I find there to be a conceptual error here of Kant’s (and maybe perhaps Schopenhauer to) of the mind’s ontological status. — Bob Ross
If the forms of representation are space and time, then that thereby (by my lights) admits the mind as having ontological status. — Bob Ross
If we have no access to the things-in-themselves because our experience is just the expression of them in space and time which is produced by our minds, then our minds must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
The only way to reconcile this (by my lights) is for Kant to claim that our minds have no ontological status either—but, then, the mind cannot be producing space and time. What would your response to that be? — Bob Ross
I find that Kant’s view is incompatible with reasonable, parsimonious metaphysical explanations of scientific knowledge. — Bob Ross
if our mind doesn’t ontologically exist, then it can’t be producing space and time to represent things to itself. — Bob Ross
with Kant’s view, we are forced to claim that we cannot infer that there is an natural environment, that we are impacted by other bodies, etc. because we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
…..has great significance for understanding the situation we find ourselves in. — Janus
The objection to Dennett remains that no third-person account of even something as simple as pain can ‘do justice’ to the actual feeling of pain, because no amount of analysis of the firing of nerve fibres, no matter how scientifically accurate, actually constitutes ‘the feeling of pain’ (‘what it is like to be in pain’). This is why, for example, John Searle parodied Dennett’s book as ‘Consciousness Explained Away’. — Wayfarer
Is this another way of saying that it's not measured until it's measured? — Srap Tasmaner
With respect to the distance "itself", as it were, it is indeterminate before measurement; with respect to those who will measure, but haven't yet, there is an assumption that the distance is measurable, that it can be determined. Is this a way of saying that scientists, unless they are foolish indeed, ought to agree that values they have not determined are values they have not yet determined? Or is there more to this assumption? — Srap Tasmaner
If by "distance" you mean a value, the result of a measurement, indeed it won't exist until it exists. Or do you mean that the spatial separation of the earth from the moon doesn't exist until someone thinks it does? Something must underwrite the assumption that "it" can be measured; its existence of that "it" to be measured would do nicely. — Srap Tasmaner
then how come we sometimes get it wrong? We can get estimates wrong. (Some more than others.) Doesn't make sense for inventions. That's the direction of existential dependency. — jorndoe
I prefer to talk about "universal consiousness" rather than "universal mind".The idea is that, although we can’t infer that everything is a part of a universal mind by directly experiencing it ... — Bob Ross
In order to infer its existence we must use one or the other worldview, theory, system, etc. Their multiplicity only indicates how hard --for me, impossible-- this is. And somewhere here enters the HPC that you mentioned.... we can infer that it exists because otherwise we have no ability to explain the mental: we have the hard problem of consciousness. — Bob Ross
Right. But also positing that it is mind-dependent leads to an impasse. That's why I maintain that only experience can lead to such knowledge.We posit that the most parsimonious explanation for what reality fundamentally is is mentality because positing it is mind-independent leads to an irreconcilable dilemma. — Bob Ross
Well, I think I explained the difference. (Well, for me at least, it is very obvious. And I'm sure you can see that from what I have said so far on the subject.)we infer there is a universal mind just like we infer there are other conscious animals — Bob Ross
the kind of existence they have is unimaginable to us, we can only imagine that they do not have the kind of existence they have as perceived phenomena, so it is an apophatic kind of imagining — Janus
in fact it is more difficult to imagine that they cease to exist when not being perceived — Janus
The assumption that there is an existential distance which can be measured is the false and misleading assumption. The better assumption would be that the distance is produced, or created by the measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover
The truth of this is demonstrated by the fact that different measuring techniques will produce a different measurement (as indicated by jorndoe's post), and each will be a valid measurement by the principles of the technique. — Metaphysician Undercover
The distance between here and the moon is indeterminate until it's measured. This means that there is no fixed value. The variance in the numbers you [ i.e., @jorndoe ] gave are evidence of this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Distance to the Moon doesn't begin to exist because someone makes an estimate, rather it can be estimated because it exists. — May 27, 2023
That's the direction of existential dependency. — May 28, 2023
I outlined an argument for why I do know this. I am unsure as to why you said this: it is unproductive. — Bob Ross
This is true and that is why I specifically used the term ‘reductive physicalism’. I do not think that irreductive physicalism is a valid position (as it either dissolves into reductive physicalism or becomes a closeted substance dualism). I can elaborate on that if you would like. — Bob Ross
Correct, but the claim that the living organism is fundamentally a mind-independent organism is to reduce consciousness thereto. — Bob Ross
If one cannot account for consciousness with a reductive physicalist approach, then the only other option is that it is not emergent. The proof that it is emergent rides on the idea that it can be reduced to brain states. — Bob Ross
As I said before (in the proof), the only way to argue that it creates consciousness (without just making it up) is to argue in the form of “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impact consciousness in [this way]”. You are assuming it creates consciousness even though this form of argument cannot prove it. — Bob Ross
The only way you can prove that consciousness is produced by the brain is by the reductive physicalist method. — Bob Ross
So if you can’t prove it with reductive physicalism, then you have no reason to believe it. — Bob Ross
It's the eternal problem of the one and the many. Are we ourselves in reality separate beings or are we one being, that perceives itself as many? The latter option is not so trivial to get rid of...
Still basing a large part of one's philosophy on DID is risky and one should be cautious in relying on it too much. Maybe when more is learned, it could be sensible to use, or it could end up being a false avenue.
If your "analytic" idealism abandons "esse is percipi" how does it differ from representational realism?
Berkeley's subjective idealism was already "analytic" in the sense that he postulated that observation and conception is tautologically equivalent to existence.
What Berkeley's principle is actually saying, is rather trivial ; that only what is observed or conceived can be thought or talked about. If a realist asserts that "unperceived objects such as quarks exist", Berkeley wouldn't contradict the content of the assertion but remind the realist that his use of "unperceived" requires elaboration until it refers to something thought or perceived, for the assertion to become sensical.
So no, the mind does not produce space and time, it conceives apodeitic conditions as explanatory devices. Therefore, it is possible the mind has no warrant for ontological status.
FYI, he wrote the precursor essays that would eventually become tectonic plate theory, nebular theory, tidal retardation of axial velocity theory...
Again, FYI……in CPR, mind is the subject of a proposition 176 times, reason is the subject over 1300 times, in ~800 pages total. Mind can be merely a convenient placeholder, signifying nothing more than the terminus of infinite regress hence omitted generally without detriment to a metaphysical theories of the human condition, but reason cannot, insofar as reason actually belongs to every human and without which he is just an animal. If we’re going to reify an abstract, let’s reify that which a human can be proved to possess, rather than that which he could conceivably do without.
Kant proves that the impossibility of denying the existence of my own body is sufficient to prove the existence of the external world. The reverse establishes the truth, in that without an external world conditioned on space and time, there is no apodeictic certainty for my own body, the denial of which is blatantly contradictory. As such, the inference of an external world is not necessary, for its reality is certain. It follows that that by which we are impacted and that from which representations are given and empirical knowledge is possible, is not the thing-in-itself, which is the ground of his empirical realism doctrine from the beginning.
Your way, re: the production of space and time, requires the production of two infinites, with all the irregularities found therein. My way needs no infinites, but only those spaces and times which condition the perception, or possible perception, of an object, followed by the experience or possible experience thereof.
BTW, how can we infer that "universal mind" exists? Can you present a specific agrumentation to support it?
By analogy, you cannot understand how an engine works by taking it apart. A pile of parts is not an engine. Taking it apart in only a part of the process whose goal is to understand the whole.
Insisting on a metaphysical position when trying to understand a biological organism is counterproductive
Physicalism is not a rejection of mind. To the contrary, it seeks to understand mind in terms of the organisms that have minds, without assuming that mind comes from somewhere other than the organism.
A misunderstanding of physicalism is not proof. Brain states are only part of the story. But of course the brain is an important part of the story. It is not clear what you think a brain state is.
Consciousness is not a set of biological functions. I think this mistake is the source of your claims about brain states.
I would counter by saying you can't prove it by metaphysical argument, but you think you have. Back to the top of this post.
(1) Measurements that have not been done have not been done.
(2) Distances are created not discovered.
Certainly yes, if you start from (2), you can derive (1). But (1) is a tautology, so you can get it from anything.
The question is whether the truism (1) provides any support for (2). — Srap Tasmaner
This is an actual argument for your position, so you need to spell it out. How do various techniques for determining a distance differ, what principles are involved, and how are they valid with respect only to their own principles not each other?
Looking back, I see that you take this variation as evidence: — Srap Tasmaner
The other side would like various techniques to give the same answer, or, in the case of estimates, roughly the same answer -- which means: the same, but only to a certain degree. — Srap Tasmaner
(Funny, Wayfarer used to make exactly the opposite argument, that because the content of a statement can be translated from one language to another -- as we might convert from imperial to metric, say -- this content must be somehow transcendent or whatever.) — Srap Tasmaner
There is something to get wrong. — jorndoe
And this is how all concepts and ideas are — Metaphysician Undercover
”So no, the mind does not produce space and time, it conceives apodeitic conditions as explanatory devices. Mww
But under Kantianism the mind is producing space and time (being synthetic a priori), is it not? Perhaps you have a neo-kantian view, but I am talking about Kant’s original argument. — Bob Ross
Correct me if I am wrong, but it sounds like Kant is arguing that there is an external world that is impressed onto our senses but that is not the thing-in-itself. But, then, I ask: doesn’t that concede that the mind’s synthetic a priori pure forms of intuition isn’t the only origin of space and time — Bob Ross
If we are admitting that the world is external to our mind and that it operates likewise in space and time, then space and time are not purely synthetic. What you say to that? — Bob Ross
To me, when I read CPR, it sounded like he was claiming anything beyond the two pure forms of intuition is the noumena (i.e., the things-in-themselves — Bob Ross
if the phenomenal world around me is just a representation under space and time that are synthetic of my mind, then I cannot know anything about an external world beyond my mind because it lies outside of space and time — Bob Ross
I don’t think my view requires two actualized infinite spaces and time — Bob Ross
I think within Kant’s view space and time are not a representation of anything — Bob Ross
I don’t see how this helps your case that physicalism doesn’t dissolve into reductive physicalism. The pile of parts of an engine does explain the weakly emergent property (or properties) of a running engine. — Bob Ross
Wayfarer used to make exactly the opposite argument, that because the content of a statement can be translated from one language to another -- as we might convert from imperial to metric, say -- this content must be somehow transcendent or whatever — Srap Tasmaner
It is not the analysis of the firing of nerve fibers but the actual firing of nerve fibers through stimulus that could cause a third person to report feeling pain. — Fooloso4
Physicalism is not a rejection of mind. — Fooloso4
But the point of the hard problem of consciousness argument is precisely that no amount of objective analysis can capture the first-person experience. — Wayfarer
You might ponder, then, what it is that ‘eliminative materialism’ seeks to eliminate. — Wayfarer
An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.’ — Wayfarer
So why do you call this something-or-other you're conceiving "unobserved rocks"? — Srap Tasmaner
in fact it is more difficult to imagine that they cease to exist when not being perceived
— Janus
Something like this then: when I imagine a rock existing unobserved, I imagine a rock and then conceptually remove things like color and other perceptible attributes, until I can only say that right there, where we would observe rocks if we were observing, there is something about which we can say nothing, except that it's still there when we're not looking. — Srap Tasmaner
You can and you can also pick up the table with cup on top of it or you can pick the table apart, say by breaking one of its legs. Or you can sit on the table and use it as a chair, say someone who has never seen a table, might use it that way. — Manuel
Nature supports making this distinction, enables it. — Srap Tasmaner
So, unlike jorndoe who seems to think that "distance" refers to some independent thing, I would say that the word "distance" refers to a specific type of interaction which we have with whatever it that is independent. So there is no real truth or falsity (in the sense of correspondence) with respect to distance, only conventional ways of acting and speaking, norms.The assumed "distance" is really as much a feature of the measurement as it is a feature of the reality or "itself" of the thing measured. Therefore the assumption that there is a distance "itself" is a false assumption, because "distance" requires an interaction between the "itself" and the subject's measurement.. — Metaphysician Undercover
So there is no real truth or falsity (in the sense of correspondence) with respect to distance, only conventional ways of acting and speaking, norms. — Metaphysician Undercover
But nevertheless, benefit of the doubt: where does the notion that space and time are synthetic a priori come from?
Since the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori and are recognized
with apodictic certainty, I would like to inquire as to the origin of such
propositions and what supports the understanding in order that it achieve to
such utterly necessary and universally valid perceptions?
Synthetic/analytic has to do with logic, hence subsumed under reason, but space and time have to do with empirical objects hence subsumed under intuition.
And while space and time are representations a priori, they are not synthetic.
Now this stipulates that there are synthetic a priori principles of knowledge, but that is not to say space and time are themselves synthetic a priori.
Whatever other origins there are for space and time are irrelevant to any system that conceives its own.
…
Could our intelligence originate space and time in a different way?
I say I understand the pure ideality of space and time, but don’t understand what you mean by qualifying them with synthetic.
Noumena are not things-in-themselves. The latter are real spatial-temporal existences, the existence of the former is only possible for an intelligence unlike our own.
If by beyond the two pure forms of intuition you mean not conditioned by them, then it is the case noumena are beyond them. Still, anything not conditioned by space and time is utterly unintelligible to us, therefore we are not authorized to say that which is beyond them, are noumena.
Again with your vocabulary, the mind is not outside time, is conditioned by it
how can anything at all be known beyond the mind, if the mind is absolutely necessary and sufficient for all knowledge.
in that mere perception and representation in phenomena does not give any knowledge at all.
You said the mind produces, and in common vernacular to produce is to actualize, I should think.
Space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each other; in other words, space does not represent to us any determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves.
Great talk; I’m liking it, so….thanks.
So why do you call this something-or-other you're conceiving "unobserved rocks"?
— Srap Tasmaner
It refers to whatever it is, apart from the human, that gives rise to observed rocks. — Janus
So there is a piece of a sort of "true by convention" account here. — Srap Tasmaner
Now you've granted that nature supports and enables our conceptualizations, and in this case using the word in the normal way is choosing that word instead of "smaller" only if the sun is further from here than the moon. The norm for usage of the word "bigger" requires something like this, else no one could understand and follow the norm. — Srap Tasmaner
For "bigger" to be meaningful at all, there must be things (I'm speaking loosely and generally here) that are stably different sizes. — Srap Tasmaner
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