive is misguided. — Fooloso4
’In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science.’ — Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science
Right, you have said that several times. But that is not something you know.
…
Right. You are claiming that we can never provide a physical explanation. But again, that is just an assertion, and it is not evidently true.
There you go. Based on your definition. But creating a definition and then rejection something because it contradicts your definition does not hold water.
You say that I am question begging because my definition merely precludes scientific investigation. I want to clarify that I am not doing that: my definition of a ‘hard problem’ is that it is irreconcilable under the view in question—there is nothing question begging about that. I am then, on top of using that definition, claiming that the ‘problem’ of consciousness for reductive physicalism is a hard problem in the sense that I defined it. There is nothing question begging about that because I am not saying that the definition is the proof of it being a hard problem. Now let me explain why I think there is a hard problem of consciousness for reductive physicalism (and it is not merely a soft problem of consciousness).
The Hard Problem is a term of art. It has a specific meaning as defined by Chalmers and is used as defined. Calling something "a hard problem", stipulating it is irreconcilable with physicalism, is your problem, not the accepted meaning of the hard problem.
Physicalism need not be reductive physicalism.
The recognition that a living organism can be conscious, is not reductive
To claim that consciousness must come from elsewhere because a physical explanation must be reductive is misguided.
It is not that biological functions impact consciousness but that it creates consciousness.
To ignore these physical organisms because you reject reductive physicalism is willful blindness.
Whatever distance is discovered, not invented, and not existentially dependent on whatever human discoverers' heads. :shrug: — jorndoe
Charles Pinter makes his case very well. Try and imagine the Universe from the perspective of a rock. That might provide a hint. — Wayfarer
You seem to be wrong here jorndoe. Miles, km, etc., all those terms you used to express the distance refer to something invented, not discovered. It seems you have this backward, distance is invented not discovered. — Metaphysician Undercover
Distance to the Moon doesn't begin to exist because someone makes an estimate, rather it can be estimated because it exists. — jorndoe
I can imagine a rock existing without there being any conscious observer of it — Janus
The distance between here and the moon is indeterminate until it's measured. — Metaphysician Undercover
But this does not imply that the value existed before the measurement. Prior to measurement there was just an assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover
if the measurement of the distance between here and the moon fixes the distance, this does not imply that the distance existed before the act of measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover
There's something interesting here, don't rush past it. — Srap Tasmaner
So, perhaps a better way of saying it would be 'I can, without contradiction or inconsistency, think that rocks exist when no one is looking at them'. — Janus
Yeah, but I'm not sure we can just switch from visualizing to something vague like "conceiving" and declare the problem solved. I think it was Hume who noted that to conceive of something is to conceive of it existing -- which cuts both ways: on the one hand, there's no "and existing" step, which either means existence is not a real predicate (which Hume says in almost so many words), or it means it's already baked in, i.e., it's at the very least part of how we think things. — Srap Tasmaner
When I imagine, for example, a planet in a far distant galaxy I just have an image of a planet. However, in this case I am visualizing a planet, which means I am relying on perceptible attributes in order to do that. — Janus
And this is different to thinking that there could be a planet in a distant galaxy that has never been or ever will be seen by humans or any other percipient entities. — Janus
I can visualize an empty room, for example — Janus
Think it'll work for conceiving unobserved rocks? — Srap Tasmaner
I found that substance dualism, likewise, fails to explain reality as well as analytical idealism because of the hard problem of interaction. — Bob Ross
Firstly, objects in general, under analytical idealism, are not disassociated complexes: only other conscious beings are. The cup I am holding exists only nominally distinctly from the chair I am sitting on: they both do not have distinct boundaries like disassociated minds. — Bob Ross
Secondly, I agree with you that DID is still a very newly researched psychological disorder, and that is why Kastrup notes it as a working hypothesis to solve to soft problem of decomposition. — Bob Ross
And yes, these objects don't have a natural separation point in which we can say this is a cup and this other thing is a table, on which the cup rests on, there's no reason why we can't take both things to be a single object. — Manuel
So that passage quoted from Magee, which I have no argument with, puts paid to Kastrup's notion of mind at large, and even to Schopenhauer's notion of "noumena as will", since "will' is a human category. — Janus
I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters.
I had a hard time understanding what you were conveying, as I think we just use terminology differently, so let me ask some questions pertaining thereto.
Subjective Idealism and solipsism aren't ideas
By “idea”, I was meaning it in the colloquial sense of the term. Technically, those are metaphysical theories. One is a sub-type of idealism that does not hold there is an objective reality but, rather, that all that exists is to perceive or to be perceived (e.g., the tree doesn’t exist other than an image within your perception). The other is the theory that all that exists is one’s own mind, or, epistemically speaking, one can only know the existence of their own mind. — Bob Ross
"Being is perception" is an unavoidable tautology of non-representational idealism that is necessarily appealed to whenever an observer interprets a physical proposition in terms of his personal experiences
I don’t see how this is true. For example, both physicalists and analytic idealists hold that being is more than perception. No one inevitably speaking in terms of their experiences forcing “being” to be perception. Why would that be the case? — Bob Ross
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