One of my all-time favourite Buddhist texts was subtitled 'Seeking truth in a time of chaos'. Don't loose sight of the fact that modernity - actually, post-modernity - is chaotic. There's a lot of turmoil, vastly incompatible opinions and worldviews all jostling one another for prominence. Learn to live with it, but I recommend not trying to tame the waters. It's beyond any of us to to that. — Wayfarer

I hear you.

Tropes and universals can be described in mathematical, computable terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus
By rational agents - human beings - augmented with intentionally-designed artefacts - computers and calculators. Were those rational abilities absent, there would be no apprehension of tropes or universals. I know it's already been suggested that crows can count, but try explaining the concept of prime to them. — Wayfarer

Again, we have here an instance of looking at one side (the apparent side) of the whole world. Since scientists have concluded, from available evidence, that big-brained homo sapiens emerged on a minor planet on the margin of an ordinary spiral galaxy, only after 14 billion earth-years of gradual development. If so, did "tropes & universals" exist in the natural world for all those eons of evolution, or are they a result of "artificial" reasoning? What about "mathematics"?*1 Is that a natural thing, or an unnatural product of human reasoning? If the universe was "computing" the inputs & outputs of Nature since the system was suddenly turned-on in a Big Bang of matter/energy interaction, who/what encoded the program of evolution? Was it a sapient counting crow? (just kidding)

A materialistic worldview intentionally avoids dealing with the elephant in the world : the human mind, the rational observer --- those annoying unnatural pests who lit-up the world with artificial light. Perhaps, as you once noted, that evasion may be due to exaggerated "fear of organized religion", or of abstract reason. in a post above, responded to my question : "Is human intelligence merely an accidental pattern of a hypothetical "universal cellular automaton"?", with : "Define 'human intelligence' ". Of course, he was not really interested in my opinion on the subject ; just looking for another opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of his mountaintop-Illuminati intellect, unburdened by the superstitions of such spooky concepts as immaterial (functional) Minds & Intelligences --- presumably including gods & ghosts & angels. Judging by superficial appearances, a doctrinaire Materialist might not see any meaningful difference between a counting crow and a computing scientist.

The implicit assumption of monistic Materialism is that anything the human mind imagines --- that can't be counted --- does not matter. And that countless category includes the distinction between Brains & Minds, or Seeing & Knowing. If he placed a coin on a table and asked me if it was heads or tails, he would ridicule my holistic BothAnd answer, because you can't see the downside of the coin ; so it doesn't count, even though you know that it is there, by reasoning from prior experience. Sure, reasoning can lead to erroneous conclusions, but so can discounting what is not directly apparent to the 5 senses. Likewise, discounting the value of human reasoning, just because it a natural outcome of mundane evolution --- instead of a divine miracle --- can lead to a one-sided worldview. A belief system that ignores ideas, reasons, and other abstractions as immaterial*2. :smile:

PS___Yes, " universals can be described in mathematical, computable terms" because, like any other man-made language, computer code can represent abstractions with symbols*3.

*1. What is Mathematics? :
the abstract science of number, quantity, and space.
__Oxford

*2. What are Abstractions? :
the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events
___Oxford

*3. What is a Symbol? :
something visible that by association or convention represents something else that is invisible.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/symbol

But your use of the metaphors of information and information processing introduce many difficulties from a philosophical point of view. My own approach is more oriented around 'history of ideas' and understanding how ideas influence cultural dynamics and entrenched attitudes, leavened somewhat with my engagement with Buddhist praxis — Wayfarer

I am aware that you and I are coming from completely different backgrounds : mine in the sciences, yours in history & literature. But, surprisingly, we have come to similar conclusions about some of the most controversial topics discussed on this forum. Hence, though wearing different uniforms, we are forced to stand back-to-back, fending-off the forces of encircling orthodox Scientism.

For example : "The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes". Personally, I don't interpret the existence of abstract Thought & logical Reason as evidence of a "supernatural" act of intervention, in the traditional sense of many world religions. Instead, I attribute the ubiquitous role of mathematical/material Information in the world to a mysterious preter-natural source, similar to the abstract principles that Plato & Aristotle called First Cause or Logos or Prime Mover. Except for that hypothetical Ontological beginning, everything else in the world is a natural result of evolutionary programming. No superstitions necessary, it's just coding.

Since I have no divine revelation or Buddhist insights, I have no basis for making more specific conjectures about the postulated metaphorical Enformer or Programmer : it's just a theory, like the Big Bang. Hence, it does not prescribe any unique shoulds & oughts & thou shalts. From the perspective of doctrinaire Naturalists though, that pre-natural + natural postulation leaves me suspended between mythical or superstitious religions, and empirical pragmatic sciences. My worldview is completely natural & mundane, up to the point where physical Nature began in an astronomically-unlikely bang in the dark. Beyond that, anything I, or anyone else, might say is a shot in the dark. :smile:

↪180 Proof in a post above, responded to my question : "Is human intelligence merely an accidental pattern of a hypothetical "universal cellular automaton"?", with : "Define 'human intelligence' ". Of course, he was not really interested in my opinion on the subject ... — Gnomon

And, of course, once again, you project by impugning my motives for requesting clarification in order to deflect from the conspicuous fact that you have no idea, Gnomon, what the hell you're gibber-jabbering about. :yawn:

we are forced to stand back-to-back, fending-off the forces of encircling orthodox Scientism. — Gnomon

"The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes".___OP

My own approach is more oriented around 'history of ideas' and understanding how ideas influence cultural dynamics and entrenched attitudes, leavened somewhat with my engagement with Buddhist praxis — Wayfarer

My knowledge of the 'history of ideas', and of Hindu/Buddhist philosophy --- not to mention "praxis" --- may be superficial compared to yours. And my knowledge of Western Philosophy --- especially of the modern era --- is superficial to that of . So, I don't pretend to compete in those arenas. But my "expertise" --- relatively speaking --- is in the 21st century sciences of Quantum Physics (QP) and Information Theory (IT).

The pioneers of QP, baffled by the variance of their experiments from classical/mechanical Newtonian Physics, turned to Hindu & Buddhist vocabularies --- not the religions --- to express the Holistic & Immaterial (mental) aspects of sub-atomic reality. John A. Wheeler even went so far as to combine QP and IT in his famous "It from Bit" postulation. Then, he went on to propose the Participatory Anthropic Principle*1, which implied that the observer's mind could have real effects upon the material world --- at least on the sub-atomic scale. He eventually toyed with the idea of a Weak Anthropic Principle, and even a Strong Anthropic Principle*2.

Obviously, such spooky-woo notions (per 180) are anathema to a believer in hard Materialism, in which the Mind is a minor side-effect of Brain functions, with no magical powers over the material world. Being a practicing scientist, not a philosopher, Wheeler didn't expand his Information/Matter/Mind theory to its ultimate conclusion. So others took-up the gauntlet for him. And their Information-centric (not matter-centric) reasoning led to the conclusion that the human mind must be a descendant of a Prime Mind of some kind : a Logos or Enformer/Programmer.

Both the woke Buddha and itty-bitty Wheeler, being pragmatic practitioners in their own fields, astutely avoided making the philosophical inference of an ultimate Mind, who planted the enforming seed that eventually sprouted in homo sapiens (rational ape). Yet, since I am an amateur philosopher, with no peer review to revile my unorthodox ideas for conformance to established orthodoxy*3, I feel free to take the "it from bit" seed to its logical ontological conclusion.

However, since I have no interest in founding a popular religion, I'm content to use the ancient vocabulary of Plato (Logos) and a neologism of my own devising (EnFormAction) to express my personal opinions on an opinion-sharing forum. As for Plato, my Logos/Enformer is no Satan or Savior, just Order-Organization-Reason in a growing-maturing-complexifying material world --- where the only Nirvana is a refuge of your own imagination. :smile:



*1. "A participatory anthropic principle (PAP) was proposed by the American physicist John Archibald Wheeler. He suggested that if one takes the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics seriously, one may conclude that, because no phenomenon can be said to exist until it is observed,"
https://www.britannica.com/science/participatory-anthropic-principle
Note : This strange statement by a physicist, echoes Berkeley's Idealist assertion : "Berkeley's immaterialism argues that "esse est percipi (aut percipere)", which in English is to be is to be perceived (or to perceive). ___Wiki

*2. "THE STRONG ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE The ultimate form of anthropic reasoning is to assert that the coincidences we have remarked on are more than that: that the universe must be such as to admit the production of intelligent life at some time. This idea is known as the strong anthropic principle."
https://ned.ipac.caltech.edu/level5/Peacock/Peacock3_5.html
Note -- Weak Principle = Intelligence from Coincidence. Strong Principle = Intelligence from Intelligence.

*3. On this forum, 180 proof has appointed himself as the un-official inquisitor of Scientism/Naturalism/Materialism orthodoxy. And what vexes his know-it-all-neurons most is the mutual ideas : a> that there is some immaterial force in the world (energy/information) and b> that it originated in some preter-natural Intelligence. He need not worry though. The Enformationism philosophy, with a single adherent, is just a personal opinion (like that of Gallileo), based on eye-opening observations of the squishy (non-mechanical) foundations of the material world.
No, 180, I'm not equating my little QP/IT notion with Gallileo's church-threatening revelations. Perhaps Information-centric physicists, Wheeler & Paul Davies, though, will find a similar place in the future history of science & philosophy. All I can say, as an amateur with no credentials, is that the all-purpose role of Information in the world makes sense of many philosophical & scientific enigmas for me : such as the emergence of intentional Reasoning in a world of dumb Matter & dynamic Energy.

*4. "By the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, logos was the term established to describe the faculty of human reason and the knowledge men had of the known world and of other humans. Plato allowed his characters to engage in the conceit of describing logos as a living being in some of his dialogues."
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Logos

But, as I understand it, while numbers tend to get grounded in quite abstruse work within set theory that there is less general confidence in, they can also be grounded using category theory. Barry Mazur has some relatively approachable stuff on this, although I certainly don't get all of it.

Timelessness remains either way, mathematics is eternal, not involved in becoming— in most takes at least. This, I think, may be a problem. Mazur had an article on time in mathematics but it didn't go that deep. But I recently discovered Gisin's work on intuitionist mathematics in physics, and that is quite interesting and sort of bound up with the philosophy of time. The Nature article seems stuck behind a paywall, but there is this Quanta article and one on arXiv.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02348

https://www.quantamagazine.org/does-time-really-flow-new-clues-come-from-a-century-old-approach-to-math-20200407/ — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't had a chance to read the referred material yet, but I think that this is an important subject, very much related to the op. As I see it the crux of the matter is the nature of "order". The first principle of mathematics is order, yet pure mathematicians do not want to be constrained by any natural order. So they propose a fundamental orderless condition which would allow infinite freedom for creations of order. This is the set which is not ordered.

The problem with this "not ordered" condition is that time is a type of order, and this puts the "not ordered condition as outside of, or prior to time. Now we can ask in what sense is this condition "prior" because it really cannot be prior in a temporal sense. And we might say that it is "logically prior". But this ought to be questioned. So the question might be, does it make sense logically, to speak of something which is "not ordered". If this idea, the existence of something without any order, is itself illogical, then the "priority" implied by placing this condition as prior to temporal order, cannot be said to be a logical priority, because it would appear more like an illogical type of priority.

My problems with his argument have nothing to do with this sort of speculation. — Paine

May I ask for your precise critique of his argument as it relates to this thread?

In a well-known argument Gerson claims that the immateriality of the intellect disproves materialism. In some places Gerson associates this argument with Aristotle, and it is this association that you seem to want to reject. But what exactly is it that you are rejecting? Which of Gerson's key claims, as presented in this thread, are non-Aristotelian?

I read all of your posts in this thread and this one seems to be most pertinent:

The "identity" with the object is not a simple correspondence of "forms". — Paine

For example, I would want to say, "What matters is whether the identity implies the requisite immateriality, not whether it is a simple correspondence of 'forms'."

If Gerson truly got this wrong then I should be interested to know how he got it wrong.

Yours is a fair challenge. I will try to gather a proper response as I can. In the meantime, I can ask about something in your statement:

For example, I would want to say, "What matters is whether the identity implies the requisite immateriality, not whether it is a simple correspondence of 'forms'." — Leontiskos

Aristotle puts a lot of emphasis on the priority of the being one encounters. The generality of being a kind of thing is a pale shadow of the actual being. If that is the case, how 'forms' work in hylomorphic beings is different in the various "Platonic" models.

I figure that should be discussed before getting into Gerson's interpretation.

Yours is a fair challenge. I will try to gather a proper response as I can. — Paine

Okay, thanks.

Aristotle puts a lot of emphasis on the priority of the being one encounters. The generality of being a kind of thing is a pale shadow of the actual being. If that is the case, how 'forms' work in hylomorphic beings is different in the various "Platonic" models. — Paine

I don't at all doubt that this is the case. In fact my assumption is that the critique would involve the claim that Gerson is projecting some variety of non-Aristotelian Platonism onto Aristotle. Of course Gerson also advances the somewhat controversial thesis that Aristotle is best seen as a Platonist, but although this is related I'm not sure we need to get into it right now.

I suggest reading enough Plotinus to see his objections to Aristotle. Gerson does not simply take those remarks as the only way to read Aristotle. But it does change the perspective of what Platonism is about.

I don't claim to understand all the moving parts.

Edit to add: Gerson has been discussed numerous times here. I made an argument against one of his positions here.

For a more exhaustive discussion of the differences between Plato and the 'Neo-Platonists' there is Fooloso4's OP on Phaedo to consider. From that, you can see that people here have been disagreeing for years about it.

I realize that I am not up for rekindling those debates right now. It is summertime and the living is easy.

In a well-known argument Gerson claims that the immateriality of the intellect disproves materialism. — Leontiskos

Just noticed your post now.

I have read some of Lloyd Gerson's work, but I find his corpus pretty unapproachable, as it is directed almost solely at his academic peer group, or so it seems to me. He's written a series of books, including one contentiously called Aristotle and Other Platonists, but they're dense with footnotes and polemical skirmishes with competing interpretations. It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. It would be great if there could be a compendium of his writing edited for a more general audience, although I suppose it would still be only a small general audience. (Rather a good lecture on his Possibility of Philosophy here.)

I've long been interested in various aspects of scholastic and platonic realism, i.e. the view that universals and abstract objects are real. There's precious little interest in and support for such ideas here, or anywhere, really. But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. But it's a hard thesis to support, and besides, as I say, has very little interest, it's diametrically at odds with the mainstream approach to philosophy.

Some of the sources I frequently cite in support include Bertrand Russell's chapter on The World of Universals, the transcript of a lecture by Jacques Maritain The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, a book section about Augustine on Intelligible Objects, a book called The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Allen Gillespie. And this excerpt from a book on Thomistic philosophy which re-states, I think, the same argument Gerson refers to in respect of the immateriality of nous.

I frequently cite in support include Bertrand Russell's chapter on The World of Universals, the transcript of a lecture by Jacques Maritain The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, a book section about Augustine on Intelligible Objects, a book called The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Allen Gillespie. And this excerpt from a book on Thomistic philosophy which re-states, I think, the same argument Gerson refers to in respect of the immateriality of nous. — Wayfarer

A digression via some questions. Plato seems to regard nous as the highest form of understanding - the ability to contemplate the ultimate nature of reality via the Forms. Do you consider this to be approximately the same as enlightenment? Or something not quite as elevated? And is the idea that reasoning or intellectual intuition can help us to access a higher realm of knowledge - i.e., the reality behind the world of appearances? I'm interested in how this access is theorised to work. A rational process. I understand we can get there through anamnesis 'remembering' as we become reawakened through dialogue and learning.

What does having direct access to the Forms do for the perceiver?

These are all very deep questions. I’m hardly equipped to make a comparison between Platonic philosophy and Asiatic teachings of enlightenment (although one of my books, The Shape of Ancient Thought, Thomas McEvilly, does go into that in detail.)

Bertrand Russell says in his chapter on Pythagoras that the numerological and rationalist tendency in Pythagoras and in the later Greek tradition is one of the things that differentiates it from Asiatic mysticism. Seems to me that the Greek approach was far more likely to give rise to later science than the Indian and Chinese traditions. But it’s also true that since the Renaissance, the West has kept those elements of the tradition which were useful for science and technology while abandoning the ethical and moral precepts of Aristotelian thought (cf Alisdair MacIntyre). That might be because of the absorption of those principles into theology so that they became rejected along with religion.

I firmly believe that Greek philosophy held to the necessity of ‘the philosophical ascent’, but that with the loss of the qualitative dimension, ‘’the great chain of being’, then the idea becomes unintelligible. (Hence the tension between tradition and naturalism.) There is no axis along which the idea of ‘higher’ makes any sense. Everything is said to have arisen from self-organising matter, ideas only exist in the minds of h. Sapiens, chiefly to serve instrumental purposes. The modern world is very much at odds with the philosophical vision of the Greeks in that sense.

Bertrand Russell says in his chapter on Pythagoras that the numerological and rationalist tendency in Pythagoras and in the later Greek tradition is one of the things that differentiates it from Asiatic mysticism. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is where I was heading. Reason as pathway to higher awareness - very different. It does strike me that the notion of a reawakening of the wisdom we held before brith 'anamnesis' has within it some of the characteristics of enlightenment traditions.

Seems to me that the Greek approach was far more likely to give rise to later science than the Indian and Chinese traditions. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is also what I was wondering. Thanks.

There is no axis along which the idea of ‘higher’ makes any sense. — Wayfarer

We retain some of the ghostly afterlife of this through various notions of wisdom, I guess, but it's faint.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

I believe that understanding the various forms of post-Platonism (rather than Neo-Platonism) is very significant to any study of metaphysics. Plato exposed many ontological and metaphysical problems inherent within the conventions of his day. He pointed in numerous different directions as to possible resolutions. The different ways that various philosophers have taken up his challenges is very indicative of the problems which philosophy encounters in addressing the nature of reality.

But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. — Wayfarer

The decline was predicted by Plato, in "Republic", Bk. 8, 546. There is a number which relates the circumference of circles to the fertility of living creatures. That number is also related to the powers of 3,4, and 5 (Pythagorean theorem?) in some obscure way. Knowledge of the "perfect number" is required for divine birth. And the rulers of the state, lacking this knowledge will inevitably provide for the births of human beings who are not good natured and fortunate. Because of this, even the best state, as proposed, will decay and face dissolution.

A digression via some questions. Plato seems to regard nous as the highest form of understanding - the ability to contemplate the ultimate nature of reality via the Forms. — Tom Storm

There is no better source of why this is not true than the works of Plato. Several of the dialogues can be cited, but Timaeus, in which Socrates remains mostly silent, presents a clear picture of the inadequacy of the Forms. In this dialogue, much or which is a monologue, Socrates expresses the desire to see the city he creates in the Republic at war. He wants to see the city in action. The story of the city in the Republic is incomplete. It is a city created by intellect (nous) without necessity (ananke), that is, a city without chance and contingency. A city that could never be.

For a more detailed discussion: Shaken to the Chora

Not really for this thread, but I understand Plato's notion of the Forms evolved throughout his writings and that he was sometimes 'self-critical' - there are explorations of the problems of participation (Phaedo) and the issue of infinite regress, 'the Third Man Argument' (Parmenides). But does Plato stop thinking of the Forms as a source of truth and ultimate reality?

But does Plato stop thinking of the Forms as a source of truth and ultimate reality? — Tom Storm

I don't know if he ever thought of them as a source of truth. Although Parmenides is generally considered a late dialogue, it is contextually an early dialogue based on the chronology of the dramatic settings of the dialogues. Socrates is a young man. What is the significance of this? Placing the dialogue at an early stage of Socrates journey suggests that he was from early on aware of the problems raised in the dialogues regarding Forms.

In Plato's Second Letter he says that his is a Socrates made young and beautiful.

In the Seventh Letter he says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

In the Apology Socrates denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. (21d)

In the Phaedo Socrates calls his hypothesis of the Forms "safe and ignorant". In addition to the Forms, he later recognizes the necessity of admitting physical causes such as fire and fever (105c)

In the Republic Socrates calls the Forms "stepping-stones and springboards" (511b). They are intended to free us from what has been hypothesized. But when asked he is circumspect but clear in stating that he does not actually have knowledge of the Forms:

"You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon," I said, "although there wouldn't be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on. Isn't it so?" (533a)

The truth as it looks to him may not be the truth, and he is not insisting that it is. But he insists that there is “some such thing to see”. What he shows us is a likeness of what the beings must be, that is, an image. The Forms are, ironically, images.

All of this is consistent with the many "likely stories (ton eikota mython)" in Timaeus. We are human beings, capable of telling likely stories, but incapable of discerning the truth of such things. Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding.

Socrates approves and urges him to perform the song (nomos). Nomos means not only song but law and custom or convention. In the absence of truth there is nomos. But not just any song, it is one that is regarded as best to accept because it is told with an eye to what is best. One that harmonizes being and becoming.

Interesting. Thank you.

We are human beings, capable of telling likely stories, but incapable of discerning the truth of such things. Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding. — Fooloso4

That's generally been my game plan. I think I'll try to find a thread on the Forms to see what's been said here.

Which of Gerson's key claims, as presented in this thread, are non-Aristotelian? — Leontiskos

Okay, I will give it a try.

The problem with Gerson is that he does not distinguish between the different roles Matter (ἡ ὕλη) plays amongst the 'Ur-Platonists' he assembles to oppose the team of 'Materialists' he objects to.

Plotinus says:

What conception then shall we for of matter? In what sense does matter exist? Its existence consists in potentiality. It is in the sense that it is potential. It exists in as much as it is a substrate of existence. "Existence" with regard to it signifies possibility of existence. The being of matter is only what it is to be. Matter is potential not just some particular thing, but all things. Being nothing by itself and being what it is, matter is nothing actually. If it were something actually, it would no longer be matter, that is , it would not be matter in the absolute sense of the term, but only in the sense in which bronze is matter. — Ennead, II, 5, 5, translated by Katz

In developing his ideas of actual being in relation to potential being, Aristotle says this:

Other thinkers, too, have perceived this nature (the belief in generation, destruction, and change in general) but not adequately. For, in the first place, they agree that there is unqualified generation from nonbeing, thus granting the statement of Parmenides as being right, secondly, it appears to them that if this nature is numerically one, then it must be also one potentially, and this makes the greatest difference.

Now we maintain that matter is distinct from privation and that one of these, matter, is nonbeing with respect to an attribute but privation is nonbeing in itself, and also that matter is in some way near to substance but privation is in no way such.

These thinkers, on the other hand, maintain that the Great and the Small are alike nonbeing, whether these two are taken together as one or each is taken separately. And so they posit their triad in a manner which is entirely distinct from ours. Thus, they have gone so far as to perceive the need of some underlying nature, but they posit this as being one, for even if someone [Plato] posits the Dyad, calling it the Great and Small, he nevertheless does the same since he overlooks the other [nature].

Now in things which are being generated, one of these [two natures] is an underlying joint cause with a form, being like a mother, so to speak, but the other part of the contrariety might often be imagined, by one who would belittle it, as not existing at all. For, as there exists an object which is divine and good and something to strive after, we maintain that one of the principles is contrary to it, but that the other [principle], in virtue of its nature, by nature strives after and desires that object. According to the doctrine of these thinkers, on the other hand, what results is that the contrary desires its own destruction. Yet neither would the form strive after itself, because it does not lack it, nor does it strive after the contrary, for contraries are destructive of each other. Now this [principle] is matter, and it is like the female which desires the male and the ugly which desires the beautiful, but it is not by itself that the ugly or the female does this, since these are only attributes. — Physics, 192a, translated by H.G. Apostle

For myself, the many points Plotinus and Aristotle may agree upon are not as interesting as where they clearly do not.

Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding. — Fooloso4

A theme also found in Kant.

I think I'll try to find a thread on the Forms to see what's been said here. — Tom Storm

Fooloso4's reading of Plato generally deprecates the widespread view that the knowledge of the forms corresponds to insight into a higher realm of truth. Plato's dialogues are open to a variety of interpretations by their very nature, and I don't think I agree with his interpretation. But to disagree would require re-visiting and re-reading many a dusty tome, so I think I'll regard his as one among other possible interpretations.

Understand. This is a tendentious subject. I just like having a sense of the scope of enquiry. :wink:

But to disagree would require re-visiting and re-reading many a dusty tome, so I think I'll regard his as one among other interpretation. — Wayfarer

Agreeing or disagreeing with interpretations aside, are you saying that pursuing authorial intent in the writings is a foolish enterprise because supporting or deconstructing a particular set of opinions is just another opinion?

Of course not. But there is plenty of scope for different interpretations.

There are many different interpretations. As one who has gotten dusty from the tomes, I am not sure how to read you balancing your interest in the works as works against a more general response to the ideas.

That is not an argument against what I think you might think but a sense of dislocation. I cannot address what you have collected and you have put yourself outside of what I can gather.

Had I been schooled in the Classics I would have a much better knowledge of the texts. Regrettably it was not part of my education, a lack that I have only come to regret much later in life, and one which I don’t think I will ever really overcome. All I have are a few straws to grasp at, grounded on the scattered readings I have done. And also the intuition that many contemporary readings of Plato downplay or redact out those elements which are incompatible with the type of naturalism which prevails in today’s academia. That is in line with what I believe is the forgetting or occlusion of the qualitative dimension of existence which begins to become apparent in Hume - the loss of the ‘vertical axis’.

One of those straws is the belief that the parable of the cave does indeed present an allegory for a kind of intellectual illumination or an insight into a higher domain of being, and that those who have ascended to it see something which others do not, as I think the allegory plainly states. (I’m of the view that this is what is represented by the later term ‘metanoia’ which is not found in the Platonic dialogues but which means in this context an intellectual conversion or the breakthrough into a new way of seeing the world.) I suppose one secondary source I could refer to for support is this SEP entry on ’divine illumination’ in Greek philosophy.

My revisionist interpretation of the basic issue revolves around the question of the reality of universals, numbers, and other such intellectual objects (such as logical laws etc). I have the idea that number (for example) does not exist in the sense that phenomenal objects exist, but it is nonetheless real. Hence this is an important ontological category that this applies to, that is constitutive of rational thought, but which is not phenomenally existent. I think this understanding is kind of implicit in Platonic epistemology with the distinction between different levels of knowledge in the Analogy of the Divided Line. Platonic realism developed into Aristotelian realism, which was maintained up until scholastic realism, after which it was overthrown by nominalism and later by scientific empiricism. (This is the subject of the book I mentioned, The Theological Origins of Modernity.)

About the only contemporary representative of those kinds of views is Edward Feser (and also maybe Gerson who we already discussed.) I’m trying to fill in the very many blanks in this account, but to date I haven’t encountered anything which would cause me to think it’s entirely mistaken.

According to wikiquote that statement that you are propagating, as being from Heisenberg, is misattributed.

Fooloso4's reading of Plato generally deprecates the widespread view that the knowledge of the forms corresponds to insight into a higher realm of truth. — Wayfarer

Perhaps the warning not to kill the messenger is apt. How well the widespread view holds up in light of the passages I sighted is up to the reader to decide.

But to disagree would require re-visiting and re-reading many a dusty tome, so I think I'll regard his as one among other possible interpretations. — Wayfarer

I can understand this, I feel that way about some philosophers, but for me Plato is not dusty tomes.
In my opinion, one must learn how to read Plato. Given the topic of this thread I will only say that the dialogues to not present the argument from reason. Certainly they contain reasoned argument, but if they

arrive at a true understanding — Wayfarer

it is an understanding of ourselves and our limits. It is not an understanding of a disembodied rational being. The dialogues are imitations or images of actual human beings known to Plato's first readers. Particular human beings with their various and particular ambitions, desires, and limits. In short, the true turning of the dialogues is not to an imagined realm of unchanging truths, but to the development of self-knowledge.

According to wikiquote that statement that you are propagating, as being from Heisenberg, is misattributed. — wonderer1

OK. I'll delete the quote.

But I wasn't trying to "propagate" anything. I had never heard that quote before. And it doesn't even indicate the point I was trying to make : The quantum pioneers who used concepts from Eastern philosophy, were not trying to "propagate" the religions associated with the Holistic concepts.

Apparently Heisenberg was at least a nominal Christian, not a Hindu or Buddhist. On this forum Holistic ideas are often dismissed as "woo". But, Holism (e.g. entanglement) is a primary distinguishing factor of Quantum physics compared to Classical Newtonian physics. Yet, Newton himself was at least a nominal Christian, who dabbled in Alchemy. Which would be dismissed today as "woo". :smile: