This seems like an oversimplification. why would no one play victim? We're on a thread where half the human population are being at least implicated in oppressing the other half. We've heard the insensitivity of white folk to their privilege. there doesn't seem to be any hesitation in assuming all sorts of malicious (conscious and subconscious) behaviour on the part of the currently vilified (whites, men, cis), so why would minority groups suddenly become so angelic? — Isaac

OK, you're right -- not no one no one.

I don't think most are, though. I wouldn't reach for guilt-removal/repression-expression as much as I'd reach for learned callousness -- people learn to be selfish and pursue their own needs. There's probably a few who've felt connected to the zeitgeist who are mistaken -- and I certainly don't think anyone is angelic. I just think looking at the benefits/cost analysis of declaring yourself trans and living that out that there's not really a lot of advantages, and so people who are confused will figure it out and move on.

I wouldn't reach for guilt-removal/repression-expression as much as I'd reach for learned callousness -- people learn to be selfish and pursue their own needs. — Moliere

Yes I agree, but we're a social species, we're dead without a community. Most people's 'needs' are primarily to be part of a social group. So yes, some callousness, some selfishness, but that still manifests as tactical choice about which social group one has the best chances of being a valued member of.

I'm not trying to deny the reality of being trans, quite the opposite, I'm saying that if one finds oneself in that situation, what social groups are made available that one can feel part of? The benefits are relatively high given how the limits of their feelings already constrain them.

OK that's interesting.

My thought is that as soon as you have an option then you'll leap at it, as I did. It's not that people weren't somewhere on the gender-bender spectrum, it's that it has become acceptable in some circles to be yourself in that way. In another time people would re-express in various ways, but -- in the positive spirit of capitalism that Marx likes -- we've invented new social forms because it was profitable to do so.

Also, I feel empathy for trans people because I feel like I'm both sides of the gender-spectrum -- I suspect that many people are, but I've learned to reserve my judgment over time as I talk to people. People really are different in their various ways of relating to their gender, their body, and their identity or gender-identity.

It's not that people weren't somewhere on the gender-bender spectrum, it's that it has become acceptable in some circles to be yourself in that way. In another time people would re-express in various ways, but -- in the positive spirit of capitalism that Marx likes -- we've invented new social forms because it was profitable to do so. — Moliere

Sure, yeah. I think that people take up the new opportunities that new social groups present.

People really are different in their various ways of relating to their gender, their body, and their identity or gender-identity. — Moliere

I think this is at the core of how we see things differently. I just don't believe in this notion of a 'true self'. People tell themselves stories and usually these stories are ones they pick from those society offers, or construct from parts thereof. I don't think these are true (nor false either). They just more or less provide a way of understanding the sometimes contradictory mental goings on they have.

So, if a reasonably explanatory story offers good social capital, it's a selling point. Truth doesn't enter into it.

I just don't believe in this notion of a 'true self'. People tell themselves stories and usually these stories are ones they pick from those society offers, or construct from parts thereof. I don't think these are true (nor false either). They just more or less provide a way of understanding the sometimes contradictory mental goings on they have. — Isaac

Which I think amounts to saying that there's a sense in which individuals don't own these stories, or the words they use to tell them; 'society' does. Which is fine so far as it goes because nobody wants to argue for Humpty-Dumpty-ism. And you're highlighting the fact that claiming an identity is a move in a language-game.

So, if a reasonably explanatory story offers good social capital, it's a selling point. Truth doesn't enter into it. — Isaac

But here's the problem, and it's the reaction everyone has to the language-game analysis: it all seems too static, as if 'society' has a list of acceptable moves and you have to pick from those else you're speaking nonsense.

But exactly what we're talking about is creating the social capital you acquire by changing the rules of the game.

For my part, I'm assuming our sense of our own sexuality and that of others is partially innate, but the machinery for making these inferences may be optimized for stereotypes of cis male and cis female,. The stories we tell and the social moves we make may have to work with conflicting intuitions. I'm not going to be on board with sexuality being purely social, that just seems crazy to me.

it all seems too static, as if 'society' has a list of acceptable moves and you have to pick from those else you're speaking nonsense.

But exactly what we're talking about is creating the social capital you acquire by changing the rules of the game. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, but there's rules for that too. Like how all neologisms evolve, I suppose someone started them, but "I declare 'bobby' is now a type of cake!" isn't going to make it so, it's not a legal move in the game

So, sure, we ought to add some dynamics to the model, but dynamics isn't anarchy.

Side note, one of my last study interests was in chaotic dynamics within social feedback. Like Asch conformity but with a message system prone to chaotic perturbation. Didn't really go anywhere, but interesting that you're pointing perhaps in that direction (or maybe I've misread).

what we're talking about is creating the social capital you acquire by changing the rules of the game. — Srap Tasmaner

Possibly, but I think that applies to a very small subset of the population. The anthropologist Clive Finlayson calls them 'innovators'. Mostly reviled until something they think suddenly works, then they gain a brief moment in the sun before going back to being reviled by the new normal.

I guess that's possibly true for our new stories about gender, but I suspect very few are mold-breakers. Most have seen the mold-breaking, seen the benefits that brings in terms of a social group with membership criteria they find easier to meet, and jumped at that.

The stories we tell and the social moves we make may have to work with conflicting intuitions. I'm not going to be on board with sexuality being purely social, that just seems crazy to me. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. As above, the choice of story isn't a free one, we still do have stuff going on which is the raw matter in need of modeling. I don't see any reason why something like sexuality might not be part of that raw matter, but at that level it's just axons firing, nothing of the sort we could categorise into natural kinds. At least, I don't think so.

A good story can really help people struggling to model their particular mentality by using the existing ones, and innovation can help there, but all I'm saying is that model utility isn't the only criteria people are using to choose them. Like theories, there are many stories which could explain the same set of mental activity. So choosing involves more than just a good fit, and there's no denying these other motivators.

choosing involves more than just a good fit, and there's no denying these other motivators. — Isaac

Oh I agree. I would never suggest there's just a biological layer that's inherently right or even striving to be right. The lowest level I'm thinking of is still inferential and it's just trying to find something that works, for some definition of 'works'. What that layer comes up with might be puzzling sometimes, not just to others but to ourselves, and obviously that's an opportunity for culture to step in and offer to tell you what you actually think or feel, since you're evidently confused.

but at that level it's just axons firing, nothing of the sort we could categorise into natural kinds — Isaac

Natural kinds would be both a simplification and an exaggeration of our intuitive inferences about sex and gender, or rather about our behavior and the behavior of others, codified as sex and gender. Those inferences might be in some ways more nuanced and in some ways less -- they don't care how elegant or comprehensive or consistent the taxonomy we make out of them is.

Sure, but there's rules for that too. Like how all neologisms evolve, I suppose someone started them, but "I declare 'bobby' is now a type of cake!" isn't going to make it so, it's not a legal move in the game

So, sure, we ought to add some dynamics to the model, but dynamics isn't anarchy. — Isaac

I don't really have much to go on here. I think the structuralist phase of linguistics and anthropology was so thrilled to be able to make sense of things at all that they accidentally created these static 'cultures' and 'languages', and that's a necessary first step, but we also know both of these literally evolve. The rules of these games are in play. I don't have a model for that to offer.

What that layer comes up with might be puzzling sometimes, not just to others but to ourselves, and obviously that's an opportunity for culture to step in and offer to tell you what you actually think or feel, since you're evidently confused. — Srap Tasmaner

I love the turn of phrase.

Bit it's more than just an opportunity, I think. The construction of something as complex as a selfhood is really difficult, I don't believe it's even possible outside of a social context where key parts are available to build from. It'd be like trying to write a computer operating system from scratch.

Things like 'gay', 'woman', 'trans', 'geek', 'leader', 'hippy',... are pretty much needed as almost fully built units because the cost of building from scratch is just too high.

Those inferences might be in some ways more nuanced and in some ways less -- they don't care how elegant or comprehensive or consistent the taxonomy we make out of them is. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. There might even be a kind of meta level to this where we make simpler constructs as facon de parler simply to handle the more complex constructs that we actually use.

Things like 'gay', 'woman', 'trans', 'geek', 'leader', 'hippy',... are pretty much needed as almost fully built units because the cost of building from scratch is just too high. — Isaac

That's a nice idea, but as you say below, we might also kind of know these are only useful approximations -- even when they're descriptive not of a person but of a role we need them to play.

The construction of something as complex as a selfhood is really difficult, I don't believe it's even possible outside of a social context where key parts are available to build from. — Isaac

Fair. I'd like to be distinguishing here and there between 'cultural' and 'social' but without doing that I've been giving short shrift to the necessary social context. -- Sexuality is obviously a social thing even when it's not cultural (among other mammals, say).

these are only useful approximations -- even when they're descriptive not of a person but of a role we need them to play. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, that's right, but the point I'm making is that they are useful, not just descriptives, but predictives. they reduce surprise, they help us navigate each other's needs and likely actions, and not just others (like a badge or uniform might) but ourselves too. Having these broad stories for ourselves helps us make sense of our own actions and thoughts, put them into context, give them a purpose and a coherence (that they might otherwise lack).

I'd like to be distinguishing here and there between 'cultural' and 'social' but without doing that I've been giving short shrift to the necessary social context. -- Sexuality is obviously a social thing even when it's not cultural (among other mammals, say). — Srap Tasmaner

I suppose I'm using the term 'culture' to mean how humans do social stuff. It may be too ambiguous a term. But sexuality might be more appropriately put into the category of raw sensation. The matter of what stimuli do what is data, the matter of why is story. 'Lesbian' is a story to explain why certain stimuli seem to have certain effects, but as a piece of culture, it offers so much more than just that single explanation, it carries behavioural answers to the question 'what do I do about this sensation?', it contains explanations for potentially unrelated matters - 'why do I feel so left out'?, 'why do most other girls never seem to like me?', 'why did my parents not bond with me as they did my other sister?'...etc. All of which may or may not have any connection to arousal, or even be true, but they're made sense of by the story and that makes them seem less frighteningly random.

I think this is at the core of how we see things differently. I just don't believe in this notion of a 'true self'. — Isaac

There are ways in which I believe in it and ways in which I do not. There's the Cartesian full-blown subject which I reject, which already puts me on shaky footing with some of my favorite philosophers. My coming back around to the subject has more to do with realizing how attached people are to so much that the metaphysical subject "explains" or at least encapsulates into a tidy concept.

And there, looking at it as a concept only rather than a metaphysical reality -- and how the concept relates to individuals within a social environment -- I think I see a sort of reality to the true self, though girded underneath with the ethical commitment that the true self is content with itself (while acknowledging that this is simply taken for granted -- that other philosophies could posit other values. That is what philosophy does, after all).

It's not the immutable, immortal, or even necessarily epistemically privileged subject. The reasons we accept standpoints have much less to do with our conceptual machinery and much more to do with how we understand ourselves, others, and our relative abilities with respect to such and such. And further it seems to me that there is a kind of broaching of the subject through our relationship to others, such that our inter-relations a/effect our identities, or can depending upon how we relate to one another. An ideal relationship being the face-to-face, which is not a conceptual proof but a phenomenological encounter.

But for that to even be approached there needs to be trust, which in turn means ceding ground to others to hear them. And in denying someone their identity it's certainly not the case that you're unheard -- far from it. Your meaning is clear -- my identity is a lie because I ought select from the binary on the shelf like everyone else so that we can get onto the important things, at least until the parties that be can invent a science of the self to my specifications, or else you're just clearly playing the victim so you don't have to deal with the guilt of living in the global north but can instead play the victim of the people you sympathize with while simultaneously not realizing your material life depends upon their suffering.

At least that's the message I've received thus far.

Which is why I've been trying to highlight how identity isn't a scientific concept, and that we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves. Truth may not enter into it, but significance does. And we get by with these shoddy meanings by granting charity, sometimes interpreting towards what is true when that's apparent, and sometimes interpreting towards significance when that's apparent. Since meaning is use, after all, new meanings are invented daily as we re-encounter new contexts. Every use of the word is itself a new meaning which isn't fixed by a Public Shelf of Meaning, but is instead invented as we provide charity for creative uses in new contexts.

There's a sense in which identity is performance, and so it's not truth-apt. But that's not to say it's not real. All conversations are performances, but they're real conversations. They could be insincere or inauthentic, perhaps, but that's getting into the territory of identity rather than prediction: neither a trait nor a behavior will tell you if a statement is sincere or authentic. That'd depend upon how you see the person as a person.

That is, I don't think the difficulties of specifying identity are unique to trans individuals, but have always been there -- it's just that this topic has highlighted these difficulties for people.

I've been out of the thread for a bit, but I wanted to thank you for how well written this is.

Also @Isaac, @Srap Tasmaner, keep up the good work. This is a rare conversation.

Your meaning is clear -- my identity is a lie because I ought select from the binary on the shelf like everyone else so that we can get onto the important things — Moliere

Not at all what I mean.

Let me try again. I'm not saying that we ought select from publicly available narratives, I'm saying we do. I'm making an empirical claim about the way the human psyche works. We do not construct unique and detailed identities from scratch through some internal interrogation. We pick from the stories we see around us, the identities, like parts in a play. I'm not making an ethical claim. You are ethically free to construct your identity from scratch. I don't believe you either can or will.

or else you're just clearly playing the victim so you don't have to deal with the guilt of living in the global north but can instead play the victim of the people you sympathize with while simultaneously not realizing your material life depends upon their suffering. — Moliere

It's not an 'or else' but yes, I'll stand by that. We have a victim culture, and I believe guilt is at least a major part of the reason. We all know how much better off we are and we all know it's grossly unfair. If that didn't have an effect we'd be zombies, and if that effect was universally positive we'd be saints. I don't believe we're either.

I've been trying to highlight how identity isn't a scientific concept, and that we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves. — Moliere

Your second second half belies the first. You claim "we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves". That's a scientific claim. It's making a statement about how humans (a clearly empirical object) think. You can't claim the concept isn't scientific and then give a detailed account of how it works.

Since meaning is use, after all, new meanings are invented daily as we re-encounter new contexts. Every use of the word is itself a new meaning which isn't fixed by a Public Shelf of Meaning, but is instead invented as we provide charity for creative uses in new contexts. — Moliere

I don't see how language could possibly work that way. We'd never understand what each other were saying if we just allowed new meanings to constantly spring forth. I wouldn't get five minutes into my day if those I'm speaking to had no foundation to judge my meaning. Sure, language evolves, but that's not that same as saying anything goes. Some neologisms take, others don't. None just spring forth fully formed from day-to-day.

And why does 'charity' get invoked with new meanings but not with the retention of old ones? I might well 'charitably' interpret a new use of a word in a new context. It'd be more polite than simply assuming error. But that's not what's happening here. I'm not being asked to merely understand a new use of gender terms, I'm being asked to partake in it. And not just that, I'm being asked to entirely replace my previous use with this new one, and further in many cases being accused of hate speech and bigotry if I don't.

I really think it's stretching credulity to lump all that under mere request for charitable interpretation.

There's a sense in which identity is performance, and so it's not truth-apt. But that's not to say it's not real. — Moliere

Yes, were on the same page here. It's why I'm comfortable saying there's no such thing. Identity isn't a psychological state one 'discovers' by interoception, it's part of our naming and storytelling practices, like 'hippy', or 'geek'. We collect performances into useful groupings and name them. The utility is about them playing a role in our stories so they're less surprising, and that works both ways - it's not imposed, it's agreed upon.

I don't think the difficulties of specifying identity are unique to trans individuals, but have always been there -- it's just that this topic has highlighted these difficulties for people. — Moliere

Yes, I agree. There's a tension between the expectations of public roles and the utility of having them at all. It's not all one way though. Knowing what to do next is fiendishly complicated and fraught with uncertainty. A device for resolving some of that uncertainty isn't always a bad thing.

Also Isaac, @Srap Tasmaner, keep up the good work. This is a rare conversation. — fdrake

Thanks, and likewise. Always nice to have a little cheer from the balcony every now and then, TPF is a tough crowd for my material (I'm saving the Maoist routine for the encore).

Moliere and Judaka seem to belong to the same Free Church when it comes to word meaning:

Every use of the word is itself a new meaning which isn't fixed by a Public Shelf of Meaning — Moliere

@Judaka I generally have the same issue with those who view word meanings as having stringent, objective definitions

Bullshit!

It's why I'm comfortable saying there's no such thing. Identity isn't a psychological state one 'discovers' by interoception, it's part of our naming and storytelling practices, like 'hippy', or 'geek'. We collect performances into useful groupings and name them. The utility is about them playing a role in our stories so they're less surprising, and that works both ways - it's not imposed, it's agreed upon. — Isaac

I do not LIKE the idea that there is no such thing as essential "identity" that one discovers, but experience and observation tells us that identity depends on culture.

A heterosexual child doesn't have to wait long for his or her culture to supply the "guide book" for what "heterosexual" means. On the other hand, a rural homosexual child may recognize that he likes other boys, and understands that this is an outlier desire, best not discussed. He may not have a "homosexual identity" until he comes into regular contact with urban homosexuals who can supply the gay "guide book".

So, a gay boy in Los Angeles may decide he likes the black leather motorcycle look and proceed accordingly. There's nothing innately gay about black-dyed cow leather or motorcycles, but culture has made it so. A gay boy in rural Uganda is extremely unlikely to follow the same route. (At least until recently) rural Uganda had few paved roads, no motorcycle clubs of any kind, and covering up in black leather just doesn't make sense on the equator.

I'm not saying that we ought select from publicly available narratives, I'm saying we do. I'm making an empirical claim about the way the human psyche works. We do not construct unique and detailed identities from scratch through some internal interrogation. We pick from the stories we see around us, the identities, like parts in a play. I'm not making an ethical claim. You are ethically free to construct your identity from scratch. I don't believe you either can or will. — Isaac

I agree that identity doesn't come from scratch. Though I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say that identity comes from the human psyche, either -- the subject is constituted socially, in my view, but that doesn't make it any less real (and it also doesn't mean that someone else is in a better position to declare the identity of another) Rather than a claim about the general structure of the human psyche this is an aspect of humanity that is largely social: a kind of reason that's beyond the brain, shared across bodies and brains through our practices.

It's not an 'or else' but yes, I'll stand by that. We have a victim culture, and I believe guilt is at least a major part of the reason. We all know how much better off we are and we all know it's grossly unfair. If that didn't have an effect we'd be zombies, and if that effect was universally positive we'd be saints. I don't believe we're either. — Isaac

I don't know if we all really do know that in the sense of who is culpable. My point in bringing up the popularity of Marxism was that this claim of guilt largely depends upon a person's relationship to Marxism -- for most they'll accept the line that capitalism is what will set us free, and that it's just a matter of progress and time for the less fortunate to be lifted up by its magic insofar that we're able to curb the excesses of capital (themselves measured by a nationalist, rather than internationalist, measure)

A usual component of guilt, perception of one's self-culpability in doing wrong, just isn't there for most people. They'll look at you like you look at the gender-benders, complete with stories as to why you'd commit yourself to an unpopular worldview.

I don't think we have a victim culture in the sense of desiring to be a victim, except perhaps for those bored enough to really crave pain -- but rather I think there really are just that many victims. Capital is violent.

Your second second half belies the first. You claim "we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves". That's a scientific claim. It's making a statement about how humans (a clearly empirical object) think. You can't claim the concept isn't scientific and then give a detailed account of how it works. — Isaac

I can if the detailed account is not scientific, which I've been denying. History is empirical, but not scientific -- so just that something is empirical is not enough to qualify it as a scientific subject.

Plumbing is the example Massimo Pigliucci likes to use to distinguish between know-how and science, and how empiricism is much wider than scientific practice -- it requires concepts, it requires testing out the pipes, and doing plumbing requires some knowledge of scientific concepts but the trade itself isn't exactly a science in the sense that we usually mean. But it's certainly knowledge.

In fact it's my position that most of our world, which is real, isn't really amenable to scientific practice, given how science relies upon prediction and universality for its force of persuasion. Anything that is real, not-universal and not-predictable will escape its purview, and as it happens a lot of the things we care about seem to fit in there -- plumbing, politics, how to drive a care, how to ride a bike, conversing, politicking, acting, the law... much of our performances, be they on the world-stage or a venue, fit here. Which is exactly the sort of practice I imagine the identity is -- real, but not-scientific.

So I'm guessing that we also have different notions about science's relationship to ontology and philosophy in addition to our respective stances on The Subject.

I don't see how language could possibly work that way. We'd never understand what each other were saying if we just allowed new meanings to constantly spring forth. I wouldn't get five minutes into my day if those I'm speaking to had no foundation to judge my meaning. Sure, language evolves, but that's not that same as saying anything goes. Some neologisms take, others don't. None just spring forth fully formed from day-to-day. — Isaac

The problem with transcendental arguments is that they can always be constructed in reverse.

We'd never deal with novelty if we were stuck using the same words, and so on.

But what if language is always-already this ambiguous judgment between what has been and what will be? And what if lowering surprise isn't the social goal for linguistic use? Most of the time, in creative use, we look for what will surprise rather than what will conform. The dance between conformity and novelty is a social dance, which just so happens to also include language (as a social practice).

And why does 'charity' get invoked with new meanings but not with the retention of old ones?

Because even using the old meanings in a new context is already a new meaning, under my notion of language at least. So it's a failure of charity on both parts, in terms of mis-communication at least.

But also sometimes people revoke charity because they've had enough, and decide that you're not part of the language-group they are. That is the words are not conceptually incommensurable, but the practices are. We understand one another just fine. We just disagree. (and some, recognizing that, simply refuse to extend charity -- they're not interested in understanding in that case, and language ceases to work)

But that's not what's happening here. I'm not being asked to merely understand a new use of gender terms, I'm being asked to partake in it. And not just that, I'm being asked to entirely replace my previous use with this new one, and further in many cases being accused of hate speech and bigotry if I don't.

I really think it's stretching credulity to lump all that under mere request for charitable interpretation. — Isaac

In terms of language use I think that's exactly what sees us through, though. What charity explains is why miscommunication occurs here -- it's because charity is not being offered that language breaks, and language-games become incommensurable through the practices they are a part of.

The new gender-bender sees the old uses as bad, and has a community that understands the value of the new uses.

You don't have to convert to the new religion. But you might need to offer some persuasion as to why the old system which punished people for being themselves is preferable in order to earn any charity to be extended to the old uses. In general the radicals tend to see the old world as basically bad, so it's an uphill sell. And on the whole people who adopt new ways don't see much value in the old ways, almost like they were already dissatisfied with how the old language-game played out and from that dissatisfaction crafted a philosophy that expresses that dissatisfaction.

But me -- I think there's value across generational divides, and that we'll be able to work out our differences. And at least you have being a Marxist going for you ;). Hence my pointing out the need for charity. But if you don't want to offer it, I don't think anyone can force you to. That's the way conversations work. I don't think we can say at this time that it's a lack of understanding one another, though. I've provided a schema complete with a marker that says "this is what needs more work". We understand one another fine. What we disagree upon is which way is a better way for our life-practices -- which language-game of gender should we play? Well, I'll pick the language-game that recognizes who I am. And being the bridge-builder that I tend to be I'll play the old game for as long as needed to catch people up to the new game. I don't think it's quite as much on its way out as I put it before -- religions have a way of sticking around even after they fragment, and I'm thinking gender is much like religion in its social dimension.

Yes, were on the same page here. It's why I'm comfortable saying there's no such thing. Identity isn't a psychological state one 'discovers' by interoception, it's part of our naming and storytelling practices, like 'hippy', or 'geek'. We collect performances into useful groupings and name them. The utility is about them playing a role in our stories so they're less surprising, and that works both ways - it's not imposed, it's agreed upon. — Isaac

I definitely don't think identity is a thing -- hence my rejection of the Cartesian subject. More like a collection, but not a bundle. It's a specific collection that's important to whatever identity is.

I agree identity is not a psychological state one discovers by interoception. That's maybe a first step for some, but not all -- what's important is how one comports themselves with others. My thought is identity is a social creation entirely, but that it's also entirely real and we can be right or wrong about it. The person whose in the best position, most of the time, for making that judgment is the person whose identity it is.

My claims come back to whether you accept there is a standpoint for identity, rather than the metaphysical claim, or even empirical claim, about identity.

Yes, I agree. There's a tension between the expectations of public roles and the utility of having them at all. It's not all one way though. Knowing what to do next is fiendishly complicated and fraught with uncertainty. A device for resolving some of that uncertainty isn't always a bad thing. — Isaac

Cool. Then while we began with trans identity, it might be better to finish with some other kind of identity -- like identity in general (as if that were easy....) -- because I think our disagreements are very much philosophical. And not finish in this thread -- just more like bookmarking "OK, interesting ideas to explore are identity in general, the relationship between science and ontology or philosophy, and the significance of science at large"

Thanks :)

I agree it's a rare conversation. We should have doxxed one another by now while rallying the rabble to burn eachother at the stake ;)

A heterosexual child doesn't have to wait long for his or her culture to supply the "guide book" for what "heterosexual" means. On the other hand, a rural homosexual child may recognize that he likes other boys, and understands that this is an outlier desire, best not discussed. He may not have a "homosexual identity" until he comes into regular contact with urban homosexuals who can supply the gay "guide book". — BC

This is an excellent point, but, as you note in the next paragraph, it's not the gay guide book, but a gay guide book. Which is interesting.

Having these broad stories for ourselves helps us make sense of our own actions and thoughts, put them into context, give them a purpose and a coherence (that they might otherwise lack). — Isaac

All of which is fine, but one of the things that's troubling about your "off the shelf" metaphor is that it suggests mass production, that more or less identical narratives are available to everyone (or maybe people within a given culture or speech community, whatever), and I'm not sure that's quite right.

It seems to me that in taking up a narrative, you don't so much buy a copy as make a copy, so even though there's going to be some, maybe considerable, family resemblance among the copies of a story each member of a community are carrying around, they are still going to be idiosyncratic. And if you consider how we get access to these stories, we're making copies of copies of copies of copies ... The archetype may still show through, but quite a few of the details might have changed. In fact, over time one narrative might split into two, if there are populations that started with different versions of the original. And by now it should be really, really obvious that what we're looking at here is evolution.

Which is no surprise, but what I'm really curious about is the copying process itself. What I don't want to slot in here is that bullshit sort of "recipe" account you always get of musicians. (Grew up listening to country on the radio, got into funk in high school, and then I discovered Ella Fitzgerald --- and out of all that came "Walking on Sunshine.") But I think we have to say something about how whatever you've got before you acquire the new story (to use on yourself or others) is going to color your version of the story. At the very least, what else is already in your repertoire is going to shape your use of the new script -- some people will use it more and some less, depending on what else they've acquired and how they use them. (You can know a hundred stories and always reach for the same two or three.)

It's not that I want to push back against psychology's legitimate pursuit of generality; it's just that I'm interested in the mechanisms of acquiring and using these stories. The individual's narrative repertoire will be idiosyncratic in exactly the way their genes and their idiolect are, but we can say general things about how people are individuated in these ways.

Which might get us some ways toward @Moliere's sense of individuality.

Idiosyncrasy might also explain some of the strange bedfellows politics makes, and the failure of people to recognize their allies.

it might be better to finish with some other kind of identity -- like identity in general — Moliere

Forgot you said this, and it's kind of what I ended up writing about above.

A heterosexual child doesn't have to wait long for his or her culture to supply the "guide book" for what "heterosexual" means. On the other hand, a rural homosexual child may recognize that he likes other boys, and understands that this is an outlier desire, best not discussed. He may not have a "homosexual identity" until he comes into regular contact with urban homosexuals who can supply the gay "guide book". — BC

Yeah, that's the idea. There's some endocrine response to the sight of the male body, or some such, that's the raw data that needs explaining. How it's explained is the story. 'Gay' is the name for the story - how it's explained - not the name for the endocrine response (which is just chemicals).

It seems to me that in taking up a narrative, you don't so much buy a copy as make a copy, so even though there's going to be some, maybe considerable, family resemblance among the copies of a story each member of a community are carrying around, they are still going to be idiosyncratic. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, completely. But here we're talking about the names given to those stories 'gay', 'man', 'geek', 'fool'... These, like any other naming practices, rely on family resemblances. The [collection of idiosyncratic stories which all sufficiently resemble each other to be called 'being a man'] is called 'manhood'. It's called that by a language community who actively want such broad summarisation of idiosyncrasy. Idiosyncrasy is annoying to take into consideration all the time, it makes prediction work really hard. There's a benefit to all of us in ironing it out for the purposes of communication and social role-playing.

But also, just as a purely psychological theory, I'm unconvinced that our stories are so unique. I agree that we re-construct them ourselves, but only out of parts available already. Remember, these are post hoc, subsequent to the actions and internal workings they are trying to explain. So the driver here is to find an explanation, it's a defensive move (against uncertainty) not a creative one.

The archetype may still show through, but quite a few of the details might have changed. In fact, over time one narrative might split into two, if there are populations that started with different versions of the original. And by now it should be really, really obvious that what we're looking at here is evolution. — Srap Tasmaner

Totally. That's why I brought up the idea earlier of message faithfulness. The idea being that we might try to copy a story, but we'll make small mistakes - I liken it to playing Chinese whispers - and others will copy their story from us, mistakes and all. We end up this way, not just with new stories, but, worryingly, stories which we might actually find unhelpful, stories which were supposed to be helpful once but which have become mutated by error into something not serving its original purpose.

Obviously there's a countervailing drive for us to find the stories useful and we'll be pulled to reject those which aren't. But that tension can create difficulties.

I think we have to say something about how whatever you've got before you acquire the new story (to use on yourself or others) is going to color your version of the story. At the very least, what else is already in your repertoire is going to shape your use of the new script -- some people will use it more and some less, depending on what else they've acquired and how they use them. (You can know a hundred stories and always reach for the same two or three.) — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, totally. It's not as unlike picking parts as you suggest you want to avoid. Think about how someone who sees themselves as a 'geek' is going to handle suddenly finding themselves to be good at some sport or other. The narrative they reach for to explain that fantastic gift with, say, archery, isn't going to be the same one the 'jock' might reach for because that simply wouldn't fit with the rest of his story, but it's unlikely to be completely made up either, just more 'Robin Hood' than 'LeBron James' (or whoever the LeBron James of archery is).

I'm interested in the mechanisms of acquiring and using these stories. The individual's narrative repertoire will be idiosyncratic in exactly the way their genes and their idiolect are, but we can say general things about how people are individuated in these ways.

Which might get us some ways toward Moliere's sense of individuality. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. I think @Moliere has even started a new thread on this, but the issue here is one of language, I think. We can accept that these stories are idiosyncratic and even unique (though I wouldn't go that far myself), but we still collect them (in loose fuzzy-edged collections) and name that collection in our language acts. Since these language acts are a public shared activity, it follows that these named collections are public shared utilities, not individually owned 'identities'.

I think by and large you're taking stories as cultural moves we can make in defense or explanation of our opinions and behavior, and I keep trying to find a role for them in production.

Fox News, for example, is like an experiment in how many different ways you can say "Shut up you fucking hippy!" They're still fighting retrograde actions against the sixties, and experience an intuitive revulsion toward the counterculture. (The eloquent version of this can be found elsewhere, Saul Bellow or Allan Bloom, etc.)

One way or another the label "hippy" gets attached to the object of revulsion. But are you a hippy because I find you revolting? Or do I find you revolting because you are a hippy? Most people will tend to go for the latter because it sounds more like a bit of reasoning, even if they think it's based on faulty premises. Your version is the former, in which "hippy" is available as a story that makes sense of the feeling of revulsion, and is more radical.

I want to go with your version, because the usual version just feels more computational and I no longer trust that model. On the other hand, I want an explanation for the initial feeling of revulsion and people keep telling me that culture can reach right down to your feelings and shape your responses; if culture can be effective in this way, it has to get into the game earlier than our post-facto stories and justifications and rationalizations.

On the third hand (the gripping hand), we needn't pretend this is all linear; you could have the revulsion, reach for an explanation, and also react to the explanation, almost as if it were being presented to you with the expectation that you will react.

The other role of stories, on this view, would be as feeling management strategies. Depending on the story the feedback might be positive or negative: this is a big deal, dial up your response; or, this isn't that important, dial it down.

This I like. I'm not clear on why this has to be conscious, but this seems to be where consciousness comes in, these very high-level sorts of management.

And it jibes with experience, I think. We've probably all had the experience of working ourselves up to a level of anger we didn't have at the beginning of a disagreement, or building up a simple infatuation into our One True Love, or literally telling ourselves that something isn't worth getting worked up over.

I've left the initial feeling of revulsion toward hippies unexplained, but I'm not sure it matters. (To young progressive this is everything!) The narrative feedback loop gets started somehow and it might have close to nothing to do with whatever got it started. (The genealogical analysis believes that uncovering the real source of that initial reaction reveals the real meaning of the narrative, and that's tempting but I suspect deeply mistaken. We can talk more about that.)

it has to get into the game earlier than our post-facto stories and justifications and rationalizations. — Srap Tasmaner

Aye. Something can be a post-facto story/rationalisation and still have whatever bodily state it secreted/was identified with be influential after the fact, I think all the change of vocabulary to "post factor" or "defence against uncertainty" does is try to put a gloss on whether social categories are primarily reactive or primarily productive. Considering that every social category, indeed every act of perception, would be primarily reactive under @Isaac's view, I don't think it operates at the required level of specificity.

Calling these norms post facto, or highlighting that they are indeed post hoc rationalisations, reads like the Less Wrong rationality trope "Uncritical Supercriticality" in this instance. In which a term from one context gets transported to another, and mutually elaborated upon cross purposes.

The specific form that would take here is that absolutely nothing of social life, no "mental furniture", ideology or even motivational state, survives the parsing. In effect it's a selectively applied table flip. Like choosing not to play the same game when one is out of moves.

Not saying that you're being disingenuous @Isaac, just that the moves you've made the last few pages undermine the starting premises of the debate. Even the law's post facto in this sense.

Sorry I must have missed your reply earlier, didn't mean to ignore it.

Rather than a claim about the general structure of the human psyche this is an aspect of humanity that is largely social: a kind of reason that's beyond the brain, shared across bodies and brains through our practices. — Moliere

Yeah, I agree. When I referred to a claim about the human psyche I only meant quite specifically the claim that we select from social constructions (and the associated claim that we're not really equipped to do otherwise). I agree that those entities, such as they are, are social ones.

for most they'll accept the line that capitalism is what will set us free, and that it's just a matter of progress and time for the less fortunate to be lifted up by its magic insofar that we're able to curb the excesses of capital (themselves measured by a nationalist, rather than internationalist, measure) — Moliere

Yeah... I think that's guilt-based too, though. No one genuinely buys that shit... do they?

I think there really are just that many victims. Capital is violent. — Moliere

That's a more charitable way of looking at it that maybe I could adopt. I'm not sure I'm ready to excuse the lack of perspective relative to the major victims (the destitute), but I'm willing to go as far as to see genuine victimhood.

I'm guessing that we also have different notions about science's relationship to ontology and philosophy in addition to our respective stances on The Subject. — Moliere

We do. So many threads to pull on here, not sure which to follow and which to save for later...

what if lowering surprise isn't the social goal for linguistic use? — Moliere

Well, then I'd be wrong! Again, supporting an active inference model of language is probably another thread we could pull on, but it's been combed through on other threads.

You don't have to convert to the new religion. But you might need to offer some persuasion as to why the old system which punished people for being themselves is preferable in order to earn any charity to be extended to the old uses. — Moliere

But that's already so loaded. Nothing about using visible signs of biological sex to pick from two forms of address is 'punishment'. It's just a cultural practice. We might have chosen hair colour, or height, or nose shape. We chose sex (for some clear cultural reasons, of course).

I can't see how that's a punishment beyond not getting what one wants. I understand some might prefer this new way. That doesn't make it a punishment to not get it.

I think there's value across generational divides, and that we'll be able to work out our differences. — Moliere

I do hope so. I want to be clear though, that it's not so much the differences that I think need resolving. I think things will eventually end up some middle ground of pronouns being like names (learnt, person by person) with a kind of neutral 'they' for unknown cases. I don't think that would be a bad thing.

The thing I'm most vexed about is the victim culture, the way that not adhering to this (or any other) scheme is treated as an act of oppression. That I think is dangerous because it undermines attempts to address actual oppression. Most of what I'm doing here is showing that it's not oppressive. It might be old-fashioned, clumsy, but not an act of abuse.

My thought is identity is a social creation entirely, but that it's also entirely real and we can be right or wrong about it. The person whose in the best position, most of the time, for making that judgment is the person whose identity it is — Moliere

Then it what sense is it a 'social' creation, if others play no role in it and are overruled by the individual? That doesn't, on the face of it, sound very social. It sounds entirely private.

absolutely nothing of social life, no "mental furniture", ideology or even motivational state, survives the parsing — fdrake

This is too meta for me to understand. :(

This is too meta for me to understand. :( — Srap Tasmaner

Oh, sorry.

Pretty much everything a mind allegedly does, if it involves what we'd describe as a judgement or interpretation, can be construed as having only ex post facto affects because the entities involved in those judgements/interpretations are ex post facto. Did someone go to jail for breaking the law, or because their motor units were recruited in a manner to move their legs away from... Did I eat the sandwich because I was hungry, or because the relative concentration of grehlin in my body was high...

I could be in jail, awaiting a sentence for stealing a car, and be able to tell the officer: "I'm not here because I'm awaiting a sentence, I'm here because (something to the effect that I'm minimising some neurological loss function defined over my body states)" - and it would be true. For a constrained sense of cause, anyway.. The same trick can be played with any conceptual register about people higher in degree of organisational complexity than the body - like an institution, a social encounter, a law, a norm, an identity.

This discussion contains laws and identities. Identities are suspect whereas laws are not. The criterion @Isaac is using to dissolve identity would also dissolve law. And all the other abstractions we'd use to understand social scenarios.

Edit: and to make clear why I think that's important, it would stop is from using any of the terms the debate was premised using to begin with. Nothing would make sense any more.

In cognitive terms, the stories act as both high level meta-models of how lower level model cohere, but also as both filters and producers of confirmatory behaviour. So there's always a forward acting element.

Like with perception, we're telling stories about the scene to explain the retinal sensation, but also those stories are producing actions design to confirm them.

I see a similar thing happening with social-role stories, they're models which explain their inputs (in this case the outputs from lower level models), and thereby act as filters for noise, but also they're producing behaviours which are aimed at maximising the information the models have to work on (minimising surprise).

A story for 'trans' might be explaining all sorts of otherwise unconnected lower level models, like sexual preferences, dress preferences, discomforts (and comforts) among other sexes,etc...but then it's also producing a set of behaviours which maximise the information harvest to confirm that model. In this case we're talking about feedback from a social role based action. "If I'm an 'X', then when I do 'Y' people will respond 'Z'" - do Y and see if people respond Z.

So in your example. The revulsion is explained - "It was a 'hippy' wot did it, hence I'm revolted", but if it was a hippy, then being more revolted would fit well as a next act, it would be what my character would do next in the play - so let's test that theory, let's be more revolted and see if it fits... and so on.

that the moves you've made the last few pages undermine the starting premises of the debate. — fdrake

Hey! I've only posted one thing since you were praising my contribution! Caprice!

This discussion contains laws and identities. Identities are suspect whereas laws are not. The criterion Isaac is using to dissolve identity would could also dissolve law. And all the other abstractions we'd use to understand social scenarios. — fdrake

I agree (with the caveat I added). We could dissolve law that way. We could say that having broken a law is a post hoc story explaining the basic social breakdown which actually caused the crime to take place. I'm not sure that would be a bad thing in some cases.

But I'm not here arguing that because we could, we ought.

What I'm arguing, is that because we could, it is not a given. We are not compelled to accept 'identities' as an empirical reality, any more than we are compelled to accept laws as a descriptor of criminality.

If it is useful to do so, we might. If our frame were a legal one, rejecting law as a reality would be self-defeating, but here we're talking about who 'owns' the reified entity, not about it's reification, sensu lato. So the matter of it being soluble, whilst true, doesn't really help determine ownership.

Ownership of this social construction that we're calling an identity seems to be hinging on epistemological claims about how it is determined, who can say what it's nature is. It's those claims I'm challenging.

I think we're thinking along the same lines except you remembered to mention filtering and I forgot again.