Hello Tom Storm,

At what point might Kastrup's answer to materialism be a case of 'mind-at-large of the gaps'?

Good question: I think it would be a ‘mind-at-large of the gaps’ iff it was a soft problem for physicalism. However, since it is provably impossible for explain consciousness under physicalism, that invalidates the theory (as far as I am concerned) provably and not just merely “we don’t know, so it could be mind”.

He rather relies upon the frailties of the former in order to justify his version of latter. I think the first job is easier than the second.

This is true. But, for me, it is the hard problem of consciousness that removes physicalism from the race, not the idea that they haven’t explained it yet.

Bob

Hello Mww,

You’re on record as admitting a Schopenhauer-ian bent

Correct. I consider it a neo-schopenhauerian view.

He was the champion of the PSR, yet brute facts negate the PSR. It must be that being “metaphysically necessary” is sufficient reason, or the PSR doesn’t apply here.

Schopenhauer claimed that there are four modes of the PSR: mathematical, motive, reason, and causal. He claims that the principle of sufficient reason of becoming (i.e.,. causal) doesn’t apply to the thing-in-itself as will, but the PSR of motive does in time. I didn’t understand him to be claiming to be a necessitarian: the will, outside of space and time, is not affected by the PSR: the PSR only comes about in space and time.

But why should it be necessary that reality be a universal mind, or manifest from such a thing?

Firstly, under every metaphysical theory, there must be something posited, by my lights, as metaphysical necessary: even if it is the infinite regression of contingencies itself. So I would say it is a matter if inevitability.

Secondly, the idea is that what is expressed in space (and time) is the representation of immaterial ideas (from a previous time): the physical is just an expression of the mental. Now, what is being expressed in time (which is fundamentally ideas being expressed as physical) is either mental or non-mental. If it is non-mental then we have the hard problem of consciousness all over again. If it is mental, then we don’t: the latter is more parsimonious than the former. Metaphysics is about maximizing explanatory power whilst minimizing complexity.

Thirdly, it is not necessary that reality must be a universal mind but, rather, that the universal mind is being posited as metaphysically necessary as a part of what would be claimed as the most parsimonious account of reality (as a general account). I am not claiming that we can have air-tight metaphysical theories about reality.

The representation is never the physical stuff, and the mental is sometimes what is represented

The representation within the physical world is the representation of an immaterial idea. From the side of the physical, it appears as a seemingly potential infinite chain of physical causes; from the side of the mental, it was the expression of will (i.e., of immaterial ideas).

The mental is always what is represented when it comes to the physical stuff: that physical stuff is a representation of the mental: this doesn’t mean that the mental always gets represented as intended (by our wills) in reality.

How is yours not backwards? Actually, it is backwards, so the real question becomes….how do you justify the backwardness, without merely saying it isn’t?

I am not following why it is backwards: please elaborate.

Why is it not that coming to know the world from two sides isn’t two kinds of knowledge?

It is two kinds of knowledge: the physical, on its own, from that side, appears as an potential infinite chain of causality—but what it is representing, the thing-in-itself, is immaterial ideas. I would say that they are two kinds of knowledge, but they don’t give a holistic account of the world on their own: one needs both to account fully for each event (if that makes any sense).

a priori as representations of mental events, and a posteriori as representation of physical stuff, but only the latter is coming to know the world.

If I am understanding you correctly, then you can come to know the world as well by understanding that the a priori representations of mental events are what is being represented, when it comes to your body, by the a posteriori physical stuff. With self-knowledge, and this where you probably will disagree and is the dispute between Kant and Schopenhauer, you can come to know the thing-in-itself of your body: your mind.

I’d be happier if it was the case coming to know the world from two conditions, which would be physical stuff and mental events, but not so much that each is a kind of knowledge all by itself without influence from the other

I am saying they don’t influence each other insofar as causally. The physical is still influenced in the sense that it is a representation of the mental: you need both to account holistically for the events, but in the vast majority of cases you only have direct access to the physical account (and not the mental account).

Perhaps instead of two kinds of knowledge, we could call it two viewpoints that are required to gain knowledge.

For S it is the will, I thought, but either way…same-o, same-o

‘Will’ is just the most fundamental aspect of mind: when we have ideas, it is fundamentally supplied by our will. You are correct that this is an overlap between schopenhauer and analytic idealism, as the latter is an extension (or adjustment) of the former.

Bob

No need to aplogize, Bob. Questions such as about the nature of consciousness, the existence of a universal mind, etc. cannot have definite answers. Besides, we have deviated a lot about the subject of your topic, which is "Analytical Idealism". We have been carried away by the energy that the process of Q&A has created. It's a very powerful process. And you never know where you can end up! :smile:

I can get on board with the idea that our minds do not exist without bodies because our bodies are extrinsic representaEition of our minds. — Bob Ross

We will have to agree to disagree on this as well.

So of course we should expect to a dead body to still have an alive mind — Bob Ross

You might expect that. I don't expect that. The majority of the medical community does not expect that. The majority of those working in cognitive science do not expect that.

Firstly, “Either or” entails a dilemma — Bob Ross

Either it is raining or it is not. What is the dilemma? Either it is Tuesday or it is not. What is the dilemma? Either consciousness is ontologically fundamental or it is not. what is the dilemma?

the former simply posits that there are physical things within experience — Bob Ross

It does not say that there are physical things within experience. It says that there are physical things that we are aware of. It does not say that those things are in experience. That is your assumption. I am aware of the tree that is providing me with shade, but that experience does not mean the tree is within experience, only that my awareness of it is. My experience does not provide shade, the tree does.

As I already explained, there is a symmetry breaker. — Bob Ross

Once again I will take the option to agree to disagree.

I provided an argument and you didn’t really counter it. — Bob Ross

Round and round we go.

But that research isn’t going to afford us an explanation of what mind is — Bob Ross

I agree. We do not have an adequate explanation of mind.

If by “embodied” you just mean that your mind corresponds to a physical body — Bob Ross

Mind is a capacity of sufficiently developed living bodies.

Hello Fooloso4,

So of course we should expect to a dead body to still have an alive mind — Bob Ross

You might expect that. I don't expect that. The majority of the medical community does not expect that. The majority of those working in cognitive science do not expect that.

I apologize: that was a typo—it was supposed to say “so of course we should not...”. I was meaning to agree with you on that.

I am aware of the tree that is providing me with shade, but that experience does not mean the tree is within experience, only that my awareness of it is.

I agree that the tree doesn’t merely exist within your conscious experience (i.e., within your perceptions), but that doesn’t mean it exists in-itself as the composition of mind-independent parts nor that it exists materially in the sense that you perceive it. The information is accurate (enough), but the appearance is just an appearance.

Bob

I think the stumbling block you're dealing with is the idea that unobserved ceases to exist, like what G E Moore said, when he asked if the train wheels ceased to exist when the passengers were boarded. That is not what Berkeley's idealism is claiming. — Wayfarer

You misunderstand. If you had read my posts more closely you would know that all I'm claiming is that unobserved objects persist, and that I'm making no metaphysical claims about how that is possible, whether it is that objects are simply physical existents, or are ideas in a universal mind or that it is on account of decoherence and entanglement or whatever. Berkeley's idealism is in accordance with the fact that objects persist, since in his philosophy they persist in the mind of God.

The point is that we know objects persist and we don't know, and it would seem, can never know, just what the explanation for that is, because none of the few imaginable candidates for explanation are empirically testable. The point of realizing this is just to clarify the position we find ourselves in; that is we are ignorant as to the fundamental nature of things.

Firstly, under every metaphysical theory, there must be something posited (…) as metaphysical necessary — Bob Ross

Agreed; I’ll go with the three logical laws of thought.

Secondly, the idea is that what is expressed in space (and time) is the representation of immaterial ideas (from a previous time): the physical is just an expression of the mental. — Bob Ross

Is it just the same to say representation of immaterial ideas are what’s expressed in space and time? And is it representation of immaterial ideas that is expressed by the mental? So the physical is just mental representation of immaterial ideas.

If my relocation of nomenclature doesn’t change any of your propositional truth value, I wouldn’t push an argument. The way I’d say it is quite different, but it’s possible we’d end up in the same place, iff it is my mind, my ideas, my representations.

Thirdly, it is not necessary that reality must be a universal mind but, rather, that the universal mind is being posited as metaphysically necessary as a part of what would be claimed as the most parsimonious account of reality. — Bob Ross

What are the other parts of the account of reality. I consider reality to be that which corresponds to a sensation in general, that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being. It follows that there isn’t need for a further account of reality, but there would certainly need to be an account for sensation. Sensation is how we are awakened to reality, which, of course, thereby presupposes it, be it what it may. No need to account for it. Sorta like your metaphysical necessity?
————-

”The representation is never the physical stuff, and the mental is sometimes what is represented.”
-Mww

The representation within the physical world is the representation of an immaterial idea. From the side of the physical, it appears as a seemingly potential infinite chain of physical causes; from the side of the mental, it was the expression of will (i.e., of immaterial ideas). — Bob Ross

Hmmm. This looks like it puts representation in the external world, when I want it to be in my head. I’d be ok with something like…representations of the physical world are (mentally generated) immaterial ideas. Then we’d have to discuss whether conceptions are immaterial ideas, insofar as I wouldn’t have any problem calling conceptions mental. Immaterial, sure, but I’m not too sure I’d leave conceptions as mere ideas. Both conceptions and ideas are representations, an idea is a conception, but a conception is not necessarily an idea.

But the real problem is expressions of will, which for me belong in moral philosophy alone, which makes this metaphysical nonsense…..

“….. indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who appears as an individual, and the answer is will. This and this alone gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movements. Every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a movement of his body. The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same….”
(WWR, 2. 1. 18, 1844, in Haldane, Kemp, 1909)

….for he who would attribute to will no more than autonomous volition predicated on subjective principles.

Which brings out one of S’s gripes with K….causality, cause and effect. S rejected K’s invocation of freedom as a causality, so without it, for him, will does not stand the relation to cause and effect.

What’s next?

@Fooloso4 - you have said there are no immaterial minds - how would you even go about looking for such a mind (I hesitate to say 'phenomenon')? We have physical instruments that can detect electromagnetic and sub-atomic phenomena with exquisite accuracy, but how would you even go about investigating such a question?

The point is that we know objects persist — Janus

Rather, we assume they do. If you read my posts more carefully, you would see that I am saying that both the posits of 'existing' or 'non-existing' are mental constructions or surmises.

Rather, we assume they do. If you read my posts more carefully, you would see that I am saying that both the posits of 'existing' or 'non-existing' are mental constructions or surmises. — Wayfarer

It is obvious that we don't know with absolute certainty that objects persist when unobserved, but all the evidence of human experience, including observation of animal behavior, suggests that they do persist. Really all we mean by "persist" is that they are perceptually invariant over varying degrees of time, depending on the object and also that they show perceptual commonality for almost all people and even some animals.

We are here discussing the perceived existence of invariance, so it is a cop-out to state the trivially true fact that 'existing' and 'non-existing' are mental constructs. If we want to do philosophy, then we have nothing else to work with than what are obviously our own concepts.

If you read my posts more closely you would know that I have acknowledged many times that our concepts may not be capable of capturing the nature of reality; how would we know whether they do or not? But they are all we have to work with.

you have said there are no immaterial minds - how would you even go about looking for such a mind (I hesitate to say 'phenomenon')? We have physical instruments that can detect electromagnetic and sub-atomic phenomena with exquisite accuracy, but how would you even go about investigating such a question? — Wayfarer

And here is a classic case in point: immaterial minds are something that language, by putting the words together, allows us to imagine. But there cannot, by your own admission, ever be any evidence for the existence of immaterial minds, so of what discursive or philosophical use is this "mental construction" or "surmise"?

If one does not want to work with substantive mental constructs and surmises, perhaps one should take a leave out of the pragmatic QM playbook and "shut up and live".

how would you even go about looking for such a mind (I hesitate to say 'phenomenon')? — Wayfarer

I don't know how to go about looking for something that probably does not exist. That is why I keep returning to living things as the place to look for minds.

I think we have gone about as far as we can with going over the same things again. I appreciate that despite our differences the discussion remained civil.

Hello Mww,

Agreed; I’ll go with the three logical laws of thought.

Which three? Principle of non-contradiction, excluded middle, and identity?

Hmmm. This looks like it puts representation in the external world, when I want it to be in my head

Representation are within our heads: they are perceptions; but, the world one is fundamentally representing is will (i.e., ideas in a universal mind) as opposed to something unknown (for Kant). Kant seems to think that we can’t gain knowledge of anything that goes beyond our pure forms of intuition, whereas Schopenhauer claims it is will.

Is it just the same to say representation of immaterial ideas are what’s expressed in space and time?

Yes.

And is it representation of immaterial ideas that is expressed by the mental?

Yes, but as an organism that has evolved to have perceptions (i.e., to represent the world: the sensations).

So the physical is just mental representation of immaterial ideas.

Correct. It is mental representation of the outer world, which is fundamentally more immaterial ideas (and I think that part you may disagree with).

I consider reality to be that which corresponds to a sensation in general, that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being.

If this is just another way of saying “reality is the totality of what is”, then I agree.

It follows that there isn’t need for a further account of reality, but there would certainly need to be an account for sensation.

The way that you defined reality sort of confused me: I don’t think that the totality of what “corresponds to a sensation in general that...the conception of which indicates a being” encompasses necessarily all reality—there could be something which is never impressed unto our faculty of intuition (in Kantian terms) but is still a part of reality.

Sensation is how we are awakened to reality, which, of course, thereby presupposes it, be it what it may. No need to account for it.

Why wouldn’t you need to account for what is sans-”impressed sensations”?

Sorta like your metaphysical necessity?

I mean something that has to be there in all “possible worlds” or is a brute fact. Are you saying that the laws of thought for a mind is what is the brute fact of reality?

What are the other parts of the account of reality.

I wouldn’t say there are other parts to reality but, rather, Analytic Idealism is meant to account for all of it the best. The claim that there is a universal mind doesn’t explain everything immediately, in itself, about reality other than it is the bedrock of it.

Both conceptions and ideas are representations, an idea is a conception, but a conception is not necessarily an idea.

Agreed. I would say that fundamental reality is ideas and not conceptions. Conceptions I would posit as only available to higher evolved life forms that have acquired the ability to cognize. I remember now about the Kantian categories: I would side with Schopenhauer in saying that the representation of the world (as perception) is just the principle of sufficient reason of becoming and not the use of concepts: conceptions, as I would use the term, are the productions of the faculty of reason (of which it is not necessarily the case that an organism with perception has it nor that it is very adept to sophisticated reasoning) which takes in perceptions as its input. I don’t see a need to posit categories (of conceptions and functions) for the understanding, but I would love to hear why your perspective on it.

But the real problem is expressions of will, which for me belong in moral philosophy alone, which makes this metaphysical nonsense…..….for he who would attribute to will no more than autonomous volition predicated on subjective principles.

Very interesting. To me, will is fundamental to our operations. When we think, those conception and ideas are fundamentally guided by (or, to me, quite literally fundamentally the) will. Will is not just morality to me, it is the essence of being alive. Conscious activity, at rock bottom, is willing. Do you disagree?

Which brings out one of S’s gripes with K….causality, cause and effect. S rejected K’s invocation of freedom as a causality, so without it, for him, will does not stand the relation to cause and effect.

Correct, because, as I understand S, the will is fundamentally outside of time and space which is just an overly precise term (‘will’) for mind (as mind is fundamentally will, but not just will).

What’s next?

I bet there is a lot you will want to respond to in my post (; If not, then there’s plenty Kantian questions I have for you.

Bob

I think we have gone about as far as we can with going over the same things again. I appreciate that despite our differences the discussion remained civil.

I appreciate you taking the time to converse with me Foolos4!

Have a wonderful day!

Bob

However, since it is provably impossible for explain consciousness under physicalism, — Bob Ross

I wonder if this is a bit dogmatic? I don't think we can say it is impossible yet. I agree that there is no obvious answer at hand, but thinkers like Metzinger point in certain directions. But even if all forms of physicalism end up being superseded, this does not make mind-at-large necessary - there might be any number of other explanations we have not yet considered. I wonder about our expertise to make totalising statements on this highly complex and speculative subject. I also wonder about the limitations of human cognition to solve some of the problems we seem to identify.

Actually, he says "zoon politikon" (political animal), yet given his monumental Organon, Aristotle tends to get tagged with that "rational animal" (which I think actually comes from Plato). Anyway, our uniquely distinguishing feature as a species, I think, is that, despite mostly being delusional, we are collaborative knowledge-producers. — 180 Proof

There's a reason for why the definition is said to be "rational animal" rather than "political animal", and that is because "political" is further broken down by Aristotle, as being a special type of social activity. So it's true that he describes man as a political animal, but "political" is described as a social activity which involves moral reasoning. This is better described in his ethics, and here reasoning or contemplation is described as the highest moral activity. Then in his biology we see that reasoning is described as intellection, which, as a power of the soul is similar to sensation but distinct from sensation because it is not like a sixth sense. And the way that reasoning is done, through the use of immaterial abstractions, is what makes it unique to human beings.

I would argue that there is even a distinction to be made between reasoning and thinking. We see that all other animals think in some way, but as I said in the last post, reasoning is a special type of thinking which uses symbols, like numerals and words. And, the use of symbols in thinking is very different from the use of symbols in communication. This is what Wittgenstein is getting at in his discussion of private language. Under this terminology, reasoning is a private activity, with a private use of symbols, therefore it is based in the private language. This makes moral reasoning very special because it's fundamentally a private use of symbols (reasoning), but it's a private act which has as its intention, or end, a synthesis of the private with the communal.

Wow. You read Witty even worse than you read Aristotle, sir. :gasp:

I am very familiar with your sense of better and worse, so a statement of that sort was expected, and taken as a compliment.

:up:

Representation are within our heads: they are perceptions; but, the world one is fundamentally representing is will (i.e., ideas in a universal mind) as opposed to something unknown (for Kant). — Bob Ross

If everything is a representation in our heads, are our heads also representations...in our heads?

It is obvious that we don't know with absolute certainty that objects persist when unobserved, but all the evidence of human experience, including observation of animal behavior, suggests that they do persist. — Janus

What evidence would that be? We don't observe what we don't observe, so ...

As far as I can tell this is not something we believe on evidence at all, but an assumption. Hume describes it so.

In a Bayesian frame of mind, you might say the furniture out in the living room is part of my model of the world, and when I'm not observing it, that part of the model is essentially frozen, not being updated because there is no relevant information upon which to base an update. No new observations. That's not much like believing, based on the evidence, that it's still there as I left it, and a lot more like just assuming that it is.

But I'm sure what you mean is that if I were now to go and check, everything would still be as my model says it is, and it's the experience over time we should trust. Thus:

Really all we mean by "persist" is that they are perceptually invariant over varying degrees of time, depending on the object — Janus

"Perceptually invariant" is a curious phrase, meaning something like "below our level of discrimination". We joke about watching paint dry or watching grass grow. You could, of course, do these things, and you would find that there is rather little in the world that never changes, even things that change too slowly for us to notice or care.

But of course invariance is, in some important ways, not a matter of observation exactly. I have an identity not just because I change slowly from day to day. So do many things. Or at least we're inclined to think so, so these identifications have at least the force of custom, and in some cases maybe that's all they have. (The identities of countries, firms, and so on.) If those identities are established by observation, it's by observation of the custom, not any object.

So if the couch has changed too little for me to notice or care since I last saw it an hour ago, I'm allowed to pretend it's the same and call it the same. Is that the metaphysics you had in mind?

they show perceptual commonality for almost all people and even some animals. — Janus

Of course this is not quite what you mean, but that we infer similar perceptions upon seeing similar behavior. Not saying that's a bad inference, but it's an inference, not an observation. We also know there is considerable variation in how things are perceived, even among humans. Beyond that, more variation: for instance, it turns out humans are relatively rare in not seeing the ultraviolet part of the spectrum, and a great many animals do. Flowers look quite different to most insects, for instance.

None of which is going to bother you because a flower, for you, is, in the final analysis just a whatever-it-is; all you need for the point is that sentient creatures all behave as if there's something there. And so it is with infants: there's research suggesting that infants develop an expectation of object permanence before the expectation of object identity. (When something goes behind a screen, the infant is satisfied if something comes out, even if it's not the same thing.)

But the theory you're defending is not that I hold, based on the evidence, that there's still a lot of somethings out in the living room, but the same chair, couch, and tables that were there when I last was. We need a lot more specificity than your fallback metaphysics of something-or-others.

What evidence would that be? We don't observe what we don't observe, so ...

As far as I can tell this is not something we believe on evidence at all, but an assumption. Hume describes it so. — Srap Tasmaner

I said "evidence", I didn't say 'proof'. For example, say I lost my well-worn copy of Crime and Punishment twenty years ago, just before my son was born and now I have an issue with my pipes leaking under the house, which my son, now a plumber, volunteers to look at. He goes under the house and comes out with a book; "look what I found under the house" he says, " an old beaten up and slightly chewed copy of Crime and Punishment. Say I had never told him about losing that book. Now I think right, the dog, now years dead, must have taken it under the house. You don't think that would count as evidence that makes it plausible to think the book had been there the whole time? Or do you think it more likely that the book popped back into existence when my son went under the house?

Of course this is not quite what you mean, but that we infer similar perceptions upon seeing similar behavior. Not saying that's a bad inference, but it's an inference, not an observation. — Srap Tasmaner

No, we can easily test whether we see the same details on common objects. Say you and I have an apple in front of us: a read apple with a very unusual yellow mark on it that looks like an image of Jesus. I ask you whether you see anything unusual about this apple and you say that it has a mark on it that looks like a bearded man with long hair. What would you consider to be the best explanation for that?

So if the couch has changed too little for me to notice or care since I last saw it an hour ago, I'm allowed to pretend it's the same and call it the same. Is that the metaphysics you had in mind? — Srap Tasmaner

I said perceptually invariant, not invariant tout court; if I can perceive any difference then it counts as perceptually invariant. And not, I'm not making any metaphysical claims about what it is that is responsible for presenting us with the world of objects of common perception.

the world one is fundamentally representing is will (i.e., ideas in a universal mind) as opposed to something unknown — Bob Ross

So…..mid-Enightenment, in the schools, Aristotle and God were still in charge. K comes along, paradigm-shifts cognitive metaphysics away from God, maintains Aristotle. If you’re S, a professional philosopher, whacha gonna do when the guy just before you upset the established applecart so completely, all that’s left is to find a loophole in what he said, because it’s just too powerful to cancel. So you concentrate of the one thing you find questionable, and that is the prescription on the limits of knowledge, which you go about finding a way to exceed.

So the deal is, in K-speak, in a human representational system, that which is represented by the system, is not what is is entailed in human knowledge, which is the same as saying that for which the representation stands, is unknown by the system, which just is the human himself. That which is represented in humans is the world, so first and foremost the world itself is that which is unknown by humans.

The fix for that, is to say, in S-speak, even if the world is not known by humans, it is surely known by something not human, whatever it may be. If it happens to be a universal mind, and if Aristotle is still in force, then that universal mind will necessarily know everything about everything, which makes explicit it will know all about the very things humans do not, which the most important would be the world itself.

Long story short, the universal mind has ideas, wills them into worldly object manifestations, complete in themselves, subsequently representable in humans just as completely as the willed idea prescribes in its manifestations. This, of course, logically, makes human knowledge of the ding an sich not only possible, but given. If the universal mind has the idea of it, wills it, then the human system can represent it in himself, and K’s human knowledge limit is exceeded. Which was, given the time and place, the whole raison d’etre for S’s world as will and representation (idea) in the first place.

Close enough? Not even wrong, as my ol’ buddy Wolfgang might say? Whatever objections I might raise are irrelevant, if I got the synopsis wrong, or, not right enough. If close enough, however, it remains to be posited what is gained by such a program, and why it should not be dismissed as a bridge too far.

I bet there is a lot you will want to respond to in my post (; If not, then there’s plenty Kantian questions I have for you. — Bob Ross

There may be a lot to respond to, depending on how well I’ve understood it so far. I suspect, perhaps somewhat egocentrically for which I somewhat apologize, faults in the universal mind theory must be addressed from a Kantian perspective, insofar as the one is almost directly connected to the other, thus if I can refute it, if the universal mind theory cannot withstand refutation, your questions would be answered thereby.

Your turn.

Hello Tom Storm,

However, since it is provably impossible for explain consciousness under physicalism, — Bob Ross

I wonder if this is a bit dogmatic?

Analytic Idealists, like any other world view, can become dogmatic: some of the things that Kastrup says about physicalism I disregard on that account. However, I don’t think it is dogmatic, in itself, to claim that physicalism has the hard problem of consciousness (and that it is, as a hard problem, irreconcilable). I think it is provable that the reductive physicalist method fails to account for consciousness.

My argument, in short, would be as follows:
Every possible explanation, under reductive physicalism, that a physicalist could give for consciousness is of the form “consciousness is [this set of biological functions] because [this set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this manner]”. The reductionist method, assuming it is reducing into physical stuff, can only afford, as can be seen the form of the argument, to provide better insight into the relationship between conscious and brain states but doesn’t actually, even when attempting to explain it, account for what consciousness is nor how it is produced by brain states.

I agree that there is no obvious answer at hand, but thinkers like Metzinger point in certain directions.

Interesting: what is Metzinger proposing as a resolution?

But even if all forms of physicalism end up being superseded, this does not make mind-at-large necessary

No metaphysical theory can proclaim to be necessary. It is about trying to give the best general account of reality.

there might be any number of other explanations we have not yet considered

I am always open ears to new ideas, but I don’t think this negates the fact that analytic idealism (I would argue) is the best known theory for accounting for reality (on the contrary to the popular belief that it is physicalism or substance dualism). I am never going to pretend that I have found the absolute truth.

I wonder about our expertise to make totalising statements on this highly complex and speculative subject. I also wonder about the limitations of human cognition to solve some of the problems we seem to identify.

This is fair, but, nevertheless, I do think metaphysics is good for navigating the world in which we live; and it is good to come to a generalization of what one thinks reality is even if we can’t absolutely know for sure.

Bob

Hello Janus,

If everything is a representation in our heads, are our heads also representations...in our heads?

Our “heads” which we experience phenomenally, in the sense of a physical head of our bodies within our conscious experience, are, under both physicalism and analytic idealism, representations. When you look in the mirror, your head is a representation that your brain (if you are a physicalist) or your mind (if you are an idealist) has of itself. Your brain (or mind) is trying to represent itself to itself when it views itself by producing perceptions of it (just like anything else).

Bob

Hello Mww,

So the deal is, in K-speak, in a human representational system, that which is represented by the system, is not what is is entailed in human knowledge, which is the same as saying that for which the representation stands, is unknown by the system, which just is the human himself. That which is represented in humans is the world, so first and foremost the world itself is that which is unknown by humans.

Would you say that Kant thought we could gather knowledge of the world (which is being represented by us) or would you say he thought that we could never acquire such knowledge (since the representations are mere phenomenon)?

To me, Kant goes dangerously close to (if not actually argues cryptically for) epistemic solipsism.

How does Kant even know, if he cannot know anything about things-in-themselves, that his mind is representing objects (which he seems to assume a lot to me)? Why not one object? Why not “the unknown which may not be an object at all”? Why not nothing?

To me, we only come to realize by empirical inquiry that our minds are the best explanation for the production of the conscious experiences we have which, in turn, show us that we are representing something—but this doesn’t work if one is positing that all of it is mere phenomenon that cannot furnish them with knowledge of things-in-themselves and, in that case, by my lights, one can’t even argue that their mind is representing anything but rather that there’s just given conscious experiences.

The fix for that, is to say, in S-speak, even if the world is not known by humans, it is surely known by something not human, whatever it may be. If it happens to be a universal mind, and if Aristotle is still in force, then that universal mind will necessarily know everything about everything, which makes explicit it will know all about the very things humans do not, which the most important would be the world itself.

Long story short, the universal mind has ideas, wills them into worldly object manifestations, complete in themselves, subsequently representable in humans just as completely as the willed idea prescribes in its manifestations. This, of course, logically, makes human knowledge of the ding an sich not only possible, but given. If the universal mind has the idea of it, wills it, then the human system can represent it in himself, and K’s human knowledge limit is exceeded. Which was, given the time and place, the whole raison d’etre for S’s world as will and representation (idea) in the first place.

For now, I accept this summary: please refute away! As you refute, I will understand better what you are saying. So far, this seems like a fair-ish summary (for intents and purposes).

The only thing I will say now is that the universal mind, under Analytic Idealism, doesn’t will them directly into our representations: there are “objective” ideas that our faculty tries represent (and depending on how well that faculty is, it may not be represented all that accurately). Also, I wouldn’t claim either that a human with supreme perceptive capabilities gets a 100% accurate representation of the world around them. It sounded like you may be saying that the will gives us 100% accurate representations: it doesn’t.

If close enough, however, it remains to be posited what is gained by such a program, and why it should not be dismissed as a bridge too far.

That is exactly what I would like to hear about! Why do you think it is dismissable as a bridge too far? Why do you think we are completely cut off from knowing the things-in-themselves? And do you think it entails epistemic solipsism?

faults in the universal mind theory must be addressed from a Kantian perspective, insofar as the one is almost directly connected to the other, thus if I can refute it, if the universal mind theory cannot withstand refutation, your questions would be answered thereby.

Sounds good to me! Refute away my friend!

Bob

Our “heads” which we experience phenomenally, in the sense of a physical head of our bodies within our conscious experience, are, under both physicalism and analytic idealism, representations. When you look in the mirror, your head is a representation that your brain (if you are a physicalist) or your mind (if you are an idealist) has of itself. Your brain (or mind) is trying to represent itself to itself when it views itself by producing perceptions of it (just like anything else). — Bob Ross

So, if our brains are representations like anything else, then how can consciousness be said to reside there? If the brain is a representation, then the consciousness that seems to reside there, and the self-model that comes with it must also be representations. The question then is what is doing the representing? Perhaps nothing? Or everything?

So, if our brains are representations like anything else [ ... ] The question then is what is doing the representing? — Janus

:fire:

:halo:

If the brain is a representation, then the consciousness that seems to reside there, and the self-model that comes with it must also be representations. The question then is what is doing the representing? Perhaps nothing? Or everything? — Janus

I like this question. I suspect that Kastrup would say that consciousness manifests as a brain, in a skull, in a body, in a world when viewed across the dissociative divide. It's just the form it appears to come in. Given that legs are as illusory as brains, I guess the functionality implied in a 'physical' body is a kind of combined hallucination to begin with. That's all I got....

So, if our brains are representations like anything else [ ... ] The question then is what is doing the representing? — Janus

Great minds think (confuse themselves) alike. :point:

From this old post: if "to be is to be perceived", then, for a perceiver to be, a perceiver must be perceived by another perceiver ... by another perceiver . .. by another perceiver .. ad infinitum. [ ... ] My naturalism is too pragmatic for this conceptual jabberwocky. — 180 Proof