I do recognize the difference in kind between neurological processes and mental experiences. I just don't think it matters. I don't think neurological processes are the same as conscious experience. I think neurological processes express themselves as conscious experiences in the same sense chemical processes express themselves as biological processes. — T Clark
I think in principle, even if the level of mechanisms are different, there is at essence, a reducibility by way of organic chemistry from biological formations to chemical ones. This cannot be said of mental states to its physical components. — schopenhauer1
2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known. — schopenhauer1
As it says, that mental events are such a different type of phenomenon, that it would be an abuse of the concept to equate it with the physical correlates without explanation other than "other things in nature work thusly". — schopenhauer1
2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known. — schopenhauer1
It's like the old SAT questions - chemistry is to biology as neurology is to [X]. Correct answer is C - psychology. — T Clark
People have to stop with the "does a tree make a sound" line as it doesn't mean what they think it does. — Darkneos
Is the hard problem of conscious just (or equivalently) the hard problem of being ? — plaque flag
Can science explain that there is being in the first place ? — plaque flag
Yes. But it grew up from itself within the framework of laws. Physics expresses itself as chemistry. But the new laws of chemistry are not unrelated to the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were not what they are, the laws of chemistry could not be what they are. The laws of chemistry emerged from, and are dependent upon, the laws of physics.Is that not exactly how the universe was constructed?
— Patterner
The universe wasn't constructed, it grew up from itself, from within. — T Clark
But it grew up from itself within the framework of laws. — Patterner
Physics expresses itself as chemistry. But the new laws of chemistry are not unrelated to the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were not what they are, the laws of chemistry could not be what they are. The laws of chemistry emerged from, and are dependent upon, the laws of physics.
Same with chemistry expressing itself as biology. — Patterner
Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern (neo-darwinian) synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of biological thought [15], p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — What is Information?
I'd have some quibbles as what is "science" but it would be going on a tangent. — schopenhauer1
Rather, I want to focus on the idea of the difference between what is going on in the Chinese Room experiment and an actual experiencer or interpreter of events that integrates meaning from the computation. — schopenhauer1
On a more general level, it is an instance of the principle that information-based systems, which includes organisms, embody a level of organisation which defies reduction to physics and chemistry. — Quixodian
In a discussion of theory of mind, consideration of neuroscience would be going on a tangent? — wonderer1
Do you see yourself as particularly well qualified to judge what is science? — wonderer1
Why do you want to talk about what is going on in a Chinese Room rather than what goes on in brains? I thought I had already explained that the Chinese Room argument is an argument against computationalism, and not particularly relevant.
I'm getting the impression that you are wanting to beat on a straw man, rather than have an enlightening discussion of the topic. Say it ain't so. — wonderer1
Why do you want to talk about what is going on in a Chinese Room rather than what goes on in brains? I thought I had already explained that the Chinese Room argument is an argument against computationalism, and not particularly relevant. — wonderer1
:up:That's actually what I think. I think what David Chalmer tries to express rather awkwardly as 'what it is like to be...' is, really, just 'being'. — Quixodian
:up:Furthermore that we universally assume that we know what 'being' means when actually we don't. — Quixodian
The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not experience.
To say 'I wonder at such and such being the case' has only sense if I can imagine it not to be the case. In this sense one can wonder at the existence of, say, a house when one sees it and has not visited it for a long time and has imagined that it had been pulled down in the meantime. But it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing. I could of course wonder at the world round me being as it is. If for instance I had this experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to the case when it's clouded. But that's not what I mean. I am wondering at the sky being whatever it is. One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at is a tautology, namely at the sky being blue or not blue. But then it's just nonsense to say that one is wondering at a tautology. — Wittgenstein
Given that we can't look around our own cognition, the brain-for-us just is the brain-in-itself. I think we have a nonobvious roundsquare situation here.
But the brain-for-us is not the brain-in-itself, exactly because it is a representation of it. — Bob Ross
This quote from Hume is what I have in mind:
With Kant, even time and space are placed 'in' the mind. So the brain-in-itself may not even be 3-dimensional. There may be no such brain. One can try to imagine (perhaps 'illegally') a radically different reality without brains that we experience as (represent as ) including brains.
Oh I see: are you arguing that the only thing one can directly know is the result of their brain’s processes (and thusly are immersed in ideas)? If so, then I would say that is epistemic idealism and not a form of solipsism; but I could be misunderstanding you. — Bob Ross
But, regardless, the brain is a informationally adequate representation of a vital aspect of oneself, as a product of oneself representation an aspect of oneself to oneself. — Bob Ross
Let's try this. What right do you (do we) have to believe in the brain-in-itself ? Why can't the hidden reality be 57 dimensional ? Why can't we all be made of purple homogenous hypergoo there ?
that is all that is required (i.e., an objective world being represented) to prove that there is a 'brain-in-itself'. — Bob Ross
It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well? — Bob Ross
Wait a minute, are the Bob Ross -for Bob Ross or the Bob Ross -in itself ?
Can you trust logic if you are the first ?
Or why should a realm of appearance include trustworthy logic ?
Weird things happen when you put illusion closer to you than reality as a matter of principle.
I'm a direct realist. I quoted Hume to give an example of what I oppose. What I finally escaped !
The classic problem is that you are trapped on the side of appearance with no way to compare. You end up with (at best, IMO) a kind of instrumentalism or 'coping' pragmatism/irrationalism.
But you only associate representing with brains due to what you've seen in mere appearance. It's circular, perhaps a slipknot, seems to me.
You are smuggling in common sense. That's my fundamental objection to indirect realism.
The whole game depends on direct realism in the background. Brains and eyes and apples and their causal relationships. Seeing others see with eyes. And so on.
What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required, unless we want to claim that what is observable is real beyond the context of its observability. What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises from which it logically follows.
Please demonstrate to me how you are able to empirically verify that every change has a cause. — Bob Ross
I think in principle, even if the level of mechanisms are different, there is at essence, a reducibility by way of organic chemistry from biological formations to chemical ones. This cannot be said of mental states to its physical components.
— schopenhauer1
I don't see any reason to believe this is true. What makes you think it is? — T Clark
I am not sure your way of seeing about this, but what I am saying is that it may be the case that "emergence" needs "something" for which to "emerge within" (i.e. a point of view). That is to say, assuming there are these "jumps" (which we call "emergent properties"), whence are these properties taking place? We, as the already-observing observer, have the vantage point of "seeing the emergence" but "where" do these "jumps" take place without a point of view? I guess, as another poster used to say, Where is the epistemic cut?. And also, how would that cut take place without an already-existing observer? What does that new enclosure (of the new emergent property) even look like without a vantage point, or point of view already in the equation?.2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known.
— schopenhauer1
I don't understand. How is this different in my way of seeing things verses your way?
As it says, that mental events are such a different type of phenomenon, that it would be an abuse of the concept to equate it with the physical correlates without explanation other than "other things in nature work thusly".
— schopenhauer1
I've acknowledged that mental events are different kinds of things than physical, chemical, biological, and neurological events and processes. I think you're saying that those differences mean that the analogy I am making doesn't work. I don't agree. It's like the old SAT questions - chemistry is to biology as neurology is to [X]. Correct answer is C - psychology.
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