Putin's reputation in the West is completely irrelevant; for him his reputation at home is essential. The propaganda monolith is very sensitive to any detractions, Putin appearing weak before Russians (and that is exactly what has happened, as evidenced by Russian TV, forums and blogs) for him is potentially fatal. He has shown that he can be challenged with impunity - there is nothing worse for an authoritarian figure. — Jabberwock

Well good we agree his reputation in the West is irrelevant, and I assume you agree with my point of reputation vis-a-vis other authoritarians.

As for domestic reputation, I agree with your general framework, but this (in my view) simply supports that the events were staged as it is precisely these drawbacks that are mitigated.

In my experience, the biggest difference between planned (whether overt or covert) and unplanned events is the presence of risk mitigation. When things happen by surprise and you just need to deal with them, there's generally no time to carefully mitigate minor risks. A quick example is a device that finds itself in a hostile environment compared to a device designed for a hostile environment.

In this case, Prigozhin mitigates his remarks about Putin to such an extent it's difficult to call this a coup (as originally advertised) at all and it's now being referred to a mutiny or rebellion ... but mutiny or rebellion to do what?

Putin himself was not openly challenged, Prigozhin clarifies during his escapade that Putin is the duly elected head of government, and it's not a coup but a "march for justice".

Instead of Putin being actually challenged, he plays more the "godfather" role of mediating and resolving disputes between subordinates, all of which pay homage to him.

Not to mention that you have failed to show how exactly 'Russian lives have been saved'. Nothing of the kind happened and in two days nobody will remember the coup, as the military packages are getting bigger and bigger. — Jabberwock

Yes, definitely, if no one will remember the coup and it will be just forgotten, then all the costs you point out don't matter. Just like the US pulling out of Afghanistan and leaving their "friends" high and dry, and having people fall off planes and so forth definitely seemed like a "reputation hit" at the time but no one remembers or cares now. The Western narrative has become a mix of out of sight and out of mind as well as Afghanis just didn't fight for their freedom hard enough, US tried its best but you get what you deserve.

However, my point was that if it is an intelligence operation and somehow these negatives consequences you point out become relevant (costs outweigh the gains) they could just come out and say it was an intelligence operation to fool the West / Ukrainians and that saved lives somehow (whether it is true or not).

Most costs and risks are not static, there's ways to mitigate them by some action in the future. Something we have already seen; if it was planned then the problem would arise of how make people 100% believe there's a coup and a "point of no return" has been reached and there will be fighting between Wagner and regular forces ... but then unwind it afterwards. It's a problem, but if you think creatively you may come up with the idea of having Belarus broker a deal and Prigozhin will go hang out there and that's the resolution to the legal crisis. It still doesn't make much sense, but it makes more sense than someone internal to Russia brokering a deal and Prigozhin staying in Russia.

And think about it, why would Lukashenko spontaneously intervene in Russian internal affairs? If this was an "open challenge" to Putin and Putin wants these mutineers dead, it makes absolutely zero sense for Lukashenko to call Prigozhin like this was some high school level drama.

That is demonstrably false. Prigozhin alone has assembled a military force that appears to be decidedly better than the rest of the Russian forces. The whole point is that Shoigu and Gerasimov's troops could not equal Wagner even with theoretically bigger resources. If he was that easy to replace, then all Russian soldiers should equal Wagnerites. They pretty obviously do not. — Jabberwock

This is just pure delusion. 25 000 troops without any supply lines or airforce or satellite intelligence and so on, are not going to defeat a million troops with supply lines and all the hardware and gadgets. Russian regular forces could continuously carpet bomb Wagner positions. Additionally, not all Wagner troops joined the "rebellion", those that didn't have the opportunity now to just join Russian regular forces. So we don't even know how much troops we're talking about.

There's also zero evidence that each Wagner fighter is literally match for 10 or even a 100 Russian regular forces, even if equipment and supply lines where equal. Pretty much a ludicrous claim. To make matters even worse, since the "coup" started 1000km from Moscow (if this was a real coup) Wagner would need to break through fortified positions, and Russian troops need only surround them and continuously fire artillery, rockets, missiles and continuously carpet bomb the entire area.

Your statement here is so foolish and disconnected to any military reality that it's difficult to even contain in the minds eye for the purposes of critical scrutiny.

Again - they had little choice as Wagner was indispensable. Besides Prigozhin was not going off script for most of the war – only when he started to hint at his ambitions they decided to pacify him by sending Wagner to Bakhmut. — Jabberwock

That's not how any military or intelligence operation works or even business works. Someone who goes off script and is unpredictable and a loose cannon is a serious problem, as you don't know what they're going to do and how much damage they can cause, wittingly or not. It doesn't matter how fast you are at putting up drywall if you're likely to burn down the entire project.

And any organisation (government, business, non-profit, and even more so military and intelligence agencies) are extremely sensitive to what information is made public. It would not matter how good a developer or executive you are at Google if you start randomly talking to the press and causing PR problems (no single person could possibly produce enough value to offset all the time required to deal with and mitigate problematic talking to the press, in addition to not knowing what the person would say next). Likewise, whenever intelligence information is leaked (and not on purpose) the idea that the leaker was otherwise good at their job and maybe still "worth it" doesn't come into the equation.

Prigozhin is not essential to Wagner continuing to operate essentially exactly the same.

Equating Wagner with Prigozhin is just false and there would be zero reason to keep him around if he was causing problems, you just get rid of him (by an "accident" or just arrest him on sedition or make a executive order or pass a law nationalising his "private military organisation") and problem solved.

No imagination is needed, because we do know that he had the leverage: the war would go much worse without Wagner. If that happened, Putin would have much bigger problems than Prigozhin. If they had the choice between allowing his ambitions to grow and losing an important part of the front, it was not much of a choice at all. — Jabberwock

Again, Prigozhin does not equal Wagner, you can easily have Wagner without Prigozhin and there is zero evidence that Prigozhin's experience in prison and hotdog stands and fancy restaurants has made him some military strategist so brilliant that he is simply irreplaceable and the war cannot be fought without him. Likely he's not involved in the tactical decisions at all (but leaves that to military professionals).

Wagner is just one of the "private militaries" that exist within Russia. There are actually a large number of "volunteer," forces that are not integrated into the MoD structure and are under the control of quasi-military leadership. Wagner and the Kadyrovite Chechens are the most visible of these in the West, in part due to significant efforts to market themselves online, but far from the only ones. Wagner itself had some other armed groups (ironically, explicitly neo-Nazi ones) folded into it prior to the war for example.

Wagner had, however, grown into the most potent such force due to its ability to recruit from prisons and then its willingness to carry out costly frontal attacks that the military balked at despite apparently heavy pressure from Putin and his clique.

Having your own military group is a weird sort of credibility thing in Russia. Strelkov's cred, while waning fast, comes from his prior control over independent forces in the Donbas for example. Some of these are the result of prior political crises in Russia. Minority leaders essentially rule as warlord vassals of Putin, the prime example being Kadyrov. These groups are less threatening because they don't pull support from the Russian majority, unlike Wagner.

While most groups are small compared to Wagner, which was at times 10-20% of Russian combat forces in Ukraine, they add up. The MoD was talking about bringing 20,000 in as contract troops by 7/1 and another 25,000 by August, essentially filling out an entire corps equivalent, which would be a significant share of combat forces. A significant number of these would be assigned to an army based out in the Far East, which is where they tend to be from.

You also have groups active in the Donbass since 2014, foreign groups (small but they add up), South Ossetians (apparently just took horrific losses plugging a gap in the defensive line), the DNR, LPR, etc. Just the MoD, Kadyrovites, Wagner, LPR, and DNR meant 5 independent armies in the war- it being such a shit show is sort of explained by this.

Wagner had, however, grown into the most potent such force due to its ability to recruit from prisons and then its willingness to carry out costly frontal attacks that the military balked at despite apparently heavy pressure from Putin and his clique. — Count Timothy von Icarus

True, but Wagner could recruit from prisons only because the Russian state allowed that to legally happen, precisely for the purposes of having prisoners dying on the front lines rather than regular troops.

The whole point of mercenaries is they are more expendable and the civilian population is less affected if they die.

Which fit in this strategy of attrition during the last phase of the war, as well as mitigated the disruption of the sanctions (limit "normal people" dying while people are also dealing with sanctions, and so reduce overall discontentment and disruption; i.e. avoid mobilising as much as possible people actually needed for the economy to function properly).

While Ukrainians have been fighting with regular Ukrainians this past half a year, Russia has mostly been fighting with these mercenaries.

In parallel to this phase of keeping the fighting focus in Bakhmut and primarily using mercenaries, the missile campaign has aimed to attrit Ukrainian air defences.

This all makes a lot of sense if during this time the Russian population has hardened its support for the war (due to things like Ukrainian intelligence assassinating people in Russia, suppression of dissent, and so on), the mobilisation and training of reserves can complete, Ukrainian air defence is effectively depleted, continuous artillery attrition over the whole front, and the next phase of the war Russia will have high moral, civilian support and air and artillery superiority.

Not to say Russia achieved all these things, just what I think is clearly what they aimed to accomplish these last 6 months.

Any large scale manoeuvres require huge amounts of troops, so not feasible with only mercenaries, but this last attritional phase of the war does make sense to use mercenaries as much as possible to limit the effect of casualties on the civilian population.

Not that this basic strategy of using mercenaries explains the "rebellion", but just why Wagner has been such a focus since last six months.

If this current and next phase of the war involve large scale engagements (such as Ukrainian attacks at multiple points along the front and any large scale offensives the Russians may do) then mercenaries are of less relevant. It also makes sense to distribute the experience gained in Bakhmut throughout the whole of the military. Which again, doesn't really explain the coup, but does explain why Russian MoD would offer Wagner forces that "didn't rebel" to sign regular military contracts.

Well good we agree his reputation in the West is irrelevant, and I assume you agree with my point of reputation vis-a-vis other authoritarians.
[...]
Putin himself was not openly challenged, Prigozhin clarifies during his escapade that Putin is the duly elected head of government, and it's not a coup but a "march for justice".

Instead of Putin being actually challenged, he plays more the "godfather" role of mediating and resolving disputes between subordinates, all of which pay homage to him. — boethius

And that is exactly why there are good reasons to think it was not staged: the most damaging for Putin was his speech: if he waited for the situation to clear up, the damage to his domestic reputation would be much less and the effects would be more or less the same. Even the same speech but less conclusive and with more doublespeak, which is his specialty, would be better: specifically threatening Prigozhin and not delivering made him take the biggest blow.

The same goes for the 'defence', which was simply hilarious. If it was staged, they could just prepare some reserve force for the defense of the capital city: that would be as convincing, as, you know, countries at war tend to have their capital cities defended, so it would not be very surprising. Instead they have been caught with their pants down. Are you saying they wanted to be comically convincing?

And I have already given reasons why Prigozhin did not challenge Putin (initially, because then HE DID, the fact that you conveniently omit): he did not want to overthrow him, just force to share some power with him, while Putin could still save face. But Putin chose confrontational language and in result could not prevent losing face when he could not deliver (which could be easily avoided if it was staged).

However, my point was that if it is an intelligence operation and somehow these negatives consequences you point out become relevant (costs outweigh the gains) they could just come out and say it was an intelligence operation to fool the West / Ukrainians and that saved lives somehow (whether it is true or not). — boethius

The operation had obvious costs and no visible gains for them. Now you are just saying that it might have gains if they said that it does... that does not even make sense.

And think about it, why would Lukashenko spontaneously intervene in Russian internal affairs? If this was an "open challenge" to Putin and Putin wants these mutineers dead, it makes absolutely zero sense for Lukashenko to call Prigozhin like this was some high school level drama. — boethius

After talks in Rostov Prigozhin refused to communicate with MoD/Kremlin directly. Lukashenko was their last channel of contact.

This is just pure delusion. 25 000 troops without any supply lines or airforce or satellite intelligence and so on, are not going to defeat a million troops with supply lines and all the hardware and gadgets. Russian regular forces could continuously carpet bomb Wagner positions. Additionally, not all Wagner troops joined the "rebellion", those that didn't have the opportunity now to just join Russian regular forces. So we don't even know how much troops we're talking about. — boethius

You misunderstood that completely. I did not say that Wagner could take out all other Russian forces, I have pointed out that Wagner is a much better force than any comparable Russian command. That is an objective fact confirmed by their war records: Wagner troops perform much better than other Russian troops. Thus your claim that anyone could replace Prigozhin is demonstrably false: those who organize and command other troops do it much worse than Prigozhin. If that did not make any difference, then the troops would not be any different.

That's not how any military or intelligence operation works or even business works. Someone who goes off script and is unpredictable and a loose cannon is a serious problem, as you don't know what they're going to do and how much damage they can cause, wittingly or not. It doesn't matter how fast you are at putting up drywall if you're likely to burn down the entire project.
[...]
Prigozhin is not essential to Wagner continuing to operate essentially exactly the same.

Equating Wagner with Prigozhin is just false and there would be zero reason to keep him around if he was causing problems, you just get rid of him (by an "accident" or just arrest him on sedition or make a executive order or pass a law nationalising his "private military organisation") and problem solved.

Again, that is obviously false. As I have already wrote, if that was the case, then all Russian troops would be at similar level. Quite obviously they are not. Wagner is the most effective Russian unit by a large margin. Are you saying that it is not Prigozhin's merit and just pure coincidence?

Again, Prigozhin does not equal Wagner, you can easily have Wagner without Prigozhin and there is zero evidence that Prigozhin's experience in prison and hotdog stands and fancy restaurants has made him some military strategist so brilliant that he is simply irreplaceable and the war cannot be fought without him. Likely he's not involved in the tactical decisions at all (but leaves that to military professionals). — boethius

So you are basically saying that anyone can run a successful PMC and anyone can be a successful commander. Seriously?

After the war, Western Europe embraced US leadership, economic support, and military presence — yebiga

Exactly: the countries embraced it.

But those who fell under Russian rule didn’t, as is obvious.

If you have problems in seeing the obvious difference, it’s your problem. The only one embracing Russia’s military presence is a Belarussian dictator who needs those troops to hold on to power.

Maybe the action was genuine, and Prigozhin hadn't anticipated that his protest against the top brass would be interpreted as an attempt at a coup. — Tzeentch

Yeah, maybe shooting down helicopters is just a form of protest.

This is just pure delusion. 25 000 troops without any supply lines or airforce or satellite intelligence and so on, are not going to defeat a million troops with supply lines and all the hardware and gadgets. — boethius

Well, Yeltsin needed only to climb on an IFV and give a speech. And then all those milloin of troops (then, actually million) and their official leaders couldn’t do anything.

The most dangerous issue for Putin was the reaction of the man in the street in Rostov applauding the Wagner troops. Yet Prigozhin found himself alone, so he naturally goes with the whimsical ludicrous lie of this just being a ”protest”.

Yeah, maybe shooting down helicopters is just a form of protest. — ssu

CSIS doesn't seem to think his intention was a coup.

26:55 - They seem to actually confirm my idea.

Putin exquisite black belt in feinting speaking to the nation:
"The organizers of the rebellion, despite the loss of adequacy, could not fail to understand this. They understood everything, including that they committed crimes, that they divided and weakened the country, which is now facing a huge external threat, unprecedented pressure from outside". (1m21)

Today Lukashenko has told the press how Putin asked him for help, as Prigozhin was not returning his calls. As he tells it, Lukashenko then gave him wise advice and then graciously saved his hide.

If even Batka openly shows his lack of respect, then Putin's cunning subterfuge worked: everyone thinks he is weak.

Has Russia ever had an actual coup? I can't think of one.

1957, 1991, …1825?

CSIS doesn't seem to think his intention was a coup. — Tzeentch

Katrina Doxsee isn’t CSIS. And then everything said before and after doesn’t at all give your impression.

And then there is whar Putin has said about this. It was Putin that referred this to 1917.

Oh. :chin:

Let’s think what a mutiny is: simply a force that disobeys orders or won’t follow orders is basically a mutiny. Seizing the military HQ in Rostov, shooting down helicopters and advancing towards the capital is a bit more than just than a mutiny.

Now the Wagner coup might have been planned as in 1991 that the leader isn’t deposed (just stays at his summer place), hence it might have been a surprise for Prigozhin how Putin responded. Now Putin is thanking the (loyal) troops of succeeding in avoiding a civil war. A moment of silence was given to the killied helicopter pilots.

Fun comment seen out there:

Putin: "It's not a war. It's a special military operation."
Prigozhin: "It's not a coup. It's a special military disagreement."

Anyway, whether staged or not, a coup attempt or not, Putin could use the events to enact more draconian laws, tighten control, perhaps start another draft, disperse blame or otherwise muddle the waters, whatever useful for his chess game.

Katrina Doxsee isn’t CSIS. And then everything said before and after doesn’t at all give your impression.

And then there is whar Putin has said about this. It was Putin that referred this to 1917. — ssu

Be sure not to watch the whole thing, because you may just have to face the fact that she's not the only one who puts it forward and they all seem to agree.

This endless cope upon being faced with unwelcome information is getting rather tiresome.

It really doesn't matter if it wasn't a coup (which also some Russian nationalist commentators believe it was). Prigozhin came close to Moscow (after seizing Rostov) armed, ready to kill and with hostile demands against the establishment status quo in a already tense environment for Putin from external and internal pressure. Besides Prigozhin bitterly questioned the Patriotic War narrative promoted by Putin. The slow, weak, contradictory reactions of the Russian establishment against the "mutiny", with rumors of Putin fled from Moscow and ordinary people either indifferent or cheering with Prigozhin (again against Putin's narrative) is striking. This is a major reputational blow against Russia and Putin that Russia and Putin inflicted upon themselves before Russian and Putin's eyes on world stage.

Well, Yeltsin needed only to climb on an IFV and give a speech. And then all those milloin of troops (then, actually million) and their official leaders couldn’t do anything. — ssu

Prigozhin isn't a politician with a constituency and has zero official command of anything that would be important for a coup, such as a military district or in charge of an intelligence agency.

There's zero evidence that Prigozhin has any backers in any position of power at all (except for Putin who he was on personal speaking terms with up to a week before this coup occurred).

Literally zero of the conditions that are necessary for an actual coup existed here.

Prigozhin makes no call for action, is clear he is not challenging Putin himself, of anyone and has zero demands (other than to "talk" with the top brass). And because he has literally zero answers to normal coup questions, he starts calling it a "march for justice" to simply form the narrative without answering any of those questions. Finally, it was simply an "armed protest".

Most importantly, Prigozhin isn't going anywhere remotely neutral and out of Putin's reach. So now that the coup is ended, Wagner effectively disbanded, if Putin was actually so embarrassed and shown to be weak etc. would he just have Prigozhin and any other ring leader killed over night.

If he kidnapped high ranking people and then negotiated a billion dollars and safe passage to some neutral country that guarantees his safety ... ok, it would at least look like some high stakes extortion and I'd consider it at least plausible that maybe Prigozhin thought he was about to be murdered anyways and this stunt of threatening chaos behind the lines was his best bet of saving his own skin. But he's going to Belarus ... where the leader is a Russian colonel and is covered with FSB and Russian military personnel. It's pretty much the same as going to any Russian province; in anyway that matters exactly the same as negotiating with Kardiyov and then going to Chechnya to live in peace and quiet while Putin "fumes" about this embarrassing insubordination.

It really doesn't matter if it wasn't a coup (which also some Russian nationalist commentators believe it was). Prigozhin came close to Moscow (after seizing Rostov) armed, ready to kill and with hostile demands against the establishment status quo in a already tense environment for Putin from external and internal pressure. — neomac

It totally does matter if it was a real coup or fake.

You outline the costs, which I agree with. Definitely is a PR issue for Putin, but that it's some sort of PR catastrophe is an outrageous exaggeration. He was challenged by Wagner, but still in power and Wagner is now being disbanded, and bunch of other key people made videos pledging their support for Putin and asking Prigozhin to stand down and so on. Everyone that actually matters immediately backed Putin which made pretty clear there wasn't going to be a coup now nor any time in the future. The events show that in terms of Russias internal politics everyone that matters backed Putin, and Prigozhin arguably doesn't matter at all in any real internal politics sense: he's not a politician, he's not military, he's no a government official -- he's a business man.

However, more important that evaluating exactly what the costs actually are of this event to Putin and the Kremlin, speaking of costs at all only matters if you comparing them to the benefits.

So, one benefit mentioned above is the large show of support of everyone else that matters in Russia.

However, there are several other potential benefits. the coup triggers large scale Ukrainian assaults on Russian lines. If Russia is trying to win a war of attrition, then this is exactly what Russia wants. If the "mutiny" didn't actually change any Russian readiness on the front, then triggering the Ukrainians to attack is more easy attrition (far easier than Russia attacking the Ukrainians).

There's all this recent talk of Russia blowing up a nuclear power plant or otherwise causing a nuclear event of some kind. If the Kremlin knows that's not what their planning, then the reason for such rhetoric is potentially a false flag. If Putin is now "weak" and not really in control, then it's difficult to pin any nuclear events on Putin. Indeed, even puts the Kremlin in the position to double bluff, do exactly what the Ukrainians are future-accusing them of already doing, then say it was just more "rogue" military elements.

Then there's just classic madman theory, which Putin and all the old guard will remember how effective that was when the US did it to the Soviet Union. No one in the West actually wants Russia to fall apart and nuclear weapons and material to get dispersed to random war lords and the blackmarket, in addition to even more inflation if Russian exports were to actually stop entirely, and so on, so making it seem that could possibly happen encourages Western support to Ukraine to be cautious and hesitant.

And, the beauty of madman theory is that even if your opponent think it's likely fake, just madman theory ... there's still that chance that it's not.

In addition to all these, there's the classic benefit of a fake coup in sussing out any potential collaborators and evaluating the loyalty of the command structure based on what people do, say, react etc. So, sure, maybe some PR costs to the coup happening, but if you can then purge everyone who maybe an actual threat then the benefits can more than outweigh the costs.

Finally, as I've explained in previous posts, there's the advantage of disrupting your enemies narrative and plans, making them improvise on false premises and make mistakes.

Especially considering:

and in two days nobody will remember the coup — Jabberwock

Of course, as @Tzeentch points out, how things play out will give us a lot more information. If Prigozhin suddenly has some new role in Belarus that would seem pretty incompatible with him also being a treacherous mutineer that brought Russia to the brink of civil war and showed Putin to be weak and disoriented, then it may seem a lot more plausible that he has a role to play and it's all theatre. If he's dead tomorrow, we may draw other conclusions.

Likewise, if Ukrainians exhaust more equipment and material and the temporary moral boost of their dreams coming true of Russia falling apart is followed by even lower moral of that not happening, and Russia starts their own offensives that rapidly take ground, it may certainly seem like the coup "just so happened" to have positive effects on the battle field, on the coup indeed will be forgotten and Russian moral will be high on the drug of victory.

Lastly, if Putin's power is even more consolidated than before, maybe the coup wasn't a "negative" for him after all.

Of course, maybe none of that happens and there's an even bigger coup tomorrow.

So we'll see.

:rofl:

So now that the coup is ended, Wagner effectively disbanded, — boethius

Has it disbanded?

(the Guardian) The Wagner group appeared to be continuing some of its operations on Monday, with recruitment centres open and fighters returning to their bases

There's zero evidence that Prigozhin has any backers in any position of power at all — boethius

So why on Earth the weak timid response then from Putin and the references to 1917 and civil war? How many Russian politicians backed Putin when Wagner was marching toward Moscow? I myself don’t know that, so it’s an important question.

You seem to have the attitude of ”Everything is fine, there’s nothing to see, the Russian leadership has everything in control” as it obviously hasn’t got everything in control. Then when Wagner is truly disbanded and Prigozhin dead or in jail, then things are ”under control”.

And if the objective of Prigozhin was to capture the military leadeship (as WSJ writes), it is absolutely hilarious to deny that this wasn’t a coup attempt, because they weren’t going for Putin. Such mutiny is more dangerous than just soldiers protesting and not following orders (which usually defines a mutiny).

:100: :up:

So why on Earth the weak timid response then from Putin and the references to 1917 and civil war? — ssu

And if the objective of Prigozhin was to capture the military leadeship (as WSJ writes), it is absolutely hilarious to deny that this wasn’t a coup attempt, because they weren’t going for Putin. — ssu

Particularly puzzling is how it happened that Wagner was allowed to cross the border and capture a million+ city hosting Southern Military District headquarters (by far the biggest prize in the entire campaign :rofl:) when Russian security agencies were aware of their plans (as both Western and Russian sources claim)?

Prigozhin originally intended to capture Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of Russia’s general
staff, during a visit to a southern region that borders Ukraine that
the two were planning. But the Federal Security Service, or FSB, found
out about the plan two days before it was to be executed, according to
Western officials.

Gen. Viktor Zolotov, commander of the National Guard of Russia, a
domestic military force that reports directly to President Vladimir
Putin, also said authorities knew about Prigozhin’s intentions
before he launched his attempt.

“Specific leaks about preparations for a rebellion that would begin
between June 22-25 were leaked from Prigozhin’s camp,” Zolotov
told state media on Tuesday. — WSJ

Solid majorities of Americans support providing weaponry to Ukraine to defend itself against Russia and believe that such aid demonstrates to China and other U.S. rivals a will to protect U.S. interests and allies, according to a Reuters/Ipsos survey.

The two-day poll that was concluded on Tuesday charted a sharp rise in backing for arming Ukraine, with 65% of the respondents approving of the shipments compared with 46% in a May poll.

The survey was conducted just days after Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the private Wagner mercenary company, launched and then called off a mutiny over what he charged was the Russian defense ministry's mishandling of the war in Ukraine. — Reuters

The feint worked.

Particularly puzzling is how it happened that Wagner was allowed to cross the border and capture a million+ city hosting Southern Military District headquarters — SophistiCat

Why would there be troops defending a city deep in Russia when Ukrainians are nowhere near Rostov? Air Defence unit perhaps could be found there, but they aren’t equipped to fight infantry. Thousands of Wagner mercenaries could take quite easily the Military HQ. Besides, immediately Prigozhin made it clear they wouldn’t interfere with the staff running the war in Ukraine. They didn’t start either to defend their buildings. Moscow was different.

Above all, this is an armed forces in a bad condition and not fully controlled. What comes to mind is Corazon Aquino’s Phillipines (1986-1992) where there were multiple military coups against her Presidency and how the military was punished for these: they weren’t. Hence not punishing mutinies or coups simply shows the leadership hasn’t got firm control over it’s armed forces. Once when a strong President was elected, Fidel Ramos, the former armed forces commander, the coups/mutinies stopped.

Of course Russia is different, but what Putin has done is that he has created competing militaries in the system: the Army, the National Guard etc. and then even private mercenary formations like Wagner (which isn’t the only one). and let’s not forget that Wagner has worked closely with the GRU and other intelligence services. Fine if it works, but when it doesn’t /hasn’t, Putin is in the terrible fix he is now in. And he can blame himself for all of this.

A summary, some interviews, ...

As Russia teetered, the elite trembled, and some private jets left (news feed version)
As Russia teetered, the elite trembled, and some private jets left (article version)
^{— Guy Faulconbridge, Darya Korsunskaya, Gleb Stolyarov, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 28, 2023}

On average the demand for foreign currency and cash rose about 30% but in southern regions near the mutiny and in large cities, demand rocketed up by 70-80%, according to an update by First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov.

Tickets for direct flights to Belgrade sold out. One-way tickets to Belgrade via Sochi soared in price to 63,700 roubles ($742). Tickets to Istanbul quadrupled in price.

But within the elite, there is now a fear that Putin will seek to assert his position and remove those he felt did not profess their loyalty with enough ardour.

“Heads will roll,” said another senior source. “They will look at who kept silent, who did not speak in support of unity and of the president.”

Ongoing murder-mayhem in Ukraine ...

Russia blows up packed Ukraine restaurant, killing kids, as Putin shows war still on after Wagner mutiny
^{— Ian Lee, Justine Redman, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Jun 28, 2023}

Heads rolling on the Kremlin's account.



Hmm... Did Lukashenko blabber...?

Russia-Ukraine war live: Putin wanted to ‘wipe out’ Prigozhin during Wagner mutiny, says Belarus president
^{— Andy Gregory, Arpan Rai · The Independent · Jun 28, 2023}

Why would there be troops defending a city deep in Russia when Ukrainians are nowhere near Rostov? — ssu

Because it's a critical command-and-control center? And yet it was taken with hardly a shot fired, and two generals, including a deputy Minister of Defense, apparently taken hostage. More to the point, the Russians supposedly had advance warning about the mutiny. How could they be caught with their pants down like that?

Compare and contrast with the successful defense of Mykolaev in the first days of the invasion. It was organized with very little advance warning and mostly local defenders.

Clearly, there was a lack of will here, if not outright collusion with the mutineers.

Russia confirms missile strike on Kramatorsk pizza place
^{— DW · Jun 28, 2023 · 2m:1s}
Ukraine says it caught a sleeper agent who sent video of a crowded restaurant to Russia before a deadly missile strike blew it apart
^{— Jake Epstein · Business Insider · Jun 28, 2023}

If they're that quick and trigger-happy, someone should try sending them photos of military installations in Rostov or something.

Ukraine-Russia war latest: General Armageddon 'detained in crackdown on Wagner mutineers'
^{— The Telegraph · Jun 29, 2023}
Russian general Surovikin was sympathetic towards Wagner rebellion -US officials
^{— Reuters via The Jerusalem Post · Jun 29, 2023}

Andrei Yudin dismissed, Sergey Surovikin taken in?

Clearly, there was a lack of will here, if not outright collusion with the mutineers. — SophistiCat

Surovikin was with Prigozhin in Syria and the two worked well together. Hence Surovikin is in jail. What is very likely true is that Prigozhin had at least people that understood him, which made him do his ”march” in the first place.

Then we shouldn’t forget that literally the vast majority of Russian army’s ground forces are engaged in Ukraine. For example, there are very few trioops on our border with Russia.

Putin’s purges are a natural outcome of the events. Needless to say how detrimental this whole episode is for the Russian military leadership, who should work as a team.

What is good for Ukrainians is that good generals are now out of the game and one of the most effective formations (Wagner) combat capability is now questionable.

, maybe Wagner will march on Minsk. :D
Better than causing trouble for others anyway.
Someone should set up a GoFundMe, "Wagner for Minsk" or something; they're guns for hire, right?
Might even spur the Belarusian freedom fighters on, though they're hardly aligned with Wagner, it would be like a tripartite clash.


Belarus leader welcomes Wagner forces but others in the country see them as a threat
^{— Jari Tanner · AP · Jun 29, 2023}

Better than causing trouble for others anyway.
Might even spur the Belarusian freedom fighters on, though they're hardly aligned with Wagner, it would be like a tripartite clash. — jorndoe

If the Belarusian opposition hires Wagner to get rid of Batka, it will not be...