There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption. — Wayfarer
The argument between Dennett and Chalmers is just an argument over the reality of qualia — Janus
Let's say the subject is not real anyway, per Buddhism for example — Janus
So whether we talk about "consciousness" as neurobiological awareness or socially-constructed knowing, it is the same epistemic process in action. Cognition as predictive modelling aimed at creating a self in control of its world. — apokrisis
And as I’ve also said, that is not something which can be framed in scientific terms, because there’s no ‘epistemic cut’ here. We’re never outside of it or apart from it. — Wayfarer
You don't yet understand the epistemic cut — apokrisis
As I’ve said, I think Chalmer’s expression of ‘what it is like to be…’ is simply a rather awkward way of referring to ‘being’. And as I’ve also said, that is not something which can be framed in scientific terms, because there’s no ‘epistemic cut’ here. We’re never outside of it or apart from it. A Wittgenstein aphorism comes to mind, ‘We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.’
Cartesian doesn’t reign for that reason at all. It reigns as the implicit metaphysics of modern science (‘modern’ being the paradigm up until the 1927 Solvay conference.) — Wayfarer
But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.
— wonderer1
There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption. — Wayfarer
(The article is here.)At the 26th ASSC conference this past weekend, 25 years after the initial wager, the results were declared: Koch lost. Despite years of scientific effort — a time during which the science of consciousness shifted from the fringe to a mainstream, reputable, even exciting area of study — we still can’t say how or why the experience of consciousness arises.
So you deem the "I" addressed to be identical to you as body. And yet, the imagined table is only an aspect of your bodily processes, specifically of certain aspects of your CNS - the very same CNS from which this "I" results (at least as its typically understood; such that the I is one of many functioning process of the body - along with a multitude of unconscious processes of mind - but is not the body itself). But then in deeming this "I" identical to you as body there is grave incoherence in terms of what is being referenced in the expression, "Things I imagine". — javra
Given this incoherence, again, in which way then do you deem what you refer to as "I" to be in any way different from the imagined table? (To emphasize: Both are functions of your body — javra
OK, so when one intends to imagine a table, you take it that one consciously holds awareness of all the table's imagined properties instantaneously to so intending, aka willing. — javra
It's alright. Got a bit more boring lately as I've finally had to give up work completely, but I live in a nice place, so I'm OK. Thanks for asking though. — Isaac
Facing up to the problem of consciousness’ concerns the difficulty, or even the impossibility, of a providing a scientific account of first-person experience due its subjective nature. — Wayfarer
it would be great to have a philosophical zombie sherpa help you climb Everest because it wouldn’t matter if they fell off. — Wayfarer
On the other hand, it would be great to have a philosophical zombie sherpa help you climb Everest because it wouldn’t matter if they fell off. — Wayfarer
Why? I'm not seeing any incoherence. — Isaac
'I' refers to me, my body, whatever I deem to be part of that unit. — Isaac
As I said to you (part of the "word-salad" you decided was beyond you to understand), you are not here dealing with your experiences. The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your mind works is not direct evidence. — Isaac
No I take 'willing' to be a post hoc construction of the working memory after the event of imagining the table. — Isaac
posts are always well supported by citations (to the point of being infamous for it!). If you're going to accuse someone of misrepresentation, at least have the basic courtesy to do so with the same level of textual support with which the original claim was given. You're not a prophet. — Isaac
This statement claims that "I" refers to both a body and to a unit of that body, this at the same time and in the same respect - thereby making a whole equivalent to a part of that whole. If you uphold this logical contradiction, it is incoherent. If you don't than your quoted statement is erroneous or, at best, very misleading; in which case, please clarify it. — javra
As to the first sentence, it reads as though making the claim that I have no experiences which I can then address. Which is sheer fallacy. I do have experiences, and it is these that I'm addressing. As to the second sentence, it is equivocating the way my total mind works with the way my conscious experience works. Where it to instead read, "The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your conscious experience unfolds is not direct evidence" it would be nonsensical. — javra
How then do you distinguish behaviors - such as that of imagining a table - that are voluntary (which means consciously willed) from those that are involuntary (which means not consciously willed). — javra
If he needs help discovering what Chalmers' meant by the "hard problem," I'll be happy to point him toward helpful resources. — frank
First, he doesn't need 'help'. You and he disagree. He's at the very least your epistemic peer, so if you disagree it is as likely you are wrong (and in need of 'help') as it is he is.
Secondly, if you were an acknowledged, qualified Chalmers expert, maybe we'd hear what you have to say first and ask for help second, but you're not. You're just an ordinary lay party. So if you think someone is wrong, have the courtesy of assuming you'll need to support that first. It's not rocket science. — Isaac
There's nothing controversial about that. — frank
The collection {things I like} is made up of anything I deem to be a member of it. It's nothing more than those things, it's not those things + the collection of those things. The collection {my body} is similarly made up of those components I deem to be part of it. It's not a thing in addition to that collection. — Isaac
The point is that you are conflating the already given with the constructed. — Isaac
We tell ourselves a story about the causes of what just happened based primarily on interocepted states. Sometimes a story involving 'willing' will be most useful. Other times a story involving 'involuntary' will. Both are constructions, when looked at at this level of analysis. — Isaac
Someone with alien hand syndrome might not deem his hand (or other body part) to be an aspect of himself. For this and other reasons, I still find you explanation of what the "I" references to be uninformative. — javra
Experience, including that which is empirical, is directly present to conscious awareness. — javra
My posts to Wayfarer were meant to be a heads up to look back at the very paper he cited. It does not say that science can not explain experience. If he thinks it does, he should point out which passage he believes says that, and we can bring to light where Wayfarer misunderstood. — frank
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
To explain experience, we need a new approach. The usual explanatory methods of cognitive science and neuroscience do not suffice. These methods have been developed precisely to explain the performance of cognitive functions, and they do a good job of it. But as these methods stand, they are only equipped to explain the performance of functions. When it comes to the hard problem, the standard approach has nothing to say.
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