Roughly, I'm not convinced you've made any progress toward removing us from your conceptions. — Srap Tasmaner

Some would argue that it is not at all possible to remove us from our conceptions. be that as it may, I see two justifications for using "rocks": First, when I see an x (any familiar object) in a particular location, and remark on it, I have never experienced anyone else saying "no, that's not an x, it's a y", so I think it's safe to conclude that whatever thing is there existing independently of us, it reliably gives rise to perceptions of an x. Second, the only thing in question now is whether there is anything there existing independently which gives rise to perceptions of a rock, and since the idea that there must be seems to be inescapable, I think the term 'rock in itself' to be distinguished from 'rock for us' is justified.

Except you seem to have forgotten that we were talking about unobserved rocks.

If you want to describe such a thing as having a "propensity" to produce rock conceptions, or an unrealized potential to, then you're still just saying it's a rock, using new words. And that means you still have to justify categorizing something unobserved. (Besides. if it's unobserved, you don't know anything about its propensities or potentials either.)

There is no need for things, that's the point Descartes made. All that is required is that we have similar perceptions — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that just kicks the can down the road. I don't know why talk about "us" and the similarity of "our perceptions" should be countenanced when talk of other things is not.

Same for the treatment of convention you build on top of this:

And, if someone tried to argue that the earth was actually spinning instead, this person was wrong, or incorrect, as not obeying the convention. — Metaphysician Undercover

That makes conventions sound every bit as solid and consistent as any rock or table.

I'm talking about the unobserved aspect of rocks, regardless of whether they are observed or not: it makes no difference. They appear to us, and we presume that does not exhaust their existence, but we also know that what appear to us as rocks do so reliably and do not appear as circus clowns or rabid dogs.

Of course I am "still just saying it's a rock", but I see a valid conceptual distinction between the rock as it is perceived and the rock as it is in itself; beyond that I have no idea what you are trying to get at, unfortunately.

I'm talking about the unobserved aspect of rocks — Janus

Ah. That's rather different.

This all began with you defending the mind-independence of objects by saying that you could readily imagine an object that's unobserved. I questioned whether you could actually do that, and still do.

As a step toward an object being unobserved, we did at least pretend to pass through stripping an object of whatever observation "adds" to it; if that's even coherent, it ought to be part of the answer for what something not observed at all is like. It's just that even in "un-observing" something we've observed, all we can do is play with exactly the same categories as when we observe it, only we pretend not to be applying them -- or at least not some of them. We leave the spatial location of the something untouched, for instance, and it remains individuated just as it was when we observed it, and so on.

And the case is even worse with something not only not being observed at the moment, but never observed, perhaps impossible to observe.

I didn't mean to say that I can imagine, as in visualize, an object as it is unobserved. My initial statements may have given that impression, but I clarified by saying that I can imagine that objects have attributes that cannot be observed, and that are not dependent on being observed.

I wouldn't say "we leave the spatial location of the something untouched, for instance, and it remains individuated just as it was when we observed it, and so on". The most I would say is that whatever that existence is, it reliably gives rise to the spatiotemporal in-common perception of individuated objects.

Cases of objects of commonly observed kinds that are not being observed at the moment, or that are never observed (because they are, fro example, in distant galaxies, I don't see as having different statuses. Objects impossible in principle to observe are not the kinds of objects I was addressing, so they would have a different status. But then if they are impossible to observe, then how could we ever know they exist at all?

I didn't mean to say that I can imagine, as in visualize — Janus

I understand that.

I can imagine that objects have attributes that cannot be observed, and that are not dependent on being observed. — Janus

Where we began was existence:

I can't imagine a particular rock without imagining it in terms of perceptible attributes, but I can imagine that a rock could exist without anyone perceiving it. — Janus

So your intention was to say that the existence of the rock is an attribute of it that is not dependent on being observed.

(Around here was where I mentioned Hume's suggestion that we seem only to think things as existing, which leaves open a question about whether existence is merely, as it were, an element of how we conceive things.)

Your idea then was never really to talk about unobserved objects, except incidentally, but to know which parts of our conception of an object we observe are down to us, and which aren't. And the existence of the object is not down to us, you say, so it's one of the properties we can still safely attribute to unobserved objects.

The most I would say is that whatever that existence is, it reliably gives rise to the spatiotemporal in-common perception of individuated objects. — Janus

But now here you have this free-floating attribute, existence, that isn't an attribute of anything, because the only sort of thing it can be an attribute of is apparently too contaminated by our conceptions.

Even a phrase like "whatever that existence is" doesn't work, because it's got a demonstrative in it. What existence are you referring to? You must be pointing at it, and you point at it just by saying it gives rise to all the conceptions you count as only for us. So we're right back where we started. You're still in a very roundabout way just saying "rock" while denying that you are.

My point is still that you're trying to bracket the "observedness" of the object, while depending on it completely to say anything at all, which means you haven't really bracketed it at all.

There is something that the observer brings to bear, without which it is meaningless to talk of distance, duration or scale. And without those it is also meaningless to talk about the existence of objects. Single word, begins with ‘p’.

If the mental cannot be explained in terms of the physical then the physical cannot be explained in terms of the mental. — Fooloso4

:up:

But the point of the hard problem of consciousness argument is precisely that no amount of objective analysis can capture the first-person experience. — Wayfarer

In other words, a map (analysis ~ respresentation) is not informationally equivalent to its territory (experience) because a territory (experience) is
computationally irreducible (otherwise it would be a map (analysis ~ representation)). There's no "hard problem", just a typical idealist / antirealist category error.

@Bob Ross

So your intention was to say that the existence of the rock is an attribute of it that is not dependent on being observed. — Srap Tasmaner

No. I'm not saying existence is an attribute, but something cannot have real attributes if it doesn't exist. I'm saying that the existence of a thing might not depend on it being observed, and that that is the common, you might even say default, attitude to things.

(Around here was where I mentioned Hume's suggestion that we seem only to think things as existing, which leaves open a question about whether existence is merely, as it were, an element of how we conceive things.) — Srap Tasmaner

I have no idea what the difference between thinking of things as existing and seeming to think of things as existing could be. I know I can think of things as existing, but I don't know if you can; you seem to doubt it, so maybe we have different conceptual capacities.

so it's one of the properties we can still safely attribute to unobserved objects. — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't call existence a property but yes, I would safely say we can think of unobserved objects as existing, albeit not in any naive realist sense.

My point is still that you're trying to bracket the "observedness" of the object, while depending on it completely to say anything at all, which means you haven't really bracketed it at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Of course the observedness of objects is essential to being aware of them, but I disagree that I haven't bracketed that when I say that I think they exist despite being observed, because that is the very meaning of what is being said. If you don't interpret it that way, then fine, that's your prerogative, but I have to say it makes no sense to me. I still have no idea what point you are attempting to make. Do you not think things exist when not being observed?

This seems to be going nowhere so perhaps we should leave it there.

Wow! This is indeed quite a specific argumentation! :smile: But it's too comlex. I should maybe ask for a "simple" instead of a "specific" argumentation.
Anyway, I will have to assume that by mind-(in)dependent you mean that the existence of the physical universe (matter and energy) is in/dependent of/on our mind. (I don't know though if you mean that exactly.)
Then you say, "If it is the latter, then I cannot account for myself as a conscious being." Does this means that you cannot consider yourself as a conscious being? If so, I can't see why. I can't find the connection. In fact, mind-(in)dependence is not a factor, or a prerequisite for (the existence of) individual consciousness, which may exist in either case.

I don't know if the above are based on a correct interpretaion of your posit ...
Maybe if you simplify the whole argumentation, using simple terms --i.e. not concepts that require clarification/interpretation (like mind-(in)dependece)-- I could follow it better.

E.g. my posit that "Consiousness is a characteristic of all life" is a simple and straight statement that does not need interpetation. It can be expanded and supported of course, but always in simple terms, arguments and examples. This makes it easy for someone to argued upon and refute it.
BTW, for me, examples act as arguments, even better. Their use is the best way to clarify statements. Unfortunately, very few people use them as part of their argumentations.

I just thought ... Why don't you start by giving a definition or description of "universal mind"? This might also work as a posit for its existence!

There is something that ‘the observer‘ brings to bear, without which it is meaningless to talk of distance, duration or scale. And without distance, duration or scale, it is also meaningless to talk of the existence of anything.

Anyone?

It's all in the perspective - the view from somewhere.

You win the lucky door prize (or you would, if I had one to give out :yikes: )

Ah, and follow-up question - where, in the objective data, is ‘the perspective’?

where, in the objective data, is ‘the perspective’? — Wayfarer

I'd flip that, perhaps - where in the perspective is the objective data? Answer: who can say?

the answer I was looking for was: you can’t find it, because it’s not there. The perspective is always outside.

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

But the answer I was looking for was: you can’t find it, because it’s not there. The perspective is always outside. — Wayfarer

Outside? I thought perspective came from inside us.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

Dramatic language. I don't disagree but what does this leave us with? Obviously the best we can do is develop tentative, fallibilistic accounts and theories that often work in the world pragmatically. I don't think this says we can use philosophy or spirituality to transcend the perspectival trap we appear to be in, or is this your proposed way out of the bottle?

I thought perspective came from inside us. — Tom Storm

Where in the data….is perspective. Inside us, outside the data.

If data is built by us from our perspective, then doesn't this come from 'inside' us - our cognitive apparatus, our values, our language?

Data is not built, it is the raw material. What is built is interpretation, what the data means - that is the difference between data and information. And that too always implies an observer, which is what physicalism never sees. It's like someone looking for their glasses with their glasses on.

Q: What did Heidegger mean by 'the forgetfulness of being'?

ChatGPT: Martin Heidegger, a 20th-century German philosopher, used the term "the forgetfulness of being" (Seinsvergessenheit in German) to describe a fundamental problem in Western philosophy and culture. Heidegger believed that throughout history, there has been a tendency to overlook or forget the true nature of "being" and its significance for human existence.

According to Heidegger, "being" refers to the basic mode of existence shared by all entities, including humans. It is not simply a passive attribute but encompasses the active process of existing and making meaning of the world (hence "being" is a verb). He argued that Western thought has traditionally focused on individual entities (things) and their characteristics, rather than investigating the broader question of being itself.

In the philosophical tradition, Heidegger saw a shift in focus from the ancient Greeks' understanding of being as a fundamental concern to an objectively-oriented approach. This shift was was accentuated with the advent of modernity and the rise of scientific thinking. He believed that modern philosophy and science emphasized a calculative and instrumental view of reality, reducing entities to mere objects to be manipulated and controlled (and thereby forgetting the nature of being altogether. You listening, Dan?)

Heidegger argued that this forgetfulness of being resulted in a loss of our authentic relationship to the world-and-self. Instead of recognizing our deep-rooted relatedness to the world, we treat it as a collection of resources to be exploited for our purposes. We become alienated from our own being and fail to appreciate the meaningfulness of existence. (We see everything from an ego-logical point of view.)

Heidegger proposed a phenomenological approach that encourages engagement with the world and critical awareness of our own being-in-the-world, rather than treating everything as mere objects of study. By reflecting on existence and the way we relate to the world, we can strive to recover a more authentic and meaningful mode of being.

Data is not built, it is the raw material. What is built is interpretation, what the data means - that is the difference between data and information. — Wayfarer

But wouldn't it be naive to think we have access to data that is unmediated or raw? Or are you saying that the raw material is like noumena - there is something there but we don't see it as it is.

That makes conventions sound every bit as solid and consistent as any rock or table. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't deny that conventions are solid as rock. But human beings easily break rocks, so the metaphor rings hollow.

I still have no idea what point you are attempting to make. — Janus

Hey Janus!

I think, and I could be wrong, that Srap was attempting to help you experience the untenability of the thing in itself.

My point was that the hard problem can only be accounted for by an obscurity, — Bob Ross

Hmmm... but you explicitly forbid physicalist accounts from appealing to obscurity???

:yikes:

I'm struggling to make much sense of your taxonomy. It seems you're lumping thought, belief, perception, imagination, olfactory, visual, tactile, auditory, gustatory, and all sorts of things into the category of subjective experience. Then using more than one name or label to reference the set of things as well as individual elements within the group...

"Perception", "qualia", and "experience" are all terms you've employed at times as synonymous with each other, and other times as something else... something more specific and different...

If someone says that eating rattlesnake is like eating chicken, I know what the experience of eating a rattlesnake will be like. — RogueAI

Feathers and all...

If rattlesnake tastes like chicken, then you may know what one tastes like. The experience of eating the rattlesnake is more than just the gustatory aspect... is it not?

But that line of reasoning is untenable. There is no way to compare noumena and phenomena in order to determine that the one is not the other.
— creativesoul

But I know that my perception of the tree is not the tree, right? My perceptions are constituted by phenomena: sights, sounds, tactile sensations and so on, but the tree is not merely a sight, or a sound (say wind in the leaves) or a tactile sensation (say the feel of its bark) or the sum of those. Can I not be said to know that without knowing what the tree is as it is in its unperceived status? — Janus

This is comparing the tree and your 'perception' of the tree. I thought we were discussing Noumena and phenomena. If the tree is a proxy for Noumena, and your perception of the tree is a proxy for phenomena, then you've just conflated Noumena and phenomena.

The tree appears to you, and as such is part of the phenomenal realm. The tree - in and of itself - is the noumenal.

You've added the notion of your perception into the mix equating it to phenomena, while equating the tree to Noumena.

Can I not be said to know that without knowing what the tree is as it is in its unperceived status? — Janus

Sure, you can draw a distinction between your perception of the tree and the tree. I'm just saying that that distinction is notably different than the one between Noumena and phenomena, and you do not need Noumena to do that.

Before getting into all that, you’re promoting analytic idealism, which is interesting in itself. The problem is that attempting to understanding Kantian idealism may very well negate your promotion. We get into this deep enough, you may find your idealism was Kantian all along, or, if it most certainly was not, then why query a form of idealism which is, for present intents and purposes, irrelevant. And even if questions regarding Kantian idealism are merely a matter of your own personal interest, satisfying that interest isn’t necessarily to support your thesis. In short, it’s possible you’re wasting your own time.

Your thread, your call.