That’s pretty clear from extrapolating the fossil record isn’t it? — Wayfarer

The line between chemistry and biology gets murky if we do wind all the way back to the first metabolic process. That doesn’t fossilise so well when it could be just a bit of organic crud lining the porous serpentine rock of an ancient alkaline thermal vent on the ocean floor.

But the past 20 years have seen remarkable progress on the question of abiogenesis. And your friend, Barbieri, got it right in figuring out the ribosome was the central player from the biosemiotic point of view.

You sound like the kid in the back seat. “Are we there yet? Are we there yet?”

You have failed to engage with the points I made and I don’t feel I need to run you through it again. — apokrisis

"Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego?
The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, which could show a rudimentary form of consciousness"
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/

What say you? Do you think it's significant that Smithsonian Magazine is taking insect consciousness seriously? Would a simulation of a working brain be conscious? Are functional equivalents of working brains conscious, no matter what the substrate? And why did you put "consciousness" in quotes?

Hey, you're the one who brought up evolution. Instead of getting defensive, just answer the questions.

If you can... :grin:

Might be murky, but it's still a line.

(BTW, the advocacy provided is directed primarily at apokrisis's comments.) — javra

But how much neurobiology do you know to make such sweeping dismissals? What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation?

Sure, you know what it feels like to feel like you. But where can you point to the failures of science to say something about that? Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience.

What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation? — apokrisis

Suppose we discovered the perfectly preserved corpse of an alien in one of their spaceships. For any definition of "conscious", what experiments could we do to ascertain whether the alien was ever conscious when it was alive?

Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience. — apokrisis

Ahem. Sign on the door says “philosophy forum’. And arguably the reason for the repeated failures to find a theory is a philosophical one.

Ahem. Sign on the door says “philosophy forum’. — Wayfarer

Does it need to be changed to say "philosophy silo"?

Not at all but the distinction shouldn’t be lost sight of

I wonder what a 'scientific explanation of consciousness' - or let's say 'mind' - is trying to actually explain. I mean, there are untold applications and benefits of science in cognitive and neuroscience, no question. But the scientific search for 'what is the mind?' will always be bedevilled by the epistemic split between knower and known, because in the case of mind or consciousness, we are what we are seeking to understand - mind is never an object to us. And I say there's a profound problem of recursion or reflexivity in the endeavour to understand it objectively, given in the Advaitin aphorism, 'the eye cannot see itself, the hand cannot grasp itself.'

What this means is that what we know of consciousness, we know because it is constitutive of our existence and experience. It appears as us, not to us. Realising that is itself a change in perspective - a meta-cognitive realisation. And, lo and behold, an entire youtube playlist, comprising hours of lectures, on just this topic -The Blind Spot: Experience, Science, and the Search for “Truth” - a workshop with philosophers, physicists, and cognitive scientists (which having discovered, I will now review, but I believe it is linked to this Aeon article from a few years back.)

Sign on the door says “philosophy forum’. — Wayfarer

.
The complaint was about science’s “failure” to answer the question. That would need to be supported by examples of science failing.

Does this pass as making an epistemological argument? :roll:

What this means is that what we know of consciousness, we know because it is constitutive of our existence and experience. It appears as us, not to us. — Wayfarer

And yet who are the drongos who are reifying it as something apart from what is being done?

Is life something apart from the process of living? Does a verb need to be confused as a noun?

Is life something apart from the process of living? Does a verb need to be confused as a noun? — apokrisis

Very good question. Being is a verb, isn’t it? Doesn’t Aquinas have something to say about that? (quick google.) Aquinas argues that being (esse) is the act of existence itself. For him, existence is not just a quality or attribute that something possesses; rather, it is the act of being. In other words, being is not something static but an active and dynamic reality. (Not that I'm an Aquinas scholar.)

RE: "Nice little roundup of the state of consciousness studies"
⁜→ et al,

I wonder what a 'scientific explanation of consciousness' - or let's say 'mind' - is trying to actually explain — Wayfarer

(COMMENT)

Before commenting on this contribution, I thought I should refresh my understanding of what "science" means when it says "consciousness." That way, I might know a little bit of the topic. So, I when to Gale Encyclopedia of Science, 4thEd, © 2008 The Gale Group, K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, Editors, pp1012, for some clarity.

It appears that "Consciousness" is a description of a condition or observation. Science does not know how to describe it otherwise. It is almost (but not perfectly) the opposite of the term "coma." "Consciousness" is (loosely) defined by the functionality of two sets:
[indent]
• The ability to accept and understand various forms of stimulation acquired through various sensory abilities, including, but not limited to taste, smell, touch, hearing, and sight. And through these senses, some life forms build and understand of their reality.

• The key physiological triggers that appear to activate "primitive response" and "involuntary reflexes" (like fight or flight). This functionality is maintained by the reticular activating system (RAS) (throughout the brainstem).
[/indent]

The complaint was about science’s “failure” to answer the question. That would needed to be supported by examples of science failing.

Does this pass as making an epistemological argument?] — apokrisis

(COMMENT)

The "Scientific Method" seeks to make sense of what we observe in reality. "Metaphysics" is the ultimate study of reality (real 'vs' unreal). The "Theory of Knowledge" (AKAEpistemology) is a discipline within philosophy which leads to how deals with the nature and/or justification as to how knowledge is acquired.

Why any particular scientific endeavor or inquiry "fails" is a forensic "post moratorium" analysis. It is an examination of the hypothesis or the methodology. Even in failures - knowledge is gained. The Epistemological argument occurs in the development of the methodology behind the test and examination of a specific hypothesis → that is before the failure.

"I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."
---- Thomas A. Edison

Just My Two-Cents Worth...
Most Respectfully,
R

But the scientific search for 'what is the mind?' will always be bedevilled by the epistemic split between knower and known, because in the case of mind or consciousness, we are what we are seeking to understand - mind is never an object to us. And I say there's a profound problem of recursion or reflexivity in the endeavour to understand it objectively, given in the Advaitin aphorism, 'the eye cannot see itself, the hand cannot grasp itself.' — Wayfarer

This is a known problem for the individual, that when exercising a bias, say, you are not, and perhaps in some cases cannot be, aware of it. But other individuals can be aware of your biased perspective, as Browning memorably pointed out.

It's just not obvious that the issue arises for types rather than individuals, and it is only the type that science studies. We all feel the pull of recency bias, of color constancy, all those myriad quirks of the way our minds work, none of which stopped scientists from designing experiments to reveal these quirks. We know that we can essentially eliminate consciousness through the use of general anesthesia, without the entire human race having to fall unconscious to find that out.

I may not be able to treat my own mind solely as an object -- though I can surely take it also as an object -- but it's not obvious what the barrier is to me treating your mind as an object of my study, and since it is your mind, not mine, I can only take it solely as an object and never as subject. That object is the also the subject of your experience, so in studying your mind, I am studying your subjectivity, and thus studying subjectivity itself. Where's the problem?

But how much neurobiology do you know to make such sweeping dismissals? What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation?

Sure, you know what it feels like to feel like you. But where can you point to the failures of science to say something about that? Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience. — apokrisis

As to definitions:

Science: any conceivable field of knowledge, including that of theoretical fartology any field of study that is necessarily founded upon empirical observation (hence, observations via any of the physiological senses) and that employs the scientific method of a) falsifiable hypothesis regrading empirical observations, b) empirically observable test, and c) empirically observable results. (e.g., M-theory is currently an untestable theory and so is not of itself science)

Consciousness: the first-person point of view which empirically observes (again, hence observes via its physiological senses), as well as introspects (which is a non-empirical activity), while always finding itself as first-person point of view in non-empirical yet experiential states of being such as those of happiness, certainty, and their opposites, among numerous others. (E.g., I know I am psychologically certain when I am simply by so being as a first-person point of view – such that this certainty is in no way something other that I as a first-person point of view apprehend but, again, is simply an aspect of my momentary state of being as a consciousness.)

If you find any disagreement with either definition, it would be important that you then express your differences.

Then, I cannot see myself as a first-person point of view in the mirror - I can instead only see the body through which I as a first-person point of view operate (e.g., neither of the two physiological eyes through which I see is the I which I am as a first-person point of view (i.e., a consciousness). Nor can I touch, smell, taste, hear, or proprioceive (etc.) myself as that which apprehends touch, smell, taste, auditory information, and proprioception (etc.).

In short, I as a consciousness – i.e. as a first person point of view – know myself to be 100% non-empirical - to in no way whatsoever stand out to anyone anywhere, my own self very much included - and to nevertheless yet be.

Science – including psychophysics and cognitive neuroscience – can only address empirical givens by definition.

Ergo, to presume that anyone now or ever can obtain scientific knowledge of what consciousness is is a massive category mistake. It’s right up there with believing one can catch the horizon if one chases it fast enough.

-----

Of important note: here is being strictly addresses the issue of consciousness – and in no way that of mind (which as a definite given among humans always pertains to a given consciousness; e.g. “my mind” or "his mind") This in no way denying the interplay between consciousness and the unconscious mind. And it in no way addresses metaphysics.

mind is never an object to us — Wayfarer

This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us and only one you might argue isn't.

This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us and only one you might argue isn't. — T Clark

Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". So how do you define mind?

As two examples among many:

1) a body of sometimes disparate agencies of awareness and will - interacting at various levels of unconscious (with one's conscience as one example) - that can of themselves hold causal power and thereby affect or else form the causal abilities of consciousness (e.g., feeling an overwhelming unconscious urge to do something that one then does) that can fully unify into a singular awareness and will (such as when one is in the flow and effortlessly acts in manners devoid of any choice making or deliberative thought). In short, mind as a mostly unified bundle of agencies.

2) the strict, causal-power-devoid epiphenomenon of a physical brain's operatons that is thereby necessarily reducible to the purely deterministic, causal operations of a physical brain's components and, hence, of itself holds no causal power to alter any behavior - this such as via the activity of making choices or of thinking - here very much including the non-agency of consciousness ... which is one aspect of a human's total mind). In short, mind as the effete byproduct of a brain.

Just two options among many, but I so far find anything resembling (1) to be non-observable (instead only being inferable, typically unconsciously in day to day life, this via observable data regarding a total person's overt behaviors) - this even though a corporeal being's mind is here yet understood to be contingent on a corporeal, hence physical, body (and at the very least in mammals, on a physical central nervous system). And, since mind here is non directly observable (with MRIs and such, which are observable, being inferential understandings of such agency we term mind), mind in this interpretation cannot be an observable object. (albeit, one can via various inferences often enough predict what minds will do).

Whereas anything resembling (2) can then be easily expressed as an observable object - this since it here basically amounts to the occurrence of a brain - of whose illusory agency in the form of mind is fully, well, illusory.

(Personally, I find that satisfactorily defining mind is far more challenging than defining consciousness - esp. when attempting to remain consistent to the occurrence of consciousness itself. All the same, an interesting topic to explore via commonalities and differences of perspective.)

Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". — javra

I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection).

I don't see any alternative for science than the Galilean approach. Bracketing out the conscious observer is analogous to, and the reverse of, the Epoché in phenomenology. It is a methodological necessity. — Janus

When considering much of what is scientifically investigated, I don't think there is any need to actively bracket out the observer. One is just considering relatively simple systems where observers aren't playing any significant causal role.

Things get messier at the quantum level, and at the classical level when what is being studied (say an animal) might well have its behavior influenced as a result of sensing the observer.

Different areas of scientific investigation do have to be handled differently depending on what is being investigated, but I think this has been well understood for quite awhile now, and I doubt Galileo did much to impede scientists' understanding of this. However, I'm not a science historian, so maybe Galileo did retard humanity's development of science in some regard despite the intuitive implausibility of that to me.

In any case, I still think attributing such a large causal role (in the development of neuroscience) to Galileo, sounds kind of ridiculous in light of the other factors i brought up, having to do with the difficulty of neuroscience.

It is hard to see how a seamless causal model from something third person observable (neural activity) to something that is not (conscious experience) could be achieved. — Janus

I agree, but mostly for technical feasibility reasons. Even now, with consciousness itself not being an issue, knowing what is going on in a trained neural network is highly problematic. See The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI.

I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection). — T Clark

So you're claiming that you (or anyone else) can observe what I'm remembering right now? I won't even push the issue by addressing those good or bad vibes of former days for which I currently can find no adequate words but, nevertheless, can still remember. I'm here simply addressing (maybe via use of brain scans) another's ability to observe that which I as a so called "mind's eye" can perceptually remember via the non-physiologial senses of one's mind (say, my perceiving the remembered smell of a particular rose).

Being is a verb, isn’t it? — Wayfarer

I would say it should be according to my metaphysics. But it is normally treated in terms of a substance rather than a process or action. Something with inherent properties rather than imposed form.

So rather than an ontology of passive existence, I would favour the “other” of active persistence when it comes to being or ousia.

I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection). — T Clark

So mind is a thing, not a process? Or both?

M-theory is currently an untestable theory and so is not of itself science — javra

Is it an untested theory or the mathematical generalisation of tested theories? And is it not indeed failing the test because supersymmetry is not showing up and looking increasingly dubious at available particle accelerator energies? The generalisation of the particular case is not worth much if the particular case is becoming so constrained by experiment in routine scientific fashion.

If you find any disagreement with either definition, it would be important that you then express your differences. — javra

I find plenty of disagreement. But not much of importance. You articulate a cultural construct with a long social history. Explaining the neurobiology is one thing, explaining the social history is another. I could do both. And you wouldn’t be happy with either as that would require seeing they are indeed their own narratives,

Is it an untested theory or the mathematical generalisation of tested theories? — apokrisis

I didn't say "currently untested". I said "currently untestable". A major difference for those science savy.

I find plenty of disagreement. But not much of importance. You articulate a cultural construct with a long social history. — apokrisis

Ah, I see. My occurrence as a first-person point of view is a "cultural construct with a long social history" - a proposition that thereby lacks a truthful correspondence to anything real, I then infer. Claims like this make one doubt one is talking to another human rather than some AI robot.

As for the rest, we all know that he who presents the most ostentatious posturing wins. Much like those chimp ancestors of ours. So, go for it.

I didn't say "currently untested". I said "currently untestable". A major difference for those science savy. — javra

I pointed out how it is failing the test in terms of being a generalisation that ought to contain supersymmetry as a particular feature. And in being thus currently tested, that makes it doubly a problem if you want to say it is currently untestable – the stronger claim that it can't even be tested in principle.

Claims like this make one doubt one is talking to another human rather than some AI robot. — javra

Would Chat GPT make as many rookie errors? There are whole shelves on the social construction of the self that could be poured into its pattern-matching data bank. It would at least be familiar with the relevant social science.

mind is never an object to us
— Wayfarer

This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us — T Clark

You never see anyone's mind. You can see their behaviour or hear what they say, but you never see the mind except for in a metaphorical sense.

I may not be able to treat my own mind solely as an object -- though I can surely take it also as an object -- but it's not obvious what the barrier is to me treating your mind as an object of my study, and since it is your mind, not mine, I can only take it solely as an object and never as subject. — Srap Tasmaner

Right. You can treat the mind as an object in a metaphorical sense: 'her mind was the object of my enquiry'; 'the subject's mental state was extremely confused'; 'that individual had a brilliant mind'; and so on. But mind itself is not an object, unlike any of the objects which you will see if you raise your eyes and glance around you. I think this is habitually overlooked or ignored, but it is the realisation behind both behaviourism and eliminative materialism which arise from a very similar insight: that the mind as such is not scientifically tractable in the sense that phenomenal objects are.

I pointed out how it is failing the test in terms of being a generalisation that ought to contain supersymmetry as a particular feature. And in being thus currently tested, that makes it doubly a problem if you want to say it is currently untestable – the stronger claim that it can't even be tested in principle. — apokrisis

OK, to state what should be obvious to those science savvy, such as yourself, one does not - and cannot - empirically test a theory inferred from data via use of strict theory and still declare such test one of empirical science.

The historic complexities aside, the theory of evolution can, for instance, be empirically tested in the lab - with fruit flies as just one among many examples.

The physics theory of relativity only became empirical science when empirically tested, and it was thereby empirically found that gravity does in fact bend light.

One does not test a theoretical inference against another theoretical inference - regardless of what the latter might be, that of supersymmetry included (which has alternatives to boot) - and then declare this a scientific test. For there's nothing empirical about such a test.

Hence, there is no currently imaginable way to test M-theory empirically - although, with no one being omniscient, given a lack of dogma one can/should allow for the existential possibility that at some point in the distant future someone somewhere might figure out a way to empirically test it. Until then - if this "then" will ever occur - it is not a scientific theory exactly and solely on this count: it cannot be empirically tested one way or another other.

This potential confusion between theoretical abstractons that might or might not be valid (edit: which often enough compete against each other) and that which becomes empirically tested and thereby empirically verified is why I initially addressed in a tongue in cheek manner that "(purely) theoretical fartology" is not a valid scientific discipline.

Would Chat GPT make as many rookie errors? There are whole shelves on the social construction of the self that could be poured into its pattern-matching data bank. It would at least be familiar with the relevant social science. — apokrisis

A direct question: does the total self of mind and body which can be to whatever extent empirically observed by others which you (I would assume) deem yourself to be hold a first-person point of view which is now reading this text?

As to social constructions studied by social sciences, these will include comparative religions just as much as those relevant notions of self (and in fairness, of non-self). Leave cultural constructs aside for a moment and given an honest proposition regarding what factually is in therms of your consciousness: do you in any way occur as a first-person point of view that is now reading this text?

When considering much of what is scientifically investigated, I don't think there is any need to actively bracket out the observer. One is just considering relatively simple systems where observers aren't playing any significant causal role.

Things get messier at the quantum level, and at the classical level when what is being studied (say an animal) might well have its behavior influenced as a result of sensing the observer. — wonderer1

My point was simply that the observer is bracketed out because it is methodologically impossible to incorporate the observer into the models which are employed for understanding what is being studied in fields like chemistry, geology, biology, cosmology and astronomy.

In phenomenology the question of the existence of the external world is bracketed out because it is the nature of perception itself, which is the object of study, and the question of the independent existence of the objects of perception is not relevant to that study.

It is only in QM where the "observer" becomes an issue, as observation and measurement appear to affect the outcome of experiments. But even there just what constitutes "the observer" is not clear, and the popular philosophical idea that it is human consciousness which actually creates the outcomes is completely useless to, and is not incorporated, or in way incorporable, into quantum theory.

When studying animal behavior, ethologists can only try their best to remain undetected by their subjects, or try to minimize whatever influence their presences might have on animals being studied in laboratory conditions.

I agree, but mostly for technical feasibility reasons. Even now, with consciousness itself not being an issue, knowing what is going on in a trained neural network is highly problematic. See The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI. — wonderer1

That's a good point. We really don't know what anything is in any absolute sense.

So you're claiming that you (or anyone else) can observe what I'm remembering right now? — javra

Of course I can. Here I go. Watch me. Hey, Javra, what are you remembering right now?

So, right, I'm being funny. But I'm also being serious. And you're describing the experience of memory, which isn't exactly the same as memory itself. I can test your memory in many ways. What's the Capital of France? What is 5 x 7? If you're from the US I could ask you to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.

I attribute memory; or thinking, or feeling, or seeing, or knowing; to people all the time just based on their self-reporting and other behavior I can observe. That's how we know the world. Mental processes are not special.

So mind is a thing, not a process? Or both? — RogueAI

Not to be a smart ass, but a process, or a group of processes, is a thing. I don't think the mind is a physical thing, if that's what you're asking.