A number of very deep questions presented here!

First, with respect to enactivism and the whole 'embodied cognition' school. Let's not forget that one of the seminal books in this field, The Embodied Mind, by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (first published 1991, revised edition 2015) drew considerably on Buddhist principles as well as, and complementary to, the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau Ponty. Indeed, Varela was one of the founders of the Mind-Life Institute of which the Dalai Lama is Patron, and even took a form of lay ordination prior to his untimely death from hepatitis C. Varela's interest in Buddhism stemmed from his contacts with the (somewhat maverick) Buddhist lama Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche. Evan Thompson also draws on Buddhist philosophy (notwithstanding his recent publication Why I am Not a Buddhist), and Eleanor Rosch was a cog. psychologist with an interest in Buddhist psychology. So I don't see enactivism and embodied cognition as endorsing any form of physicalism, but it's also not part of the other side of the dichotomy, viz, idealism. They're seeking to subvert the whole 'mind-body' divide which has bedevilled Western philosophy especially since Descartes.

(I have more to say on the other points you've raised but will be away for a couple of hours.)

Interesting material. I have read a little George Lakoff who also talks about embodied cognition. It certainly resonates with me.

“...there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false.”

― George Lakoff, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought

that double negative in the first few words is not not confusing.....

From the snippets of Lakoff and Johnson that I've read, I think they (as distinct from the others mentioned above) are quite wedded to physicalism, although I'd have to read more than snippets to really get a feel for their work.

First off, thanks for starting the thread.

For clarity, this portion of what the OP quotes has the following link in the original:

Although debatable, these interpretations for example corroborate the construal of Nirvana as “transcendent consciousness” or, else worded, as a transcendent awareness devoid of I-ness – one that can hence be inferred as being beyond time, space, and the co-occurrence of observer, observing, and observed. — javra

First, with respect to enactivism and the whole 'embodied cognition' school. Let's not forget that [...] — Wayfarer

I’ve read Thompson’s Mind in Life with considerable interest. I’m of course also familiar with Varela’s and Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis. And, while I’m not steeped in the details, I am likewise aware of the Mind & Life Institute. So I know that Buddhism inspired considerable aspects of at least certain enactivits’ positions in respect to cognition.

Enactivism and the closely related embodied cognition are vast topics in their own right. And they can be expressed as having presented somewhat of a shock to mainstream materialism. As for myself, I respect much, but not all, that I’ve read regarding these two positions. Notwithstanding, the pivotal metaphysical divide I presented in the OP so far appears to me to remain.

Both enactivism and embodied cognition as these are currently known – neither of which is on its own a comprehensive metaphysical ontology – will tend to hold views that more or less correspond to the central tenets of physicalism. For one example, here, the cessation of the living body is inferred to signify the (permanent) cessation of its respective cognition - such that it ends in absolute nonbeing, or nihility. Hence, for example, the reincarnation of awareness is implicitly deemed to be untrue on grounds that each unique mind is bound to its respectively unique body.

In contrast, in the worldview of idealism, the possibility of personal consciousness that transcends into a literally egoless awareness remains viable. And, for this to occur, there logically must then be a continuation of being subsequent to the death of one's body. Not only this, but there then must logically be a continuation of being after one's literal death of ego wherein I-ness completely vanishes.

To be clear, my own view is that one can, at least in principle, have an objective-world-realism explained by an idealist metaphysics which, thereby, supports enactivism and embodied cognition for corporeal beings such as ourselves while, simultaneously, allowing for soteriological ends.

However, were one to start with the affirmation that consciousness can in principle only be embodied and, thus, in a dualistic relation to other, then the soteriological ends of Hinduist Moksha and Buddhist Nirvana (together with the metaphysics on which these concepts are founded) so far seem to me to become logically negated.

(I have more to say on the other points you've raised but will be away for a couple of hours.) — Wayfarer

There’s of course no rush. I look forward to your views.

Both enactivism and embodied cognition as these are currently known – neither of which is on its own a comprehensive metaphysical ontology – will tend to hold views that more or less correspond to the central tenets of physicalism. — javra

I really don't know if that's true of The Embodied Mind book, in particular. That book, as mentioned, draws mainly from phenomenology and also Buddhist psychology, which is not physicalist in orientation. One idea is that the brain simulates or recreates sensory and motor experiences when engaging in cognitive tasks. For instance, when understanding language, we may simulate the associated sensorimotor experiences (gestures etc) to comprehend the meaning better. It is combined with the enactivism that emphasizes the active role of the agent in shaping cognition. Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. Obviously its main focus is not on eschatology or other such religious concerns, but I wouldn't describe it as physicalist in orientation either.

if consciousness can in principle only occur in a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness (as the quote above seems to affirm), and it thereby cannot occur in a purely nondual form as just described, then it so far seems to me the notion of Moksha in Hindu philosophy could only be concluded utter fallacy. — javra

I don't consider myself learned in any depth in Eastern philosophy, but I think the response of one who was adept in those traditions would be to reject the claim that Mokṣa is a notion or a concept in the first place. In both Vedic and Buddhist traditions, the aim is to realise a state of non-conceptual wisdom (Jñāna or Prajna) arising from insight into the psychological causes of distress and dissatisatisfaction. As such, it's not a conceptual construction in the sense that theories or hypotheses generally are. The term 'Upaniṣads' is derived from 'sitting near to' or 'sitting close', indicating that these texts were always conveyed in a guru-chela relationship. Seeing a guru is a 'darshan' meaning something like 'an audience' in which the living presence of the guru is a major factor in imparting the sought-after wisdom. I think the gist is, the guru conveys a wholly different way of being or orientation which is impossible to convey in conceptual terminology, or at least not without some degree of immersion in the tradition. That's not much of a rebuttal, but I think it's as close as I can make it at this point.

In contrast, in the worldview of idealism, the possibility of personal consciousness that transcends into a literally egoless awareness remains viable. — javra

The condition of 'self-and-other', or awareness of oneself as a separate being, is another deep issue. In terms of philosophy of religion, it symbolises 'the plight of existence', so to speak. Whatever exists is by definition finite and separate - the 'ex-' in 'exists' is the same prefix in 'external' and 'exile'. I think there is a sense in all the ancient philosophies that to exist at all is to have 'fallen' into a state characterised by death and decay. The first noble truth of Buddhism is that existence is dukkha - distressing, unsatisfying. From a scrapbook entry 'Existence refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound. Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from, yet also dependent upon. In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite. Therefore existence is estrangement." Hence the theme of 'union' or 'returning' which is universal in all of the perennial traditions, but again, something that escapes easy (or any!) conceptualisation.

There are millenia of debates about whether this entails some sense of continuity life to life, or whether union with or return to the One amounts to complete cessation of any sense of oneself. For example, Christian theology, while it drew on many elements from neoplatonism, rejected Plotinus' depiction of union with the One as being impersonalistic, whereas, supposedly, in theosis according to Christian doctrine, the soul continues (presumably the meaning of Heaven). The Buddhist perspective is that the desire for continued existence is itself decried as 'eternalism' - a subtle form of craving - but then, you can't help but notice that Buddhist cultures, such as Tibet, have a firm belief in the reincarnated lamas, which seems to fly in the face of that dogma. It's a perplexing issue. (There is a doctrinal rationale for that, but it would take us even further afield.)

(Interestingly, in discussions with Apokrisis, the term 'epistemic split (or cut)' has come up. For instance, Howard Pattee in discussing origin-of-life, observes that: 'Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object. Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'. (Notice the resonance with embodied cognition, not a coincidence.) But you also find explicit awareness of the 'self-other' duality in non-dualist philosophy, where it is understood as the root of the anxiety that pervades individual existence. Of course, the contexts of the two discussions are worlds apart, but I feel that they're both touching on the same deep issue.)

Interesting thread. Is consciousness cognition? Or is cognition something one might be conscious of. Or can both be true at once, such that consciousness is recursively defined as consciousness of consciousness?

The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science ...

http://www.siese.org/modulos/biblioteca/b/G-Spencer-Brown-Laws-of-Form.pdf

This relates to Bateson's idea of a difference that makes a difference, and also to symmetry and symmetry -breaking. It is a mathematician's version of Genesis, and necessarily, before the beginning, before 'a universe comes into being' there must already be a space and a severing or breaking thereof.

Suppose that the space is consciousness; it is contentless, a blank page. But saying as much, I have already severed the space into consciousness and its contents.

'Wordless' is a word that is self-negating. Best not talk about it, but at the same time one is always talking about what is beyond words unless one is disappearing entirely up one's own arse. "The tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal tao."

The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart...
http://www.siese.org/modulos/biblioteca/b/G-Spencer-Brown-Laws-of-Form.pdf — unenlightened

As you note later in this post, this is the essence of how Lao Tzu saw creation and the ground of being. Here are a couple of verses from Ellen Marie Chen's translation of the Tao Te Ching:

Verse 1

Tao that can be spoken of,
Is not the Everlasting Tao.
Name that can be named,
Is not the Everlasting name.
Nameless, the origin of heaven and earth;
Named, the mother of ten thousand things.

Verse 40

Returning (fan) is the movement of Tao.
Weak is the functioning of Tao.
Ten thousand things under heaven are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu - Ellen Marie Chen translation

The idea that naming brings the world into existence is the foundation of my metaphysics. What that implies for human psychology, sociology, and ethics; not to mention science; is profound.

Alva Noë argues against the view that consciousness is solely a product of the brain's activity. He contends that the traditional approach of trying to understand consciousness by studying neural processes within the brain is insufficient and ultimately misleading. Noë proposes that consciousness is not something that happens exclusively inside the brain but emerges through dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and the external world. As such he is aligned with enactivism or embodied cognition which explores how our perception and experience of the world are shaped by our embodiment and interaction with our surroundings. — Wayfarer

At the risk of starting an argument where you don't intend one, do you think there is anyone on the more materialist side of the consciousness issue who doesn't believe "consciousness is not something that happens exclusively inside the brain but emerges through dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and the external world." I certainly believe that.

I really don't know if that's true of The Embodied Mind book, in particular. That book, as mentioned, draws mainly from phenomenology and also Buddhist psychology, which is not physicalist in orientation. — Wayfarer

Ah, in terms of that one particular book, I have not yet read it, and I too am uncertain. In fact, rather, given its primary interests, like I believe you are, I’m fairly confident that nothing within this particular book contradicts the ontological tenets which would allow for Moksha to occur in principle. As I previously suggested, it is possible to maintain an embodied understanding of consciousness from within an idealist worldview wherein an ontically real soteriological end occurs (the Real, as some would call it). As such, one could then maintain an embodied cognition approach that is utterly neutral to ontological commitments. And my current hunch is that this applies to Varela et al.’s The Embodied Mind.

One idea is that the brain simulates or recreates sensory and motor experiences when engaging in cognitive tasks. For instance, when understanding language, we may simulate the associated sensorimotor experiences (gestures etc) to comprehend the meaning better. It is combined with the enactivism that emphasizes the active role of the agent in shaping cognition. Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. Obviously its main focus is not on eschatology or other such religious concerns, but I wouldn't describe it as physicalist in orientation either. — Wayfarer

Well said. However, I was addressing embodied cognition as they are TMK currently known within popular philosophical debate. Which, whether pro or contra these stances, seems to me to most always take for granted that cognition can only occur within a physical body (that interacts with other). I’m addressing the (it seems to me) implicitly given difference between “the occurrence of cognition can be thus embodied in a physical body” and “the occurrence of cognition must be thus embodied in a physical body”. When the latter “must” is implicitly employed, then all soteriological ends become logically nullified.

That said, in having thought about it some more, maybe this is me reading too much into the current literature I’ve been exposed to? I can’t conclusively evidence what I currently believe to be true regarding the mainstream philosophical understanding of embodied cognition. Yet, I so far have not encountered evidence to contradict that this is the typical way in which embodied cognition is currently understood.

I don't consider myself learned in any depth in Eastern philosophy, but I think the response of one who was adept in those traditions would be to reject the claim that Mokṣa is a notion or a concept in the first place. — Wayfarer

Yes, I can understand that, yet this at the same time reminds me of the saying “the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao”: To speak of X is to necessarily have a conceptual understanding of X. A conceptual understanding will itself be other relative to that which understands it, and thereby necessitate a duality between I-ness (the personal act of understanding) and non-I-ness (that which is understood in conceptual form). So the Moksha which is addressed in speech cannot be the eternally real state of Moksha which, necessarily, is nonconceptual (hence, devoid of any duality between a conceiver and that conceived).

From my reading there is a distinction made between “having gained an awareness/understanding of Moksha (as ultimate reality and soteriological end) – else, an awareness of Nirvana” and “having actualized the state of being which is Moksha – else, Nirvana – wherein all ego vanishes; i.e., having actualized the soteriological end itself). In Buddhist terms, the first is “Nirvana-with-remainder” and the second is “Nirvana-without-remainder”.

So then, even the Buddha while alive had then only obtained "Nirvana with remainder" and not "Nirvana without remainder". As such the soteriological end of "Nirvana without remainder" was yet other in respect to the living Buddha. As such, the latter could then have only been a concept, or idea, that represented the nonconceptual actuality which is specified by "Nirvana without remainder".

This appears to me to be no different than contrasting the reality of a physical rock and the concept, or idea, of a rock; only that when it comes to Moksha and Nirvana, the ontic reality addressed, instead of being physical, is among other things beyond space (e.g. any sort of distance between I-ness and other - including that applicable to what some term "cognitive spaces") and time (e.g. any before and after - including that applicable to, for one example, thoughts). So, if a soteriological end is ontically real (rather than being only conceptually real), than among the differences between its reality and that of a physical rock is that the former cannot be perceived to be real - but can only be understood to be real, this to varying extents.

[...] Therefore existence is estrangement." Hence the theme of 'union' or 'returning' which is universal in all of the perennial traditions, but again, something that escapes easy (or any!) conceptualisation. — Wayfarer

I'm in agreement. Of note, the themes of "union" and "returning" can only be coherently aligned to this state of perfectly nondual being, in one way or another, itself being a soteriological end As such, the state of perfectly nondual being is then a teleological determinant, or teleological cause, but cannot - at least by this - be interpreted as an efficient cause of where we are. In other words, this state of being is an ultimate end, and not an ultimate beginning.

There are millenia of debates about whether this entails some sense of continuity life to life, or whether union with or return to the One amounts to complete cessation of any sense of oneself. — Wayfarer

Depending on what one means by "life", I don't yet understand why the two could not both be true - were the soteriological end to be real. (Not life in the sense of biology but life in the sense of "He's dead inside" or "He's never been more alive" - such that, in this latter sense of the term, the One would be both the cessation of any sense of oneness (what is to be expected of an absolutely infinite being) as well as a state of absolute, or perfectly complete or whole, or even a state of perfectly wholesome life. The Good in Platonic terms).

For instance, Howard Pattee in discussing origin-of-life, observes that: 'Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object. Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'. (Notice the resonance with embodied cognition, not a coincidence.) But you also find explicit awareness of the 'self-other' duality in non-dualist philosophy, where it is understood as the root of the anxiety that pervades individual existence. Of course, the contexts of the two discussions are worlds apart, but I feel that they're both touching on the same deep issue. — Wayfarer

I fully agree. In my view, any cogent biosemiotics will hold the duality between I-ness / self and non-I-ness / other as the most essential epistemic cut imaginable. With all other epistemic cuts being extrapolated from the reality of this one.

Maybe this is neither here nor there for this discussion, but as to Umwelts, I find it beneficial to distinguish between intra-real Umwelts (those each individual forms for themselves), inter-real Umwelts (those shared by two or more agents; e.g., a cultural worldview or, more biologically speaking, the genetically inherited aspects of cognition pertaining to an individual species (e.g., grass is green to us humans but not some other species of animal), and the equi-real Umwelt, which can only be singular (that Umwelt which is equally applicable to all coexistent agents in the cosmos). The equi-reality I here address becomes very difficult to explain in a constructionist-like manner - it certainly wouldn't be constructed by individuals but, instead, here laconically expressed, in large part by the unconscious processes of all coexisting beings which, as construct, then affects all agents in equal manners. All the same, devoid of the concept of equi-reality (a reality that is equally applicable to all and which is thereby in this sense objective) I would have very little understanding of how the following works as regards the total world (the same which the empirical sciences study):

The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'.

Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. — Wayfarer

I struggle with this.

On the one hand, there's a story that says, here's an organism and here's its environment, and here's how the organism is or isn't well adapted to that environment, and here's how evolution takes hold to shape future generations of that organism.

It's just that we learn two things from biology and psychology (and evolution back of both of them). First, that the environment is obviously not uninterpreted for the organism: it's food and shelter and threat and opportunity and all those things that are meaningful to its career as a living organism and a reproducer. Second, we're in the same boat as scientists (and philosophers), that we know we're dealing with a reality we construct, that reality so-called can only be our predictive model.

But that's a bit of a knot, because we lever ourselves up to the position of recognizing reality as constructed by means of a theory that's more naturally taken as treating reality as this objective, mind-independent milieu we interact with. So then what becomes of that theory? Not just evolution, but even our conception of organism here, environment there.

@apokrisis has an answer to that, and maybe you have to go in for a great totalizing theory to handle this problem.

For the moment, while I try to adjust my worldview, I'm just allowing that there's a contradiction if you look at it from a non-pragmatist point-of-view, and I remind myself not to care that there's a contradiction.

And it's also why I have so little sympathy for your approach which places such heavy emphasis on ontological issues: is physicalism true? what sort of being do numbers and other abstract objects have? all that stuff. I've come around to the view that all we're talking about -- with organisms and with science -- is pragmatic assumptions, working hypotheses, and the true nature of things is not on offer. Naturalism, as I conceive it, is a matter of how we learn and how we investigate, not a claim about what kinds of things are in the world, as if we have some other way of checking -- because rational argument is also not a way of checking.

I'll post this lovely quote from Grice once again (fourth time I think) but this time to point out the word work:

My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all…. To fangle a new ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of entia realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. — Paul Grice

There's not some other test for the existence of entities besides, do they work? That's the pragmatist spirit and the scientific spirit, as I understand them. Everything is subject to revision, and ontology is at best bookkeeping for the current state of theory. (Quine thought the distinction important, and it might be for certain purposes, but it's not inherently important.) And theory, like life, is inherently prospective not retrospective, which means it is understood that theory will evolve.

Interesting thread. Is consciousness cognition? Or is cognition something one might be conscious of. Or can both be true at once, such that consciousness is recursively defined as consciousness of consciousness? — unenlightened

Aye, though question - with the meaning intended to these quoted words being crucial to any proper answer. All the same, I so far see both as true at once but in different ways. We can cognize that which is in some way other than us (as that which cognizes): these can include percepts as well as concepts.

Yet at the same time we can be cognizant of ourselves as that which cognizes other. Here, the innumerable examples can includes one's own state of being as that which cognizes other as taking the form of being either happy or sad, of being either confident or unsure, of being either interested or bored, and so forth. The latter does not in any way stand apart from us as that which cognizes other (not in lived experience, not unless this lived experience is turned into concepts of self that one then analyzes). So, as to, for example, being certain as that which cognizes X, the experienced certainty and the "cognizer" which so experiences one's own certainty will in that one instant or more be in a perfectly non-dual relation to each other; will in that instant be the same exact thing or process (or both, or neither).

Tying this with the thread's main theme, were a literally egoless consciousness possible to actualize in principle, such would then be perfectly devoid of otherness - but there is no cogent reason to then affirm that it would also be devoid of its "auto"-awareness regarding its own, here unperturbed, state of being. I interpret this to then be in-line with the often told description of Moksha or Nirvana as being pure bliss.

Yes, I can understand that, yet this at the same time reminds me of the saying “the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao”: To speak of X is to necessarily have a conceptual understanding of X. A conceptual understanding will itself be other relative to that which understands it, and thereby necessitate a duality between I-ness (the personal act of understanding) and non-I-ness (that which is understood in conceptual form). — javra

I don't think this is an argument against anything you are saying. I guess it's just an observation. I don't know much Buddhism, but in Taoism, it seems to me there is much less antagonism between the Tao and the 10,000 things than there is between the I-ness and non-I-ness you are discussing. There's a cycle - Tao to multiplicity of things and back to Tao again - continuously and continually taking place. Everything is always both. The idea of illusion doesn't really come into it.

the themes of "union" and "returning" can only be coherently aligned to this state of perfectly nondual being, in one way or another, itself being a soteriological end As such, the state of perfectly nondual being is then a teleological determinant, — javra

Again, in my understanding of Taoism, the Tao and the multiplicity of the world are recognized as continually cycling, returning. Neither causes the other. The Tao is not better or more important than the 10,000 things. What's important is our awareness of the cycle.

Again, in my understanding of Taoism, the Tao and the multiplicity of the world are recognized as continually cycling, returning. Neither causes the other. — T Clark

I acknowledge your interpretation of the Tao. Thank you for it. I'll point out that there are multiple interpretations of the Tao.

For instance:

A central tenet in most varieties of religious Taoism is that the Tao is ever-present, but must be manifested, cultivated, and/or perfected in order to be realized. It is the source of the Universe, and the seed of its primordial purity resides in all things. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tao#Diversity_of_views

Here the Tao (from which yin and yang emanate and, thereby, from which the multiplicity of the world emanates) "is to be manifested, cultivated, and/or perfected". The "primordial purity" of the Tao is then a priori to (thought not necessarily an efficient cause of) the mutiplicity of the world which the Tao's yin and yang brings about. Realizing this primordial purity via cultivation of the Tao, then, would in this case be a telos and, thereby, a teleological determinant of being by other words.

But again, there are multiple interpretations of the Tao.

I'll point out that there are multiple interpretations of the Tao. — javra

Sure, although my understanding is a pretty mainstream one and I think my observation was valid. It goes back directly to the Tao Te Ching and Chuang Tzu, the founding documents of Taoism. There is a generally recognized difference between philosophical Taoism, which I am referring to, and religious Taoism, which I know very little about.

:ok:

On the one hand, there's a story that says, here's an organism and here's its environment, and here's how the organism is or isn't well adapted to that environment, and here's how evolution takes hold to shape future generations of that organism. — Srap Tasmaner

Which is scientific realism. It assumes that the world is as it is, absent any or all observers or beings. That is an empirical fact, as science attests. But what it doesn't see is the role of the mind in creating the context within which empiricism itself is meaningful. And as the mind itself is never amongst the objects of cognition, then realism carries on as if it's presence doesn't really matter, or is a recent arrival in an otherwise mindless world which would be just the same in its absence. (This is where the recent book, Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter, is invaluable - not a philosophy book, as such, drawn mostly from neuro- and cognitive science.)

also why I have so little sympathy for your approach which places such heavy emphasis on ontological issues: is physicalism true? — Srap Tasmaner

Having put a lot of weight on the fact that it is true, to question it is irksome. For our culture, the whole question is done and dusted, it's signed, sealed and delivered, in a locked box. Please don't open it again.

do you think there is anyone on the more materialist side of the consciousness issue who doesn't believe.... — T Clark

I think many do now, mainly as a result of just the kinds of sources we've been discussing, but that is an indication of how the times are a'changing.

The idea that naming brings the world into existence — T Clark

I agree, but would prefer the subtly different 'brings the world into being'. I suggest that is why we are designated as such. It's not as if, absent beings, the universes ceases to exist, but that such an existence as it has is unintelligible and meaningless.

Which is scientific realism. — Wayfarer

Is it? I thought that was the Quinean view, as distinct from instrumentalism. No matter.

But what it doesn't see is the role of the mind in creating the context within which empiricism itself is meaningful. — Wayfarer

Which I remember being the exact point of my post. Why does it sound like you're pointing this out to me? And keep in mind, I learned this from science.

And as the mind itself is never amongst the objects of cognition — Wayfarer

And here's where we disagree, but I won't spoil your thread rehashing that.

I agree, but would prefer the subtly different 'brings the world into being'. — Wayfarer

The two terms are generally used interchangeably, although I acknowledge there is a bit of a difference in feel. Different translations of the Tao Te Ching use one, the other, or both words. I like using both. The Tao Te Ching is full of subtly different uses of language, so there is room for ambiguous usage.

It's not as if, absent beings, the universes ceases to exist, but that such an existence as it has is unintelligible and meaningless. — Wayfarer

Such an existence is not unintelligible, but is rather intelligible, but yet to be understood, meaningful although the meaning is yet to be discovered, just as unseen worlds are visible, but yet to be seen.

This is a subtle, but most important distinction. Our understanding of the fossil record speaks to this; those traces were always intelligible and meaningful, just waiting to be discovered by an intelligent being.

keep in mind, I learned this from science. — Srap Tasmaner

But that seems in conflict with the

conception of organism here, environment there. — Srap Tasmaner

I’ll come back to that when I have time.

Such an existence is not unintelligible, but is rather intelligible, but yet to be understood, meaningful although the meaning is yet to be discovered, just as unseen worlds are visible, but yet to be seen. — Janus

An empirical fact - but there’s always an implicit first-person perspective in such conjectures.

The Tao Te Ching is full of subtly different uses of language, — T Clark

You mean translations of the Tao. It is notable that no two translations into English are the same.

You mean translations of the Tao. It is notable that no two translations into English are the same. — Wayfarer

No, that’s not what I meant.

An empirical fact - but there’s always an implicit first-person perspective in such conjectures. — Wayfarer

Which is really more an interpretation than a fact. I mean the fact that conjectures are always made by people is a truism; the interpretive part comes into play when we form opinions about just what it is to be a subject of experience; something which, despite our perhaps seemingly self evident intuitive "folk" understandings, is by no means obvious.

Fossils mean nothing to dinosaurs old chap :wink:

Perhaps not, but then so what? That fossils, among other things, have meaning for us is a truism the significance of which is itself a matter of interpretation.

Which I remember being the exact point of my post. Why does it sound like you're pointing this out to me? And keep in mind, I learned this from science. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes I see what you mean. First paragraph: scientific realism (first, there is a mountain)

Second paragraph: 'but we know scientific realism is a construct (then there is no mountain)

Third para: This is a knot.

Indeed it is.

For the moment, while I try to adjust my worldview, I'm just allowing that there's a contradiction if you look at it from a non-pragmatist point-of-view, and I remind myself not to care that there's a contradiction. — Srap Tasmaner

Give this a listen.

Tying this with the thread's main theme, were a literally egoless consciousness possible to actualize in principle, such would then be perfectly devoid of otherness - but there is no cogent reason to then affirm that it would also be devoid of its "auto"-awareness regarding its own, here unperturbed, state of being. I interpret this to then be in-line with the often told description of Moksha or Nirvana as being pure bliss. — javra

I have to report that there is as a matter of fact a state of absorption sometimes called 'flow', which I have experienced, mainly playing music, but even occasionally in writing, and sometimes walking in the countryside. In such a state, there is no separation for the moment between self and world; the music is playing the fingers and the rhythm is breathing the time, I mean timing the breath: even as an audience one can become lost in music.

In such a state, there is no difference between idealism and physicalism. It is called flow because the normal state of consciousness holds self static as the ruler that measures the movement of time, like the post of a sundial or the static face that the hands of the clock move across. Or perhaps it is more like like a log in the river, snagged on a rock that the river of time washes over and around until some wave or flood releases it to flow with the movement of the water for a while.

My poetic metaphorical language attempts to convey something that is probably familiar to most, so one does not need to rely on the authority of another. Bliss, because the habitual tension and anxiety of holding out against the world is gone for a while.

:up: :100:

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi dedicated his life to studying that. See here.

Nice obituary. A lifetimes' work, to add one informative idea to the human mindscape.

I have to report that there is as a matter of fact a state of absorption sometimes called 'flow', which I have experienced, mainly playing music, but even occasionally in writing, and sometimes walking in the countryside. In such a state, there is no separation for the moment between self and world; the music is playing the fingers and the rhythm is breathing the time, I mean timing the breath: even as an audience one can become lost in music. — unenlightened

Good subject and nicely made point. I would quibble on “no separation for the moment between self and world” being, as I currently interpret the expression, a poetic truth. In other words, the sharp distinction between self and world – often, as thought the two were in some ways antagonists – vanishes in moments of flow. True. Yet it's a poetic truth in that there is yet technical distinctions between observer and observed – between the experiencer of flow and the immediate world that this experiencer perceives which is (or at least seems to be) fully unified with oneself in terms of one’s intentions and resulting activities. Such that what one does one then does in manners fully unperturbed by aspects of what one would in other situations recognize as one’s unconscious (e.g., in slips of the tongue) or factors external to one’s total self of body and mind. Hence, my quibble is that technically, because there is yet a distinction between that (be it deemed entity, process, both, or neither) which perceives and that which is perceived by it – granted, this being a distinction one gives no importance to in such moments – there will then yet be a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness, regardless of the extent to which this duality is momentarily reduced or otherwise harmonized.

My poetic metaphorical language attempts to convey something that is probably familiar to most, so one does not need to rely on the authority of another. Bliss, because the habitual tension and anxiety of holding out against the world is gone for a while. — unenlightened

Agreed. In keeping with what I take to a possible interpretation of Eastern philosophies, such moments of flow as you’ve described can be deemed examples of moments in which one (maybe unintentionally) approaches – but does not yet obtain – the actualization of Moksha/Nirvana (in absolute form).