Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction. — Philosophim
We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans. — Philosophim
Here's an example.
Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.
If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use. — Philosophim
If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another. — Philosophim
Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue. — Philosophim
As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.
Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.
We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.
We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.
Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion. — Philosophim
I can have experience, supposedly, but that doesn't mean I am viewing it as parts and words and concepts. — Darkneos
Nope, we can't prove animals discretely experience, we can only infer that based on behavior. Also calling it theory of knowledge is a stretch, you're kinda anthropomorphizing here. — Darkneos
Why is it most rational to take your position of probability? Depending on the person it might be more rational to believe god will do it. Something being rational doesn't mean right or true necessarily. This is just another assumption. — Darkneos
Well no, you can have different theories of knowledge like science does where different ones apply to different levels of reality. That's why quantum physics was such an upset. — Darkneos
You haven't really shown it has defeated radical skepticism, I keep saying you're making a bunch of assumptions. Even the fact I experience isn't certain, I could be wrong in some wacky and EXTREMELY paradoxical or whatever way. — Darkneos
Well no, we don't understand the concept of discretely experience, again this is just a you thing. Get out of your own head. It is very much circular. — Darkneos
Lastly it's not really induction that all will, it's just a fact. — Darkneos
Everything is built on language that only makes sense in a social setting and that we made up to be self referential in order to talk to each other. So off the bat you're on shaky ground. — Darkneos
For your theory to even get off the ground it has to take things as a given, just like everything else. Chiefly the axioms listed in the video I posted, faith in your observations and that you can know things. — Darkneos
Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience. — Philosophim
Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking. — Philosophim
Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.
Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot. — Philosophim
No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction. — Philosophim
Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.
Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.
And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience. — Philosophim
If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.
Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does. — Philosophim
No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so? — Philosophim
Nope. Still doesn’t mean I discretely experience. I could just be a bot after all, or just smacking the keys and yielding this. Can I know the letters, maybe, you don’t know that. My denial doesn’t lead to a contradiction, it’s more like you’re just really wanting to be what is a maybe to be a certainty. It’s not proof by contradiction, it’s wishful thinking at best — Darkneos
You’ve obviously never seen an animal trying to leave. — Darkneos
They don’t have to prove anything. — Darkneos
Being rational isn’t objective though, it’s subjective. — Darkneos
Maybe to you they aren’t rational because YOUR questions aren’t satisfied but that doesn’t mean anything besides you being upset about it. — Darkneos
No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.
— Philosophim
I’d argue yes since all ideas eventually have to start from axioms without exception. There is no branch of philosophy without axioms. — Darkneos
This is still circular as it’s just operating on the definition you say it is. You have a claim that can be contradicted by reality because all you’re doing is just saying that you do this, you haven’t shown that you do. — Darkneos
Try as you might it’s still an assumption you are making rooted in the faith of your senses. — Darkneos
You cannot prove these assumptions must be without being circular, like using sensation to prove sensation. — Darkneos
I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation. — Philosophim
That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation. — Philosophim
Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality. — Philosophim
No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny. — Philosophim
The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes. — Philosophim
No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly. — Philosophim
Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational. — Philosophim
I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it. — Philosophim
I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.
— Philosophim
My point is that animals will try to leave but don't see there is an exit, — Darkneos
That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.
— Philosophim
That is circular though because you're pretty much saying a dog is a dog. — Darkneos
Again no it doesn't mean that, this is just you trying to force your definition on reality. — Darkneos
Not really, axioms can't be tested, they have to be taken as true in order to get off the ground. Trying to prove the axioms is akin to assuming the conclusion. — Darkneos
"under the theory" which is pretty much just saying "according to me". They have solved the math problem correctly if according to them 2+2=5. We agree that 2+2=4 but if someone doesn't you can't really convince them otherwise. — Darkneos
Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.
— Philosophim
Again, according to you. — Darkneos
Typing "i don't discretely experience" is evidence enough that I don't unless you're claiming to have knowledge of the inside of my mind and subjective experience to verify this, which you can't. — Darkneos
Try as you might your theory falls to strong skepticism. — Darkneos
No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument. — Philosophim
No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism. — Philosophim
I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known. — Philosophim
If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious. — Philosophim
Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example. — Philosophim
you don't prove something is a dog so much as say it is one. Matching IDs to objects is circular because it all comes down to saying it is that "because I said so". Which is fine, I mean that's what definitions are. — Darkneos
Because it is and all you're really doing is just asserting that it isn't. And I don't know how much I can repeat that point for you to understand it. — Darkneos
I don't have to reread it, that's why I said what I said. — Darkneos
Your theory is just your say so. This is a serious approach and you just keep reasserting your points like they've been shown to be the case. — Darkneos
Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos? — Philosophim
I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end). — Caerulea-Lawrence
Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.
To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.
If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it. — Caerulea-Lawrence
I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?
God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure. — Caerulea-Lawrence
It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.
The growth from reading this — Caerulea-Lawrence
That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.
And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all. — Caerulea-Lawrence
Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.
Thank you again for reading and contributing! — Philosophim
I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, “I” would be different from “everything else”. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.
Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”. — Philosophim
The measurable 'time' when we felt 'indistinguishable' from the rest, is a much bigger part of our history than the time of the conscious, self-recognized thinker. — Caerulea-Lawrence
Your claim works well as it is, so why 'complicate it'? Well, like I postulate, our 'lives' have been spent mostly as simple consciousnesses or impulses. And so I wonder if this basic tenant of these two experiences would do better if contrasted with their opposites: The 'simple, interconnected subconscious' and the 'indistinguishable whole'. — Caerulea-Lawrence
Somehow I see that there could be an 'indiscrete experience' as a complementary piece here. And this circles back to what I said about the category "irrational". I guess the reason is that the most 'out there' beliefs, border or cross the border to the 'indiscrete experience'. When they bleed into our conscious mind, they aren't fully 'translated', so to speak. — Caerulea-Lawrence
So what happens when we classify in the absence of theory? We aren’t yet inductively constructing theory, and we aren’t able to deduce from theory (since there isn’t any yet) the classes of objects in the domain we are investigating. We argue that what is happening here is pattern recognition (Bishop 1995). We are classifier systems. It is one of the distinguishing features of neural network (NN) systems such as those between our ears that they will classify patterns. They do so in an interesting fashion. Rather than being cued by theory or explanatory goals, NNs are cued by stereotypical “training sets”. In effect, in order to see patterns, you need to have prior patterns to train your NN.
I read through your first two posts. — wonderer1
I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. — wonderer1
In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.
Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. — Philosophim
What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”. — Philosophim
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can — Philosophim
It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses. — Philosophim
I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” — Philosophim
Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim
Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. — Philosophim
While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. — Philosophim
There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. “‘This’ is separate from ‘that’”. — Philosophim
I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience. — Philosophim
1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.
Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep. — Philosophim
The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. — Philosophim
Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. — Philosophim
Or just “there is discreet experience”. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce “there is discreet experience” and we can deduce “there is discreet experience.” — Fire Ologist
This quote is essential. It’s why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of “there is discreet experience” as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here. — Fire Ologist
This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist
You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that you’ve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist
I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. — Fire Ologist
Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions. — Fire Ologist
I've read through the thread. There are some darned good points being made. — Treatid
There are infinite (unlimited) possible categorisations — Treatid
While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, — Philosophim
Could you define 'distinct' for me, please? — Treatid
The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. The things we experience are part of the universe. Saying they are not connected appears counter-factual to me. — Treatid
Your use of 'distinct' gives me the impression that you think we can chop off bits of the universe and consider them in isolation. — Treatid
The idea of 'hard distinction' makes no sense to me. — Treatid
So, I see difference and connection as intimately connected concepts that cannot be separated. Each one is part of and requires the other. — Treatid
Beyond this, I think that every concept we hold is defined by its connection to all the other concepts. The connections a concept has IS the concept.
Remove those connections to other concepts and you are left with nothing. — Treatid
As it stands, your references to distinctions run counter to my direct experience. — Treatid
You cannot say, "This and that are connected" without both "this" and "that". — Philosophim
We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data. — Treatid
the epistemic meaning of the sense data we perceive is dependent on the nature of our conceptual schemes. Do you agree with this? — Joshs
Just to make sure I follow you here. You make three distinctions:
1. Sense data
2. Epistemic meaning
3. Conceptual schemes
Correct? — Fire Ologist
In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.
I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection. — Treatid
Can you imagine the possibility of some other universe existing with only relationships? Are objects a requirement for a universe to exist?
For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. — Treatid
I see your arguments and they seem well formed given your assumptions. We have enough commonality that we are clearly drawing from similar enough experiences to communicate. — Treatid
I can see how it would be annoying if you felt I was derailing your thread with my pet theory. Tell me to bugger off if you feel like it. — Treatid
I have some sense of what you are trying to do in presenting a framework of thought and communication. I think others have made similar efforts before and met with lacklustre success because you are (mistakenly) assuming a fundamentally objective universe. — Treatid
As such, I suggest steering the discussion towards the question of whether it is, in principle, possible for two Cooperative participants to arrive at a definite solution. — Treatid
My disagreement is with your fundamental perception of discreteness.
In the above quote you state that "this" and "that" are requirements for a connection to exist.
I disagree. I think that "this" and "that" are illusions created by the connection. — Treatid
It is the relationships between 'Left' and 'Right' that define each of them. Similarly with 'Hot' and 'Cold', 'Tall' and 'Short', .... — Treatid
What I'm interested in is whether you can imagine a relationship centred reality as distinct from your current perception of an object centred reality? — Treatid
For my part, I can see your assumption of the primacy of objects over relationships. I'm not in doubt about what it is you believe. I disagree with it. — Treatid
We both agree that we directly experience Sensory Data. You perceive that Sensory Data as having been caused by objects (hence you have indirect perception of objects). I perceive Sensory Data and more Sensory Data. — Treatid
What reason can you give me to believe your indirect perception of objects is an accurate representation of reality? — Treatid
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