That’s pretty clear from extrapolating the fossil record isn’t it? — Wayfarer
You sound like the kid in the back seat. “Are we there yet? Are we there yet?”
You have failed to engage with the points I made and I don’t feel I need to run you through it again. — apokrisis
(BTW, the advocacy provided is directed primarily at apokrisis's comments.) — javra
What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation? — apokrisis
What this means is that what we know of consciousness, we know because it is constitutive of our existence and experience. It appears as us, not to us. — Wayfarer
Is life something apart from the process of living? Does a verb need to be confused as a noun? — apokrisis
I wonder what a 'scientific explanation of consciousness' - or let's say 'mind' - is trying to actually explain — Wayfarer
The complaint was about science’s “failure” to answer the question. That would needed to be supported by examples of science failing.
Does this pass as making an epistemological argument?] — apokrisis
But the scientific search for 'what is the mind?' will always be bedevilled by the epistemic split between knower and known, because in the case of mind or consciousness, we are what we are seeking to understand - mind is never an object to us. And I say there's a profound problem of recursion or reflexivity in the endeavour to understand it objectively, given in the Advaitin aphorism, 'the eye cannot see itself, the hand cannot grasp itself.' — Wayfarer
But how much neurobiology do you know to make such sweeping dismissals? What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation?
Sure, you know what it feels like to feel like you. But where can you point to the failures of science to say something about that? Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience. — apokrisis
This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us and only one you might argue isn't. — T Clark
Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". — javra
I don't see any alternative for science than the Galilean approach. Bracketing out the conscious observer is analogous to, and the reverse of, the Epoché in phenomenology. It is a methodological necessity. — Janus
It is hard to see how a seamless causal model from something third person observable (neural activity) to something that is not (conscious experience) could be achieved. — Janus
I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection). — T Clark
Being is a verb, isn’t it? — Wayfarer
I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection). — T Clark
M-theory is currently an untestable theory and so is not of itself science — javra
If you find any disagreement with either definition, it would be important that you then express your differences. — javra
Is it an untested theory or the mathematical generalisation of tested theories? — apokrisis
I find plenty of disagreement. But not much of importance. You articulate a cultural construct with a long social history. — apokrisis
I didn't say "currently untested". I said "currently untestable". A major difference for those science savy. — javra
Claims like this make one doubt one is talking to another human rather than some AI robot. — javra
mind is never an object to us
— Wayfarer
This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us — T Clark
I may not be able to treat my own mind solely as an object -- though I can surely take it also as an object -- but it's not obvious what the barrier is to me treating your mind as an object of my study, and since it is your mind, not mine, I can only take it solely as an object and never as subject. — Srap Tasmaner
I pointed out how it is failing the test in terms of being a generalisation that ought to contain supersymmetry as a particular feature. And in being thus currently tested, that makes it doubly a problem if you want to say it is currently untestable – the stronger claim that it can't even be tested in principle. — apokrisis
Would Chat GPT make as many rookie errors? There are whole shelves on the social construction of the self that could be poured into its pattern-matching data bank. It would at least be familiar with the relevant social science. — apokrisis
When considering much of what is scientifically investigated, I don't think there is any need to actively bracket out the observer. One is just considering relatively simple systems where observers aren't playing any significant causal role.
Things get messier at the quantum level, and at the classical level when what is being studied (say an animal) might well have its behavior influenced as a result of sensing the observer. — wonderer1
I agree, but mostly for technical feasibility reasons. Even now, with consciousness itself not being an issue, knowing what is going on in a trained neural network is highly problematic. See The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI. — wonderer1
So you're claiming that you (or anyone else) can observe what I'm remembering right now? — javra
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