I had said simply said this, which you never addressed — Terrapin Station

Yes, I did address it. You didn't reply to my comment about it. Maybe you missed it.

Yes, I did address it. You didn't reply to my comment about it. Maybe you missed it. — Pierre-Normand

Sorry, you did. So you're saying that epistemic possibility in that scenario has nothing to do with what the individual in question believes about possibility (versus what they do not believe)?

Otherwise, how exactly does that amount to mixing anything up, because all I did was talk about what they do and do not believe?

(What this might amount to is simply that I don't at all buy the distinction you're attempting to make. There's ontological (or "metaphysical") possibility and there are beliefs about (ontological) possibility.)

Otherwise, how exactly does that amount to mixing anything up, because all I did was talk about what they do and do not believe? — Terrapin Station

That's because in the case you are describing, as I've displayed through formalizing it, there are two different sorts of modalities involved. It is a case where you avow ignorance regarding which one among two propositions is nomologically (or temporally, maybe) impossible, while the other one is nomologically possible, although you don't (yet) know which one. Since epistemic possibility doesn't entail nomological possibility, there is no validity in inferring the conclusion that you believe both to be nomologically possible. It's just your conflating the those two sorts of 'possibility' that generated the invalid inference and the false conclusion that you thereby believe both to be possible conjointly.

Actually this is a better question: why wouldn't epistemic possibility be beliefs about nomological possibility? I'm not at all convinced that it's coherent to say that it's anything other than that.

Wait, in the situation I'm presenting, what are you claiming the person believes is nomologically possible? — Terrapin Station

There isn't any proposition that she is claiming to be nomologically possible, if I understand you. Rather, she is claiming that one and only one among two propositions, A and B, is nomologically possible but she doesn't know which one it is. (If she would care to draw logical inferences from her own beliefs, though, she could conclude to the nomological possibility of the disjunctive proposition 'A xor B', as I've suggested to Michael, since this is a valid inference from (nomological) modal logic.)

I changed my post to this:

Actually this is a better question: why wouldn't epistemic possibility be beliefs about nomological possibility? I'm not at all convinced that it's coherent to say that it's anything other than that.

Actually this is a better question: why wouldn't epistemic possibility be beliefs about nomological possibility? I'm not at all convinced that it's coherent to say that it's anything other than that. — Terrapin Station

I'm unsure why anyone would think that the only sort of propositions which, for all one knows, might be true, are complex propositions regarding the nomological possibilities of basic propositions. There are more things under the Sun than just nomological possibilities. Maybe a determinist would believe something like that (that everything that is true is nomologically necessary) since, on her view, everything that will ever become temporally necessary in the future always has been in the past also. But then, that would only be true if we assume the nomological necessity of the 'initial state' of the universe.

I'm unsure why anyone would think that the only sorts of propositions which, for all one knows, might be true, are complex propositions regarding the nomological possibilities of basic propositions. — Pierre-Normand

What in the world does that have to do with what I asked?

I didn't say anything about the only sorts of propositions that might be true. In fact, I didn't say anything about propositions or truth whatsoever.

I didn't say anything about "complex" versus "basic" propositions.

It seems like you're making an incomprehensible jump from "possibility" to "truth."

What in the world does that have to do with what I asked?

I didn't say anything about the only sorts of propositions that might be true. In fact, I didn't say anything about propositions or truth whatsoever.

I didn't say anything about "complex" versus "basic" propositions. — Terrapin Station

What you asked me was this: "Actually this is a better question: why wouldn't epistemic possibility be beliefs about nomological possibility? I'm not at all convinced that it's coherent to say that it's anything other than that."

Are you not familiar with the idea that the contents of beliefs are propositions?

It really sounds like you were doubting that epistemic possibilities can coherently be said to be about anything other than propositions of nomological possibility. That would make those contents complex propositions of form (NP(A), where A is a simple proposition in subject/predicate form, and the belief itself (the epistemic possibility) has the form EP(NP(A). I have no idea why you would believe that, or believe that beliefs of the form EP(A) that aren't themselves "about" nomological possibilities, are necessarily incoherent.

To put it quite simply, when I say that, for all I know, my girlfriend may still be at home, this statement of epistemic possibility is about my girlfriend being at home. It's not about any sort of nomological possibility. I may not even believe that there are laws of nature. (Maybe I am a Humean regularist about laws, and I don't believe in natural necessities at all, say).

Are you not familiar with the idea that the contents of beliefs are propositions? — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but I don't agree with it. Some beliefs are definitely propositions, but in my view belief is a lot broader and fuzzier than that.

But what would that have to do with the only sorts of propositions that might be true?

It's not as if all beliefs are about possibility.

What would be the grounds for a claim that a proposition like "There is a possibility that x" has a structure like "(NP(A)" (or EP(A) or EP(NP)A) or whatever)? How does the structure obtain? Propositions only exist insofar as someone thinks them, and they only have the structure that someone thinks.

It's not as if all beliefs are about possibility. — Terrapin Station

Of course not. But you were the one expressing doubt that epistemic possibilities could coherently be thought to be "about" anything else than nomological possibilities, not me. I had construed that as the claim that epistemic possibilities have the form: 'for all I know, A might be nomologically possible', or, in shorter form, 'EP(NP(A)'. If you meant something else with your suggestion that all epistemic possibilities are "about" nomological possibilities, I don't know what that is. You would need to explain what you mean by "about" if it's not propositional contents.

What happened to this part?

What would be the grounds for a claim that a proposition like "There is a possibility that x" has a structure like "(NP(A)" (or EP(A) or EP(NP)A) or whatever)? How does the structure obtain? Propositions only exist insofar as someone thinks them, and they only have the structure that someone thinks

What would be the grounds for a claim that a proposition like "There is a possibility that x" has a structure like "(NP(A)" (or EP(A) or EP(NP)A) or whatever)? — Terrapin Station

I am simply trying to understand *your* suggestion that it may be incoherent to interpret epistemic possibilities to be "about" anything else than nomological possibilities. I provided a simple counterexample regarding my girlfriend possibly being at home (for all I know). It would help if you would explain what you meant with your "about" claim if it's not related to content.

I'll be away from my computer over the next several hours.

Again, it's not at all plausible to me that beliefs about possibility are beliefs about something other than whether an event can metaphysically obtain.

At least where one is using the term "possibility" in anything like its conventional sense.

I think I see what you are getting at. Let's compare life to a maze. To me, I am walking through the maze, constrained by the walls, at the same time making limited choices whether to stop or go on. The exit point is pre-determined, lets' say I have some control over how long I take to get there.

This, to me is determinism + free choice. Compatibilist. This may be an imperfect example, but let's use it for now.

Now, for the determinist, I make no choices, its all pre-programmed as if I am a robot.

For those who say there is free will, I am not sure which of the following apply ( broadly, there are different definitions of free will).

1. The maze exists only in my field of view. What is beyond is non-existent
2. The maze exists within my field of view and outside. The maze changes its shape and its exit point depending on my choices
3. There is no God or other being who can view the maze journey from all or any point in time, and therefore know which path I would take, or finally took, or am going to take, assuming He is viewing something real.

Have I missed anything?

I think I see what you are getting at. Let's compare life to a maze. To me, I am walking through the maze, constrained by the walls, at the same time making limited choices whether to stop or go on. The exit point is pre-determined, lets' say I have some control over how long I take to get there.

This, to me is determinism + free choice. Compatibilist. This may be an imperfect example, but let's use it for now. — FreeEmotion

Indeed, this it's how religious people think of responsibility, God, and life. Heaven is their destination picked for them by God and it matters naught how many people they lie, steal, cheat, and even kill along the way (maybe kill is not allowed).

Indeed, this it's how religious people think of responsibility, God, and life. Heaven is their destination picked for them by God and it matters naught how many people they let, steak, cheat, and even kill along the way (maybe kill is not allowed). — Rich

This is insulting to the religious person, even to the more Calvinistic Christians I know. Some religious folk are compatibilists; they think responsibility holds even if determinism is true. There are those who are free will libertarian as well, so they think that determinism is not true and they effectively choose their fate. Neither believes one can break the laws of their religion and get away with it. They are not fatalists about salvation. A person who murders, cheats, and steals will not go into heaven, even from a Calvinist perspective.

This is insulting to the religious person, even to the more Calvinistic Christians I know. Some religious folk are compatibilists; they think responsibility holds even if determinism is true. There are those who are free will libertarian as well, so they think that determinism is not true and they effectively choose their fate. Neither believes one can break the laws of their religion and get away with it. They are not fatalists about salvation. A person who murders, cheats, and steals will not go into heaven, even from a Calvinist perspective. — Chany

It gets complicated since God has already decided and has the final say.

But not too worry, it's better than determinism that has us all killing each other because some gene is obsessed with surviving.

I think I see what you are getting at. Let's compare life to a maze. To me, I am walking through the maze, constrained by the walls, at the same time making limited choices whether to stop or go on. The exit point is pre-determined, lets' say I have some control over how long I take to get there.

This, to me is determinism + free choice. Compatibilist. This may be an imperfect example, but let's use it for now. — FreeEmotion

It is not. Free will libertarians do not believe in pure freedom. I am not free to gain magic powers if I will them, for example. Just because I am in a maze with only one eventual outcome a the end of the maze does not mean I make decisions inside the maze. The libertarian believes that, at some points in my life, I have the ability to actualize one of many possibilities in a given scenario. When faced with a forked path, I can choose to go right or left. If I go right, I did not need to go right- I could have gone left if I so chosen. In other words, even if everything had been the same (same chain of events leading up to the forked path), I could have gone left. This ability is what the libertarian calls free will and what they view as needed for moral responsibility.

The determinist thinks that prior causal events dictate what will occur, so there is only one course of action that will result. If I go right, in a sense, then I must go right. Given a particular chain of events, only one outcome results. Determinists reject free will and the moral responsibility along with it.

Compatibilists think that free will exists, but they do not define it like the libertarian does. They think the relevant use of words like "choose", "could have done otherwise", and "free will," does not require the ability to actually be able to do something different given a specific chain of prior causal events. They think that their definition of free will allows determinism to be true. In short, being free for the compatibilist does not mean determinism is false. They can think there is only one possible outcome for a given situation and that free will and responsibility still holds.

Again, it's not at all plausible to me that beliefs about possibility are beliefs about something other than whether an event can metaphysically obtain.

At least where one is using the term "possibility" in anything like its conventional sense. — Terrapin Station

The words "possible", "possibly" and "possibility" have a multiplicity of senses and not just one single conventional sense. Just look up the two or three main definitions in any common English dictionary, as well as the various examples of common usage that they give.

It is not at all plausible that epistemic possibilities really are beliefs about the metaphysical (or alethic, or temporal) possibility of events. One good way to get at the difference is to pay attention to the fact that most modalities can be construed as statements regarding some set of possible worlds (semantic models). But epistemic possibilities always are statements about the *actual* world. (See the examples in the Wikipedia article on epistemic possibility and the mention of the actual world at the very beginning.)

If we are waiting for the bus, and we are unsure if we may *possibly* have missed it, and ought to walk rather than wait any longer, we are not pondering over whether there might be possible worlds other than the actual world where the bus has passed ahead of schedule. We rather are pondering over whether it is at all likely (where "likely" expresses subjective probabilities) that it has passed ahead of schedule, and we thereby missed it, in the actual world. This "possibility" is entirely premised on our state of ignorance regarding some features of the actual world.

Another telling example might be this. If I endeavor and seem to have succeeded in proving a mathematical conjecture then I may still wonder if the conclusion might not be false because I have made a logical mistake while constructing the proof. So, I think it is still possible that the conclusion may be false. But the conclusion being a mathematical proposition, if it is true in this world then it is true in all possible worlds. (In other words, the truth of mathematical proposition isn't a contingent truth). Therefore my belief that, for all I know, the conclusion might still be false (because I am still unsure about the validity of my proof) doesn't entail the claim that there might be possible worlds other than the actual world where the statement is false. The possibility of its being false is purely epistemic.

It gets complicated since God has already decided and has the final say. — Rich

God, in their minds, does not decide what they will do, at least in the sense that precludes moral responsibility. God could determine actions, but refrains from doing so to preserve creaturely freedom. Again, the compatibilist thinks that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible with each other.
Unrepentant murderers do not go to heaven.

But not too worry, it's better than determinism that has us all killing each other because some gene it's obsessed with surviving. — Rich

Not all determinists are materialists. And I do not see what this has to do with anything I said. It seems like you are just saying things to try to get a rise out of people.

Website on free will with links.

There is nothing to say that a person cannot freely choose a predetermined path. Even in the case of a biological machine-brain, there is nothing to say that a person cannot choose exactly what his brain has been programmed to choose. In this case I would say that free will is compatible with determinism. I call this concurrent free will or coincident free will. Admittedly unlikely but possible.

In my view that explanation is just compounding problems (note that my comments below are in the context of what's functionally going on, with respect to what's coherent or not, re conventional uses if terms):

* "Possible worlds" talk doesn't make sense except as talk about what is metaphysically possible in the actual world (which for a determinist is only one thing for each "branching point" so to speak . . . also, I see logical possibility as a subset of what's metaphysically possible, although determinists would have to say that it's the subset of things that are possible to non-contradictorily imagine; that, however, is still a subset of metaphysical possibility.)

* I don't know if you intended them to, but alethic or temporal possibility wouldn't refer to anything other than metaphysical possibility (they'd just be limiting the consideration to metaphysical possibility re truth-value judgments or changes that obtain relative to something)

* "Possible worlds as semantic models" -- we can note that the semantic models that individuals happen to possess (meaning is subjective and only obtains insofar as individuals actually think it) are actualized possibilities, but this is still metaphysical possibility (and to a determinist actualized (or to-be-actualized) possibilities are the only possibilities there are)

* The idea of "subjective probabilities" is just nonsense--if there are probabilities and that's not just an illusion, that's going to be a name that picks out some objective relational feature(s) of the world

* It's fine to note that we can be ignorant about which possibility obtains, where we believe that prior to something obtaining, there is more than one possibility, but if we're determinists we do not believe this; we believe that there is only one thing that's a possibility prior to each "branching point,' and our ignorance is about which thing was possible. Thus (a) ignorance isn't the same thing as some sense of possibility, and (b) this is not a different sense of possibility than metaphysical possibility; we're merely talking about our ignorance and beliefs re metaphysical possibility.

* Mathematics (and logic) are simply languages that report our subjective understanding of contingent relations, as they are thought about on the most abstract level, and

* Truth-value is a judgement about the relation of a proposition to something else (the exact something else being whatever the individual believes to be the pertinent relational consideration (for the context at hand). That could be their perception of the external world, or consistency with their stock of previously adjudged propositions, or usefulness per their judgment, etc.)

Now, for the determinist, I make no choices, its all pre-programmed as if I am a robot. — FreeEmotion

Right, which is why the idea where you make some choices have some "free" control over the maze isn't actually determinism. What you described at the start is libertarianism (not in the political sense obviously) where the ultimate outcome is predetermined somehow.

Re free will (aka libertarianism (with respect to will)), your (2) is closest.

Re your (3), one can believe that God exists (I personally do not--I'm an atheist, but one can believe God exists). And many people see free will as compatible with God's omniscience because they see knowledge as only being about what actually obtains, including natural laws, if one believes they obtain, and this gives God some predictive powers. But free will isn't part of natural law in this view, and God can't know what you'll decide prior to you deciding it. That's not the only approach to this issue in the context of religious belief, obviously, but it is one popular approach.

Just for reference, let me paste here my maze scenarios:

For those who say there is free will, I am not sure which of the following apply ( broadly, there are different definitions of free will).

1. The maze exists only in my field of view. What is beyond is non-existent
2. The maze exists within my field of view and outside. The maze changes its shape and its exit point depending on my choices
3. There is no God or other being who can view the maze journey from all or any point in time, and therefore know which path I would take, or finally took, or am going to take, assuming He is viewing something real. — FreeEmotion

You said

Re free will (aka libertarianism (with respect to will)), your (2) is closest.

Re your (3), one can believe that God exists (I personally do not--I'm an atheist, but one can believe God exists). And many people see free will as compatible with God's omniscience because they see knowledge as only being about what actually obtains, including natural laws, if one believes they obtain, and this gives God some predictive powers. But free will isn't part of natural law in this view, and God can't know what you'll decide prior to you deciding it. That's not the only approach to this issue in the context of religious belief, obviously, but it is one popular approach. — Terrapin Station

In my view that explanation is just compounding problems (note that my comments below are in the context of what's functionally going on, with respect to what's coherent or not, re conventional uses if terms):

* "Possible worlds" talk doesn't make sense except as talk about what is metaphysically possible in the actual world (which for a determinist is only one thing for each "branching point" so to speak . . . also, I see logical possibility as a subset of what's metaphysically possible, although determinists would have to say that it's the subset of things that are possible to non-contradictorily imagine; that, however, is still a subset of metaphysical possibility.) — Terrapin Station

What's logically possible is whatever isn't ruled out by the laws of formal logic alone. Whatever isn't self-contradictory is thus logically possible. Metaphysical possibilities, however you construe them, seem also to exclude propositions that are false because they are ruled out by a priori conceptual truths or by the laws of nature. (But see also Kripke on the metaphysical necessity of identity or of origin). It is very strange to say that logical possibility "is a subset of what's metaphysically possible", rather than the other way around.

* I don't know if you intended them to, but alethic or temporal possibility wouldn't refer to anything other than metaphysical possibility (they'd just be limiting the consideration to metaphysical possibility re truth-value judgments or changes that obtain relative to something)

Something is an alethic possibility ('a-possibility') if there is a true subjunctive conditional (e.g. a causal conditional) in which it figures as the consequent.

e.g. I arrived at work late because I forgot to set my alarm clock but it is a-possible that I would have arrived to work in time since if I had (counterfactually) not forgotten to set it then I would have arrived to work in time.

What is the allowed range of counterfactual antecedents that make alethic possibility statements either true or false is of course a pragmatic contextual matter that a semantic model must be sensitive to. (There seems to me to be a flaw with David Lewis's 'counterpart' models and their seemingly context insensitive similarity relations between possible worlds. Saul Kripke seems to me to provide a better informal account in Naming and Necessity.)

A temporal possibility is a possibility for the future that may become actual after the time has come. When the time has come, and the proposition now represents the past, it becomes (temporally) necessarily true or necessarily false. The range of possible worlds under consideration, in this case, is the set of possible worlds that share the same past with the actual world, at a time, and are branching out in the future consistently with the laws of nature. Just in case determinism is true, of course, then there is no branching out. There only is one actual future.

My point only was that epistemic possibilities depend on neither of those two modalities since they are premised on my ignorance regarding the actual world and don't always depend either on whatever is as of yet unsettled (for the future) or on what would have happened in counterfactual circumstances.

* "Possible worlds as semantic models" -- we can note that the semantic models that individuals happen to possess (meaning is subjective and only obtains insofar as individuals actually think it) are actualized possibilities, but this is still metaphysical possibility (and rob a deterministic actualized (or to-be-actualized possibilities) are the only possibilities there are)

No. Semantic models aren't "actualized possibilities". This is nonsense. They are sets of characterizations of possible worlds with only one among them being labelled as the actual world. When something is actual, then it is possible but only one possible world is actual.

* The idea of "subjective probabilities" is just nonsense--if there are probabilities and that's not just an illusion, that's going to be a name that picks out some objective relational feature(s) of the world

If you throw a die that you know to be fair and balanced, then, regardless on the laws of nature being deterministic or indeterministic, after the die has been thrown, but before you are informed of the result, the subjective probability for each one of the six conceivable results, from your own epistemic perspective, is p = 1/6. I am unsure why you would think this is nonsense. It is just part of the normal course of practical deliberation for people to make use of their own subjective probability estimates of the consequences of various possible actions, even when the consequences already are settled conditionally to their choices.

* It's fine to note that we can be ignorant about which possibility obtains, where we believe that prior to something obtaining, there is more than one possibility, but if we're determinists we do not believe this; we believe that there is only one thing that's a possibility prior to each "branching point,' and our ignorance is about which thing was possible. Thus (a) ignorance isn't the same thing as some sense of possibility, and (b) this is not a different sense of possibility than metaphysical possibility; we're merely talking about our ignorance and beliefs re metaphysical possibility.

Those are just dogmatic assertions that you are making. Determinists and indeterminists alike usually agree about the fixity of the past. Yet, it makes sense to speak about epistemic possibilities regarding past events.

* Mathematics (and logic) are simply languages that report our subjective understanding of contingent relations, as they are thought about on the most abstract level, and

* Truth-value is a judgement about the relation of a proposition to something else (the exact something else being whatever the individual believes to be the pertinent relational consideration (for the context at hand). That could be their perception of the external world, or consistency with their stock of previously adjudged propositions, or usefulness per their judgment, etc.)

Well, yes, sure. That's exactly what epistemic modalities are about.

What's logically possible is whatever isn't ruled out by the laws of formal logic alone. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not going to keep doing a series of posts of ever-increasing length, on an ever-increasing number of topics, where you state some status quo view, I give a view that disagrees with it, and then you either restate or state additional status quo views in response, where your responses don't seem to really even acknowledge what I had said very well.

So back to one thing at a time.

I wouldn't say that there are any laws of formal logic.

There are basically language games that are set up as conventions re different species of logics, where logic, as I had said, is a subjective linguistic reporting of how individuals think about relations on the most abstract level.

I wouldn't say that there are any laws of formal logic.

There are basically language games that are set up as conventions re different species of logics, where logic, as I had said, is a subjective linguistic reporting of how individuals think about relations on the most abstract level. — Terrapin Station

You are the one who brought up the topic of logical possibility and claimed, contrary to traditional wisdom, that logical possibilities are a subset of metaphysical possibilities. I am usure how this further characterization of logic explains the claim that you made. Maybe it would help if you would give an example of something that, in your view, is a metaphysical possibility even though it is not a logical possibility. That would possibly help me make sense of your strange suggestion.

I am usure how this further characterization of logic explains the claim that you made. — Pierre-Normand

It doesn't. It shows why your explanation doesn't work in my view. Logical possibilites have nothing to do with "laws of logic" because there are no such things.

I'm using logic to refer to a language about relations on an abstract level, and more specifically, it has to do with implications/inferences of relations. (Because that's what logic is, functionally, contra some beliefs about it.)

Not everything in the world is a language about relations, is it?

So, for example, imagine there are no persons. Well, there is no logic in that case. But there are metaphysical possibilites.