it's not really relevant to the argument at hand. — Wayfarer

That may be, but I assure you it was relevant to my understanding what you're talking about.

1. No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes. — Wayfarer

Suppose I just deny this. As I understand it, Anscombe did, and argued that there was no reason you could not give both a causal and an inferential account of the same phenomenon.

I accept that the causal explanation is not the same as an inferential explanation, but I do not see why having the one excludes having the other.

How will you persuade me to accept (1)?

How will you persuade me? — Srap Tasmaner

By giving reasons, yes? As distinct from twisting your arm, or threatening you in some other way.

No, that's scientific materialism. It is not the same thing. It mainly comes from the attempt to apply scientific methodology to philosophical problems, as a few here are doing. — Wayfarer

Science only deals with subjects insofar as they are material, or physical, if you like. It is only those kinds of inquiries that can be rigorously tested. Other kinds of ideas (like the synthetic generalizations I mentioned earlier) are what we (collectively) cannot imagine being otherwise. Then there things which are true as a matter of logic.

What category do you think the idea your OP consists in is based on?

What category do you think the idea your OP consists in is based on? — Janus

Philosophy, I would hope. I think the lineage of the argument can plausibly be traced back to the Phaedo.

That's a non-answer, or an argument from authority, (whivh amounts to being a non-answer) which I suspect you know.

Do you think your argument and/or philosophy itself belongs to any of the categories I outlined? One of them, (variously) all of them or none of them?

And please note, what the ancients, people of other cultures, or other times generally, cannot imagine being otherwise is not necessarily the same as what we moderns cannot imagine being otherwise.

By giving reasons, yes? — Wayfarer

Proceed.

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say I see. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

Thoughts are more events than things. See the following link for information about scientists detecting thought events:
https://www.eedesignit.com/oh-no-ai-now-reads-minds/ — wonderer1

Interesting! Now, neurologists resort to AI to find answers about the process of thinking!
So they say, "If the participant is open to having their thoughts decoded, their listening to a new story or imagining telling a story allows the machine to generate corresponding text from brain activity alone."
If the decoding of thoughts is a fact, that would have shaken not only the whole scienific community but the whole world!
And also, my dreams would become true! I have been thinking of such a possibily since a very long time ago: being able to project one thoughts on a monitor! What a thrill, eh?
Unfortunetely though, this still belongs to sci-fi ...

Yet, if this some day becomes true, who can guarantee that it is the brain that creates this process and not that it just reacts --as a stimulus-response mechanism that it is-- to thoughts produced from some other source than the brain? Ha!
In fact, this is what's happening: When I'm thinking of a stressful life event willfully --not, unintentionally-- this has inpact on my body because it produces adrenaline and sensorial disorders. This of course happens in communication with the brain, which controls the pituary gland, etc. But it's not the brain that thinks of that stressful event. The brain can only receive stimuli (signals) and react to them.

If you want to find the “process of thought” watch a person think. Human thought, like believing and reasoning, is an action performed by persons, and not by any other collection of things and processes. If you want to see a cartwheel or a backflip you do the same thing: watch a person perform these actions. — NOS4A2

:up:
But if you train your brain hard enough, it will be able to do these things itself, automatically. You wouldn't have to do anything at all. Not even thinking about doing them! :grin:

If thoughts are not persons thinking, beliefs are not persons believing, and reasons not persons reasoning, then they are nothing but words without a referent. There is no other way around it. — NOS4A2

:up:

I think Hume provides us with a very good approach to this problem with his discussion of induction and causation. We create inductive rules through empirical observation of what has happened in the past. And from this we can, and do, produce very effective predictions concerning the future. However, we have no empirically derived principle which tells us that things in the future must necessarily be the same as they have been in the past.

So the prediction must always be expressed in terms of probability rather than the necessity which we desire of logic. This means that empirical observation along with inductive reasoning cannot provide us with an understanding of causation, and prediction in general. There is a feature of the universe which allows that empirical observation, with inductive reasoning, can provide us with very good predictions, but empirical observations with inductive reasoning cannot provide us with an understanding of this feature. That is because this mode of prediction which employs empirical observation along with inductive reasoning, to make accurate predictions, takes this feature of the universe for granted.

By taking this feature for granted, as a sort of foundational premise, the logical system built on top of this premise has no capacity to understand the meaning of that premise, it just employs it. The premise employed, or feature of the universe represented, can be portrayed as a temporal continuity. This is the same temporal continuity which is taken for granted by Newton's first law. When these "laws" which are in themselves actually derived from inductive reasoning, are taken for granted as a premise for a logic system (an axiom), the logical system cannot be turned back on itself to question, inquire, or analyze the premise in a skeptical way, because the premise must be taken for granted in order for the system to be applied. So to analyze the fundamental premise (axiom), in order to understand it, we must use principles from outside that system, therefore an independent system.

Now when we get to the very bottom of empirical observation, and the inductive reasoning which deals with it, and we want to understand these features, and how they work in our universe, we must employ principles which are not empirically derived. Therefore our logic must transcend empirical observation, or else we could not ever understand the relationship between past and future.

A most valiant effort.

Surely this does at least suggest 'a transcendent realm accessible to the wise'? — Wayfarer

In the first paragraph, what " is thought to rule and lead us by nature" does not suggest a transcendent realm. Nor does "what is noble and divine". Contemplation is called divine but it is not and does not lead to transcendence. It is, according to Aristotle, the highest human activity. It is part of the fulfillment or realization or actualization of our nature, not a transcendence of it.

As to the use of the term 'divine': In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214).

A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles

...

Contemplation is that activity in which one's νοῦς intuits and delights in first principles."

Only a person who is wise can have a true conception of unproven first principles, but only a person who is wise can know whether a conception of unproven first principles is true. If we are not wise then at best we can have an opinion about first principles we assume is true, but cannot prove.

Theoria (contemplation) is related to our term 'theater', to view or see. Plato's cave is a theater. A place in which the distinction between seeing and acting is most pronounced. The prisoners are shackled to the wall and can observe but not act. What they behold is taken to be true and nothing they are able to know contradicts that belief.

The image of the cave is an image of religious practices that seek to experience the sacred and divine. The problem is there is nothing they see that shows them that what they see is not true. Contemplative activity does not provide a reality check. Rather than transcendence it is far more likely to entrap us in a cave with its hope and expectation of transcendence.

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say I see. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us. — Wayfarer

If you think that the use of reason within this discussion demonstrates the soundness of the argument from reason, I think you’ve misunderstood Srap’s criticism.

He asked you to defend this:

No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes — Wayfarer

That you will defend it with reason is irrelevant (although you haven’t actually defended it yet).

I’d add that metaphysical naturalism can be true even if beliefs cannot be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes. Nonreductive materialism is popular among philosophers. Which takes us back to @180 Proof’s early response, which I don’t think you’ve addressed.

Tom, your unwillingness to commit to at least a provisional position on the Random Chaos vs Rational Cosmos question is puzzling to me. — Gnomon
I think that's mostly a problem for you and may explain things. Also 'unwillingness' is not a good word, it implies an ought - I 'ought' to be able to, right? I would say 'inability' would be more appropriate. I hold tentative positions on some matters, and was just writing elsewhere above - — Tom Storm

Yes. Our different attitudes towards opinions "may explain things". You seem motivated to avoid dogmatic positions, while I'm interested in discovering moderate "provisional positions". And yet, you do occasionally express a brief succinct opinion on some specific topics. Maybe you only avoid a priori topics that cannot be definitively proven true or false.

Perhaps you think broad general questions --- "some matters", such as Random vs Rational Reality --- are more likely to be answered imperiously, and perhaps based on debatable religious or political postures, instead of hard scientific facts. I'm keenly aware of that danger, but I'm willing to take a chance on exchanging opinions on such fraught topics, on the outside chance that I might learn something philosophically important. Such as "why some opinion exchanges are more polarized than others". :smile:

PS___Regarding the "ought" (moral obligations) aspects of expressed opinions, some might hold that scientific views (beliefs, opinions) ought to be expressed in terms of Factual Particulars, while philosophical perspectives ought to be expressed in Generalities & Possibilities --- or not expressed at all. I've noticed that some posters on this philosophy forum seem to deliberately avoid voicing general or speculative opinions (philosophy ; rationalism), and to restrict their views to particular & empirical facts (science ; naturalism)*1 *2. And they can be rather dogmatic about defending what they see as a wall of separation between Fact (science) & Fiction (philosophy). In that case, perhaps they ought not to be posting on a wishy-washy philosophy forum at all. :cool:


*1. :
Science only deals with subjects insofar as they are material, or physical, if you like. It is only those kinds of inquiries that can be rigorously tested. Other kinds of ideas (like the synthetic generalizations I mentioned earlier) are what we (collectively) cannot imagine being otherwise. Then there things which are true as a matter of logic.
What category do you think the idea your OP consists in is based on?
:
Philosophy, I would hope. I think the lineage of the argument can plausibly be traced back to the Phaedo.

*2 Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science :
We’ll start with what has historically been the most dominant view of the nature of philosophy:[1] let’s call this view ‘rationalism.’[2] After looking at this traditional perspective, we’ll review a more recent view of what philosophy is or should be: ‘naturalism.’
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/

Obviously I agree, but I'll add one more point, which might count as a sort of non-reductionism.

It seems to me a lot of our traditional "mental" vocabulary does not refer to exclusively internal states of human beings, but rather to mental rather than, I guess, bodily interactions with the environment and objects. We distinguish, and presumably have for a very long time, between chopping down a tree and looking at it, wondering if it's big enough for the beam we need. Both descriptions involve both the guy with the sharp implement and the tree, so just as <chopping down a tree> doesn't map cleanly onto postures and movements of my body alone, in the absence of a tree, so <estimating a tree's yield> needn't map onto something going on in my brain in the absence of a tree.

As it happens, representational theories of mind will map the necessary tree onto my internal representation of the tree, and you'll see often on this forum theories that claim my goal in either case to produce a certain state of my internal model. I think that's a very different issue from whether our everyday vocabulary around thinking, perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on, not only presupposes objects for these activities but folds them into terms that are in some ways holistic.

Does that make any sense?

Nonreductive materialism is popular among philosophers. Which takes us back to 180 Proof’s early response, which I don’t think you’ve addressed. — Jamal

@Wayfarer won't because he dogmatically cannot.

That you will defend it with reason is irrelevant (although you haven’t actually defended it yet). — Jamal

I believe I have successfully defended it in numerous places in this dialogue, and I don’t think Srap’s criticisms come to terms with the argument. Say if I do persuade you to believe any proposition whatever - not necessarily this one - where you agree that you 'see the point' of the argument - how can that be understood in any terms other than rational persuasion? What is it that you see, when you see the point? What about that kind of transaction can be described in physical terms? I think that's a very direct question, which prompted nothing more than circumlocution.

This is because it is my dogmatic belief that matter does not act, but is only acted upon.

Nonreductive materialism is popular among philosophers. — Jamal

And I would guess that this is because it purportedly gets them off the hook from having to defend the ridiculous implications of reductive materialism, whilst not giving ground to anything that sounds like dualism or idealism. In which context, 'supervenience' serves as a kind of convenient gap-filler.

//furthermore, the OP stipulates that the argument from reason is directed at reductive materialism. It is arguable that the reason for the development of such views as 'non-reductive materialism' was just because of such challenges as the argument from reason.//

our everyday vocabulary around thinking, perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on, not only presupposes objects for these activities but folds them into terms that are in some ways holistic. — Srap Tasmaner

That would be the subjective unity of perception - which is another thing that is not explainable in physicalistic terms, as the linked article explains.

Say if I do persuade you to believe any proposition whatever - not necessarily this one - where you agree that you 'see the point' of the argument - how can that be understood in any terms other than rational persuasion? — Wayfarer

The neural networks in your brain have been formed by your unique life experience and genetic constitution such that hearing the proposition affects those networks so as to produce the result that the proposition is convincing to you, whereas it might not be so to others, whose brains' neural structures have formed differently, due to different life experiences. If it was all just pure sovereign reason, then why would everyone who can think rationally not agree about everything?

Of course, I'm not claiming this explanation or at least something along those lines is anything other than the best empirical explanation we currently have. If logic doesn't by itself doesn't tell us anything, and a primary principle of rational thinking is not to believe anything without sufficient evidence, then what other possible cogent explanation is there?

Should we believe something simply because it feels right to us? I don't say we shouldn't, but I also believe in that case we must relinquish the claims that our belief is rationally-based and accept that is is a matter of faith. Matters of faith cannot be cogently argued for.

The other point of inconsistency in your position seems to be that you think rational persuasion is a matter of free will; but how could it be if rational persuasion is as strict as valid logical deduction is?

I don’t think Srap’s criticisms come to terms with the argument — Wayfarer

That may very well be, but I have tried. I'm not even sure I've posted a criticism of the argument so much as I've tried and failed to understand it.

Apropos seeing the point, a gift:

I'm not even sure I've posted a criticism of the argument so much as I've tried and failed to understand it. — Srap Tasmaner

That's what it seems to me, but I appreciate the fact that you directly addressed it, rather than changing the subject or digressing.

If it was all just pure sovereign reason, then why would everyone who can think rationally not agree about everything? — Janus

That's subjectivism and relativism. It's obvious that, for example, in the American political scene, there is a huge polarization, but it's no coincidence that a large part of the cause of this is a leading political figure who quite openly tells enormous lies which large numbers of the electorate are willing to swallow. Surely a political scientist or pollster can come up with reasons why they do that, but it doesn't change the fact that they're believing lies, and that they are lies, regardless of anyone's opinion.

:rofl: Gave me a laugh!

That's subjectivism and relativism. It's obvious that, for example, in the American political scene, there is a huge polarization, but it's no coincidence that a large part of the cause of this is a leading political figure who quite openly tells enormous lies which large numbers of the electorate are willing to swallow. Surely a political scientist or pollster can come up with reasons why they do that, but it doesn't change the fact that they're believing lies, and that they are lies, regardless of anyone's opinion. — Wayfarer

The question was about people who are (presumably) capable of thinking strictly rationally, philosophers for example; what explains the fact that there is so much disagreement among them?

The other point of inconsistency in your position seems to be that you think rational persuasion is a matter of free will; but how could it be if rational persuasion is as strict as valid logical deduction is? — Janus

As you point out, logic itself is not necessarily descriptive of the world of experience - something can be logically true but physically impossible, and things happen which defy logic. The argument from reason is not presenting reason as a panacea or magic bullet, but as an indispensable faculty which can't be explained in physicalist terms (among other things.

what explains the fact that there is so much disagreement among them? — Janus

It's the old Indian elephant parable; that we've only ever got a grasp of some aspect of the elephant, its tail or its ear or tusk and we form conclusions on that basis. Reality, or rather, Being, is infinitely vast, and coming to an understanding exceedingly difficult.

As you point out, logic itself is not necessarily descriptive of the world of experience - something can be logically true but physically impossible, and things happen which defy logic. The argument from reason is not presenting reason as a panacea or magic bullet, but as an indispensable faculty which can't be explained in physicalist terms (among other things. — Wayfarer

I don't think many would disagree that reason is indispensable to human life. However, even if the semantic content of logic or rational thought cannot be described in terms of fundamental physics (to expect that would be to commit a category error), it doesn't follow that there can be no physical, neurological or evolutionary explanations for the fact that humans are capable of rational thought.

It's the old Indian elephant parable; that we've only ever got a grasp of some aspect of the elephant, its tail or its ear or tusk and we form conclusions on that basis. Reality, or rather, Being, is infinitely vast, and coming to an understanding exceedingly difficult. — Wayfarer

No one is omniscient, or even close to it, and some know more than others to be sure. A neuroscientist presumably knows much more about neuroscience than you or I do, for example, and knowledge has become so specialized that it seems laypeople such as ourselves are in no position to criticize a neurological understanding of the mind and brain unless we have sufficient training in the discipline.

it doesn't follow that there can be no physical, neurological or evolutionary explanations for the fact that humans are capable of rational thought. — Janus

You're quite right. Please note the terms of reference provided in the original post. It is quite specific about the type of physicalism the argument has in its sights. The fact that naturalism has changed signficantly in the last 60 odd years in regard to physicalism (for example, with the introduction of biosemiotics) might be due to the growing realisation of the inadequacy of physicalism, although the original physicalism is still defended by the philosophers that I have mentioned in this thread (such as Daniel Dennett).

As I've said many times, I do not doubt that fact of evolution, but the way I put it is that h. sapiens has developed the capacity for reason. I still say it's a mistake to say conceive of reason as result of evolutionary biology, because it reduces reason to mere adaptation (the argument at the basis of Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion* and also Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism.)

*From which: 'I suspect that there is a deep-seated aversion in the modern “disenchanted” Weltanschauung to any ultimate principles that are not dead--that is, devoid of any reference to the possibility of life or consciousness.'

I still say it's a mistake to say conceive of reason as result of evolutionary biology, because it reduces reason to mere adaptation. — Wayfarer

I'm not seeing why acquiring the capacity for reason should not be thought of as a result of evolutionary biology, driven by adaptation. We know that thinking is correlated with neuronal processes, and we also know that we can formulate the principles or rules of rational thought or logic. And further to that we know, due to the obvious adaptive superiority of humans over other animals, which most plausibly would seem to be on account of language and the evolutionary complexification of rational thought it enables, that language and rational thought must have adaptive advantages. What am I missing?

I'm not seeing why acquiring the capacity for reason should not be thought of as a result of evolutionary biology, driven by adaptation. — Janus

Because there's nothing in the theory that addresses it specifically. The theory is about the factors that contribute to the survival and evolution of species. It's a biological theory, but the view that it accounts for everything about human nature and the human condition is biological reductionism (whereas I would say that we're 'underdetermined' by biological factors). Historically, because evolutionary biology stepped into the vacuum left by the abandonment of religion, then such capabilities as the faculty of reason are simply assumed to be explained by that theory. But Alfred Russel Wallace, for one, never accepted it - see his essay Darwinism Applied to Man

I should add, the expression 'neo-Darwinian materialism' which I already mentioned, describes the view that living things are material in nature, that were formed by some as-yet-to-be-understood process designated 'abiogenesis', allowing the 'Darwinian algorithm' (Dennett's phrase) to take off, giving rise to ever-more complex life-forms over hundreds of millions of years. This is the sense in which neo-Darwinianism is materialist. Whereas the kind of dualist philosophy that I'm tentatively exploring, sees the earliest life as the manifestation of intentionality, not necessarily as a consequence of theistic creation (although that might be thought of as a metaphorical account), but as an expression of a latent attribute of the Cosmos being made manifest through the process of evolution. In other words, that conscious beings manifest through the processes of evolution. This leaves space for consciousness to be understood as having a formative role, rather than as an accidental byproduct of a fortuitous process (Bertrand Russell's 'accidental collocation of atoms'.)

I'm not seeing why acquiring the capacity for reason should not be thought of as a result of evolutionary biology, driven by adaptation. — Janus

Because there's nothing in the theory that addresses it specifically. The theory is about the factors that contribute to the survival and evolution of species. — Wayfarer

No, the study of civilization, which includes evolution, is also the study about the intelligence of humans over epochs. What Janus might be referring to is the study of logic, which is a modern development. The "capacity for reason", as civilization reveals, is actually the capacity to use tools, for example.

. It's a biological theory, but the view that it accounts for everything about human nature and the human condition is biological reductionism (whereas I would say that we're 'underdetermined' by biological factors). — Wayfarer

I'd say that with the advent and evolutionary development of culture, factors other than the merely biological certainly came into play, plausibly to the point of predominance. Don't forget, though that evolution is not merely a biological determinant, since animals, including humans have to cope with and survive in environments. Another point is that cultures themselves and their survival and flourishing are determined by geographical and biological, as well as human factors, so there is no clear line beyond which biology becomes irrelevant.

In any case saying that the capacity for language and rational thought evolved, driven initially by adaptive advantage, is not to say that everything about humans is determined by fitness for survival and reproduction.

No, the study of civilization, which includes evolution, is also the study about the intelligence of humans over epochs. What Janus might be referring to is the study of logic, which is a modern development. The "capacity for reason", as civilization reveals, is actually the capacity to use tools, for example. — L'éléphant

:up: Yes, tool use is one very significant thing that distinguishes us from most other animals, and the degree to which we have developed that distinguishes us from all other known animals. Language and logic can also be considered to be tools, but I would be loath to say that they are nothing but tools.

I have many conflicting views of what is "spiritual" But I am not down with this:

As contrasted with this hopeless and soul-deadening belief, we, who accept the existence of a spiritual world, can look upon the universe as a grand consistent whole adapted in all its parts to the development of spiritual beings capable of indefinite life and perfectibility. To us, the whole purpose, the only raison d'être of the world--with all its complexities of physical structure, with its grand geological progress, the slow evolution of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and the ultimate appearance of man--was the development of the human spirit in association with the human body. From the fact that the spirit of man--the man himself--is so developed, we may well believe that this is the only, or at least the best, way for its development; and we may even see in what is usually termed "evil" on the earth, one of the most efficient means of its growth. For we know that the noblest faculties of man are strengthened and perfected by struggle and effort; it is by unceasing warfare against physical evils and in the midst of difficulty and danger that energy, courage, self-reliance, and industry have become the common qualities of the northern races; it is by the battle with moral evil in all its hydra-headed forms, that the still nobler qualities of justice and mercy and humanity and self-sacrifice have been steadily increasing in the world. Beings thus trained and strengthened by their surroundings, and possessing latent faculties capable of such noble development, are surely destined for a higher and more permanent [[p. 478]] existence; and we may confidently believe with our greatest living poet--



That life is not as idle ore,
But iron dug from central gloom,
And heated hot with burning fears,
And dipt in baths of hissing tears,
And batter'd with the shocks of doom
To shape and use. — A.R. Wallace