But then the definition of a state is supposed to somehow preclude the possibility that there could ever be more than one system without prior states. That doesn't seem to flow from your definition.
If one system can have no prior states why not others? Even if we say there can be no "last states," the definition doesn't suggest "there must be one and only one "first state." Nor am I aware of a definition of "system," that precludes systems from interacting. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Then there is the other issue of events. If we adopt one of the more eliminative views on cause, then what we call events is really just the transition from state to state. For a Newtonian universe, we can think about 3D slices cut across the time dimension. An event then is simply a description for some phenomena we experience that can be described by some components of a state, a subset. The event has a starting time and an ending time, and it exists as just the relevant subset of components of a state from the start time to the end time.
Now the states we observe don't evolve in just any way. They evolve based on regularities that can be described by mathematics; our "laws of physics," are at least an approximation of these regularities. However, if a first state, a particular arrangement of variables occurs due to no prior states why does it then follow that the variables cannot shift their values randomly, as opposed to in accordance with their normal regularities, at any other time? More importantly, why should we define a state, a set of variables describing a system at some instant, as only a "state" when there are multiple states and states evolve such that regularities dictate that evolution.
I see now reason why I can have a model universe where the values of the variables describing S1 do not entail the values of variables at S2. — Count Timothy von Icarus
For the definition to solve the problems we need the definition of a state to be: "a variables describing a system at a given moment but only in cases where the evolution of states is dictated by mathematically describable regularities, except in the case of the first state. Further, to be a state, it must exist in a system that does not interact with any other systems (this is required to avoid a second 'first state' for some other system occuring, and then the new system interacting with our original)." That seems like an ad hoc definition aimed at "defining away," the problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If the universe has a first state then it does not exist without beginning or end, it is not eternal. If it began to exist, if there was a "birth of the universe" then that is an event, an occurrence, a thing that happened,etc. There aren't technical terms, I mean them just in the normal sense. If something coming from nothing can happen, then it can happen again because if something can begin to exist with no prior conditions then no prior conditions are relevant to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yeah, I got that part. If I accept your definition I accept your conclusion because your conclusion is contained in the definition. I understand why your conclusion flows from your definition. The question is, why should I accept your definition? Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior to its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing. I am not sure how the position just stated violates some core principle of logic? — Count Timothy von Icarus
If anything, the claim that the universe has no cause is the claim that violates a commonly held "rule of thought," the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But I will allow that not everyone agrees that PSR should be taken as axiomatic and that it remains controversial . However, I do think it's telling that the only context where I can recall seeing people deny PSR in the context of the external/physical world is on the topic of First Cause. — Count Timothy von Icarus
For what it is worth, I also don't think the claim that the universe began uncaused is illogical in any sense either, I just think it presents problems. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yeah, I got that part. If I accept your definition I accept your conclusion because your conclusion is contained in the definition. The question is, why should I accept your definition? Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing. I am not sure how the position just stated violates some core principle of logic? — Count Timothy von Icarus
It might violate logic if you assume that before the first moment of existence of everything there was another moment of existence of nothingness.
A state prior to the absolute first state" is a nonsensical construction, which you seem to be insisting on inserting into Jabberwock's model instead of grasping the model that Jabberwock is trying to convey to you.
Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior to its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing.
If an set of uncaused entities can come to exist at some first state, why can't other uncaused entities exist for the very first time at any later state? This is where the definition seems to be doing the all heavy lifting, because a state is then also defined as "everything that exists," to preclude more than one uncaused system, and "states are such that they only progress from other states, except for the first state," to preclude additional uncaused entities. But I don't see any logical reason to think that if one set of entities starts to exist uncaused that this somehow precludes that any other entities starts to exist uncaused. — Count Timothy von Icarus
One could just as well argue that the universe specialises in black holes
Sorry if I wasn't clear before. But yeah, that's the basic problem I see. If things start to exist, having not existed at any prior point, then it seems like things could start existing whenever and anything should start to exist in this way, not just the Cosmic Inflation state preceding the Big Bang. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Agreed. That gets to the unreasonability of denying PSR in many every day contexts. But generally we don't feel the same way about violations of PSR for seemingly "eternal," truths. "Why does the Golden Ratio or Pi have the values they do?" Well, we can explain that in terms of other ratios and numbers, but we generally are fine with there being no "cause," behind the explanation. 2+2 is equivalent to 6-2 in some way, but we don't tend to say 2+2 causes 4. — Count Timothy von Icarus
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