There is no better source of why this is not true than the works of Plato. Several of the dialogues can be cited, but Timaeus, in which Socrates remains mostly silent, presents a clear picture of the inadequacy of the Forms. In this dialogue, much or which is a monologue, Socrates expresses the desire to see the city he creates in the Republic at war. He wants to see the city in action. The story of the city in the Republic is incomplete. It is a city created by intellect (nous) without necessity (ananke), that is, a city without chance and contingency. A city that could never be.

For a more detailed discussion: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12008/shaken-to-the-chora/p1 — Fooloso4

:fire: I very much appreciate this insight. Thanks!

:up:

Connectionism is much closer to where it's at when considering the way human thought really works. Perhaps it is harder for most people to think in connectionist terms though.

Just happened to come back to this. I imagine it's because we have defined what computers can do and we also know that relatively simple cellular automata can do anything a computer can. I think the move to thinking of the mind as (or the result of) a computer is another example of "looking for the keys under the streetlight."

To date, it is unclear that cellular automata, neural networks, or the like can do anything that Universal Turing Machines cannot. But this seems like a replay of the old Meno Paradox. We can't check if these entities can do something novel and possibly related to consciousness until we know what that "thing," is so we can go look for it. .

Gerson has been discussed numerous times here... — Paine

Thanks for the references. I just reread Phaedo last week so I will be curious to have a look at the thread.

I realize that I am not up for rekindling those debates right now. It is summertime and the living is easy. — Paine

Fair enough. :smile:

The problem with Gerson is that he does not distinguish between the different roles Matter (ἡ ὕλη) plays amongst the 'Ur-Platonists' he assembles to oppose the team of 'Materialists' he objects to... — Paine

Okay, that is an interesting difference between Aristotle and Plotinus. I am much more familiar with Aristotle than Plotinus. I found a source which corroborates what you say, and may also relate to what you say about Aristotle and Plotinus' disagreement on the soul in the other thread:

The anti-Aristotelian conclusions [in Ennead II.5] are two. While sensible reality, according to Aristotle, involves continuity of change based on the actualisation of proximate matter, Plotinus breaks this continuity by defining matter only as prime matter which can never be actualised. While Aristotle mentions in De Anima II.5 a certain potentiality in the soul, Plotinus argues that it is rather active power than passive potentiality. — Sui Han, Review

For myself, the many points Plotinus and Aristotle may agree upon are not as interesting as where they clearly do not. — Paine

The article that has already been referenced in this thread is Gerson's "Platonism Versus Naturalism." There he gives this definition of anti-materialism:

Anti-materialism is the view that it is false that the only things that exist are bodies and their properties. Thus, to admit that the surface of a body is obviously not a body is not thereby to deny materialism. The antimaterialist maintains that there are entities that exist that are not bodies and that exist independently of bodies. Thus, for the antimaterialist, the question "Is the soul a body or a property of a body?" is not a question with an obvious answer since it is possible that the answer is no. The further question of how an immaterial soul might be related to a body belongs to the substance of the positive response to [Ur-Platonism], or to one or another version of Platonism. — Lloyd P. Gerson, Platonism Versus Materialism | cf. From Plato to Platonism, 11

Are you then of the opinion that either Aristotle or Plotinus are not "antimaterialists"? That Gerson has not categorized them correctly?

I just reread Phaedo last week so I will be curious to have a look at the thread. — Leontiskos

A couple of years ago I started a thread on Phaedo. When I completed it I compiled my separate posts so that they can be read through without having to read the whole thread. I would be interested in your comments.

1. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1


2. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534860


3. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535343


4. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535924


5. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536573


6. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/537114


7. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/537698


8. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538481


9. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/539501


10. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540733

I very much appreciate this insight. — 180 Proof

And I very much appreciate your appreciation.

I appreciate your efforts to compare the texts.

I think Sui Han's points are Important and will look into his writings.

Thus, for the antimaterialist, the question "Is the soul a body or a property of a body?" — Lloyd P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 11

In the portion I quoted, Plotinus separates 'embodiment' from matter. What is at issue is how to understand properties.

From the OP (based on the C S Lewis form of the argument):

The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes. It is, therefore, an argument against materialist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

And quoted above, from Gerson's paper

The antimaterialist maintains that there are entities that exist that are not bodies and that exist independently of bodies — Lloyd P. Gerson, Platonism Versus Materialism | cf. From Plato to Platonism, 11

The convergence of the two quotations ought to be clear - which is hardly surprising, since Lewis, as a Christian intellectual, no doubt defends a broadly Platonist point of view, considering the incorporation of many elements of Platonism into Christianity.

As we've now re-introduced Gerson, I'll provide a bit more detail from the essay quoted above:

(Gerson defends the) thesis that most of the history of philosophy, especially since the 17th century can be characterized as failed attempts by various Platonists to seek some rapprochement with naturalism and, mostly in the latter half of the 20th century and also now, similarly failed attempts by naturalists to incorporate into their worldviews some element or another of Platonism. I would like to show that what I am calling the elements of Platonism...are interconnected such that it is not possible to embrace one or another of these without embracing them all. In other words, Platonism (or philosophy) and naturalism are contradictory positions. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

The elements of ‘Ur-platonism’, according to Gerson’s hypothesis are: anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-scepticism, summarised below

Anti-materialism rejects the notion that only bodies and their properties exist. It allows for entities beyond bodies, like souls. Anti-mechanism states that materialist explanations are inadequate and proposes non-bodily explanations for material phenomena. Anti-nominalism denies that only individuals exist and allows for sameness in difference (i.e. the role assigned to forms or universals). Anti-relativism opposes the view that truth and goodness are subjective and emphasizes their objective or transcendental determinations. Anti-scepticism asserts that knowledge is possible, countering scepticism's doubt about attainable knowledge. (Refer to reference above for detailed content).

What is at issue is how to understand properties. — Paine

It is in this respect where I proposed the revisionist understanding of the nature of intelligibles (such as forms, numbers, the soul, and so forth.) This is not of my devising, as it is elaborated in an historical source, namely the writings of theological philosopher Scotus Eriugena (as I'll explain). The gist of this argument is that 'the soul' does not exist in the sense that the terms 'entity' and 'exist' are understood within the framework of naturalism. As an illustrative example, numbers and other intelligibles, such as 'the concept of prime', likewise do not exist in the sense that chairs, tables, and the objects of natural science exist. Their existence is purely intelligible, i.e. only perceptible to a rational mind. They are nevertheless real, in that they have the same value for all who can grasp them. As Bertrand Russell says in The World of Universals, 'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' The rational soul (psyche) is what can perceive these ideas but itself is not a cognizable entity. So to make of the soul an entity, as the body is an entity, is an (understandable) error of reification (literally, 'to make a thing out of').

This is from the SEP entry on Scotus Eriugena. (I have taken the liberty of replacing 'to be' with 'to exist' to draw out the point I'm trying to articulate):

Eriugena lists “five ways of interpreting” the manner in which things may be said to exist or not to exist. According to the first mode, things accessible to the senses and the intellect are said to exist, whereas anything which, “through the excellence of its nature”, transcends our faculties are said not to exist. According to this classification, God, because of his transcendence is said not to exist. He is “nothingness through excellence” (nihil per excellentiam). (On this, also see Whalon, God does not Exist).

The second mode of existence and non-existence is seen in the “orders and differences of created natures” whereby, if one level of nature is said to exist, those orders above or below it, are said not to exist:

For an affirmation concerning the lower (order) is a negation concerning the higher, and so too a negation concerning the lower (order) is an affirmation concerning the higher. (Periphyseon, I.444a)

...This mode illustrates Eriugena’s original way of dissolving the traditional Neoplatonic hierarchy of being into a dialectic of affirmation and negation: to assert one level is to deny the others. In other words, a particular level may be affirmed to be real by those on a lower or on the same level, but the one above it is thought not to be real in the same way. — John Scotus Eriugena, Dermot Moran, SEP

This is obviously a rather recondite set of distinctions, but to me it is the only way to make sense of the reality of intelligibles, such as universals, number, and the like, because it restores a dimension of reality or being that has been 'flattened out' in the transition to modernity with its exclusive concentration on material and efficient causation. Consequently, there is no conceptual space for the idea that there are different levels or domains of reality - to us, things either exist or do not exist, they do not exist 'in different ways'.

Thanks for the clarification. That's what I figured--I just wanted to make sure. To be fair, Aristotle's metaphysical account of proximate matter always struck me as a little wobbly, so Plotinus' critique makes some sense.


Yes, Paine pointed me to the same thread. I am a layman, but I do look forward to reading it. :smile:

To date, it is unclear that cellular automata, neural networks, or the like can do anything that Universal Turing Machines cannot. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't mean to suggest that I think neural nets can do things that a Turing machine couldn't do in principle. Remember I was talking about "the way human thought really works".

We don't have thinking based on Turing machines. We have thinking based on neural networks, and understanding the nature of the more analogish sort of information processing that occurs in neural networks is conducive to improving one's understanding of oneself.

For example Peter Tse's book The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation discusses aspects of understanding free will, in light of scientific understanding of the way we think. It's not the sort of free will that many people want to believe in, but there is a lot of pragmatic value in understanding it.

Thank you that's a very succinct and informative summary of the position you've been articulating.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

That's true, but at the same time Gerson is opening up the can of worms within his own discipline and therefore providing a stepping stone for someone to do the work of translating it into the world of modern philosophy. I am fairly certain that this will happen.

I've long been interested in various aspects of scholastic and platonic realism, i.e. the view that universals and abstract objects are real. There's precious little interest in and support for such ideas here, or anywhere, really. But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. But it's a hard thesis to support, and besides, as I say, has very little interest, it's diametrically at odds with the mainstream approach to philosophy. — Wayfarer

In the Catholic world it is just the opposite! That thesis is so prevalent that it is thought to be trite. That line says that the nominalism that was conceived with Duns Scotus and came to maturity with William of Ockham is the crucial error that fueled the loss of realism and set the stage for the modern period. I think there's a lot of truth to it, although there is nuance to be had.

Some of the sources I frequently cite in support... — Wayfarer

Thank you for all the sources! I am especially interested to read the essay by Maritain.

Let me find some time and get back to you with more sources regarding this thesis, including at least one popular adaptation of Gerson.

The current form of the argument from reason was popularised by C S Lewis in 1947, subsequently revised and reformulated after criticism from G.E.M. Anscombe. — Wayfarer

Regarding the OP, I have always found Lewis' argument to be sound. I would be curious to read Anscombe's criticisms beyond the footnote he gives. She is a very competent philosopher.

Consequently, there is no conceptual space for the idea that there are different levels or domains of reality - to us, things either exist or do not exist, they do not exist 'in different ways'. — Wayfarer

This is patently false: objects exist for us in a different way than sensations, thoughts or emotions. Inanimate objects exist for us in a different way than animals. Humans exist for us in a different way than animals. Concepts and numbers exist for us in a different way than concrete objects, and so on.

Concepts and numbers exist for us in a different way than concrete objects, and so on. — Janus

:lol: There is huge controversy over their reality and whether number is invented or discovered and so on. Empiricist philosophers like yourself generally reject the notion that they have any reality apart from as the product of the mind (read 'brain'.)

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York, was initially attracted to Platonism—but has since come to see it as problematic. If something doesn’t have a physical existence, he asks, then what kind of existence could it possibly have? “If one ‘goes Platonic’ with math,” writes Pigliucci, empiricism “goes out the window.” (If the proof of the Pythagorean theorem exists outside of space and time, why not the “golden rule,” or even the divinity of Jesus Christ?) — What is Math?

Why not indeed? (My bolds, and also my point.)

In the Catholic world it is just the opposite! That thesis is so prevalent that it is thought to be trite. — Leontiskos

Which I suspect is the reason for its unpopularity outside that world. Incidentally you'll find a breakdown of Anscombe's criticism of Lewis' argument in Victor Reppert's essay (Reppert authored a book on the argument.)

That line says that the nominalism that was conceived with Duns Scotus and came to maturity with William of Ockham is the crucial error that fueled the loss of realism and set the stage for the modern period. I think there's a lot of truth to it, although there is nuance to be had. — Leontiskos

The role of Duns Scotus and the eclipse of scholastic realism is also central to John Milbank's 'Radical Orthodoxy' as I understand it (see this blog post).

There is huge controversy over their reality and whether number is invented or discovered and so on. Empiricist philosophers like yourself generally reject the notion that they have any reality apart from as the product of the mind (read 'brain'.) — Wayfarer

Firstly, I am not an Empiricist philosopher and secondly, I am not making any claim about any "ultimate" explanation for the existence of anything. Numbers exist for us, trees exist for us, emotions exist for us, sensations exist for us, the world is full of many things which exist, and they all exist for us in different ways, a fact which refutes your claim that different things do not exist in different ways.

Turing machines are material. If they can "reason" without some immaterial force, why can't we?

I'm not saying our reasoning is identical (see Penrose), but what is it about our reasoning that is different in a way that matters in this context? Intention? Well, a Turing machine also seemingly intends to arrive at a conclusion too. There are material forces in it that pushes out a calculation, and maybe that too is true for us?

Yet, we feel that intention. And that's really the actual challenge of materialism; The Hard Problem of Consciousness; why/how do we experience things in a completely material universe?

I am not an Empiricist philosopher… — Janus

Don’t make me go back and copy the hundred thousand times you’ve claimed that we all learn abstract concepts through experience.

If they can "reason" — Ø implies everything

Having to use scare quotes on that context vitiates whatever comes next.

The role of Duns Scotus and the eclipse of scholastic realism is also central to John Milbank's 'Radical Orthodoxy' as I understand it... — Wayfarer

Yes, Milbank takes the thesis into new frontiers. My sense is that almost all Medievalists accept the thesis with qualifications, and modern philosophers don't know the medieval period well enough to consider the thesis. When Milbank brings this up in those circles he is often met with blank stares rather than incredulity. Rowan Williams is another outlier who supports the thesis. And most any Thomist philosopher will support it to one degree or another, because the shift away from Aquinas' form of realism in the late middle ages is undeniable.

Incidentally you'll find a breakdown of Anscombe's criticism of Lewis' argument in Victor Reppert's essay (Reppert authored a book on the argument.) — Wayfarer

Great, thank you!

Having to use scare quotes on that context vitiates whatever comes next. — Wayfarer

No, because what I wrote next only agrees with the quotation marks. Turing machines might not reason the way we do; thus, whatever their equivalent is, I call it "reason".

Don’t make me go back and copy the hundred thousand times you’ve claimed that we all learn abstract concepts through experience. — Wayfarer

We do learn abstract concepts via experience; how else would we learn them, if we are not born with them? Anyway, that is a red herring: why don't you try to deal with the fact that your argument that things all exist for us in the same way is refuted, and actually attempt to engage in some discussion, rather than trying to deflect via dismissal by labelling?

your argument that things all exist for us in the same way — Janus

That's about the opposite of what I stated.

That's about the opposite of what I stated. — Wayfarer

Right, what I should have said is "your argument that there is no conceptual space for the idea that things exist for us in different ways", that we moderns generally think that different things exist in the same way. That is a strawman of the dominant view I would say.

:up:

In other words, Platonism (or philosophy) and naturalism are contradictory positions.
— Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism — Wayfarer

What's referred to here as "naturalism" I think is more cogently conceived of as Pre-Platonism (e.g. Milesian, Ionian & Eleatic cosmologies) from which subsequent "Platonism" is abstracted (and then, IMHO, reified (fallaciously) into transcendent "forms" "categories" "essences" "emanations" "universals" "patterns" etc).

Anyway, Wayf, reviews of Gerson's book are intriguing so I'll pick it up (unless @Fooloso4's arguments / objections (here or elsewhere) persuade me not to bother).

One of those straws is the belief that the parable of the cave does indeed present an allegory for a kind of intellectual illumination or an insight into a higher domain of being, and that those who have ascended to it see something which others do not, as I think the allegory plainly states. (I’m of the view that this is what is represented by the later term ‘metanoia’ which is not found in the Platonic dialogues but which means in this context an intellectual conversion or the breakthrough into a new way of seeing the world.) I suppose one secondary source I could refer to for support is this SEP entry on ’divine illumination’ in Greek philosophy. — Wayfarer

The breakthrough referred to here, intellectual conversion, or illumination, is to apprehend the priority of conceptions and ideas. Ideas are first in the mind of the individual, as what are present to the mind. This is Kant's starting point in the Critique of Pure Reason, the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. But for Plato the priority is not just a logical priority, but also a temporal priority as well. He sees ideas as causal through the reality of "the good". This way of looking at things is outlined in The Symposium, when the student of love grasps the beauty of human artefacts and institutions, and learns of a Beauty which transcends the beauty of any particular artefact.

So the cave allegory expresses this causal relationship of temporal priority. What the people in the cave see, are shadows on the wall, and the shadows are representative of artificial material objects. Behind the scenes, what few people properly relate to, and understand, is that human ideas, along with ambition, desire, intention or good, are the cause of these artificial products. Human intention and ambition is represented as the fire, and we are directed to apprehend the material products as simple representations of the human ideas, the shadows which come into being through the means of the fire.

That is the first stage of the philosopher's illumination, and the important point is that the ideas, along with the intention or good (the fire), are temporally prior to the material products as the cause of them. This temporal priority is what validates Plato's claim of a higher degree of reality to the intelligible realm (what's inside the mind), as the artificial material products are simply a copy or reflection of what's inside the mind. Aristotle adopts this position, and assigns actuality to form.

The second stage of the illumination is when the philosopher exits the cave. Then the philosopher sees the entirety of the natural world under this conceptual structure of temporal priority. All material objects are seen as reflections of the Form which produces them. The human good (the fire) is replaced by the natural good (the sun) and the philosopher sees all natural material objects illuminated by the sun, as reflections of the Forms which produce them. The Forms are temporally prior to the material objects as the cause of their existence, and this priority is also a logical priority as expressed in Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's Metaphysics as the cosmological argument.

The logical necessity of the priority of the Forms is the result of assigning actuality to form, and this is validated by the concept of final cause, the causal force of human ideas, and the existence of artificial objects. You'll notice that Plotinus' proposition of "the One" as prior to all, fails in logical necessity because "the One" is assigned the character of unlimited potential. So "the One" as Plotinus' first principle, lacks in the required actuality to be causal. Therefore it lacks the logical force required as a first principle.

I understand you guys are talking about Plato, but I wanted to inject this in the interest of conformity with the textual record.

This is Kant's starting point (….) the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

Priority of what’s in the mind…..yes; that the priority of what’s in the mind is phenomena……no.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories.

Ideas, remaining with Kant, have priority in the mind regarding that which is not as yet, or may never be, phenomena.

Unless I misunderstood, in which case…..never mind.

the parable of the cave — Wayfarer

The irony here is that although with the image of the cave Plato is warning against the persuasive power of images he does so using images. And this is often taken to be not an image but the truth itself.

The cave story is, as Socrates says when telling it:

... an image of our nature in its education and want of education ... (Republic 514a)

The escape from the cave is an escape from the bonds of our education, an escape from the images of the truth. Replacing an image with another image, one of a transcendent realm of Forms, is not to escape the cave, but to remain bound within it. The image makers, the educators, that is, the poets, are not replaced by all knowing truth telling philosophers, but by the image maker Socrates.

In the Apology Socrates denies having knowledge of "anything very much or great and good or beautiful" (21d). And yet in the Republic he tells this story of transcendent knowledge, a knowledge he does not possess. In the Phaedrus he says he has an 'erotic art' (257a). And in the Symposium he claims to know nothing except things about eros (177d). It is this knowledge of eros or desire that informs his story of transcendence. The philosopher desires, but does not possess, transcendent knowledge.

The education of the philosopher living in the city, which is to say, the cave, is an education is how to educate those he must educate if there is to be any possibility of justice for the philosopher. Socrates does so by imitating the theologians, those who claim to have knowledge of divine things. But in doing so he replaces the willful capriciousness of the gods with the Forms.

Yes, it has always seemed to me that the 'cave' metaphor in Plato is better read as the contrast between unthinking acceptance of the shadows on the wall as being the Real, and the philosophical attitude of questioning the reality of those shadows, and not as a contrast between ignorance and enlightenment; a matter of coming to know, not the truth, but that the truth you thought you knew is not the truth; Socrates' wisdom of knowing that you do not know.

The escape from the cave is an escape from the bonds of our education, an escape from the images of the truth. Replacing an image with another image, one of a transcendent realm of Forms, is not to escape the cave, but to remain bound within it. — Fooloso4

Your interpretation is at odds with the text, though, and every interpretation of the meaning of the Allegory of the Cave that I've read. In the allegory 'prisoners' represent those ignorant of the forms:

For in the first place, do you think such people [i.e. the prisoners in the cave] would ever have seen anything of themselves, or one another, apart from the shadows cast by the fire onto the cave wall in front of them? — Republic VII

So the education in question, is the education necessary to overcome their attachment to the illusory domain and to perceive the real (i.e. be closer to 'what is'):

“Now,” I said, “consider what liberation from their bonds, and cure of their ignorance, would be like for them, if it happened naturally in the following way. Suppose one of them were released, and suddenly compelled to stand up, crane his neck, walk, and look up towards the light. Would he not be pained by all this, and on account of the brightness be unable to see the objects whose shadows he previously beheld? And if someone were to tell him that he beheld foolishness before, but now he sees more truly, since he is much closer to ‘what is’, and is turned towards things which partake of more being, what do you think he would say? Moreover, if they showed him each of the passing objects and forced him to answer the question ‘what is this?’, do you not think he would be perplexed, and would believe that what he saw before was truer than what he is now being shown?”

What do you think it means to 'partake of more being'?

The philosopher desires, but does not possess, transcendent knowledge. — Fooloso4

Then what to make of all this? First there is the passage where the philosopher (I presume it's a philosopher) returns to the Cave, but his eyes are now unaccustomed to the gloom:

Now, suppose that he had to compete once more with those perpetual prisoners in recognising these shadows, while his eyesight was still poor, before his eyes had adjusted. Since it would take some time to become accustomed to the dark, would he not become a figure of fun? Would they not say that he went up, but came back down with his eyes ruined, and that it is not worth even trying to go upwards? And if they could somehow get their hands on and kill a person who was trying to free people and lead them upwards, would they not do just that?

“Definitely,” he said.

“Then, dear Glaucon,” I said, “you should connect this image, in its entirety, with what we were saying before.[2]Compare the realm revealed by sight to the prison house, and the firelight within it to the power of our sun. And if you suggest that the upward journey, and seeing the objects of the upper world, is the ascent of the soul to the realm known by reason, you will not be misreading my intention, since that is what you wanted to hear. God knows whether it happens to be true, but in any case this is how it all seems to me. When it comes to knowledge, the form of the good is seen last, and is seen only through effort. Once seen, it is reckoned to be the actual cause of all that is beautiful and right in everything, bringing to birth light, and the lord of light, in the visible realm, and providing truth and reason in the realm known by reason, where it is lord. Anyone who is to act intelligently, either in private or in public, must have had sight of this.”

“I also hold the same views that you hold,” he said, “after my own fashion, anyway.”

“Come on then,” I said, “and agree with me about something else. Do not be surprised that those who have attained these heights have no desire for involvement in human affairs. Their souls, rather, are constantly hastening to commune with the upper realm. For I presume that is what is likely to happen, if this really does accord with the image we described earlier.”

Bolds added. I think 'the realm known by reason' makes the meaning perfectly clear, and that as a whole that the allegory shows that, on the whole, prisoners of the cave (the hoi polloi) do not inhabit that realm, but require a 'painful education' in order to reach it.

Ideas are first in the mind of the individual, as what are present to the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' ~ Bertrand Russell

I meant my remark about properties to apply specifically to Plotinus assigning a different role to 'matter', as potential, from what Aristotle did. For Plotinus, the hylomorphism that makes each creature different from another, is said to be an illusion, a trick of the light. Once a body takes a determinate shape, it is no longer 'material' as an expression of potential. With 'matter' no longer having a portion of being, the shared life of being a soul like all the other forms of life, where our need for nutrition or use of perception and movement is the same as plants and other animals, is overruled by an idea of individual souls.

We shall have to introduce among the number of beings another principle, the soul. The soul is a principle of no little importance. She is the force that binds all things together. Unlike the other things she is not born of some seed but is a primary cause. When she is outside the body, she remains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent even of the cause which administers the world. As soon as she has descended into a body, she is no longer fully independent, for she then forms part of an order with other things. She yields in part to the influence of the accidental circumstances into which she fell, but also dominates and directs them according to her wishes. This power of domination depends on the degree of her excellence. When she yields to temperaments of the body, she is necessarily subjected to desire or anger, is discouraged in poverty, is proud in prosperity, and is tyrannical in the exercise of power. But when she resists all these evil tendencies and her nature is a good one, she changes her surroundings more than she is changed by them. Then she alters some things, while she tolerates others without herself falling into vice. — ibid. III, 1, 8

While I admire this passage for bringing forth the importance of being an individual human, it does not reflect the serious consideration by Plato and Aristotle to recognize the indeterminate events and accidents that studying a natural world require of us.

Thank you :pray:

Unlike the other things she is not born of some seed but is a primary cause. When she is outside the body, she remains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent even of the cause which administers the world. — ibid. III, 1, 8

You can definitely see echoes of this in Christian theology, in which each soul is created by God (i.e. 'not born of some seed').