One thing that seems to me to be absurd, and perhaps even unethical, is to live one's life with the expectation and aim of gaining merit for an existence after death; I think that idea has the potential of radically devaluing this life. — Janus

Couldn't agree more.

Whatever works, and we are all different, right? — Janus

I think so.

If only for the fact that most metaphysical views or scientific theories make no difference to how I live my life or what choices I make. — Tom Storm

I'm sure they nevertheless have at least a subliminal influence in our worldview and self-understanding.

I will add that the principle difference between the neo-Kantian Cassirer, and standard view of physicalism, is that the latter sees mind and being as the emergent products of physical processes which are understood to be inherently non-intentional and non-teleological. The former recognises the role of mind in the constitution of the world which is the context within which all judgements about what constitutes 'the physical' are made. Mind is, in this sense, ontologically prior to the physical, not in the sense of being a class of object or substance that temporally exists before the physical, but as the fundamental ground for which and in which the physical is made manifest.

I'm sure they nevertheless have at least a subliminal influence in our worldview and self-understanding. — Wayfarer

Of course, it goes without saying that a human is a kind of mess of preconceptions and enculturations.

I will add that the principle difference between the neo-Kantian Cassirer, and standard view of physicalism, is that the latter sees mind and being as the emergent products of physical processes which are understood to be inherently non-intentional and non-teleological. The former recognises the role of mind in the constitution of the world which is the context within which all judgements about what constitutes 'the physical' are made. — Wayfarer

I have no issues with this account. I don't know where I sit precisely. I do believe we 'construct' the world, our cognitive apparatus has foibles and limitations and there is embodied cognition - along the lines of phenomenology. I'm not sure any of this matters to how I go about my daily business.

I will add that the principle difference between the neo-Kantian Cassirer, and standard view of physicalism, is that the latter sees mind and being as the emergent products of physical processes which are understood to be inherently non-intentional and non-teleological. — Wayfarer

Are you using "non-intentional" in the sense of intentionality or in a sense related to motivation, or other?

If in the sense of intentionality, then I could make a case that intentionality supervenes on neural networks. It seems likely it would take some charitable consideration and effort on your part to understand it, but it is well worth understanding for those interested in understanding themselves. (Particularly if interested in the nature of intuition.)

Of course we all have different brains, and as a consequence, different constellations of cognitive strengths and weaknesses. This impacts what we find interesting, and I'm certainly not suggesting you should be interested in the things I'm interested in.

I'm aware of that book, but no, haven't read it. — Wayfarer

Bummer, it'd make it easier to communicate some things to you if you had. Yes, Kahneman is quite brilliant, and presents important things to understand about intuition, and does so a whole lot better than I could.

Anyway, maybe we could switch to discussing the argument from reason that you mentioned?

I'm certainly not suggesting you should be interested in the things I'm interested in. — wonderer1

No worries, I very much appreciate the courteous manner in which you post.

As for the differences between our views, I start from what might be called a counter-cultural orientation. I understand that scientific naturalism is regarded as normative for many epistemological claims in our culture but in keeping with the OP, I am critical of science as a metaphysic. In very summary terms, scientific methodology has yielded many amazing and indispensable discoveries and innovations, but it doesn't necessarily comprehend or address the problems of philosophy, and the attempt to squeeze those problems into the procrustean bed of the objective sciences has deleterious consequences. That's my overall take.

maybe we could switch to discussing the argument from reason that you mentioned? — wonderer1

I'm planning to create an OP, but it's going to take a few days. It's a deep topic.

I'm planning to create an OP, but it's going to take a few days. It's a deep topic. — Wayfarer

I'm looking forward to it. :up:

In very summary terms, scientific methodology has yielded many amazing and indispensable discoveries and innovations, but it doesn't necessarily comprehend or address the problems of philosophy, and the attempt to squeeze those problems into the procrustean bed of the objective sciences has deleterious consequences. — Wayfarer

Yes, scientism becoming the predominant view.

I have forgotten that this is Pantagruel's thread. I thought it was Gnomon's. Sorry.

An exact and scientific metaphysics
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-99403-7?fbclid=IwAR25Wl-rdb1Pt0E2Z6Xngg5__x0xcG0xYq0XwDkUuYNIhMqRq7kP2QYcsFU

An experiment is performed. A machine registers the outcome. This is when the "collapse" occurs. An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill

This is great issue. Even without the collapse, it's still interesting.

At the moment, I don't think the 'answer' is complete or whole or intelligible apart from its place in the human project of physics.

I think the difficulty here is the red herring of independence of physics and its objects from any particular embodied physicist.

I think we are tempted to make a mistake of trying to 'see around' all physicists at the same time and then think we can still talk about a 'measurement.' It's subtle point, but I think we are smuggling in our own current brain-activity and cultural training when we imagine 'numbers' appearing on a screen and no one in the room ----except we are in that room (as security cameras?), and the room itself is in our imagination.

( As an empiricist, I'm compelled to question stories that aren't backed by human experience. In a certain sense, measurements without measurers are ghost stories. Along these lines, ain't no world to speak of without a living human brain around....)

Mind is, in this sense, ontologically prior to the physical, not in the sense of being a class of object or substance that temporally exists before the physical, but as the fundamental ground for which and in which the physical is made manifest. — Quixodian

I think you make an important point, but of course I say that there's entanglement and interdependence.

In some sense, spirit is a self-modification of nature, an emergence from nature (cultural beings emerged from subcultural beginnings, presumably by evolution). And in another sense, nature is a product of spirit (the concept of nature is cultural, developed within the timebinding Conversation of spirit).

I don't know where I sit precisely. I do believe we 'construct' the world, our cognitive apparatus has foibles and limitations and there is embodied cognition - along the lines of phenomenology. I'm not sure any of this matters to how I go about my daily business. — Tom Storm

:up:

Hence the 'foolishness' of the philosopher who 'wastes time' on such things --and yet the intention is to write nonfiction.

In some sense, spirit is a self-modification of nature — plaque flag

The fundamental condition of existence is alterity. (c)

The fundamental condition of existence is alterity. (c) — Quixodian

It is a classic theme. Derrida tried to make difference god.

Is Reality is a self-differentiating self-perceiving self-thinking godstuff ? Maybe kinda sorta ?

Or Saussure: Language is a system of differences without positive elements. But this structuralism is like taking an X-ray of a language. Useful fiction. Abstraction.

It doesn't matter how we carve the chess pieces if we give them their usual roles. But we need to carve them in some way or another. Same deal with information that moves from medium to medium, or the conceptual content that moves from language to language. [ Pure information is the 'same' bad idea as pure matter without a subject. (Structurally speaking .) ]

I think the difficulty here is the red herring of independence of physics and its objects from any particular embodied physicist — plaque flag

A group of physicists devise an experiment, including a device to measure the outcome. They perform the experiment, then cluster around the computer screen to read the result - they all agree they see the same thing. The experiment is replicated numerous times, with the same result. How is this "dependence" upon a particular "embodied" scientist?

Perhaps I'm not interpreting what you say properly.

How is this "dependence" upon a particular "embodied" scientist?

Perhaps I'm not interpreting what you say properly. — jgill

It's a weird point, so I'm not surprised if I didn't find the best words.

Actually I'm saying that the meaningfulness of the measurement is independent of any particular physicist. It doesn't have to be Larry or Susan. But it has to be somebody.

I make my case by saying that we have no experience whatsoever of a world apart from the one entangled with our networked timebinding human nervous systems.

We are tempted to forget this because the embodied subject is left out for practical reasons. It doesn't matter if Larry or Susan was watching the machine. We trust them both. The subject becomes 'transparent' to a physicist long accustomed to a godlike view of an artificial videogame Euclidean space. Because his body is not before his eyes that stare at symbols that help him think of that imaginary space, he forgets that such a space was never available without his body's help.

The fundamental condition of existence is alterity.
— Quixodian

It is a classic theme. Derrida tried to make difference god.

Is Reality is a self-differentiating self-perceiving self-thinking godstuff ? Maybe kinda sorta ? — plaque flag

That way of expressing it came to me as a consequence of listening to one of Kastrup's talks, along the lines that the appearance of living organisms is also the initial appearance of 'otherness'. The very first thing that any proto-organism has to do is enact the boundary between itself and the environment. If there were no boundary, it is simply subject to whatever chemical and physical influences act on it - it would dissolve or break up. Whereas an organism has to maintain itself (which is homeostasis), seek nutrition, avoid threats, and replicate. That is the origin of the self-other divide.

They perform the experiment, then cluster around the computer screen to read the result - they all agree they see the same thing. The experiment is replicated numerous times, with the same result. How is this "dependence" upon a particular "embodied" scientist? — jgill

But that is precisely what has been called into question by experiments that confirm the observer-dependency of results in quantum mechanics, which challenge the principle that all observers see the same facts. Objective Reality Doesn't Exist, Quantum Experiment Shows.

If there were no boundary, it is simply subject to whatever chemical and physical influences act on it - it would dissolve or break up. Whereas an organism has to maintain itself (which is homeostasis), seek nutrition, avoid threats, and replicate. That is the origin of the self-other divide. — Quixodian

Also why I insist that the ego is flesh. I think it's this basic bodily boundary that inspires us to further develop the tradition of the 'soul' -- of a responsible discursive subject existing with a new intensity in the dimension of time, capable of making and keeping promises. One soul per body too. Did it have to be that way ? Or was it just far more convenient to train a brain to be one person ?

The very first thing that any proto-organism has to do is enact the boundary between itself and the environment. — Quixodian

The boundary is not enacted by the proto-organism; it is always already enacted to enable the existence of the organism before it can do any of its own enacting.

Or was it just far more convenient to train a brain to be one person ? — plaque flag

One brain per body, no?

But that is precisely what has been called into question by experiments . . . — Quixodian

A lot depends upon the idea of "superposition", which has a simple mathematical interpretation. I remain unconvinced, and Wigner himself criticized "Wigner's Friend". I refuse to succumb to the woo surrounding this - but that's just me and I don't have a physics background.

One brain per body, no? — Janus

Is it impossible for a brain to be trained to run two personalities? It'd probably be difficult, but maybe possible, if folks were mean enough to experiment on children that way. Two discursive selves would be held responsible for the coherence of two different sets of beliefs/claims. Maybe there's Weekend Willy and Weekday Walt.

Anyone read Tim Maudlin?

Listened to a long interview the other day (which I'm beginning to prefer to reading, as I can listen whilst driving or working out.) Seems a sane sort of fellow. David Albert another along similar lines.

Is it impossible for a brain to be trained to run two personalities? — plaque flag

Some of the studies on dissociative personality disorder showed that the brain of subject who had a blind alter did not show any effects associated with visual stimulation when the blind alter personality was tested.

With Sam Harris?

Is it impossible for a brain to be trained to run two personalities? It'd probably be difficult, but maybe possible, if folks were mean enough to experiment on children that way. Two discursive selves would be held responsible for the coherence of two different sets of beliefs/claims. Maybe there's Weekend Willy and Weekday Walt. — plaque flag

The well-documented cases of multiple personality disorder show that one person may experience being multiple personalities. From the common perspective it is one person, and the multiple personalities are a disordering of what is the 'normal' order.

It seems reasonable to think that animals also have a sense of self, not many senses of many selves, judging by the general predictability of their behaviors.

No, this one..

The well-documented cases of multiple personality disorder show that one person may experience being multiple personalities. From the common perspective it is one person, and the multiple personalities are a disordering of what is the 'normal' order. — Janus

:up:
'One is one around here' or one is mentally ill.