If there can be a "first state" at one point, then there was a system for which no prior states existed. That seems fine.

But then the definition of a state is supposed to somehow preclude the possibility that there could ever be more than one system without prior states. That doesn't seem to flow from your definition. If an entity can exist in a "first moment," and we can say nothing meaningful about why, then any number of entities can exist in a first moment. Nor can we say might about these entities properties or if they can interact.

If one system can have no prior states why not others? Even if we say there can be no "last states," the definition doesn't suggest "there must be one and only one "first state," for one and only one system. Nor am I aware of a definition of "system," that precludes systems from interacting.

Then there is the other issue of events. If we adopt one of the more eliminative views on cause, then what we call events is really just the transition from state to state. For a Newtonian universe, we can think about 3D slices cut across the time dimension. An event then is simply a description for some phenomena we experience that can be described by some components of a state, a subset. The event has a starting time and an ending time, and it exists as just the relevant subset of components of a state from the start time to the end time.

Now the states we observe don't evolve in just any way. They evolve based on regularities that can be described by mathematics; our "laws of physics," are at least an approximation of these regularities. However, if a first state, a particular arrangement of variables occurs due to no prior states why does it then follow that the variables cannot shift their values randomly, as opposed to in accordance with their normal regularities, at any other time? More importantly, why should we define a state, a set of variables describing a system at some instant, as only a "state" when there are multiple states and states evolve such that regularities dictate that evolution.

I see no reason why I cannot have a model universe where the values of the variables describing S1 do not entail the values of variables at S2.

For the definition to solve the problems we need the definition of a state to be: "a variables describing a system at a given moment but only in cases where the evolution of states is dictated by mathematically describable regularities, except in the case of the first state. Further, to be a state, it must exist in a system that does not interact with any other systems (this is required to avoid a second 'first state' for some other system occuring, and then the new system interacting with our original)." That seems like an ad hoc definition aimed at "defining away," the problem.

Imagine if there was empirical evidence to support the existence of multiple Big Bangs, our universe being the result of some sort of cosmic merger. Would this entail that such a universe had no states?

I guess what would convince me of your point is if you could show that only one uncaused system can exist by necessity and that system's prior states necessarily have some sort of entailment relationship with their future ones. Otherwise the fix seems ad hoc. For it to be convincing that something is "true by definition," the definition needs to be necessary in some way, entailed by other premises we accept, or the disagreement needs to be about popular word usage.

But then the definition of a state is supposed to somehow preclude the possibility that there could ever be more than one system without prior states. That doesn't seem to flow from your definition.
If one system can have no prior states why not others? Even if we say there can be no "last states," the definition doesn't suggest "there must be one and only one "first state." Nor am I aware of a definition of "system," that precludes systems from interacting. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course it precludes it - the totality means exactly that. You cannot have 'two everythings'. If there are two systems, they still comprise a single state. If system one predates system two, then system two necessarily has prior states (the ones in which only system one existed).

Then there is the other issue of events. If we adopt one of the more eliminative views on cause, then what we call events is really just the transition from state to state. For a Newtonian universe, we can think about 3D slices cut across the time dimension. An event then is simply a description for some phenomena we experience that can be described by some components of a state, a subset. The event has a starting time and an ending time, and it exists as just the relevant subset of components of a state from the start time to the end time.

Now the states we observe don't evolve in just any way. They evolve based on regularities that can be described by mathematics; our "laws of physics," are at least an approximation of these regularities. However, if a first state, a particular arrangement of variables occurs due to no prior states why does it then follow that the variables cannot shift their values randomly, as opposed to in accordance with their normal regularities, at any other time? More importantly, why should we define a state, a set of variables describing a system at some instant, as only a "state" when there are multiple states and states evolve such that regularities dictate that evolution.

I see now reason why I can have a model universe where the values of the variables describing S1 do not entail the values of variables at S2. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In the first state there exist some physical entities which are governed by some specific regularities. Due to those regularities they transform to the second state. Again, those same regularities obtain, which result in transformation to the third state, etc. The first state is no exception here, the regularities that obtain are exactly the same. Of course, in subsequent states we can have physical entities which are the result of some previous processes - we would not expect them to exist in the first state. But the regularity itself obtains for all states.

For the definition to solve the problems we need the definition of a state to be: "a variables describing a system at a given moment but only in cases where the evolution of states is dictated by mathematically describable regularities, except in the case of the first state. Further, to be a state, it must exist in a system that does not interact with any other systems (this is required to avoid a second 'first state' for some other system occuring, and then the new system interacting with our original)." That seems like an ad hoc definition aimed at "defining away," the problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I have explained above, none of those exceptions are necessary.

Yeah, this still seems empty. All the work is done by definitions I'm not inclined to accept. I am left at a loss about why it is "illogical," to disagree with you. This seems reminiscent of the claim that it is "meaningless to talk about anything causing the Big Bang because by definition nothing caused the Big Bang."

If the universe has a first state then it does not exist without beginning or end, it is not eternal. If, as you say, states contain entities, then entities came to exist acausally. If entities began to exist for no reason then there is no constraint on entities coming into existence for no reason and it is not the case that, as you say, things always progress "from something to something." If an entity exists for no reason than its initial existence involves "something from nothing."

If there was a "birth of the universe" then that is an event, an occurrence, a thing that happened,etc. There aren't technical terms, I mean them just in the normal sense. If something coming from nothing can happen, then it can happen again because if something can begin to exist with no prior conditions then no prior conditions are relevant to it. If this the case, as you seem to accept, then the claim that "something always comes from something," is simply in contradiction with the claim "that everything came from nothing."

What exactly in logic makes the universe existing as a brute fact necessary? What formal system do we use to prove "things began to exist, all at once," by logical necessity?

I don't even think it's a bad option to claim that the universe simply began and we can know nothing as to why in virtue of the other options. This might be my preferred take. I don't know why there is an impetus to first claim the universe is a brute fact though, and then claim this is somehow logically necessary.

If the universe has a first state then it does not exist without beginning or end, it is not eternal. If it began to exist, if there was a "birth of the universe" then that is an event, an occurrence, a thing that happened,etc. There aren't technical terms, I mean them just in the normal sense. If something coming from nothing can happen, then it can happen again because if something can begin to exist with no prior conditions then no prior conditions are relevant to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, that is exactly where you are wrong. I understand that you are very attached to this notion, but that makes it nearly impossible to understand what I am saying.

If you say 'coming from nothing', then you are positing a transition: from one state - nothingness - to another state - the first state of the universe. That is NOT what I propose. The claims 'there was a state of nothingness before the first state of the universe' and 'there no state before the first state of the universe' are not equivalent and mean two different things. Can you see the difference between them?

Yeah, I got that part. If I accept your definition I accept your conclusion because your conclusion is contained in the definition. I understand why your conclusion flows from your definition. The question is, why should I accept your definition? Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior to its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing. I am not sure how the position just stated violates some core principle of logic?

If anything, the claim that the universe has no cause is the claim that violates a commonly held "rule of thought," the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But I will allow that not everyone agrees that PSR should be taken as axiomatic and that it remains controversial . However, I do think it's telling that the only context where I can recall seeing people deny PSR in the context of the external/physical world is on the topic of First Cause.

If the universe is a brute fact then it is a brute fact, not a deduction that it is illogical to question. I don't rule out that the position is true, only that it's illogical to question it, and I've yet to see or hear of a proof showing how PSR applies, except for the birth of the universe based on any commonly accepted first principles.

For what it is worth, I also don't think the claim that the universe began uncaused is illogical in any sense either, I just think it presents problems.

Yeah, I got that part. If I accept your definition I accept your conclusion because your conclusion is contained in the definition. I understand why your conclusion flows from your definition. The question is, why should I accept your definition? Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior to its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing. I am not sure how the position just stated violates some core principle of logic? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It might violate logic if you assume that before the first moment of existence of everything there was another moment of existence of nothingness. You interpret 'coming from nothing' as an actual event, which is not necessarily the only interpretation or even the most preferable one. If I say 'He gave nothing to his son for Christmas', nobody actually thinks that he gave his son an empty box, most people would assume that no act of giving anything occurred at all. That is how 'coming from nothing' might - and I would say should - be interpreted - as not coming from anything, i.e no event of 'coming' at all, no 'birth of the universe'. The first state just is, it is not a result of an event, change or transition. Interestingly, that confusion appears only in such languages like English, which abhor double negation. In Slavic languages it would be 'He didn't give nothing to his son' or 'The universe did not come from nothing' and it would be perfectly clear what is meant.

If anything, the claim that the universe has no cause is the claim that violates a commonly held "rule of thought," the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But I will allow that not everyone agrees that PSR should be taken as axiomatic and that it remains controversial . However, I do think it's telling that the only context where I can recall seeing people deny PSR in the context of the external/physical world is on the topic of First Cause. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue with PSR is that it either assumes necessitarianism, which is itself problematic, or a property of aseity, which fares no better, so the defenders of PSR do not have it that easy either. But I suppose that is a topic for another discussion.

For what it is worth, I also don't think the claim that the universe began uncaused is illogical in any sense either, I just think it presents problems. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I understand, I am just pointing out how some of those problems might be avoided.

Yeah, I got that part. If I accept your definition I accept your conclusion because your conclusion is contained in the definition. The question is, why should I accept your definition? Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing. I am not sure how the position just stated violates some core principle of logic? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suspect Jabberwock is sleeping now. So I'll interject.

I don't think is is a matter of definition. It looks to me as if you don't have a clear mental model of what Jabberwock is proposing. Jabberwock is proposing a first state, in which something exists. "A state prior to the absolute first state" is a nonsensical construction, which you seem to be insisting on inserting into Jabberwock's model instead of grasping the model that Jabberwock is trying to convey to you.

IOW, it looks to me like you are attacking a straw man of your own creation, where you've tacked your own addition, of a state of nothingness prior to the absolute first state, onto Jabberwock's model.

Might I suggest, spending some time, on getting a better grasp on the picture Jabberwock is seeking to convey to you?

It might violate logic if you assume that before the first moment of existence of everything there was another moment of existence of nothingness.

I don't see how emptiness (an empty set) void, is precluded by logic. But, moreover, I never proposed such an assumption. The question is why uncaused entities, relations, etc. must necessarily all exist for the first time at the exact same moment (and then continue to exist indefinitely).

A state prior to the absolute first state" is a nonsensical construction, which you seem to be insisting on inserting into Jabberwock's model instead of grasping the model that Jabberwock is trying to convey to you.

No, I get that there is no state prior to the first state in the way Jabberwocky frames things, and I see nothing wrong with that in terms of being coherent. I actually accept that way of looking at things (with a caveat). I didn't say "your model is nonsense," I said "why should I accept your claim that it would be illogical to question your model?"

The way this exchange started was not a disagreement over whether uncaused entities are coherent. It was a disagreement over whether or not it is necessary that, if uncaused entities exist (i.e., they exist without existing in any prior state) they can only exist for the first time simultaneously, that it is a necessity that uncaused entities not exist for the first time except at the exact same moment.

Something starting to exist when it did not exist prior to its first moment of existence is something coming from nothing.

Maybe the phrasing is bad here, but I explained it in detail earlier. When I say, "something from nothing," I am not talking about a progression of states of nothing, a series of empty states with no variables, to a series of states with variable that is continuous with the empty states. I am talking about the fact that entities that can be described by variables exist in some first state, despite not existing in any prior state, and so there is "nothing" causally prior to them.

I get that we are not talking about a progression of moments. There is no time where there exists a "nothing." If nothing exists, then nothing changes, so there is no relevant time dimension. But the "first state," does not occur outside of time. It is a state existing within time. The first state is a state containing entities, per Jabberwocky, which I think makes sense. These entities exist in the first state and exist in no prior state. So, entities can exist without having existed in any prior state.

This being the case, I am left wondering why it follows that entities can exist without existing in any prior state, but only in the first state that any entity exists? If entities can exist uncaused (having existed in no prior state), then it seems like they should be able to exist uncaused in any state given the normal definition of "states," which is just "a description of what exists in a system.


If a set of uncaused entities can come to exist at some first state, why can't other uncaused entities exist for the very first time at any later state? This is where the definition seems to be doing the all heavy lifting, because a state is then also defined as "everything that exists," to preclude more than one uncaused system, and "states are such that they only progress from other states, except for the first state," to preclude additional uncaused entities. But all it normally means that states "progress" from one another is that they are ordered. That they are ordered does not mean that the descriptions of later states must be entailed by earlier ones. But the definition now seems to also include the caveat that, outside the first state, all future states are entailed by prior ones, precluding anything else that is uncaused. I'll buy that this might describe our universe, but I don't see how it's illogical to reject this model.


This isn't the usual definition of states. You can have toy model universes that are random and they can have states.

Glad that we understand each other now. I have disagreed with your objections due to such claims of yours like 'If it began to exist, if there was a "birth of the universe" then that is an event, an occurrence, a thing that happened,etc.', which seemed to suggest that the 'birthing' event is required for the first state. If we agree that is not necessary, then I have no problem with that.

If an set of uncaused entities can come to exist at some first state, why can't other uncaused entities exist for the very first time at any later state? This is where the definition seems to be doing the all heavy lifting, because a state is then also defined as "everything that exists," to preclude more than one uncaused system, and "states are such that they only progress from other states, except for the first state," to preclude additional uncaused entities. But I don't see any logical reason to think that if one set of entities starts to exist uncaused that this somehow precludes that any other entities starts to exist uncaused. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is a valid objection, of course. There is no such preclusion for the things that start to exist which are preceded by a prior state but are not directly caused by it cannot be logically excluded. But I would argue that objection is valid for any model without an infinite regress of causes.

Sorry if I wasn't clear before. But yeah, that's the basic problem I see. If things start to exist, having not existed at any prior point, then it seems like things could start existing whenever and anything should start to exist in this way, not just the Cosmic Inflation state preceding the Big Bang.

I always figured this is one of the reasons why many cosmological theorists start with some sort of vacuum state or "the laws of physics," existing without beginning, instead of positing an initial first time they exist, but I might be wrong.

I am not entirely clear on the history of this sort of argument, but I gather that it was taken seriously and used to justify the the once popular view of an eternal, static universe, before evidence of expansion and the Big Bang began to pile up. "Start states,' seemed to open the door for supernaturalism. But the shift towards accepting the Big Bang didn't seem to rekindle interest in the problem, prehaps because it's intractable and there is not much new to say. IDK, you still see it in Big Bang to Big Crunch to Big Bang appeals or Black Hole Cosmology, the universe then never had a start states but oscillates or regress eternally.

One could just as well argue that the universe specialises in black holes

This is actually one of the theories I find more interesting. What if every inside black hole singularity is a Big Bang, the Big Bang simply being our name for a specific white hole. Universes can have all sorts of traits, which are somewhat random, but only universes that tend to produce black holes "reproduce." Prehaps this fixes the Fine Tuning Problem, we exist because universes like ours produce more black holes and natural selection works on universes. It's intriguing at least because the mathematics of models around black holes jive with observations we'd expect were this the case, although to date this "Black Hole Cosmology," is empirically indiscernible from the position that the Big Bang is unique. This perhaps just gets us to an infinite regress, but it's a neat idea.

Who knows? :wink:

Sorry if I wasn't clear before. But yeah, that's the basic problem I see. If things start to exist, having not existed at any prior point, then it seems like things could start existing whenever and anything should start to exist in this way, not just the Cosmic Inflation state preceding the Big Bang. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would just add that the qualification of 'starting to exist' does not make much difference. Suppose we see a painting and when we ask 'Who painted it?' and the answer is: 'Oh, nobody - it has always existed!' Would such explanation be more acceptable than 'It started to exist uncaused!'?

Agreed. That gets to the unreasonability of denying PSR in many every day contexts. But generally we don't feel the same way about violations of PSR for seemingly "eternal," truths. "Why does the Golden Ratio or Pi have the values they do?" Well, we can explain that in terms of other ratios and numbers, but we generally are fine with there being no "cause," behind the explanation. 2+2 is equivalent to 6-2 in some way, but we don't tend to say 2+2 causes 4.

IDK, there are plenty of ways to deny that mathematical truths are eternal, and I'm open to those. But it does seem much more plausible that these sorts of Platonic truths exist in some sort of acausal way. So there is an argument from analogy that could be made that an eternal universe is sort of like 2+2 = 4, it's a truth without beginning or end.

I don't think the analogy works. What would be satisfying is something that doesn't work on analogy, but rather carries the same sort of necessity as simple mathematical truths or logical truths. This is what I take Hegel to be attempting in the Science of Logic, starting from the consciousness, but it's also fairly impenetrable.

Agreed. That gets to the unreasonability of denying PSR in many every day contexts. But generally we don't feel the same way about violations of PSR for seemingly "eternal," truths. "Why does the Golden Ratio or Pi have the values they do?" Well, we can explain that in terms of other ratios and numbers, but we generally are fine with there being no "cause," behind the explanation. 2+2 is equivalent to 6-2 in some way, but we don't tend to say 2+2 causes 4. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is that PSR does not explain why some things are necessary and others cannot be. Why paintings cannot have aseity?

On a different note, could we say that the description of any rational (law-like) possible universe is equivalent with just the begining of a description of an infinite number of possible irrational universes that just happen to act like a given law-like universe up to some arbitrary number of states? And so we could say that an analog of Cantor's Diagonal Argument applies here in that a combinatorial concatenation of all law-like universes simply defines one unique irrational universe (one that jumps around essentially "simulating," each rational universe in turn). Sort of a diagonal "Kolmogorov Complexity of the infinite," argument . I don't think there is a bijection if these sets can exist.

In this case, there would be infinitely more irrational possible universes. Not convinced this works, but it seems plausible.



If I had a good answer for that I'd be publishing my landmark philosophical treatise, but I'm at a loss.