If we can, can you explain it? Particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them, are doing things other than interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. We know this subjectively, because we are each experiencing. And we know it objectively, because scans of our own brains during this experiencing reveal nothing but particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. What I mean is, we don’t look at those scans, and say, "What the...! What's going on there??" And if we didn’t know what the scans were, we would not think, "Ah. this is a conscious being." Because we are only seeing, if you will forgive me, particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them.Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. — Philosophim
We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.
The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness
No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.
I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not?
I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not?
To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.
The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?
Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia.
He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does
Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem.
According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem.
I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?
It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner
Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away
They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.
Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.
So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?
Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.
What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?
Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world.
You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to
Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches.
Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!
Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states.
— Philosophim
If we can, can you explain it? — Patterner
What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. — Bob Ross
When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. — Bob Ross
Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. — Bob Ross
If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question. — Bob Ross
I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness. — Bob Ross
Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter. — Bob Ross
Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. — Bob Ross
If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross
Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away
If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. — Bob Ross
Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism. — Bob Ross
Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. — Bob Ross
So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?
I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them. — Bob Ross
However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones. — Bob Ross
What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?
Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. — Bob Ross
You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to
I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing). — Bob Ross
“I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both.”
--Bob Ross
I would argue that if there is no awareness of seeing that it makes no sense to speak of qualitative seeing.
Again I would say that being disassocited from experience is the same as having no (qualitative) experience
Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.
Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.
What is the “conscious modelling”? — Bob Ross
That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. There are living things that react to stimuli without awareness of the stimuli or their reaction to it. We have also built machines like this. If our awareness is causal, then their benefit, and the reason evolution choose for them, is obvious. But it still doesn't explain the How. (If our awareness is not causal, of course, and merely observes our actions, which are simply physics-driven interactions of particles, then it is of no value, and there is no reason evolution would have selected for it.)To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine. — Philosophim
1. The definition of qualia
2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes
Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.
What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function
Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.
If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction.
Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.
We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.
Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist.
No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.
Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.
I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.
The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.
Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something
Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something.
"4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?
I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"
So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.
So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross
In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. — Bob Ross
You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. — Bob Ross
If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. — Bob Ross
What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. — Bob Ross
My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access — Bob Ross
but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing — Bob Ross
there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environmen — Bob Ross
What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical. — Bob Ross
I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.
Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa. — Bob Ross
The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.
Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent. — Bob Ross
Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it? — Bob Ross
Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself. — Bob Ross
But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves. — Bob Ross
I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"
This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. — Bob Ross
No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.
What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?
I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.
Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false. — Bob Ross
To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.
— Philosophim
That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. — Patterner
Let me try to explain my thinking this way... It we saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid water, we would look for something else going on. Because the properties of liquid water cannot account for the characteristics of a skyscraper.Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again. — Philosophim
The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles. — Patterner
Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. — Philosophim
The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. This is the chemical paradigm, a view that is very popular today and that is often considered in agreement with the Darwinian paradigm, but this is not the case. The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life—biological information and the genetic code—that are totally absent in the inorganic world, which means that information is present only in living systems, that chemistry alone is not enough and that a deep divide does exist between life and matter. This is the information paradigm, the idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’.
Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of Biological Thought, p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — What is Information?
I feel this also fixes ideas that observation or subjective consciousness creates all of reality. Subjective consciousness creates a subjective reality. Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. Whether you define that material in front of you as a rock or not, that material is still there. They each have their uses, but one does not affect the other. — Philosophim
But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. At issue is the claim that organisms can be understood solely in terms of matter and energy, or physics and chemistry. But this is a contentious claim. What if there is something about even the very simplest forms of organic life that is not observable in inorganic matter? What if organism have attributes that are not reducible to physics and chemistry? — Wayfarer
The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. — What is Information?
The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life — What is Information?
Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. — What is Information?
But this overlooks the role of the observer in physics. This shows that the act of observation and the establishment of measurement outcomes seem to play a fundamental role in determining the observed properties of the objects of the analysis, which are, purportedly, also the fundamental particles of physics. — Wayfarer
This is what gave rise to physicist John Wheeler's theory of the 'participatory universe', in which our participation as observers is as essential to the nature of the Universe as are the objects of analysis. So that torpedoes any neat separation of the objective and subjective poles. But that, in any case, is also called into question by 'enactivism', which shows that the organism and environment (or subject and object) are 'co-arising', such that it is impossible to draw an ultimate dividing line between one and the other. — Wayfarer
I do not deny it. I have gone to lengths, with my words and with Nagel's, to make clear that it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious. Our consciousness is not separable from our brain.I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes? — Philosophim
Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. — Philosophim
it does not negate that life is still just matter and energy. — Philosophim
in the cases like the quantum realm, its like slinging a que ball at an eight ball. — Philosophim
The explanation of uncertainty as arising through the unavoidable disturbance caused by the measurement process has provided physicists with a useful intuitive guide as well as a powerful explanatory framework in certain specific situations. However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impressions that uncertainty arises when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos
one expression of matter and energy — Philosophim
it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious. — Patterner
However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do." — Patterner
Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known.
— Philosophim
It is not something known, but something assumed by you. You assume that it is scientifically established that matter~energy is the only true existent. — Wayfarer
It is exactly what is called into question by that article. It is saying, there is a capacity or attribute which cannot be accounted for by physics and chemistry, namely, information. — Wayfarer
However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impressions that uncertainty arises when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos
it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious.
— Patterner
That is panpsychism, which seeks to resolve the apparently inexplicable nature of consciousness by saying it is elementary, in the same sense that the physical attributes of matter are. — Wayfarer
As you then correctly observe there are aspects of consciousness that are external to the models of physics. That is the subject of philosophy of mind, in particular, and there are many involved in trying to come up with a theory. — Wayfarer
Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of. — Philosophim
the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now. — Philosophim
A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune. — Philosophim
Obviously DNA is matter and energy, and honestly it is a storage of information. So is the brain. So is your hard drive. Do we think that a fly or a roach is something magical because it can retain information? Even plants do. Viruses. There are tons of example of matter and energy that store information. — Philosophim
Wayfarer, matter and energy is the only true existent that we know of.
— Philosophim
Says who? Quote a source for that. See, what you always argue is basically 'materialism 101'. Then you are exasperated that it can be questioned, when it seems so obvious. — Wayfarer
the fact that we do not know what tomorrow will bring does not negate what we know now.
— Philosophim
It might completely revolutionise it. If we were having this discussion in 1620, you would be utterly convinced that the Earth stands still and Sun goes around it. If we were having it in 1840, you would know nothing about electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer
A wave function is formed as a mathematical concept to deal with our inability to get a fine tune.
— Philosophim
The ontological status of the wave-function is one of the great unanswered questions of modern science and philosophy. The fact that you think you can sweep it aside with a sentence speaks volumes. — Wayfarer
If you google the phrase, science disproves objective reality, you will find many discussions of the radical implications of this idea. And they are radical - far more so than you're apparently aware of. — Wayfarer
That's all entirely true. That is the state of our understanding of consciousness. When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B.However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do."
— Patterner
Sure, we don't know everything yet. Just like we don't know how quantum physics fully works. Doesn't mean we can't take what we do know and work with it from there. Doesn't mean that we don't understand the part of quantum physics that we do. Subjective states are internal, whereas we measure externally. If we could one day measure something internally, perhaps? Or its just something that isn't possible. We don't have to know everything about component parts to use the parts that we do know. — Philosophim
I hold you in higher regard than snippy insults and then leaving. — Philosophim
Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. — Philosophim
There's not question being begged here. Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. — Philosophim
Provide me evidence of something that exists that is not matter and energy, and we have a discussion. — Philosophim
Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. — Philosophim
Educate me... — Philosophim
When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. — Patterner
OK, I appreciate that, and I apologise for it — Wayfarer
I'm pointing out that the assumption that organisms can be understood in solely physical terms is the point at issue. You're assuming that organisms can be accounted for solely in terms of matter-energy, and brushing off a reasoned argument (illustrated with references), which calls this into question. That's what 'begging the question' means. — Wayfarer
I mentioned already the aphorism that 'information is information, not matter or energy'. So, do you think that is wrong? Do you think that Ernst Mayr's assertion that the genetic code cannot be accounted for in terms of matter and energy, but implies something over and above them, is also wrong? I provided both of those as examples, and you haven't discussed them or even acknowledged them, beyond saying 'it's kind of silly'. — Wayfarer
Subjective reality does not alter objective reality.
— Philosophim
This is precisely what the measurement problem in quantum physics calls into question — Wayfarer
I think it all depends on what you mean by "qualitative seeing". People with colour agnosia can "guess" with not perfect, but greater than random accuracy, what colour card is being held before their eyes, for example. They are not actually aware of seeing the colour, but that greater than random accuracy of guessing shows that the data which would normally produce an experience of colour is registered by the brain and can be more or less reliably accessed even though the conscious qualitative experience is absent.
My point is that I would not refer to the brain's mere registration of the data as qualitive experience or seeing. If you don't agree, then all we will be arguing about is terminology, and there cannot be a definitive right answer. So, I'm saying that to me, it makes no sense to speak of qualitive experience in the absence of awareness of that experience.
Conscious modeling is conceptual modeling made possible by re-cognition. We say things have qualities because we recognize similarities. Take red as an example; we call red things red because they look similar to one another, and there is a great range of different red. But on either side towards yellow and blue we reach points where we would say a thing is orange or mauve or purple.
(FYI, I added the sentence "And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B." after you had hit Quote.)When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B.
— Patterner
I agree. But we can still know of A and B, and not fully knowing B does not negate what we fully know of A. — Philosophim
You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either.
In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously.
Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia?
A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.
and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.
Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states.
This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.
Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not
Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences
Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?
Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No
But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness
…
No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means.
Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is
Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob?
More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter.
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There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality.
The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness
What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine?
"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."
I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge
Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were?
Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement,
That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail.
Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally,
You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.
Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science.
A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.
The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical.
I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known.
My point is that our subjective reality of whether we treat the electron as a wave or a particle does not alter reality, it just alters are mathematical predictive or post assessment models — Philosophim
Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge.
I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information. — Philosophim
Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness. — Bob Ross
Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become. — Bob Ross
I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’. — Bob Ross
I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross
So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. — Bob Ross
When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross
I would say that they are still seeing the colour card, to some degree, if they can accurately guess them; and the fact that sometimes they can’t means that they no longer have introspective access to those qualitative experiences.
By “qualitatively seeing”, I mean something which is not-quantitative (viz., it has no definite quantity) and there is something it is like to see in and of itself. — Bob Ross
I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness: there can be a qualitative experience and something it like in and of itself to see of which the person, as the ego, does not have introspective (or perhaps cognitive) access to. — Bob Ross
is this like our ability to self-reflective on our perceptions? — Bob Ross
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