I am not sure your way of seeing about this, but what I am saying is that it may be the case that "emergence" needs "something" for which to "emerge within" (i.e. a point of view). That is to say, assuming there are these "jumps" (which we call "emergent properties"), whence are these properties taking place? We, as the already-observing observer, have the vantage point of "seeing the emergence" but "where" do these "jumps" take place without a point of view? I guess, as another poster used to say, Where is the epistemic cut?. And also, how would that cut take place without an already-existing observer? What does that new enclosure (of the new emergent property) even look like without a vantage point, or point of view already in the equation?. — schopenhauer1
"To return to the physiologist observing another man’s brain: what the physiologist sees is by no means identical with what happens in the brain he is observing, but is a somewhat remote effect. From what he sees, therefore, he cannot judge whether what is happening in the brain he is observing is, or is not, the sort of event that he would call "mental". When he says that certain physical events in the brain are accompanied by mental events, he is thinking of physical events as if they were what he sees. He does not see a mental event in the brain he is observing, and therefore supposes there is in that brain a physical process which he can observe and a mental process which he cannot.
This is a complete mistake. In the strict sense, he cannot observe anything in the other brain, but only the percepts which he himself has when he is suitably related to that brain (eye to microscope, etc.). We first identify physical processes with our percepts, and then, since our percepts are not other people’s thoughts, we argue that the physical processes in their brains are something quite different from their thoughts. In fact, everything that we can directly observe of the physical world happens inside our heads, and consists of "mental" events in at least one sense of the word "mental".
It also consists of events which form part of the physical world. The development of this point of view will lead us to the conclusion that the distinction between mind and matter is illusory. The study of the world may be called physical or mental or both or neither, as we please; in fact, the words serve no purpose. There is only one definition of the words that is unobjectionable: "physical" is what is dealt with by physics, and "mental" is what is dealt with by psychology. When, accordingly, I speak of "physical" space, I mean the space that occurs in physics."
- Bertrand Russell "An Outline of Philosophy" — Manuel
It's nature is consistent. Not random or chaotic. The strength of gravity and the strong nuclear force, the speed of light, etc., are what they are. They are aspects of its nature that we have noticed, and we call them laws.But it grew up from itself within the framework of laws.
— Patterner
Well, not really. It grew up from within itself in accordance with it's nature and then we called the pattern of that growth "laws." I don't think this is a trivial or nitpicky distinction. — T Clark
It's true that we likely could not have predicted many of these things. There's way too much we don't know or haven't figured out. But us not being able to predict liquidity from three properties of H2O molecules doesn't mean those properties are not directly responsible for liquidity. The physical universe is in the form it is in because of extremely consistent characteristics.Physics expresses itself as chemistry. But the new laws of chemistry are not unrelated to the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were not what they are, the laws of chemistry could not be what they are. The laws of chemistry emerged from, and are dependent upon, the laws of physics.
Same with chemistry expressing itself as biology.
— Patterner
You say "not unrelated to." That makes you seem like a spokesman for reductionism, which I know you're not. I say "not predictable from." To me, that is the essence of why reductionism doesn't work. — T Clark
Yes, I just read that a few weeks ago, as I was trying to learn about semiosis. It is a fascinating point!Here's a snippet I will sometimes quote. It's from Ernst Mayr, who is a mainstream scientist, and it's about the fundamental difference between living organisms and inanimate matter. It has to do with the ability of DNA to store and transmit information for which there is not an analog in the mineral domain.
Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern (neo-darwinian) synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of biological thought [15], p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’
— What is Information?
On a more general level, it is an instance of the principle that information-based systems, which includes organisms, embody a level of organisation which defies reduction to physics and chemistry. There's an often-quoted meme by Norbert Weiner, founder of cybernetics, to wit, 'The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.' — Quixodian
One of the problems of correlationism is making sense of the ancestral world. Emergence looks tempting, despite its problems and complexities. But I really don't know. — plaque flag
First what? — Bob Ross
Prima facie, it doesn’t. However, upon investigation, there are strong inductive arguments for our (1) at least our representative faculties using logic and (2) I would go so far as to say that reality has logic, as a Platonic form, which conditions the universal mind. The ‘realm of appearance’ is informationally-accurate (enough for survival purposes) and, consequently, is an indirect window into the world-in-itself. — Bob Ross
It seems to me that despite the novelty of biological systems, that they are not different in kind, then their chemical substrates. That is to say, they are still not anything like the loose definition I gave of mental events. They are still physical events, — schopenhauer1
it may be the case that "emergence" needs "something" for which to "emerge within" (i.e. a point of view). That is to say, assuming there are these "jumps" (which we call "emergent properties"), whence are these properties taking place? We, as the already-observing observer, have the vantage point of "seeing the emergence" but "where" do these "jumps" take place without a point of view? I guess, as another poster used to say, Where is the epistemic cut?. And also, how would that cut take place without an already-existing observer? What does that new enclosure (of the new emergent property) even look like without a vantage point, or point of view already in the equation?. — schopenhauer1
Basically I am saying, we must keep in mind the incredible difference and distinction between mental and physical versus physical and other physical events. — schopenhauer1
It's nature is consistent. Not random or chaotic. The strength of gravity and the strong nuclear force, the speed of light, etc., are what they are. They are aspects of its nature that we have noticed, and we call them laws. — Patterner
It's true that we likely could not have predicted many of these things. There's way too much we don't know or haven't figured out. — Patterner
But us not being able to predict liquidity from three properties of H2O molecules doesn't mean those properties are not directly responsible for liquidity. — Patterner
Why is that? The world does its thing, one level emerging from the previous, in consistent ways. The more we learn about those ways, the more predictions we are able to make. Things have been a total surprise to us in the past. no one knew enough about anything to have predicted the aurora borealis before people first witnessed it. But people have come to understand things, and we have been able to predict where such things might lead. Einstein figured out a lot of things, which then led to our predictions of the background microwave radiation and gravity waves, which were later confirmed. predicting ways we could use what Einstein figured out, people invented the laser, GPS, and the atomic bomb. I suspect we will predict and invent many other things because of our understanding of the basic principles. So why would we not think what is already known to us, all of which is based on consistent characteristics, could’ve been predicted in principle?It's true that we likely could not have predicted many of these things. There's way too much we don't know or haven't figured out.
— Patterner
The claim is they are not predictable even in principle. — T Clark
Except I do think biological processes are different in kind from physical or chemical processes in the same sense that mental processes are different from biological/neurological processes. — T Clark
I was asking whether you were the real Bob Ross himself or just Bob Ross for Bob Ross.
I feel like you are using logic to prove that you should be allowed to use logic ?
Just like reason, senses are impossible to completely untrust or doubt. I don’t see how the use of comparison representations is any form of circular logic, and it seems to be how we penetrate into the world-in-itself indirectly. — Bob Ross
How do you know that it is good enough for survival purposes ? If the real you and real everything is hidden, you may be doing very badly down there. What's going on 'up here' in representation might be a escapist daydream from starvation down there.
How can you be a direct realist if everything you come to know is filtered through your representative faculties?
As far as I can tell, there's no possible evidence for any kind of relationship
I have never claimed that our understanding that every change has a cause is universally applicable, or that it tells us anything beyond how things seem.
”It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well?” – Bob Ross
What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required
What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises, and their entailments, from which it logically follows.
There is nothing higher than reason (epistemically). You cannot dethrone her without thereby trusting her to be able to dethrone herself, and, thusly, the position of a hard skeptic pertaining to logic is self-refuting. — Bob Ross
I know this because it is much more parsimonious to explain the data of experience by believing that one’s conscious experience is an indirect window into the world-in-itself. — Bob Ross
Why is that?... So why would we not think what is already known to us, all of which is based on consistent characteristics, could’ve been predicted in principle? — Patterner
predictions of the background microwave radiation — Patterner
You misinterpret how “physical” is being used in its juxtaposition to mental. It doesn’t mean “physics” as you seem to be using it. There is a way in which atomic, chemical, biological are physical events that are different in kind than qualia, ideas, what-it’s-likeness and so on. This is what I mean by taking this distinction seriously. — schopenhauer1
A sophisticated direct realism is more parsimonious still.
This is exactly because nothing is higher than reason (for philosophers) AND because the rational discussion is primarily concerned with worldly public objects (the stuff in our world)
I don’t think beliefs can be justified or proven with reason.
Reason is rooted in emotion fundamentally and even then we did make up the rules for it as well. So that sort of blows a few holes in its reliability.
I mean just look at flat earth and vaccine denialism.
Your example doesn’t show you know things beyond mere observation, it’s more just assertions like 1=1.
Science was able to show us the holes in our reasoning through the myriad of unconscious biases we employ each day.
It was not a flaw in reason that these were wrong, but, rather, in one's reasoning. Our faculty of reason is our deployment of logic, modality, etc.: it is not a particular chain of derivation. — Bob Ross
You can only ever use reason: you have no choice. How else would you suggest that you can prove something or warrant a belief? — Bob Ross
But it isn't: you can't account, by my lights, for the fact that our brains are representing the world to us. For example, how do you account for the fact that if your brain is damaged in a particular way, then you lose your ability to see red if you aren't experiencing a representation of the world? — Bob Ross
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