quote="Janus;813294"]I would say that subjective consciousness may not be what we naively or intuitively think it is, and that. maybe (I'd have to think further on this) there is no substantive distinction between objective and subjective consciousness, but that the distinction is an artefact of our dualistic mode of thinking.[/quote]

We agree that there is no substantive difference between the objective and subjective. They are merely different aspects of the same reality. The objective is the reality of another beings consciousness that we can objectively know. The subjective is the reality of the conscious thing from its perspective that no one else can know. One does not negate the other.

I'm wondering if our experience of perception of the spectrum is different from the electric eye's. — Patterner

Its interesting isn't it? We don't even have to go to the electric eye, we can go to a fly's eyes. Flies have numerous eyes without pupils. This allows them to see the world in a near 360 viewpoint. Birds have eyes on the side of their head and cannot see directly in front of them because of it. How do they process that way of sight? What would it be like to experience that? From a physical standpoint, the experience is most certainly different from ours.

From a physical standpoint, the experience is most certainly different from ours. — Philosophim

Right. And that's why Nagel choose the bat. Our experiences are different enough that we can't imagine what they experience. But, since we're both mammals, there is a lot more common ground than between us and, say, the fly, so we might feel safer thinking bats do have subjective experience.

But I'm wondering if, by saying

Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification, — Janus

Janus means our subjective experience is equivalent to the electric eye's. I'm just not sure what is meant.

The subjective is the reality of the conscious thing from its perspective that no one else can know. One does not negate the other. — Philosophim

I think we more or less agree, but I would say that both the objective and the subjective are ideas rather than realities from the human perspective.

Right. And that's why Nagel choose the bat. Our experiences are different enough that we can't imagine what they experience. But, since we're both mammals, there is a lot more common ground than between us and, say, the fly, so we might feel safer thinking bats do have subjective experience.

But I'm wondering if, by saying
Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification,
— Janus
Janus means our subjective experience is equivalent to the electric eye's. I'm just not sure what is meant. — Patterner

What we see may be very different from what the bat sees and closer to what an "electric eye" or camera sees, but that wasn't what I meant. The bat and the camera may be closer in that the bat probably has no idea of its subjective experience. So, I was saying that I see subjective experience, if thought as being distinct from what is experienced, as merely an idea that very easily becomes reified into the notion that qualia are realities over and above what is experienced. To put it another way, I experienced the rain, and I self-reflectively think of myself experiencing the rain; I do not experience myself experiencing the rain.

Inasmuch as I feel, being, as I am, a sensitive organism, I am of course closer to the bat.

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate you sharing those links with me: blindsight is, indeed, a very interesting topic. I read through the article and, long story short, I do not think that the author provided a resolution (nor a partial resolution nor a method to providing a resolution) to the hard problem of consciousness. Although the scientific inquiry into how consciousness relates to the brain is most definitely a fascinating subject and fruitful, I did not find anything the author was citing as evidence as proof of consciousness being emergent from brains.

Firstly, blindsight, and many other related disabilities (e.g., blindhearing, blindtaste, etc.), is the dissociation of a person with their qualia and not the absense of qualia. The author even admits this implicitly:

To DB himself, his success in guessing seemed quite unreasonable. So far as he was concerned, he wasn’t the source of his perceptual judgments, his sight had nothing to do with him.
…
One of the most striking facts about human patients with blindsight is that they don’t take ownership of their capacity to see.

Of course, a person who lacks the ability to associate their qualia with themselves is going to say that they aren’t seeing anything when, in fact, they obviously are. This is no different than people who lose all sense of self: they don’t thereby lose their qualitative experience but, rather, their ability to identify it as theirs. I heard a fascinating story of a woman who suffered from complete loss of self; and during childbirth, she kept frantically asking “who’s having the child?”. Does the fact that she can’t associate herself with her own childbirth prove (or even suggest) that she isn’t giving birth to a child? Of course not! Does the fact that someone can’t associate themselves with their own qualitative seeing prove (or even suggest) that they aren’t having it? Of course not! So, right off the bat, I think the author mistakenly thought that neuroscience was proving that qualia is gone with patients suffering from blindsight: no, they still have qualia.

Secondly, I would like to note that I have no problem admitting that brain states and mental states are inextricably linked and, thusly, damage to the brain directly affects the mental activity (and abilities) of a mind. So, I have no problem admitting that it may be possible for a person to lose all sense of self (viz., self-identity), meta-consciousness (i.e., self-knowledge), etc. but as long as they are alive they are having qualitative experience to some degree—even if they don’t recognize it.

Thirdly, throughout the article the author, despite recognizing their work as pertaining to the hard problem, didn’t give any solution to it other than vague notions of evolutionary processes:

Their properties are to be explained, therefore, not literally as the properties of brain-states, but rather as the properties of mind-states dreamed up by the brain.
...
I believe sensations originated as an active behavioural response to sensory stimulation: something the animal did about the stimulus rather than something it felt about it.
…
In short, the animal can begin to get a feel for the stimulus by accessing the information already implicit in its own response. This, I believe, is the precursor of subjective sensation. But, of course, it will not at first be sensation as we humans know it: it will not have any special phenomenal quality.

In short, none of this explainshow mind-independent stuff produces mind. Also, the first sentence (I quoted) doesn’t even make any sense: if qualia are properties of mind-states rather than brain-states, then that means it is irreducible to brain-states—there’s some extra “mind stuff” happening that has those uniquely qualitative properties. If not, then the author still has to provide how the brain-states are producing the so-called “mind-states” that, in turn, produce such properties. I know you don’t like camps, but to summarize here briefly, their argument sounds like a mixture of property dualism and physicalism in a manner that is incapable with eachother. Maybe I misunderstanding something.

The last thing I will comment on (for now) about the article was the 6 criteria of investigating whether an animal is conscious (according to the author), which were:

1. Have a robust sense of self, centred on sensations?
2. Engage in self-pleasuring activities – be it listening to music or masturbation?
3. Have notions of ‘I’ and ‘you’?
4. Carry their sense of their own identity forward?
5. Attribute selfhood to others?
6. Lend out their minds so as to understand others’ feelings?

None of these have anything to do with the hard problem.

I think it is important that we separate two different claims that we have since been mushing together: knowing how qualitative experience is for a being is different than knowing that they have it. So, when you say:

Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

I agree, but I want to clarify some things. Firstly, I don’t see how you can prove that a being is having qualitative experience (under your view)--not just how they are experiencing it themselves. Secondly, the hard problem has nothing to do with either of these two: it is about how something mind-independent produces mind, which is not the same claim as “how a being experiences qualia” or “how one knows that other’s have qualia”: the former doesn’t matter and the latter is a presupposition of the formulation of the problem.

If it is the case that we can use quantitative processes to change our own qualia, then the argument I made stands and you're still holding a contradiction.

Another important clarification I think we need is that knowing that something affects something else does not entail, in itself, that it causes it. You can certainly prove that quantitative processes affect qualia, but not that the former produces the latter: these are two different claims. I have no problem admitting that qualia is affected by quantitative processes; but, I would say, we cannot fully account for all emergent properties of a human being (specifically mental properties) by means of the quantitative processes of the physical properties, whereas we can with a camera + AI. So there’s a symmetry breaker there.

Secondly, I would like to note, although it may be too far beyond the scope of our conversation right now, that I don’t actually hold there are quantities ontologically. Just like how I think the “sun” is a nominal distinction, so is mathematics: it isn’t real. So yeah, I am a mathematical anti-realist: I’m sure we probably disagree on that (; But, the important thing to note is that from the perspective of everything being mind, the camera and all its “quantitative” processes are a steady flow of qualities and our quantifying of those qualities is just an approximate thereof. The reason I was using the “quantitative cannot produce qualities” argument was to keep this friendly to physicalist notions, because a mind-independent world usually entails that reality is fundamentally quantitative and qualities are only emergent with minds.

Where is the evidence of qualia? If I operate on a dog and open up the brain, do I see the image and smell the smells the dog is experiencing? No

We know by abductive argumentation: I have evidence of my qualia, and, on the other “side” of it, I am a physical organism which operates the exact same (just with more superior functionality) to a dog—so the best explanation is that the dog is also qualitatively experiencing. Otherwise, one runs into unparsimonious explanations (e.g., my dog is obviously dreaming right now….but he could be a philosophical zombie that isn’t really dreaming).

You are right that PZs can’t be disprove because they are unfalsifiable; however, they are not the best explanation of organisms around us at all.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I read through the article and, long story short, I do not think that the author provided a resolution (nor a partial resolution nor a method to providing a resolution) to the hard problem of consciousness — Bob Ross

My intention was not to address the hard problem of consciousness. From the argument I've presented, you can see there is no hard problem to address.

Of course, a person who lacks the ability to associate their qualia with themselves is going to say that they aren’t seeing anything when, in fact, they obviously are. This is no different than people who lose all sense of self: they don’t thereby lose their qualitative experience but, rather, their ability to identify it as theirs. — Bob Ross

Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness? This is actually a limited example of a P-zombie.

I want to ask you what you mean by qualia Bob. Qualia to my knowledge, is almost always identified as the experience one has. Qualia is seeing the color green as only you see it. If someone was not conscious of seeing the color green, most would not mark that as qualia. If you believe qualia does not require consciousness, then what is special about the word qualia at all? At that point, a p-zombie has qualia, they are just not conscious of it. And if that is the case, then my point that subjective consciousness can be separated from objective consciousness stands does it not?

I heard a fascinating story of a woman who suffered from complete loss of self; and during childbirth, she kept frantically asking “who’s having the child?”. Does the fact that she can’t associate herself with her own childbirth prove (or even suggest) that she isn’t giving birth to a child? Of course not! — Bob Ross

No, but how is that relevant? I'm not claiming that you need subjective consciousness for someone to claim you have objective consciousness. This example once again supports the division I'm noting.

Thirdly, throughout the article the author, despite recognizing their work as pertaining to the hard problem, didn’t give any solution to it other than vague notions of evolutionary processes: — Bob Ross

Again, I'm not interested in the hard problem, just objective and subjective consciousness.

Although, I'm once again surprised to hear from you that you don't believe qualia comes from brain states. That's the assumed knowledge of science, psychology, and medicine. Its nothing I have to prove, its a given Bob. Can you prove that qualia does not come from brain states? As I mentioned in your last OP, it is not in dispute by anyone within these fields that the mind comes from your brain. I feel analyzing this will assist in the objective subjective separation of consciousness.

Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

I agree, but I want to clarify some things. Firstly, I don’t see how you can prove that a being is having qualitative experience (under your view)--not just how they are experiencing it themselves. — Bob Ross

We can't under my view. We can believe them. We can observe the objective conscious actions they take and assume they must be experiencing qualia. But no, we can't prove. It is always at best an inductive reason, never deduced knowledge.

Another important clarification I think we need is that knowing that something affects something else does not entail, in itself, that it causes it. — Bob Ross

To clarify, we can't say its the entire cause. When something affects another, that result of that affectation is part of the chain of causality.

You can certainly prove that quantitative processes affect qualia, but not that the former produces the latter: these are two different claims. — Bob Ross

Agreed. But we can certainly say that it has an influence in producing mind, therefore is part of the cause of qualia. To claim that there is something else besides brain states would require an example of something besides a brain state affecting qualia. Do you have an example? For example, if I drop a penny, it falls because of gravity. But the penny wobbles in a state that we cannot attribute to gravity alone. Air resistance also affects the fall of the penny. Thus the speed of something dropping is determined not only by gravity, but by any resistance against gravity as well. In what way does the brain have a qualitative state that cannot be explained by the brain alone? Do you have any example of something else besides the brain which would affect the mind?

We know by abductive argumentation: I have evidence of my qualia, and, on the other “side” of it, I am a physical organism which operates the exact same (just with more superior functionality) to a dog—so the best explanation is that the dog is also qualitatively experiencing. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is an induction. This is something we cannot deduce, or actually know. That is why such discussions would be under subjective consciousness, while objective consciousness would not concern itself with something that does not have objective certainty.

Hello Philosophim,

My intention was not to address the hard problem of consciousness. From the argument I've presented, you can see there is no hard problem to address.

I thought you were arguing that minds emerge from brains? Am I misunderstanding you? Or you are saying that the objective vs. subjective consciousness distinction is the out of scope of that claim?

If so, then I think it is very relevant to your claim implicitly because your distinction is predicated, as far as I am understanding, on an outlook that the mind is emergent from the brain. For example, to say that a camera + AI has qualia only makes sense if you are implicitly claiming that consciousness arises out of mechanical (i.e., quantitative) processes which immediately invokes the hard problem.

The reason I explicitly brought it up was because that was what the article you sent was talking about; sorry, I must have misunderstood what you were trying to cite by that article.

I want to ask you what you mean by qualia Bob.

Let me layout how I use the terms in their most generic sense:

Consciousness : qualitative experience.
Qualia: instances of qualitative experience (e.g., seeing a car, feeling a pillow, tasting an apple, etc.).
Meta-consciousness: self-knowledge: ability to acquire knowledge of one’s consciousness (e.g., I not only taste the apple, but I am aware of my tasting of the apple: I can gain knowledge of my own qualitative experience).

These terms are not compatible with your terms, so let me try to cross-reference:

Your use of consciousness is broader than mine, and I think my fits in your “subjective consciousness” category; but to me, you seem to also use my term sometimes to refer to “objective consciousness” as well, or at least I am confused as to whether you think that “objectively conscious” beings have qualitative experience or not? That’s all I mean by consciousness: observation and awareness are not synonymous with consciousness to me—I have found that it just muddies the waters when discussing the hard problem (which I know you are saying you aren’t trying to discuss here, but it is inevitably pertinent hereto).

Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness? This is actually a limited example of a P-zombie.

No it is not a P-Zombie. Like I said before: there is a difference between not having subjective (qualitative) experience and being unable to identify it. I would argue that the blindsight person is still qualitatively seeing, they just don’t identify themselves as seeing. This could be because they simply don’t think they are having the qualitative experience (like the woman giving childbirth asking “who having this child?”) or that they have lost meta-consciousness when it comes to seeing (just like how some lower life forms have qualitative experience but they are unaware that they have it). A P-Zombie is a being with no qualitative experience, and I am not seeing why blindsight would be an example of such a being.

Qualia to my knowledge, is almost always identified as the experience one has. Qualia is seeing the color green as only you see it.

Correct: qualia is the instances of qualitative experience we have, which doesn’t necessarily mean per se that you see a different color green than I do.

If you believe qualia does not require consciousness

I do believe that qualia requires consciousness, but you refer to things that aren’t qualitatively experiencing as conscious; so under your terms, yes, I do think you are arguing that there could be a being which doesn’t have qualitative experience (or at least we don’t know if they do) but yet we can decipher that they are observing, identifying, and acting upon their environment (which meets your definition of consciousness). Within my terminology one has to be qualitatively experiencing (to some degree) to be conscious: it’s your view that your critique here applies I would say (i.e., If you believe qualia does not require qualitative experience, then what is special about the word qualia at all?). For you, you can cogently claim within your terms that one can be conscious without qualia.

At that point, a p-zombie has qualia, they are just not conscious of it. And if that is the case, then my point that subjective consciousness can be separated from objective consciousness stands does it not?

Again, I hold that P-Zombie are being which observe, identify, and act (to use your terms: conscious) but do not have qualitative experience (consciousness in my terms).

No, but how is that relevant? I'm not claiming that you need subjective consciousness for someone to claim you have objective consciousness. This example once again supports the division I'm noting.

But your division is just a broader definition of consciousness than what is typically used: non-qualitatively observing beings are not standardly included in the definition of consciousness.

As far as I am understanding your terms, there can be objectively conscious beings that are not subjectively conscious, and the former entails nothing about the latter. This entails two important things:

1. There is no bridge between the two, so I don’t think you can claim by abduction with criteria from objective consciousness (i.e., observing, acting, and identifying) that someone is subjectively conscious—and this is just the definition of epistemic solipsism.

2. The terms are perfectly cogent, as laid out, because it just includes more than I would be willing to semantically associate with “consciousness”. I would argue it is leading and will lead to confusions. For example, a philosophical zombie, when they say it isn’t conscious, they are not referring to your “objective consciousness”--so it would incorrect to think that a merely objectively conscious being is “conscious” for intents of the PZ debate. Consciousness is qualitative experience.

Although, I'm once again surprised to hear from you that you don't believe qualia comes from brain states. That's the assumed knowledge of science, psychology, and medicine. Its nothing I have to prove, its a given Bob.

I don’t know why you would say that it is given: that sounds awfully dogmatic. I figured you would have a proof for it, are you saying you just assume that is the case? Am I understanding you correctly?

Moreover, when you say it is assumed knowledge of science (and the other disciplines similar thereto) I think you are wrong and right—it doesn’t entail what you are implying. There’s a difference between scientific consensus and scientists having a consensus: the former is a consensus within a subject within the field of science, and the latter is merely a consensus amongst people who also have the professional of doing science. This is important to distinguish; for example, I think it is safe to say that most scientists are atheists, but I would be wrong to claim that “there is a scientific consensus that God doesn’t exist”--rather, it is really that “there is a consensus amongst scientists that God doesn’t exist”. Likewise, I could, with some truth, claim that “it is assumed that God doesn’t exist in science”. But whether God exists is not a scientific question but, rather, a theological one. Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus.

Can you prove that qualia does not come from brain states? As I mentioned in your last OP, it is not in dispute by anyone within these fields that the mind comes from your brain

Firstly, yes it absolutely is disputed: not every scientist is a physicalist. Secondly, science doesn’t tell us whether the brain produces consciousness.

Thirdly, no I cannot prove that qualia cannot come from brain states but, rather, I can prove that methodological naturalism (which is the same method as science) cannot account for consciousness as brain states. There’s no proof that consciousness is produced by the brain, and so, within metaphysics, it becomes a question of what has the most explanatory power (in terms of explaining the world we experience) while minimizing complexity (of the explanation). Physicalism is less parsimonious than idealism. It’s not about proving it impossible; if that was the case then I should hold that unicorns exist on the other side of the galaxy, that there is an invisible cookie monster that watches me sleep, that there is a teacup floating around saturn, that everything is within my mind, etc.

We can't under my view. We can believe them. We can observe the objective conscious actions they take and assume they must be experiencing qualia

To clarify though, you are saying that determining someone is objectively conscious does not entail that they have qualia, correct?

To clarify, we can't say its the entire cause. When something affects another, that result of that affectation is part of the chain of causality.

I was getting at that correlation is different than causation. When we determine something causes something else, we provide proof in the form of empirical observations and conceptual explanations. We don’t just say: this impact that, so this caused that if we can’t conceptually explain what is actually happening.

But we can certainly say that it has an influence in producing mind, therefore is part of the cause of qualia

I disagree. We can say that consciousness is impacted by brain states which doesn’t entail, in itself, that the brain is influencing the production of the mind.

To claim that there is something else besides brain states would require an example of something besides a brain state affecting qualia.

No it wouldn’t. The claim is that “something else is producing qualia” only has to rely on the fact that the something in question isn’t regarded as producing it. We can’t claim that we know brain states are producing it, so we venture out by claiming “something else might be producing it”. Then, we examine what is the best explanation for the mind-body problem: I would argue it is the exact reverse of what you are claiming: the physical is weakly emergent from the mental, not vice-versa. The reason there’s such a strong correlation is because the physical are representations and at rock bottom it is minds “interacting” with minds so to speak. We have direct, introspective knowledge of ideas being manifested within the physical, whereas we have no knowledge of the physical producing the mental. I think it is more parsimonious to hold consciousness as fundamental.

In what way does the brain have a qualitative state that cannot be explained by the brain alone?

All of it: science doesn’t provide any conceptual explanation of how any mental state is produced by any brain state.

Do you have any example of something else besides the brain which would affect the mind?

I don’t claim that there is something else besides mind, some other third substance, that producing mind but, rather, that mind is fundamental. Mind is affecting mind: ontologically there are ideas in a mind. In schopenhaurian terms: the world is will and representation.

Bob

Like I said before: there is a difference between not having subjective (qualitative) experience and being unable to identify it. I would argue that the blindsight person is still qualitatively seeing, they just don’t identify themselves as seeing. — Bob Ross

A robot, just like the person who suffers from visual agnosia can see and respond to what they are seeing, but do not have the self-reflective awareness of seeing. The way I interpret this is that both lack subjective experience (of seeing). To put it another way, both the robot and the blindsight person do not know that they can see.

If a person suffered agnosia in regard to all their senses, including proprioception and interoception, it would seem hard to say how they would differ from a robot that had functional equivalents of all the human senses, that is a robot that could respond to tastes, smells, tactile feels, sounds, and sights, as well as proprioceptive and interoceptive data.

I thought you were arguing that minds emerge from brains? Am I misunderstanding you? Or you are saying that the objective vs. subjective consciousness distinction is the out of scope of that claim? — Bob Ross

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine.

As for the hard problem, I still think you misunderstand it. " Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem." -Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy
https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/#:~:text=The%20hard%20problem%20of%20consciousness%20is%20the%20problem%20of%20explaining,directly%20appear%20to%20the%20subject.

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain. The question is how does consciousness explicitly form from that process, and can we scientifically demonstrate what it is like to be that conscious being. Essentially consciousness is personal to the brain, it is not something we can observe from the outside.

"This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard."

My solution to this is to just simply note that referring to the experience of the conscious subject itself is "subjective consciousness". Knowing what it is like to be the subject of any one conscious being besides ourselves is currently impossible.

I don’t know why you would say that it is given: that sounds awfully dogmatic. I figured you would have a proof for it, are you saying you just assume that is the case? Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross

The only people questioning that mind comes from the brain are philosophers. To my knowledge, every other factual aspect of the world knows that the mind comes from the brain. The hard problem does Mind coming from the brain is like oxygen theory, while the idea it does not is like phlogiston theory. Oxygen theory does not have to prove itself, phlogiston theory does at this point in time. I am open to hearing arguments that the mind does not come from the brain, but I don't feel the need to prove the scientific default. The discussion I'm trying to hold is more equivalent to the science of launching a rocket. Having to pivot to prove that mind comes from the brain is like then debating that fuel and oxygen is what causes the rocket combustion instead of phlogiston leakage.

It may be a large enough subject to address elsewhere. I can hop back into your original thread when it dies down if you would like! But feel free to prove here first that the mind does not come from the brain and lets see where that takes us.

Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus. — Bob Ross

While this is an interesting thought, is this something you can demonstrate? How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

Firstly, yes it absolutely is disputed: not every scientist is a physicalist. Secondly, science doesn’t tell us whether the brain produces consciousness. — Bob Ross

First, like you noted, just because you're an atheist scientist, it doesn't mean that science concludes atheism. What is the currently agreed upon consensus in science? Finding a few here and there who disagree is easy to find; 1-10 dentists don't believe that brushing your teeth helps prevent tooth decay for example.

Second, the easy problem confirms that yes, science knows that the brain produces consciousness. Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

Here are a few interesting videos to check out. This is from 11 years ago:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FsH7RK1S2E

This is from five years ago:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecvv-EvOj8M (Start at 6:00)

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

Consciousness : qualitative experience.
Qualia: instances of qualitative experience (e.g., seeing a car, feeling a pillow, tasting an apple, etc.).
Meta-consciousness: self-knowledge: ability to acquire knowledge of one’s consciousness (e.g., I not only taste the apple, but I am aware of my tasting of the apple: I can gain knowledge of my own qualitative experience). — Bob Ross

This would seem to me that meta-consciousness is "qualitative experience of qualitative experience". In which case, is this a useful term? At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Lets bring it out of blindsight for a minute. Right now are you conscious of everything your senses are processing right now? Aren't there smells, sounds, and even sights in the corner of your eyes, that you are not conscious of? Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia? I suppose I'm looking for a separation between the meaning of qualia and perception or senses. Generally I've understood qualia to be that conscious experience of sensations or perceptions, not the mere flooding of light or sound into one's body.

Back to blindsight, it seems much like the inability to give a conscious focus to what one is perceiving. Which seems to me to be something that the person does not subjectively experience, even though the objective observation of their actions implies that they do. Here they are accurately assessing where something is, actively looking at it, then claiming they do not see it. Can you explain how your definitions counter this?

I do believe that qualia requires consciousness, but you refer to things that aren’t qualitatively experiencing as conscious; so under your terms, yes, I do think you are arguing that there could be a being which doesn’t have qualitative experience (or at least we don’t know if they do) but yet we can decipher that they are observing, identifying, and acting upon their environment (which meets your definition of consciousness). — Bob Ross

Let me clarify what I'm stating. Qualia is the subjective experience of the thing which is observed to be objectively conscious. Qualia is not necessary for us to conclude something is objectively conscious. The reason for this, is we cannot objectively assess qualia. We cannot prove what a conscious being is experiencing, or not experiencing at a subjective level. Therefore we do not consider it objectively, but can only consider it from their subjective viewpoint.

Blindsight is a clear example that a person can have an objective consciousness about something, but not have any subjective consciousness, or personal experience of seeing the object needed to make the correct conscious decision.

This is getting too long, and I think the above has addressed most of your points. One more!

I don’t claim that there is something else besides mind, some other third substance, that producing mind but, rather, that mind is fundamental. Mind is affecting mind: ontologically there are ideas in a mind. — Bob Ross

How is this any different from magic then Bob? Even if you could get such a model to work, which I don't want to go into all the potential problems at this time, what would you hope to get out of it? How would this be useful to humanity?

Thank you again Bob for your clear and deep thoughts on the subject!

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine. — Philosophim

Microbial colonies exhibit an awareness of and adaptation to their environment (eg. The Global Brain by Howard Bloom). Which demonstrates the most fundamental aspects of consciousness, perception and action. So the requirement isn't so much a "brain" as some form of physical medium. Ascribing consciousness to a brain is just anthropocentric prejudice. In which case, there is literally no limit to what could potentially instantiate a consciousness. Any kind of quantum-coherent system, for example. So if you want to argue for brain-dependence, it should be qualified as "human consciousness." If you are additionally claiming that human consciousness is the only kind of consciousness, I just offered a counter-example.

Microbial colonies exhibit an awareness of and adaptation to their environment (eg. The Global Brain by Howard Bloom). Which demonstrates the most fundamental aspects of consciousness, perception and action. So the requirement isn't so much a "brain" as some form of physical medium. Ascribing consciousness to a brain is just anthropocentric prejudice. In which case, there is literally no limit to what could potentially instantiate a consciousness — Pantagruel

Yes, you misunderstand. I've expressed in the OP that consciousness is not limited to humans, and have noted that consciousness could exist in plants, and even AI elsewhere. In long form conversations that take time to write out, its much easier to rely on the context of the conversation. In the full context of Bob's conversation, I think its clear we're talking about human minds and human brains.

Ok. And you do note in your OP that one of the problems with the term consciousness is that it is "too generic." I'm not sure whether that is a problem or a feature. If you want to stipulate that when you use the term consciousness you are restricting that to mean "human consciousness" only that's your prerogative.

However, in that case, your statement, that minds emerge from brains " Its just what is considered fact at this time" is really either tautological or out of scope of your assumption. Human minds emerge from human brains. Minds, in general, perhaps do not necessarily.

However, in that case, your statement, that minds emerge from brains " Its just what is considered fact at this time" is really either tautological or out of scope of your assumption. — Pantagruel

I've already clarified that your statement taken out of context was a misread. If you would like to contribute, start from the OP and take the definitions as given there. Here is a relevant paragraph for you.

Why the need for the separation?

The simple answer is because a subjective experience cannot be observed by someone who is not that subject. We can infer and believe that another being experiences a subjective consciousness, but it is beyond our knowledge of experience. Yet objective consciousness is clearly within the realm of experienced knowledge. This lets us also apply consciousness beyond humanity. We can examine other animals for objective consciousness, as well as plants and perhaps even things we may not consider life. Objective consciousness doesn't have to know what its like to be the subject within that consciousness, or even if there's something that we as humans would recognize as a subject at all. — Philosophim

Isn't this whole idea of "objective consciousness" misleading? Aren't you just describing the external observation of consciousness?

Isn't this whole idea of "objective consciousness" misleading? Aren't you just describing the external observation of consciousness? — Pantagruel

Mislead is a pretty bold accusation. Please point out where and how I'm misleading the reader if you're going to do so.

As I said, the idea "objective consciousness" yokes together terms which are normally exclusive (consciousness is by definition subjective) in an equivocating fashion. You are describing either an object-consciousness (if it is the consciousness doing the observing of the other consciousness, ie. consciousness of consciousness as an object) or a conscious-object (if you are describing the observed consciousness qua observed by the other).

Pantagruel, you've pulled statements out of context, accused me of misleading, and apparently have not read the OP, or simply lack reading comprehension. I clearly defined what objective consciousness is in the OP. This is philosophy, the term and its definition is a proposal to be debated on that I did NOT mislead people about. I do not mind answering questions, clarifying issues, or addressing relevant critiques. I'm not interested in discussing with someone who is not making good faith efforts to address and understand the OP.

I'm not interested in discussing with someone who is not making good faith efforts to address and understand the OP. — Philosophim

No, I'm going straight from your OP.

"Objective consciousness occurs when we can know that something that is not our subjective consciousness is also observing and identifying. The problem in knowing whether something is objectively conscious is that we cannot experience their subjective consciousness."

and

"On the other end, objective consciousness shouldn't try to ascertain that it can know what subjective consciousness is like."

You clearly say that objective consciousness occurs in the observing subject as a function of the awareness of another conscious being. Which is fine. Except you then also ascribe the property of being "objectively conscious" to theobserved being (see italicized in the above quote). Not only that, you then go on to ascribe an additional intentionality to objective consciousness (which is nothing more or less than specifically awareness of another consciousness by your own definitions) when you suggest that it "shouldn't try to ascertain" that it can know what subjective consciousness is like. Is it a mode of consciousness? Is it a specific instance of consciousness of something?

Ok, yes, when I see something which I believe to be conscious, I am conscious of an object that I deem to be conscious. You are absolutely correct. And I don't experience the contents of other minds. For sure.

Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. — Philosophim

Ok, this is better Pantagruel.

You left out the next few sentences in the quote, which are important. You need to read more than a few sentences before making judgements. Sentences are part of an overall idea right? Don't read the sentences in isolation. Read the sentences to understand the idea.

Objective consciousness occurs when we can know that something that is not our subjective consciousness is also observing and identifying. The problem in knowing whether something is objectively conscious is that we cannot experience their subjective consciousness. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what an objective consciousness does that only an observing identifying thing could do.
"Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify."
— Philosophim

Objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness. Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing and identifying things through their actions.
Subjective consciousness is the direct subjective experience of being conscious.

You clearly say that objective consciousness occurs in the observing subject as a function of the awareness of another conscious being. — Pantagruel

I want to break down your words here to make sure I understand. You use the word "occurs in" with regards to objective consciousness. Objective consciousness is observed and known by the observing a subjects actions. It does not assess the inner experience of the subject. It does not assess the inner experience of the self. So its a little odd to say objective consciousness occurs in something. Objective consciousness is an observation of consciousness that does not require understanding the inner subjectivity of that consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.

Ok, yes, when I see something which I believe to be conscious, I am conscious of an object that I deem to be conscious. You are absolutely correct. And I don't experience the contents of other minds. For sure. — Pantagruel

To simplify this further:

When I see something that I believe to be conscious, I study its actions. If the actions of the being are actions that can only be done by something which can observe and identify, then objectively, it is conscious.

My own experience of being conscious, is subjective consciousness. My experience is only within my knowledge, no one else can know exactly what I am experiencing. I of course know what its like to be conscious from my point of view. But just like no one else can know what its like to be conscious from my point of view, I cannot know what its like for someone else to be conscious from their point of view.

Because subjective consciousness cannot be known by anyone besides the subject, it should be in a separate category than objective consciousness, which can be known and studied by everyone.

Objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness. Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing a — Philosophim

If it is an observation and a logical conclusion then it is subjective consciousness. These are both elements of subjective consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness. — Philosophim

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, you say objective consciousness should not "try to ascertain that it can know." Ascertaining and knowing are also operations of subjective consciousness.

It's a meaningless characterization.

If it is an observation and a logical conclusion then it is subjective consciousness. These are both elements of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Correct. Meaning that if you are observing and identifying, that experience you are having of observing and identifying is your subjective consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.
— Philosophim

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, you say objective consciousness should not "try to ascertain that it can know." Ascertaining and knowing are also operations of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Please finish what I claimed.

"should not try to ascertain that it can know what another subjective consciousness is like"

You agreed with me on this. You cannot know what it is like for another being to be conscious. You cannot know another beings subjective consciousness. You can of course know your own subjective consciousness. But because I can never know your subjective consciousness, I cannot make any claims to the experience of your subjective consciousness objectively. I can't know what its like when you see green. You can't know what its like that I see green. We can objectively know that we both see the wavelength we call green. But we cannot objectively know what the subjective experience of seeing green is like.

Correct. Meaning that if you are observing and identifying, that experience you are having of observing and identifying is your subjective consciousness. — Philosophim

Except that you keep saying objective consciousness is not conscious. Ascribing these properties to objective consciousness contradicts this. Your demarcation isn't working.

You agreed with me on this. You cannot know what it is like for another being to be conscious. You cannot know another beings subjective consciousness. You can of course know your own subjective consciousness. But because I can never know your subjective consciousness, I cannot make any claims to the experience of your subjective consciousness objectively. I can't know what its like when you see green. You can't know what its like that I see green. We can objectively know that we both see the wavelength we call green. But we cannot objectively know what the subjective experience of seeing green is like. — Philosophim

And even if I just ignore the self-contradictions of "objective consciousness," there are senses in which we are co-conscious. Mirror-neurons function through identification with the observed cognitive state of others in certain circumstances. Empathy is a co-awareness of the subjective plight of another. And it is a critical developmental stage in conscious development.

Except that you keep saying objective consciousness is not conscious. Ascribing these properties to objective consciousness contradicts this. — Pantagruel

I don't say that at all. The statement doesn't even make any sense. Please re-read the definition of objective consciousness, subjective consciousness and my explanations. Pull some quotes demonstrating where I've said this, as I don't understand how you're drawing that conclusion. I can't attempt to clarify for you until you give me my exact words that back your claim.

And even if I just ignore the self-contradictions of "objective consciousness," — Pantagruel

Please point out these self-contradictions. And quote me. At this point it is safe to say you have trouble reading and understanding the OP. This could be due to the lack of clarity in my terms or arguments. But I cannot know this if you do not cite.

there are senses in which we are co-conscious. Mirror-neurons function through identification with the observed cognitive state of others in certain circumstances. Empathy is a co-awareness of the subjective plight of another. And it is a critical developmental stage in conscious development. — Pantagruel

This has nothing to do with the definitions or topic here. Lets ensure that you first understand the definitions and arguments being made before you try adding new definitions like co-conscious.

"Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing"

Objective consciousness is logical conclusion. How can it not be conscious? Logical conclusions don't think themselves.

In fact, you even talk explicitly about "an objectively conscious being."

"Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness?"

It's unsinn. If the objectively conscious being is making observations and logical conclusions then it is conscious. The entire point of a p-zombie is that it is not-conscious. Calling it "objectively conscious" has no meaning.

"Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing"

Objective consciousness is logical conclusion. How can it not be conscious? Logical conclusions don't think themselves. — Pantagruel

First, you cut off the rest of the quote which includes identification, and action. Second, your grammar is starting to fail. "is logical conclusion" "logical conclusions don't think themselves". This shows me you're not thinking about things, but putting out sloppy and quick replies.

I had to do a German translation for Unsinn. Why? I'm not German. And finally your point about the p-zombie shows me, again, that you have no idea what the definitions are that I've clearly described in the OP and in follow ups.

I've been more than patient, but its clear you're not taking this discussion seriously. Have a good day Pantagruel, we'll try again another time.

Hello Janus,

A robot, just like the person who suffers from visual agnosia can see and respond to what they are seeing, but do not have the self-reflective awareness of seeing.

I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both.

The way I interpret this is that both lack subjective experience (of seeing). To put it another way, both the robot and the blindsight person do not know that they can see.

I think it makes more sense, given that blindsight only demonstrates a disassociation with one’s experience, that the person simply isn’t meta-conscious of or perhaps able to identify with their qualitative experience.

If a person suffered agnosia in regard to all their senses, including proprioception and interoception, it would seem hard to say how they would differ from a robot that had functional equivalents of all the human senses, that is a robot that could respond to tastes, smells, tactile feels, sounds, and sights, as well as proprioceptive and interoceptive data.

As far as I understand, ‘agnosia’ is when one fails, despite having adequate senses, to process those senses; so a robot that can process senses would actually have more capability to navigate its environment than the human with agnosia. However, the human would still be qualitatively experiencing, they just fail to process that qualitative experience correctly. Part of qualitative experience, for normal people, is much more than what is required to have baseline ‘qualitative experience’ to me.

Bob

I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both. — Bob Ross

I would argue that if there is no awareness of seeing that it makes no sense to speak of qualitative seeing.

I think it makes more sense, given that blindsight only demonstrates a disassociation with one’s experience, that the person simply isn’t meta-conscious of or perhaps able to identify with their qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Again I would say that being disassocited from experience is the same as having no (qualitative) experience. Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.

Hello Philosophim,

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine.

The point is that I don’t. It is not a scientific fact that brains produce consciousness. It is a scientific theory, but scientific theories are either more facts (i.e., explaining the how in terms of another how) or metaphysical commitments. In the case of physicalism, which is the term for the claim you are making, is a metaphysical commitment that most scientists agree with. That’s not the same thing as science proving the brain produces consciousness.

As for the hard problem, I still think you misunderstand it. " Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem." -Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy

I partially agree with you here because “consciousness” and “something it is like to for the subject” are being used ambiguously there. This is why I always note a distinction, when discussing the hard problem, between awareness and experience: the former being “how a being has knowledge, be aware, of its environment” while the latter is “how a being has qualitative, subjective experience of its environment”. All problems pertaining to ‘awareness’ are easy problems for physicalism: the hard problem pertains to everything about ‘experience’. Explaining functions, for example, is an easy problem—e.g., a being can know that something is green by interpreting the wavelength of light reflected off of the object. However, explaining how those functions produce experience is a different story—e.g., why does the being also have a qualitative experience of the greeness of the object?

My distinction is pretty standard and honestly I think your link just explains it more ambiguously. For example, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness:

The hard problem of consciousness asks why and how humans have qualia[note 1] or phenomenal experiences.[2] This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give humans and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth

I really like this post about it: https://consc.net/papers/facing.html . Section two really explains the distinction well (to me at least).

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain

I think you may be misunderstanding. Yes, the hard problem presumes, in order to even be a problem in the first place, that one is trying to explain consciousness by the standard reductive naturalist methodological approach. However, this is not the same thing as it being true. The hard problem is only such for physicalism, not other accounts such as substance dualism and idealism.

My solution to this is to just simply note that referring to the experience of the conscious subject itself is "subjective consciousness". Knowing what it is like to be the subject of any one conscious being besides ourselves is currently impossible.

This isn’t a solution, it is semantic distinction between what we can know (i.e., that beings can interpret their environment and observe it) and what we can’t (i.e., that they are conscious in the qualitative sense). To me, you are admitting that we can’t know people are conscious in the sense of the term that matters for the hard problem: the hard problem isn’t pertinent to beings that merely observe, act, and identify—those are soft problems for physicalism.

The only people questioning that mind comes from the brain are philosophers.

I generally agree and would say that this is due to the fact that mainly only philosophers are brushed up in philosophy of mind and, consequently, realize that we, at the very least, have no clue what consciousness is (and of course others try to give accounts of it). Most scientists aren’t engaged in philosophy which, like I said before, is the proper subject for this matter (i.e., metaphysics); instead, they metaphysically commit themselves to physicalism (most of the time) without every explicitly engaging in metaphysics themselves.

The hard problem does Mind coming from the brain is like oxygen theory, while the idea it does not is like phlogiston theory

I don’t see how this analogy holds. The scientific theory that brain produces mind is purely metaphysics.

But feel free to prove here first that the mind does not come from the brain and lets see where that takes us

Again, I am not claiming that the mind does not come from the brain but, rather, that we cannot prove (even theoretically in the future) because reductive physicalism affords no such answers—the methodology fails in this regard. I can prove that much, and that is all I need to prove to claim that you are not warranted in claiming that the mind comes from the brain.

To keep it short, my proof is the examination of the form, absracted, of what methodological reductive naturalism (physicalism) can afford with regards to consciousness. The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness. The best reductive naturalism can do is provide better insight into how the brain affects the mind (i.e., “this [set of conscious states] is impacted by this [set of biological functions] in this [set of manners]”), but this doesn’t afford any conceptual explanation of how the conscious states are allegedly produced by the brain states. Once one understands that, one immediately likewise apprehends that science can afford no answer either because it is predicated on the reductive naturalist methodology.

That would be my shortened argument.

Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus. — Bob Ross

While this is an interesting thought, is this something you can demonstrate?

Taking into consideration the abbreviated argument above, it becomes clear that science cannot afford an answer and consequently the answer to the claim goes beyond the possibility of all experience which, to me, is the definition of metaphysics.

How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

From an ontological agnostic’s perspective, those fields are getting much better at understanding the relation between brain states and mental states but they say nothing about what consciousness fundamentally is.

From an Analytic Idealist’s perspective, the strong correlation between mental and brain states is because the brain, along with everything else that is physical in a colloquial sense of the term (i.e., tangible, solid, has shape, etc.), is a extrinsic representation of the mental. I see the color green and the highest level extrinsic representation of that, when examining my brain with a scanner, is the neural activity we see within our perceptions--our representations of the world around is. Think of it like the video game analogy: if a character, Rose, hooks up another character, Billy, to a brain scanner and observes Billy qualitatively experiencing a green tree, she would be factually wrong to conclude that the Billy’s brain states were causing his mental experience of it because, in fact, the tree and his brain and body are fundamentally representations of 0s and 1s in a computer. We conflate our dashboard of experience with what reality fundamentally is—mentality.

Rose wouldn’t be wrong in noting that any scientific inquiry she could do on brain states and mental states (of billy) will be useful and will help them gain better knowledge to navigate the territory—but it says nothing about the itself.

Second, the easy problem confirms that yes, science knows that the brain produces consciousness.

What easy problem confirms that?

Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

If I could, then I would be proving myself wrong. The point is that science doesn’t afford an answer, so it would be contradictory of me to provide you with a scientific explanation, which is a reductive naturalistic approach, to afford an answer.

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

I would say, in summary, that the extrinsic representation of qualitatively seeing a world, from the side of another being that is qualitatively seeing, is light entering the physical eyes and brain interpreting it—but this is just the representation of it on our dashboard of experience. Under Analytic Idealism, the information is accurate (enough to survive at least), but the way it is represented is not fundamentally how it (ontologically) exists (like the tree in a video game).

This would seem to me that meta-consciousness is "qualitative experience of qualitative experience".

Not quite. Meta-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s qualitative experience: I am not qualitatively experiencing my qualitative experience—I have one steady flow of qualitative experience. The point is that, under Analytic Idealism, you are still conscious when you are in a coma—you just have lost your meta-consciousness and other higher level aspects to consciousness (such as potentially the ability to cognize). Consciousness isn’t just what bubbles up to the ego under Analytic Idealism—you are fundamentally qualitatively experiencing until you die. Under physicalism, this is not the case at all: consciousness is an emergent property and, as such, is only “on” when the higher levels of your brains abilities are “on”--thusly you aren’t conscious when you are in a coma.

At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Let me ask you this: what about blindsight indicates, to you, that they don’t have qualia? Simply because they can no longer identify that they are seeing?

Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia?

No, that is an aspect, a ability, of higher conscious forms. A being can be qualitatively experiencing while having not the capability to self-reflect about it. If you couldn’t self-reflect and acquire self-knowledge then you wouldn’t know that you just smelled that flower: you would just smell the flower—there wouldn’t be a self-reflective “I just smelled a flower”.

I suppose I'm looking for a separation between the meaning of qualia and perception or senses

To me, perceptions are representations of the world, which are qualitative (and thusly are constituted of instances of qualia). Qualia is any instance of qualitative experience, so, to me, there could be a being with qualitatively experiences but isn’t capable of providing itself with a reflection (a representation) of the world around it. For example, I think some plants, which are just strictly stimuli responses to the environment, are qualitatively experiencing (in the form of basic stimuli responses) but are not perceiving anything.

Sensations, on the other hand, are just the raw input which is also qualitative.

Generally I've understood qualia to be that conscious experience of sensations or perceptions, not the mere flooding of light or sound into one's body.

That’s fair. It is usually referred to in that manner simply because humans and higher animals are what are typically considered in the debate, but I would say that it equally applies to any instance of qualitative experience—not just higher conscious life forms.

Back to blindsight, it seems much like the inability to give a conscious focus to what one is perceiving.

But they are still perceiving and perception is qualitative.

Let me clarify what I'm stating. Qualia is the subjective experience of the thing which is observed to be objectively conscious. Qualia is not necessary for us to conclude something is objectively conscious. The reason for this, is we cannot objectively assess qualia. We cannot prove what a conscious being is experiencing, or not experiencing at a subjective level. Therefore we do not consider it objectively, but can only consider it from their subjective viewpoint.

So then are you advocating for epistemic solipsism? To me, this confirms that you can’t actually claim that objectively conscious beings are subjectively conscious and, thusly, we cannot know that there are other subjects but, rather, just that there are other observing beings.

How is this any different from magic then Bob?

Magic is when something poofs into existence from thin air—I am arguing that fundamentally reality is mind and, thusly, that the physical world is what the ideas within that mind appear upon our dashboard of experience. This is no different than when you have a dream and assume the character of a person (of which usually resembles yourself in real life) and view the “objective” dream world from that person’s perspective; and only after waking up do you realize that the entirety of the physical was just a representation of ideas. I don’t see how this is magic.

Thank you again Bob for your clear and deep thoughts on the subject!

And same to you my friend! I always enjoy our conversations!

Bob

quote="Bob Ross;814253"]The point is that I don’t. It is not a scientific fact that brains produce consciousness.[/quote]

We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.

"The way that scientists use the word 'theory' is a little different than how it is commonly used in the lay public," said Jaime Tanner, a professor of biology at Emerson College in Boston. "Most people use the word 'theory' to mean an idea or hunch that someone has, but in science the word 'theory' refers to the way that we interpret facts." https://www.livescience.com/21491-what-is-a-scientific-theory-definition-of-theory.html

One way to think of it is all the science up till now points to the brain, in the case of people, being the source of consciousness in people. Its like evolution. Its not a scientific law for sure, but every single attempt at refuting it has come up short. This is why I asked you to give a counter. You need to take the scientific knowledge that we have at this time and demonstrate why it cannot come from the brain. A simple way to do this is provide an alternative that we can use.

This is why I always note a distinction, when discussing the hard problem, between awareness and experience: the former being “how a being has knowledge, be aware, of its environment” while the latter is “how a being has qualitative, subjective experience of its environment”. — Bob Ross

I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not? Can you give me example of something that you could be aware of that was not also qualia, or subjective experience? To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.

Explaining functions, for example, is an easy problem—e.g., a being can know that something is green by interpreting the wavelength of light reflected off of the object. However, explaining how those functions produce experience is a different story—e.g., why does the being also have a qualitative experience of the greenness of the object? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not? Perhaps with blindsight I can see it more to your viewpoint. The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?

Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia. Generally I would not use the term awareness for such a situation, but if that is your definition, and it fits this situation, then I think I understand your argument better. Please correct me here.

A good link to Chalmers. Let me point to these two paragraphs in section 2.

"The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does"

I've bolded that sentence explicitly. Chalmers agrees on the technical aspects of mind as brain within his easy problem explanation, so what is he saying here? He's not saying that we can't observe all of the processes that give rise to consciousness. He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does. We can simplify Chalmer's entire line of questioning to, "Since we cannot experience the subjective experience itself, how can we possibly reconcile subjective experience with the observable mechanics in front of us?"

The answer is of course, "We cant'." You and I agree on this entirely. We're only off by a slight understanding of what Chalmer's means here. Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem. The solution as I gave, is to work around it.

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain

I think you may be misunderstanding. Yes, the hard problem presumes, in order to even be a problem in the first place, that one is trying to explain consciousness by the standard reductive naturalist methodological approach. However, this is not the same thing as it being true. The hard problem is only such for physicalism, not other accounts such as substance dualism and idealism. — Bob Ross

According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem. I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?

It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner. Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away. I care about objectivity. Subjectivity has never interested me beyond some fun, "What ifs". Musing about the subjective without any objective basis is fantasy. While it is fun, it does not solve anything in reality.

Again, I am not claiming that the mind does not come from the brain but, rather, that we cannot prove (even theoretically in the future) because reductive physicalism affords no such answers—the methodology fails in this regard. — Bob Ross

Again, the fact that we cannot objectively experience the subjective experience of another brain itself, does not negate that the subjective experience is coming from the brain itself. Chalmers demonstrates that by the easy problem here:

"The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
the focus of attention;
the deliberate control of behavior;
the difference between wakefulness and sleep."

All of this is consciousness, and all of that comes from the brain. Chalmers never disputes this. Please show where he does if I am mistaken.

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.

How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

From an ontological agnostic’s perspective, those fields are getting much better at understanding the relation between brain states and mental states but they say nothing about what consciousness fundamentally is. — Bob Ross

They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.

Think of it like the video game analogy: if a character, Rose, hooks up another character, Billy, to a brain scanner and observes Billy qualitatively experiencing a green tree, she would be factually wrong to conclude that the Billy’s brain states were causing his mental experience of it because, in fact, the tree and his brain and body are fundamentally representations of 0s and 1s in a computer. We conflate our dashboard of experience with what reality fundamentally is—mentality. — Bob Ross

This just seems to be a language issue. The words I'm stating are not the subjective words in my head correct? When I type a sentence, you don't know everything I'm thinking. But that doesn't mean the words aren't an attempt to represent what I'm actually thinking right? The words that you are seeing are just a bunch of black pixels squiggled together. Without translation, someone who didn't speak English would have no clue that these squiggles mean anything.

So we can translate Billy's thoughts to comprehend that he is thinking of a tree, but of course we can't get to the actual subjective experience of Billy seeing a tree, because we're not the subject, or Billy in this case. If billy confirms he his seeing a tree after we hook up the computer, and every time the computer is hooked up, says Billy is thinking of a tree, and Billy then states, "I'm thinking of a tree", then we are on the road to causality. Current neuroscience is way past this simple example, and way past the point of possible correlation.

Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

If I could, then I would be proving myself wrong. The point is that science doesn’t afford an answer, so it would be contradictory of me to provide you with a scientific explanation, which is a reductive naturalistic approach, to afford an answer. — Bob Ross

Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

I would say, in summary, that the extrinsic representation of qualitatively seeing a world, from the side of another being that is qualitatively seeing, is light entering the physical eyes and brain interpreting it—but this is just the representation of it on our dashboard of experience. — Bob Ross

Certainly, just like language is a representation of the thoughts I am trying to convey. It being a representation does not mean that language does not convey thoughts. It does not mean that I did not write them. It does not mean that I don't have thoughts. It just means you can never see my thoughts from my subjective viewpoint.

Meta-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s qualitative experience: I am not qualitatively experiencing my qualitative experience—I have one steady flow of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

See I view the consciousness of knowledge as qualia. Unconsciously knowing things would not be qualia, or subjective consciousness to me. I see qualia as the subjective experience of consciousness. it is that attentive awareness. So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

The point is that, under Analytic Idealism, you are still conscious when you are in a coma—you just have lost your meta-consciousness and other higher level aspects to consciousness (such as potentially the ability to cognize). — Bob Ross

So according to my definition of consciousness, a person in a coma could be considered objectively unconscious, but still subjectively conscious. Even then, perhaps there are still aspects of the brain that are still conscious. So for example, if we analyzed their brain and found that they were dreaming. Would we be able to know what that dreaming was like? No, but dreaming is observing and identifying.

Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.

At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Let me ask you this: what about blindsight indicates, to you, that they don’t have qualia? Simply because they can no longer identify that they are seeing? — Bob Ross

Qualia to me is something you experience. While the unconscious portion of the brain is processing, your subjective awareness is not. Qualia is the requirement for subjective consciousness. Unconscious processing is not qualia, at least to my understanding of the general use of the word.

Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia?

No, that is an aspect, a ability, of higher conscious forms. — Bob Ross

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness? You seem to be implying that higher consciousness is the ability to remember what you just did, then analyze it. How is that any different from my definition of observing than identifying?

To me, perceptions are representations of the world, which are qualitative (and thusly are constituted of instances of qualia). — Bob Ross

Just trying to get the vocabulary down here. Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world. So I could have the smell of a flower flow through my nostrils, but if I don't try to represent it as anything beyond the sensation of the smell itself, I don't have a perception. That is very similar to my observations/identity point. I have a feeling we're both off slightly with each other through semantics than a clash of ideology.

Sensations, on the other hand, are just the raw input which is also qualitative. — Bob Ross

I also agree with this. I think the difference is that if I am not attentive to the sensation, its an unconscious sensation. You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to. Does this capture your thoughts correctly?

So then are you advocating for epistemic solipsism? To me, this confirms that you can’t actually claim that objectively conscious beings are subjectively conscious and, thusly, we cannot know that there are other subjects but, rather, just that there are other observing beings. — Bob Ross

For an easily identifiable terminology, yes. We cannot know what another's subjective experience is, or even if they have it. Blindsight is proof of that. What we can do is have a cogent belief that others do. We can also analyze this objectively by looking for the consequence of having a subjective viewpoint. If I know that the ability to observe an identify is my subjective consciousness, then I can conclude that it allows me to do things that I could not if I were not an observing and identifying being. As a very simple test, I could put a puzzle in front of another being.

Lets take a crow for example. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGaUM_OngaY

In accordance to the definitions I've given, the crow is objectively conscious. Can we know what its like to be a conscious crow? No. Its impossible. Can we still objectively analyze its consciousness? Yes. Can we muse what it must feel like to be a crow? Of course, but its nothing we can know, just something we believe.

Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaZbCctlll4

Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!

Nagel said

Finally, so far as we can tell, our mental lives, including our subjective experiences, and those of other creatures are strongly connected with and probably strictly dependent on physical events in our brains and on the physical interaction of our bodies with the rest of the physical world.

I don't see how it could be said our consciousness would exist but for our brain.

However, that's not the same as an explanation of how the brain produces consciousness. That is, how do physical particles with their properties that we're aware of, acting in accordance with the forces that we're aware of, become aware of things, themselves, and their own awareness, and have subjective experience on top of the physical interactions? We know where in the brain certain aspects of consciousness take place. But we don't know how. I've never heard of a scientific theory that even addresses it. "It just does" seems to suffice. Adding more and more physical structures and process doesn't suggest it will ever become other than physical.

We know where in the brain certain aspects of consciousness take place. But we don't know how. — Patterner

Its because we cannot measure from within a conscious state. All objective measurements are from "without". We bounce stuff off of things to detect features. Vibrations for sound, photons for light. But consciousness is subjective, which means it comes from within a state. We can't currently bounce something at a state to measure what its like to be within that state.

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. Its only limited to an examination for consciousness as an observing being outside of the conscious state. We don't know "how" it is to be conscious from within the state, but we can know how it is conscious state outside, or the consequence of the actions of that inner state, work and function.