Let's take "socialism" -- I'm not sure I could write a dialogue demonstrating, but maybe our experiences with this word could suffice?

What does "socialism" mean?

There's more than one definition that people would offer, even among those who'd say they are socialists.

And there's a strange mixture of misunderstanding and half-understanding and pop-understanding along with more precise understandings of the meaning of socialism. — Moliere

This is I think a good example of what I suggested as elaboration. The multiple people who say "socialism" misunderstand what it is the others are saying. If instead they each communicated a couple of paragraphs explaining exactly what their view of socialism is, will this not reduce the misunderstanding?

Those people may still disagree on which detailed view is the one we should strive for, but that is then not a misunderstanding of meaning, but a disagreement (in the vein you talked about).

This is I think a good example of what I suggested as elaboration. The multiple people who say "socialism" misunderstand what it is the others are saying. If instead they each communicated a couple of paragraphs explaining exactly what their view of socialism is, will this not reduce the misunderstanding? — PhilosophyRunner

Yup, I think so. People have to want to understand at some level -- so I've been insisting upon trust and charity as interpretive virtues within a conversation, or what is missing if we're mis-understanding one another -- but I think that's a good place to start.

Those people may still disagree on which detailed view is the one we should strive for, but that is then not a misunderstanding of meaning, but a disagreement (in the vein you talked about).

Right.

Maybe the question is -- is there a time when a definition is true? Can we insist that a particular meaning is true of an utterance? Then the disagreement is about the meaning itself rather than, or perhaps also in addition to, disagreeing upon what we should strive for (or whatever it is the dispute is over).

If Scruffy happens by just then, he takes this as an affront to his status; it could be a challenge. He doesn't just shove his larger head into the bowl, forcing the other one aside, as the outside cats assert seniority; he makes an issue of it. He huffs, flattens his ears and utters that low throaty mwaaa sound. — Vera Mont

Right, so this is tricky for the thread. It's Scruffy who makes a communicative display and vocalization, which is correctly understood by D2, who backs off. D2 was not attempting to communicate anything to Scruffy by his behavior, he was just eating. But Scruffy seems to have taken this behavior as potentially a challenge, so he responded accordingly, and we want to say here that Scruffy has made an incorrect inference about D2's intentions, or at least had has taken action to determine whether it was a challenge. (And it makes sense that Scruffy's repertoire would include a range of behaviors that starts at maybe-a-threat.)

Back to the topic: this might or might not be what @Moliere is interested in. D2 did not engage in a misunderstood communicative behavior, but may nevertheless have been misinterpreted. (That's word's a little tendentious, but who cares.) Now if we say that the reason we (a big enough "we" to include cats) interpret each other's utterances is to divine each other's intentions, same as with other behaviors, since utterance is verbal behavior, then what Scruffy did is what we're interested in, since it's where verbal interpretation ends up.*

But there may still be a problem, because D2's behavior, unlike speech, and unlike Scruffy's display and vocalization, was not intended to be communicative. That would seem to put this event outside @Moliere's theme. Unless we want to say something deflationary about communicative intentions, which we certainly could.


* There are alternatives: we can insist that there's a difference between understanding what you mean and understanding what you intend, which is fine. But we could also say that even if the whole point of verbal interpretation is divining your intentions (aka "mind-reading") -- "point" being shorthand for why we have such a skill -- it is still an ability I now have and can apply for other purposes, like just trying to understand you even if I don't care about predicting your actions, or placing your verbal behavior in some wider context. All arguable in different ways.

Back to the topic: this might or might not be what Moliere is interested in. D2 did not engage in a misunderstood communicative behavior, but may nevertheless have been misinterpreted. (That's word's a little tendentious, but who cares.) Now if we say that the reason we (a big enough "we" to include cats) interpret each other's utterances is to divine each other's intentions, same as with other behaviors, since utterance is verbal behavior, then what Scruffy did is what we're interested in, since it's where verbal interpretation ends up.*

But there may still be a problem, because D2's behavior, unlike speech, and unlike Scruffy's display and vocalization, was not intended to be communicative. That would seem to put this event outside @Moliere's theme. Unless we want to say something deflationary about communicative intentions, which we certainly could. — Srap Tasmaner

That's useful.

Now if only I was clear enough in my own thinking to say what I'm interested in. :D

Also for @Vera Mont

For one thing I'll be clear that I'm not pursuing a deflationary account of meaning, at least. I'm open to a reductive account, but a deflationary account would be like solving the riddle by saying there's no riddle. Which very well may be the case, but I'd rather not start with that explanation given how it kind of terminates the thought.

But your interpretation of Scruffy works for my purposes of misunderstanding one another: D2 was not challenging Scruffy, Scruffy interpreted it as a challenge and issued their own challenge, D2 shuffled off.

I'm not sure this is exactly right, though -- but I'd say that because my thought has more to do with symbolic meaning than communication: the meaning which signs have. So if someone says "Red means go" that's obviously wrong, because red means stop (in the proper context, etc.).

My thought is that some signs, like democracy or socialism, don't have such a straightforward symbolic meaning, that they have a multitude of associations that make it difficult to pin down something straigtforward.

Cats participate in animal communication -- status within a tribe, territory, or even just grumpiness. My thought is that symbolic meaning can be used for animal communication, but it can be used for more than that. We communicate intentions, animal communication is shared (hell, organismic communication occurs across more than animals, in the sense of a sender, a sign, and a receiver). I'm not interested in putting human beings "above" animal communication.

But even the great apes don't seem to understand that 7+5/12=1, for instance. Or other feats of the human language. It's not a surprise, either, because it's kind of the only thing we have going for us in the big natural world -- our trans-genomic-adaptability is our main advantage, I think. We don't have to have as many of us die in order for the species to "learn" -- which pairs well with our reproductive rates being extremely slow in comparison to other species.

Maybe the question is -- is there a time when a definition is true? Can we insist that a particular meaning is true of an utterance? Then the disagreement is about the meaning itself rather than, or perhaps also in addition to, disagreeing upon what we should strive for (or whatever it is the dispute is over). — Moliere

My stance is that within social conventions, yes a definition can be wrong as defined within those social conventions. Different social groups may define the word differently (different dialects, slang, technical jargon, etc).

Outside a social convention, no.

But your interpretation of Scruffy works for my purposes of misunderstanding one another: D2 was not challenging Scruffy, Scruffy interpreted it as a challenge and issued their own challenge, D2 shuffled off.

I'm not sure this is exactly right, though -- but I'd say that because my thought has more to do with symbolic meaning than communication: the meaning which signs have. — Moliere

I didn't say this before, but you could reasonably restrict the word "misunderstanding" to misinterpretation of intentional communicative behavior. If I didn't say a word to you, how could you have misunderstood me? But you can always interpret my behavior, whether I intend you to interpret it or not.

What I was asking @Vera Mont about was really this restricted sense. Conventional (what Grice calls "non-natural") meaning leaves an opening to attach the wrong meaning to an utterance; it's just not clear to me how this works with other animals, whether a vervet monkey might think you meant "snake" when you meant "leopard" or whatever. We know for a fact with humans that the particular sign is arbitrary because there are multiple human languages. Not clear to me whether there's anything conventional about signaling systems among other animals or not. I just don't know. It would be interesting if there were cases of a non-human misinterpreting a signal, or if there were never such cases.

It would be interesting if there were cases of a non-human misinterpreting a signal, or if there were never such cases. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree. That's a good question!

I suspect it does not happen. And I suspect vervet monkeys never mistakenly make the wrong warning call, i.e. misspeak. (On a related note, I believe they only call out "snake" is they believe there are other monkeys nearby to warn; it would also be nice to know if they ever mistakenly call or keep silent, but that's a side issue.) But there's no point in guessing and the world is a surprising place.

But there may still be a problem, because D2's behavior, unlike speech, and unlike Scruffy's display and vocalization, was not intended to be communicative. — Srap Tasmaner

His response was. He's easily Scruffy's physical superior: younger, leaner, tougher. He made not even a token gesture; no hackle-raising, side-walking or flat ears, just took three or four polite steps back and sat down. (Hey, dude, chill. I did'n mean nuthin.) It worked, this time. But they have had a few scuffles which they're invited, in no uncertain terms, to take outside - even in January.

My thought is that some signs, like democracy or socialism, don't have such a straightforward symbolic meaning, that they have a multitude of associations that make it difficult to pin down something straigtforward. — Moliere

Yes, that's humans for you! Overcomplicate everything.

But even the great apes don't seem to understand that 7+5/12=1, — Moliere

Neither would any human who has not been specifically instructed in arithmetic. But that's not part a natural language. That's a specialized artificial language invented by adults to keep track of their possessions and punish their children. Apes in laboratories can learn a great many human-invented symbols that have no function or meaning in the ape's world, just as dogs and horses learn unnatural behaviours under human tutelage. I don't see many humans learning to read urine tags or the wind. Different forms of communication can be acquired with study and practrice, but they don't come equally easily to all species or individuals.

our trans-genomic-adaptability is our main advantage, I think. — Moliere

Plus a big, super-convoluted and oxygenated brain. Of course, that can sometimes be a handicap, as well: difficult birth, long maturation period, a ridiculous number of possible ways to malfunction, both individually and societally.
It's easier for other animals to get the terminology right every time, since they're naming real things with known characteristics: I very much doubt any humans would mistake a snake for a hawk, either, and monkeys don't have garden hoses lying around to confuse the issue.

. Not clear to me whether there's anything conventional about signaling systems among other animals or not. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know. The young of the more sophisticated species are taught by their mother the rudiments of expected behaviour, and the social ones have their education enhanced by other members of the pack, flock or troop. I would imagine that vocal communication would be included in that education (crows are certainly vocal enough, especially when instructing the fledglings - everybody participates.) Maybe Jane Goodall has been privy to these communications, but I don't suppose many humans are. Konrad Lorenz had some interesting observations about geese and jackdaws, wolves and dogs in King Solomon's Ring.

I suspect it does not happen. And I suspect vervet monkeys never mistakenly make the wrong warning call, i.e. misspeak. (On a related note, I believe they only call out "snake" is they believe there are other monkeys nearby to warn; it would also be nice to know if they ever mistakenly call or keep silent, but that's a side issue.) But there's no point in guessing and the world is a surprising place. — Srap Tasmaner

I wonder if small isolated societies misunderstand each other as much as we do. For example the isolated Amazon tribes. I would guess (and it is a guess or intuition) that they rarely misunderstand what it is they are saying, for the simple reason that they are likely to all share common definitions, values, world-views, etc.

His response was. — Vera Mont

I see. So the idea is that D2 reacted in this way to tell Scruffy that he was getting worked up over nothing. Interesting. (And his nonchalance might have been a deliberate reminder that he's no pushover.)

small isolated societies — PhilosophyRunner

This is an interesting point.

I want to just agree, because I think it's clear that there are things that change once society reaches a scale where you interact everyday with strangers, rather than kin and nearly kin you've known your entire life. We probably need to talk about that, the institutions we rely on to guarantee trustworthiness and so on.

There's something else I wanted to say, but I think it might rely on what amounts to a myth that traditional societies as not only homogeneous but static. My thought was that homogeneity could also cut the other way because members of such a society would have so little experience of divergent views -- disagreeing with how something is done might be unimaginable or if broached then something like a sign of madness. On the other hand, we're used to it. People in modern societies can all name a dozen religions -- bedrock stuff for a great many people, and we're casually aware that there's variation. We know about different political views, differing tastes in food and fashion and art and sport, in lifestyle, in everything. We're in some ways old hands at something small homogeneous communities would find at least puzzling if not shocking.

---- But that just might not be true. It sounds plausible, but I don't really know anything about how traditional communities deal with relatively serious divergence. (Only thing that comes to mind is a story from some French ethnographer of a small tribe in which sometimes there might be a man who did not find the hunting lifestyle of the men suited him, and the other men agreed so he would be left with the women, who didn't particularly want his help with their tasks, so he would make pots and baskets as they did, but his work being unnecessary, could spend time creating new designs and patterns for them. So there you go, gay men invented art here by being 'extra'.)

The young of the more sophisticated species are taught by their mother the rudiments of expected behaviour, and the social ones have their education enhanced by other members of the pack, flock or troop. — Vera Mont

Right, there's certainly training of some kind in something, but it's hard to pin down the details. There may be some convention in there. Maybe it doesn't matter, but convention looked like an easy point of attack for misunderstanding, in theory anyway: if other animals communicate without conventions and never misunderstand each other, that might suggest that reliance on convention is necessary to misunderstanding, and that would give us a way in. Since it's so hard to tell, we'll just have to do without.

There's something else I wanted to say, but I think it might rely on what amounts to a myth that traditional societies as not only homogeneous but static. — Srap Tasmaner

For 'static', substitute 'stable'. Ructions and upheavals generally had an external cause, rather than dissent within the group. When a serious difference of opinion arose, a group might split and go separate ways, rather than start a civil war the way more complex, heterogeneous societies might: almost nobody wants to kill his uncle or cousin.

My thought was that homogeneity could also cut the other way because members of such a society would have so little experience of divergent views — Srap Tasmaner

Why should that be? Have you never seen brothers and sisters fight? Anyway, tribal societies were not so isolated as all that. They generally had trade relations with several other communities, and big social gatherings a couple of times a year, with dancing and feasting - particularly so that young people could meet potential mates from other groups.

I think the cause of misunderstanding among humans is not in the conventions, so much as in the versatility of human language. So much of our theoretical, conceptual, intellectual communication correspond to nothing concrete in the real world that we couch our less pragmatic ideas in metaphor and borrow words that mean something ordinary to use for something entirely different.
To run, in the real world means to move one's legs very fast to achieve rapid forward motions. So how is a great big cumbersome building caused to perform that action? And yet, this skinny guy in a suit 'runs the factory'. How the hell does a 2 ton contrivance of metal parts propel itself over a pool of liquid fossil fuel - and yet all kinds of cars 'run on gasoline'. And those are examples of pragmatic usages. Wait till we get into moral precepts, which have no real-world components at all!

Right, there's certainly training of some kind in something, but it's hard to pin down the details. — Srap Tasmaner

Not really. People have been studying avian behaviour for a long time, making videos and recordings. Might be worth your while to seek out some nature shows on You Tube.

My stance is that within social conventions, yes a definition can be wrong as defined within those social conventions. Different social groups may define the word differently (different dialects, slang, technical jargon, etc).

Outside a social convention, no. — PhilosophyRunner

Conventional (what Grice calls "non-natural") meaning leaves an opening to attach the wrong meaning to an utterance; — Srap Tasmaner

You keep mentioning Grice which makes me want to read him more. Once upon a time I came across his maxims but that's about all I know of him.

This, at least, is a start though: under the condition of social convention a definition can be wrong. Definitions are often a feature of quizzes to see if students bothered reading or understanding the material, and that seems to be the most obvious case of being wrong. Misinterpreting the signs on the literal signs of the road seems an obvious case as well. What girds both is some sort of social project that predates our birth or even decisions -- school for children to develop into adults (and allow the adults to work), and streets to transport. To demonstrate a knowledge of these definitions is to be right about the definitions.

But then when it comes to "democracy" that just is a project that already assumes ends. Even in agreeing we like democracy we can misunderstand one another because we have different conventions in mind (maybe your teacher preferred Rawls, and mine preferred Nozick).

To disagree, after coming to understand one another, on definitions is to disagree upon social convention.

Plus a big, super-convoluted and oxygenated brain. — Vera Mont

I say "trans-genomic-adaptability" because I'm not one to emphasize the brain in the question of mind. That's one likely part in our species' adaptability, but the social aspect is very important too. As you note:

Neither would any human who has not been specifically instructed in arithmetic. — Vera Mont

Of course the instruction needs to be there.

But would you deny the difference? Or would you say:

Yes, that's humans for you! Overcomplicate everything. — Vera Mont

As if to say "Abandon All Hope All Ye Who Enter Here"?

As if to say "Abandon All Hope All Ye Who Enter Here"? — Moliere

I didn't equate those two sentiments. But, of course there is no getting out of one's species - except by a long hard slog evolutionary slog. And of course brain configuration is a major factor in the range and complexity of thought of which a species is potentially capable. That doesn't mean every individual of the species approaches anywhere near the potential. And of course socialization also plays an important part - as it does in other intelligent species (and some not quite so clever ones); even the notable exception

Researchers have published reports of octopuses gathering in large groups on the seafloor, sharing dens, using color and gesture to communicate, and forming cooperative hunting parties with fish.

I believe humans tend toward overcomplication because they combine reasoning capacity with imagination. That imagination has been most useful in many ways, but when it uses reason as a vehicle, rather than other way around, it drives us into quagmires of weird and twisted thinking.

That imagination has been most useful in many ways, but when it uses reason as a vehicle, rather than other way around, it drives us into quagmires of weird and twisted thinking. — Vera Mont

Weird, twisted -- and fun ;)

Weird, twisted -- and fun — Moliere

Well, yes. If you're looking for a way in which humans are unique, I guess it's that we make things up. Some of that fantasy leads on to great inventions and discoveries; a lot of it is fun, but it also digs some deep dark tunnels covered in phosphorescent toxic slime. And, as a bonus, conspiracy theories, cults and political fragmentation.

Yup.

There's no becoming-animal, if I'm correct about language at least. Once you know how to Write there's no unlearning it while at the same time retaining its lessons (thinking here of lobotomy).

We just have to live with the fact that when we make things up it can lead us to inventions, discovery, fun, darkness, fragmentation -- etc. But we'll keep making things up all the same. It's what we do!

To disagree, after coming to understand one another, on definitions is to disagree upon social convention. — Moliere

Yes, I agree with this.

Hrm!

Well, that wasn't as hard as I thought then. Unless there are lingering doubts out there.

But how do you make that move, maybe? If I were to tell someone in a conversation about democracy "look we understand one another, we're just disagreeing on conventions" -- how do you make that disagreement into a productive disagreement rather than the termination?

"look we understand one another, we're just disagreeing on conventions" -- how do you make that disagreement into a productive disagreement rather than the termination? — Moliere

By making the next sentence: "How do you interpret democracy?" ...and paying attention to the answer.

Hrm!

Well, that wasn't as hard as I thought then. Unless there are lingering doubts out there.

But how do you make that move, maybe? If I were to tell someone in a conversation about democracy "look we understand one another, we're just disagreeing on conventions" -- how do you make that disagreement into a productive disagreement rather than the termination? — Moliere

Just to clarify my thoughts - if we understood what it is each other is saying, but disagreed on the word to use to represent the other's views, that is a disagreement on social conventions. Here we can continue the conversation once we understand in detail what each other means behind the word.

If we disagreed on the underlying concept itself, then that is a disagreement that might be about social convention or not, depending on the specifics. The continuation here would be specific to the underlying issue - a moral philosophy discussion, or a scientific discussion, etc.

An example of the second type above - If you think our political system should be such that everyone votes directly on each policy, while I think we should elect officials who then vote on policies.

An example of the first type above - Whether we should call your system, my system or both "democracy"