It's not just imagined. Persons didn't exist at one point in the past. There was no logic. No logical possibilities. But there were metaphysical possibilities.

It's not logically possible for no intelligent beings to evolve.* If no intelligent beings evolve, there is no logic. You're assuming that logic is something other than a thing that intelligent beings do.

(*Prior to intelligent beings evolving, it's also not logically possible for them to evolve. Again, if there are no intelligent beings, there is no logic.) — Terrapin Station

Say it's 10 billion years ago or so.

Is it logically possible at that point in time for intelligent beings to evolve or not evolve? — Terrapin Station

What's the difference between saying "it was logically possible" and "it was 10 billion years ago"? If you want to say that the former requires there to have been a formal system of logic at the time then to be consistent shouldn't you also say that the latter requires there to have been a calendar at the time?

If you want to say that the former requires there to have been a formal system of logic at the time then to be consistent shouldn't you also say that the latter requires there to have been a calendar at the time? — Michael

In my view time is objective. Logic is not.

Why would that be meaningful but it's not meaningful to say that things occurred 15 (or 18 or whatever age you accept) billion years ago? — Terrapin Station

But I quite agree that it's perfectly meaningful to say that things occurred billions of years in the past (I am just agnostic regarding the exact moment of the big-bang). But it is one thing to say that there were things happening over some specified time frame in the distant past, and it is another thing to say that there was a "point in time" at some specified moment in the past. It's the latter that I can't make sense of.

In fact, I had been insisting that it is meaningful to say that there are distant past events that possibly occurred, as a matter of logical possibility, while *you* were denying it on the ground that there were no human being back then and hence that there was "no logic".

But it is one thing to say that there were things happening over some specified time frame in the distant past, and it is another thing to say that there was a "point in time" at some specified moment in the past. It's the latter that I can't make sense of. — Pierre-Normand

Again, "point" was in quotation marks for a reason. "Some specified time frame" is the same thing (per what I had in mind).

Right, so do you think it's meaningful to say that the first stars were forming at "some specified time frame" in the past?

Right, so do you think it's meaningful to say that the first stars were forming at "some specified time frame" in the past? — Terrapin Station

Yes. That's meaningful. But episodes of star formation are events. They are not points in time, and neither are they "specified time frames" existing on their own some time shortly after the big-bang.

So during those events--the first star formation, say, was there logic?

So during those events--the first star formation, say, was there logic? — Terrapin Station

There was no logic, no music and no literature. But this has no bearing at all on the question, for instance, whether or not it is logically possible that there were roughly as many spiral galaxies as there were elliptical gallaxies. That's indeed logically possible, arguably. It is not, however, logically possible that there were more binary star systems than there were stars. In those statements, "there were" is past tense, but "it is" is intemporal. It is not pegged to a specific time but rather to our own interpretation of logical possibility.

There was no logic, no music and no literature. — Pierre-Normand

Right. So during those events, was it logically possible for life to evolve?

Right. So during those events, was it logically possible for life to evolve? — Terrapin Station

Why is your statement of logical possibility tensed? It makes sense to tense the proposition that the modal operator is operating on since this specifies the time frame of the events you are talking about. But why tense the modal operator also? If you mean to peg the interpretation of the concept of logical possibility to the understanding of whatever people might have been alive at that time (if any), then your question would be more conspicuously phrased something like:

"During those events, was it logically possible for life to evolve from the standpoint of the people who were living at the time, if any?"

The answer would be 'no' since there weren't any living people. But this is not what we mean when we say, for instance, that it is logically possible that, at that time, conditions weren't such as to prevent the future evolution of life. (And if conditions were such as to prevent the evolution of life, anyway, then the impossibility would likely be nomological rather then logical, or so it seems to me.)

Why is your statement of logical possibility tensed? — Pierre-Normand

Because I'm asking you a question re during the first star formation.

You had no problem answering that during the first star formation, there was no logic.

Why are you having a problem answering whether during the first star formation, there was logical possibility?

If there's no logic, is there logical possibility?

Why are you having a problem answering whether during the first star formation, there was logical possibility?

If there's no logic, is there logical possibility? — Terrapin Station

If there is no logic then there is no logical possibility. But it is irrelevant to our claims of logical possibility regarding the past state of the world whether of not there "was logic" in the past. Our claims of logical possibility are our own. They are pegged to our interpretation.

Likewise, our claims about the logical possibility about distant places in space aren't pegged to "the logic" at those places.

If we ponder over whether it is logically possible that there are non-rational Martians on Mars and that the tallest Martian is taller than the shortest Martian, then it doesn't make sense to say: it's not logically possible on mars, because martians don't use logic. The reason why it's not logically possible is our logic, not anyone else's.

If there is no logic then there is no logical possibility. — Pierre-Normand

Great. So an example of there being a metaphysical possibility that's not a logical possibility is that during the first star formation, it was a metaphysical possibility that life would evolve, but it wasn't a logical possibility.

Great. So an example of there being a metaphysical possibility that's not a logical possibility is that during the first star formation, it was a metaphysical possibility that life would evolve, but it wasn't a logical possibility. — Terrapin Station

No. The contemplated scenario about the eventuality of life evolving from those initial conditions is both a nomological possibility and a logical possibility. The fact that there was nobody using logic doesn't make the scenario logically impossible from our perspective. Likewise for the scenario about there being an unknown uninhabited planet permanently hidden on the other side of the Sun. There being such a planet over there doesn't fail to be a logical possibility just because, according to you "there is no logic over there".

When I acknowledge that if there is no logic then there is no logical possibility, I of course meant, not logic anywhere at anytime. But it's not true that there is no logic. There still is our logic, and it's the only logic that counts for the evaluation of our claims of logical possibility.

The fact that there was nobody using logic doesn't make the scenario logically impossible from our perspective. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not talking about our perspective.

I'm talking about during the first star formation. It was a metaphysical possibility that life would evolve. It wasn't a logical possibility. So that's an example of there being a metaphysical possibility and that's not a logical possibility. It might not be an example that you care about, that's at all interesting to you, etc. Nevertheless, it is an example.

The task wasn't to give a "context-independent" example, or an example that only involves us. If a context-independent example had been the task, I'd say that there is no such thing. If an example that only involves us had been the task, I'd say that it's a loaded question. And that would also have nothing to do with the comment I'd made earlier about logical possibility being a subset of metaphysical possibility.

Let's see a definition of free will and how it relates to determinism:

Free-will: The free-will doctrine, opposed to determinism, ascribes to the human will freedom in one or more of the following senses:

(a)The freedom of indeterminacy is the will's alleged independence of antecedent conditions, psychological and physiological. A free-will in this sense is at least partially uncaused or is not related in a uniform way with the agent's character, motives and circumstances.

(b)The freedom of alternative choice which consists in the supposed ability of the agent to choose among alternative possibilities of action and

(c)The freedom of self-determination consisting in decision independent of external constraint but in accordance with the inner motives and ideals of the agent. — FreeEmotion

Free will libertarians usually believe a combination of (a) and (b). They think agents can, in some situations, choose between different options. If faced with the option to divorce someone, a person could divorce or not divorce. Both options are actually open to them; it does not just appear from their perspective that they have this power. They think (c) is important, but is more of necessary condition that is needed to make (a) and (b). Also, (a) and (b) are required for moral responsibility.

Determinist reject (a) and (b). They think that our ability to choose is an illusion and that there is only one actual option that results. The decision we reach when we decide whether to divorce or not is the result of prior causes that will dictate the outcome. Determinists, obviously, believe there is a sense in which (c) is true- there is a difference between a person caused by drugs that behaves out of character and a person who is not under the influence of drugs that behaves in character- but find it irrelevant to moral responsibility.

Compatibilists focus on (c). They think that the libertarian position is incorrect in that they think moral repsonisibility does not depend on (a) and (b) because, on a more critical reflection, phrases like "freely choose" and "possibility" do not mean what the libertarian does in terms of moral responsibility. They think the truth of determinism is irrelevant to moral responsibility and what we should use the term "free will" is compatible with determinism beibg true.

I'm not talking about our perspective. — Terrapin Station

No but you are talking from our perspective. When we make claims of logical possibility regarding contemplated scenarios unfolding here or elsewhere, now or in the past or in the future, we are envisioning those logical possibilities from our own perspective.

I'm talking about during the first star formation. It was a metaphysical possibility that life would evolve. It wasn't a logical possibility. So that's an example of there being a metaphysical possibility and that's not a logical possibility.

You are again conflating two different claims. First, there is the claim that at the time of the first star formations there wasn't yet a practice of logical evaluation of consistency of propositions, validity of inferences, etc. (just as there was no musical or scientific practice, say). And then there is the claim that it was not a logical possibility that something occurred at that time. The first claim doesn't entail the second because logical possibilities don't have temporal boundaries anymore than they have spatial boundaries. If it's logically possible that there are more than two rocks on Earth, then it's also possible that there are more than two rocks on the surface of Mars regardless of the fact that there is "no logic on Mars" in the sense of there not being such a socially instituted practice over there.

The task wasn't to give a "context-independent" example, and if that had been the task, I'd say that there is no such thing.

So, the implied interpretative context, in all claims of logical possibility, is our own practice of logical evaluation of propositions and inferences. There doesn't exist this context-free 'view from nowhere' perspective relative to which a determinate scenario is nomologically possible but is neither logically possible nor logically impossible.

The first claim doesn't entail the second because logical possibilities don't have temporal boundaries anymore than they have spatial boundaries. — Pierre-Normand

But do you understand that I don't agree with this? I'm an antirealist on logic. I don't believe that logic is something objective. Logic is ONLY a language that individual persons use. It does not exist beyond that, which means that logical possibility does not exist beyond that.

I'm not saying that we have a language of logic that's about objective stuff that's more or less "the same thing." I'm saying that ALL that logic is is our language. That definitely has a temporal and spatial location. (And if you remember, I noted a while back that I do not buy that there are ANY real abstracts. That includes logic/logical objects/etc. and mathematics/mathematical objects, etc.) In my view there is nothing that does not have a temporal and spatial location.

Why are you having a problem answering whether during the first star formation, there was logical possibility?

If there's no logic, is there logical possibility? — Terrapin Station

If there is no logic, there is no logical possibility, but there is logic: our logic. And the truth of modal logical claims is not temporally limited anymore than it is spatially bounded.

Imagine that a team of paleontologists comes up with the following discovery about the past: At some point during the Cretaceous, over a period stretching more than one million years, the average population of triceratops was exceeding the average population of pterosaurs, which themselves were more populous than the velociraptors, which themselves were more populous than the pterosaurs.

They thus submit their putative discovery to a scientific journal and one reviewer sends an e-mail to the main author of the study pointing out that their main result has the form of a conjunction of propositions making up an inconsistent triad. That's just not logically possible. The main author replies that it may very well be that this would be logically impossible now, but none of the three reported disjuncts are nomologically impossible, and it is irrelevant that their logical conjunction isn't logically possible now since it happened over 100 million years in the past, at a time when there was no logic.

Upon receiving this reply, the reviewer scratches her head and ponders over what to respond to Professor Station.

And the truth of modal logical claims is not temporally limited anymore than it is spatially bounded. — Pierre-Normand

Again, I do not agree with this. Do you understand that I do not agree with it?

And re your example, that my view is something unusual isn't of any consequence. I'm explaining it to you now. You need to be able to understand something other than the status quo, something other than a consensus view, etc.

Again, I do not agree with this. Do you understand that I do not agree with it? — Terrapin Station

Of course, this is precisely why I present arguments as to why this claim that you are disagreeing with is reasonable and why your disagreeing with it leads to absurd results. If you are not agreeing with the idea that the truth of logical propositions isn't temporally bounded, then you must be agreeing with the defense provided by the author of the paleontological study. You must also be agreeing with the claim that scenarios that are logically impossible on Earth, those very same scenarios, are not logically impossible on Mars. If fact, they are not even logically impossible on the coffee table between us (assuming we would have had a conversation over coffee) since there is no logic literally 'on' the coffee table.

Of course, this is precisely why I present arguments as to why this claims that you are disagreeing with is reasonable and why your disagreeing with it leads to absurd results. If you are not agreeing with the idea that the truth of logical propositions isn't temporally bounded, then you must be agreeing with the defense provided by the author of the paleontological study. You must also be agreeing with the claim that scenarios that are logically impossible on Earth, those very same scenarios, are not logically impossible on Mars. If fact, they are not even logically impossible on the coffee table between us (assuming we would have had a conversation over coffee) since there is no logic literally 'on' the coffee table. — Pierre-Normand

Right, logical anything, including possibility and impossibility, is always to someone, and not only that, but it's also going to be only relevant to the particular logic that person is using at that time. Logical possibility and impossibility do not obtain outside of that. Not on a coffee table, or to amoeba in the ocean, or 3 billion years ago, etc.

This is no different than saying that "Joe's usage of the word 'plook'" doesn't occur when we limit our domain to the coffee table, or to amoeba or 5 billion years ago, etc.

You rather have an objectivist view of logic. I do not.

Right, logical anything, including possibility and impossibility, is always to someone, and not only that, but it's also going to be only relevant to the particular logic that person is using at that time. Logical possibility and impossibility do not obtain outside of that. Not on a coffee table, or to amoeba in the ocean, or 3 billion years ago, etc. — Terrapin Station

So, this means that on your view, Professor Station was correct and the logical criticism of the conclusion of the study by the reviewer was misguided. The editor of the journal should publish the study without any revision since the result hasn't been shown to be logically invalid. It was not logically impossible that there were more triceratops than pterosaurs, more pterosaurs than velociraptors, and also, more velociraptors than pterosaurs. Our contemporary logic just doesn't extend to the distant past.

Re this by the way, then:

They thus submit their putative discovery to a scientific journal and one reviewer sends an e-mail to the main author of the study pointing out that their main result has the form of a conjunction of propositions making up an inconsistent triad. That's just not logically possible. — Pierre-Normand

It would be that it's not logically possible to the reviewer, per the system of logic that they're employing.

The main author replies that it may very well be that this would be logically impossible now,

Which would have to be to the author, per whatever system of logic they're employing (which could be "the same" system of logic the reviewer was employing)

but none of the three reported disjuncts are nomologically impossible, and it is irrelevant that their logical conjunction isn't logically possible now since it happened over 100 million years in the past, at a time when there was no logic.

The reviewer should ask why whether they weren't logically impossible or possible at the time matters to the author in the context of the article. Did the article have something to do with whether there was logic 100 million years ago?

In our case, you asked for an example of a metaphysical possibility that's not a logical possibility, so I gave you an example. I think you rather just didn't care for the fact that I was able to give you an example.

So, that means that on your view, Professor Station was correct and the logical criticism of the conclusion of the study by the reviewer was misguided. — Pierre-Normand

He was correct that the statements wouldn't have been either logically possible or impossible 100 million years ago. (They also wouldn't be true or false, they wouldn't have meaning, they wouldn't refer to anything, etc. 100 million years ago, by the way.)

"The criticism was misguided" is a value judgment that doesn't follow from anything. You have no idea what I feel makes criticism of something in various contexts misguided or not. In this case, I would say that the criticism isn't misguided.

The editor of the journal should publish the study without any revision since the result is scientifically valid.

Similarly, this is a normative claim that doesn't follow from anything either one of us said. Whether anyone should publish anything is going to be based on their subjective criteria.

It was not logically impossible that there were more triceratops than pterosaurs, more pterosaurs than velociraptors, and also, more velociraptors than pterosaurs. — Pierre-Normand

100 million years ago, indeed it was not logically impossible, and it was not logically possible either. It wasn't logically anything.

It gets complicated since God has already decided and has the final say.
— Rich

God, in their minds, does not decide what they will do, at least in the sense that precludes moral responsibility. God could determine actions, but refrains from doing so to preserve creaturely freedom. Again, the compatibilist thinks that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible with each other.
Unrepentant murderers do not go to heaven.

But not too worry, it's better than determinism that has us all killing each other because some gene it's obsessed with surviving.
— Rich

Not all determinists are materialists. And I do not see what this has to do with anything I said. It seems like you are just saying things to try to get a rise out of people — Chany

There are relevant historical social, political, and moral contexts for all of these strange descriptions of human existence. They don't spin out of the blue. All that is necessary is to have each person make choices with uncertain outcomes, but for those in positions of power, throughout history, this often does not fit the playbook. Hence the concoction if determinism and compatibilism.

The reviewer should ask why whether they weren't logical impossible or possible at the time matters to the author in the context of the article. Did the article have something to do with whether there was logic 100 million years ago? — Terrapin Station

Well, this is pretty much what I have been asking you in several recent posts. I have been consistent in my insistence that claims about the logical possibility of scenarios or propositions depicting the past have absolutely nothing to do with whether there was logic in the past.

In our case, you asked for an example of a metaphysical possibility that's not a logical possibility, so I gave you an example.

The metaphysical possibility that you offered was about the past state of our universe at the time when the first stars formed. It was about the "metaphysical" possibility that this state could give rise to the evolution of life. This is also a logical possibility since the possibility of live evolving from that initial state "(has nothing) to do with whether there was logic (billions of) years ago" (as you now seem to be acknowledging). The fact that there was no logic back then is no more relevant to the evaluation of the logical possibility of the claim, regarding the evolution of life, than it is relevant to the relative populations of different species of dinosaurs.

There is nothing to say that a person cannot freely choose a predetermined path. Even in the case of a biological machine-brain, there is nothing to say that a person cannot choose exactly what his brain has been programmed to choose. — FreeEmotion

Yes, the illusion of free will is often used to explain the experience humanity by both Buddhism (some branches that is) and science. Once we go down this path, anything and everything can be an illusion and there is nothing left to say other than welcome to the world of magical illusions.

(b)The freedom of alternative choice which consists in the supposed ability of the agent to choose among alternative possibilities of action and

And this is precisely what is happening in life. We have habits and skills and senses. We continually observe and make judgements of possible modes of action and then, depending upon our skills, we make a choice in a particular direction. We then observe results, learn, and continue the cycle. The human experience is about exploring, creating, and learning and this is the mode by which we do it.

This is also a logical possibility since the possibility of live evolving from that initial state "(has nothing) to do with whether there was logic (billions of) years ago" — Pierre-Normand

<sigh> it's not also a logical possibility at the time in question.

At the time in question, it's only a metaphysical possibility.

This is because logic only exists once there are people. That's not the case with the world in general.

This is relevant to there being an example of a metaphysical possibility that's not also a logical possibility. I'm not saying that it's relevant to anything else.

<sigh> it's not also a logical possibility at the time in question.

At the time in question, it's only a metaphysical possibility.

This is because logic only exists once there are people. That's not the case with the world in general.

This is relevant to there being an example of a metaphysical possibility that's not also a logical possibility. I'm not saying that it's relevant to anything else. — Terrapin Station

When you say that "something" is a logical possibility at time t, this can be interpreted in a specific way that is perfectly intelligible but that is clearly not how you mean it. This "something" must have the form of a predicate such that it may be true at some time and not at other times. For instance, some specific apple's being ripe would be such a predicate. This could be written R(...), where the argument place is a time variable. Then, saying that the apple's being ripe is a logical possibility at time t means that R(t) is logically possible.

But what you mean is something different. You rather mean that the saturated expression R(t), (or rather the proposition that is expresses), not the unsaturated predicate R(...), itself may be logically possible or logically impossible depending on whether or not there happens to be human beings (or other sorts of logic users) in the temporal and/or spatial vicinity of the apple. I think this is nonsensical, and it is absolutely not required by the thesis that logic is human dependent, in a pragmatic or Kantian sense. The relevant sense of human dependence does't require that the objects thought about be in the spatial or temporal vicinity of the human beings evaluating the logical possibilities of propositions about them since our cognitive reach isn't limited to the present or to the surface of the Earth, say.

But I am not going to belabor the point. We will have to agree to disagree. This excursus was rather off topic anyway.