and talk of shit-throwing superstitious monkeys. — Judaka
I really did mean in all in a friendly tone. I paraphrased part of an argument I found in a book that changed my mind about certain relativistic positions I once found convincing. — plaque flag
I think we 'have' to separate logic in its ideal / normative sense from logic as a mere description of our fallible often illogical (in a normative sense) thinking process. I'd say that truly logical thinking ought to compel us. — plaque flag
You call it a strawman, but I don't see why it's a strawman. Pragmatism is close to instrumentalism and the idea of useful fictions. In some version of prag/inst, the claims/beliefs are more like shovels, neither truth nor false, — plaque flag
The issue is that psychological claims are only authoritative if logic is. In our context, I tried to use logic to show that pragmatism has serious issues. We seem to agree that truth is about assertion. But this means truth transcends utility. — plaque flag
The reason why P is true isn't because I "assert it", it's true because the necessary prerequisites to be true have been met, whatever they may be. — Judaka
it's about a correct reference, and the intention is in that. — Judaka
The very idea of rationality is a useful fiction, and the idea of logic is a useful fiction. — Judaka
Of course. That's so obvious that I'm surprised you'd misunderstand me like that. The point I was making is that calling P true is different than calling P useful. — plaque flag
I think I've lost track of what we're talking about, I'm just responding to comments at this point, sorry. I don't have a clear picture of what I'm currently arguing against or what I'm arguing for. — Judaka
If you feel like it, what do you make of the OP ? — plaque flag
I'd say we all see actual worldly real apples when we see, even if we see them from different angles, and even if I'm colorblind and you are nearsighted. We look at and talk about the same apple that is out there in the world. We aren't trapped in a dreambubble.talking about the perceiving of apples. — Judaka
The differentiation might be "agential" in the sense that it is a feature of the agent's sensibility, and carried out through the process of sensation combined with other agential processes, memory anticipation, etc., therefore be inherent within the phenomena, or, it might be performed by the agent's application of logical processes. The application of logic to the sense appearances (phenomena) produces a differentiation which is distinct from the differentiation which inheres within the phenomena, produced by the agent's pre-conscious systems. The application of logic toward understanding any phenomenon as actually different from how it appears in sense perception is what Plato strongly argued for when he insisted that the senses deceive us.
Because of this, the proposed agential separation must be understood as complex and multi-faceted. Consequently, restrictions to differentiation, which are fundamentally within the phenomena, making some aspects of separability of the phenomena appear to be impossible, are not really impossible with the appropriate application of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
According to what I stated above, you need reference to a transcendental reality in order to justify the perspective of "outside". The "new phenomenon" which you propose is not a phenomenon at all, being independent, or "outside" all sense appearances, and simply the basis for propositions or premises for logical proceedings. But unless the propositions can be justified, they are nothing other than imaginary, fictitious fantasies. We might consider the axioms of pure mathematics as an example. These axioms are not "new phenomenon", nor are they grounded in any sort of phenomenon, they are taken to be prior to phenomenon, and this is the way that mathematics gets "outside" phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover
There very clearly is a meaningful distinction to be made between the object and instrument, as there clearly is a distinction to be made between the act of operating, and the thing being operated on. To deny this distinction is simply to deny the reality of the distinction between active and passive. And if we deny this then all things become equally active and passive, such that we rob ourselves of any principles of causation, along with any hope of understanding temporal reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ah, I see. I was trying to explain how some ordinary situations inspired some philosophers to think that we don't see real objects at all but only representations of them. — plaque flag
Ah, I see, so I guess I was right when I thought your OP was talking about something I'd consider common sense — Judaka
:up:This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.” — Possibility
But I do reject scientific realism ('mind-independent objects'), and that part probably goes against commonsense. — plaque flag
It's a vague term, so let me specify what I reject.What do you reject about scientific realism? — Judaka
Can you provide an example of an issue that convinced you to reject scientific realism? Or do you just take it to be semantically inaccurate? — Judaka
To tell you what you already know, we have a lot of corroborating factors involved, for example, I see a table in front of me, I then reach out and I can touch it in the place I saw it, and then I put my water bottle on top of it. All of that seemingly validates my vision. Hence our ability to know about hallucinations and illusions, where corroborating factors are scarce or contradictory. — Judaka
The semantic issue is that we can't give any meaning to the world-in-itself that isn't stolen from the world-for-us. — plaque flag
On the other hand, I live as a consciousness, and that's my reality, the world began when I was born, and will end when I die. — Judaka
I'd need a reason to care, and some pros and cons before I could begin thinking about it. Not that I expect you to provide me with that, by the way. — Judaka
What I am suggesting is that there are strong indications that it must be possible to objectively determine 'the past'. And, the reason why we cannot, at the current position of human evolution is that we have not established the necessary logical premises. I would also propose that the only way to "objectively determine 'the past'" is to establish a very clear and unambiguous understanding of "the present". "The present" is where the future and past meet. The required principles (premises) are not as you propose, a clear distinction between past and present, and future and present, because this would leave the entirety of "the present" as inconsistent with both the past and the future, rendering "the present" as completely unintelligible from any temporal, empirically derived principles. This sense of "the present" gives us eternal immutable Platonic Forms, along with the so-called "interaction problem", and it validates the realm of imaginary, fictitious and fantastic mathematical axioms So the required principles are not as such, but I propose that they are those which establish a clear distinction between past and future.
So the problem which is now arising, is that Newtonian physics, and the physics of "objects" in general are based in a faulty understanding of "the present". The object is represented by Newton's first law as a static continuity of being, staying the same through time, eternally, unless caused by a force to change. The object is then represented by its past existence, and the cause of change to it, is generally represented as the past existence of another object which exerts a force. The consequence of this model is determinism.
The problem which I mentioned is that this is not a proper representation of the object's past existence, because it is actually produced with a view toward the future. The purpose or intent is to model the continued existence of the the object, into the future, for the sake of prediction. Generally speaking, this is the purpose of the conception of "mass" to show a continuity of the object from past into future through inertia. The issue is that this supposed continuity between past and future, is not real. It has been created just for that purpose of prediction. And this presupposes that eternal continuous existence of the object, at the present, unless caused to change. That is temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Quantum physics requires a new logical framework that understands the constitutive role of the measurement process in the construction of knowledge. — Barad
This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.”
— Possibility
:up:
I relate to this. People tend to forget the crucial 'contribution' of the 'subject.' This subject is
the 'ontological community' or 'the Conversation,' which is not outside of the reality it articulates but arguably its necessary center. — plaque flag
In ironic contrast to the misconception that would equate performativity with a form of linguistic monism that takes language to be the stuff of reality, performativity is properly understood as a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve. — Barad
I think the difference between your position and mine (or Barad’s), though, is that we don’t believe there is an inherent distinction of the ‘subject’ - certainly not as necessarily central to the reality it articulates. There’s a ‘Copernican Turn’ of sorts required here, to decentralise language, if we are to more accurately understand reality and our role in it. — Possibility
Bohr’s phenomena is more complex than Kant’s phenomena (‘sense appearances’), in that they include ‘all relevant features of the experimental arrangement’. That is, phenomena as I’m referring to here would also incorporate ‘the agent’, their ‘processes’ and ‘systems’ as you’ve described here, as well as the ‘object’ of their sensibility. — Possibility
Agency is not a property of certain ‘agents’ to varying degrees. The inherent dynamism of a reality that consists not of objects in time but of interrelating events (Rovelli) / intra-acting phenomena (Barad) IS agency. — Possibility
I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality. — Possibility
It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility
In my interpretation of Kant, the agent is incorporated into the phenomena though the means of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. These are necessary conditions for the existence of phenomena. The exact status of any 'object' might be somewhat ambiguous, because there is a distinction between the object as phenomenal, and the thing in itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Interrelating events" is the terminology of process philosophy. What Whitehead demonstrated with his process philosophy is that this perspective runs into a very real problem with the issue of how events are related to one another. To begin with, the division of reality into distinct events is somewhat problematic, because the divisions are to a degree arbitrary. But if there is real distinctions, then "an event" takes the place of an object, as a distinct entity, but such assumed "occasions" require relational principles for their existential reality and presentation as phenomena. So Whitehead uses the concepts of prehension, and concrescence to explain relations between events.
The relevant point here is that if reality is broken down into events, then the need for relations between events, to produce a model of continuity as we experience in phenomena, causes the positing of subjective principles (agential activities of creation) to account for the reality of these relations. The result is a panpsychism, because these subjective principles are a requirement for reality as we experience it.
The issue I believe, is that the "event" incorporates space and time into its conception as necessary preconditions for its reality. So, while Kant places space and time as intuitions proper to the human agent, here space and time are already presumed as inherent within the fabric of the universe, as necessary conditions for the fundament feature, the event. Now space and time are external to the human agent, but external agential concepts are now required to explain the reality of phenomenal appearances. This is why Whitehead ultimately turned to God, having no other way to account for the existence of the panpsychic elements which he found necessary to posit, in order to hold his reality together, in the unified form which we experience.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Elementary particles, photons and quanta of gravity - or rather ‘quanta of space’… do not exist immersed in space; rather, they themselves form that space. The spatiality of the world consists of the web of their interactions. They do not dwell in time: they interact incessantly with each other, and indeed exist only in terms of their incessant interactions. — Carlo Rovelli
It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved.
— Possibility
Can you explain to me in clear and unambiguous terms, just what "intra-action" means? — Metaphysician Undercover
In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements. — Karen Barad
I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality.
— Possibility
As I said, I think that the passive/active distinction is necessary in order to understand causation, and this is necessary in order to understand temporal reality. Without this, two distinct events cannot be ordered in time, because it is necessary to understand how one acts one the other, to produce a causal understanding, and therefore a temporal order. Without this distinction, events would be interacting, but there would be no way to order them temporally without determining what part of which event is causing what part of the other event. There is just interaction, and this provides no information for temporal order therefore a deficient understanding of reality.. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no single time: there is a different duration for every trajectory; and time passes at different rhythms according to place and according to speed.
It is not directional: the difference between past and future does not exist in the elemental equations of the world. Its orientation is merely a contingent aspect that appears when we look at things and neglect the details.
The notion of the ‘present’ does not work: in the vast universe there is nothing that we can reasonably call ‘present’.
The substratum that determines the duration of time is not an independent entity, different from the others that make up the world; it is an aspect of a dynamic field. It jumps, fluctuates, materialises only by interacting, and is not found beneath a minimum scale….
The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time….
The temporal relations between events are more complex than we previously thought, but they do not cease to exist on account of this. The relations of filiation do not establish a global order, but this does not make them illusory. If we are not all in single file, it does not follow that there are no relations between us. Change, what happens - this is not an illusion….
To describe the world, the time variable is not required. What is required are variables that actually describe it: quantities we can perceive, observe and eventually measure…If we find a sufficient number of variables that remain synchronised enough in relation to each other, it is convenient to speak of when.
There is no need in any of this to choose a privileged variable and call it ‘time’. What we need, if we want to do science, is a theory that tells us how variables change with respect to each other. That is to say, how one changes when others change. The fundamental theory of the world use be constructed in this way; it does not need a time variable: it needs to tell us only how things that we see in the world vary with respect to each other. That is to say, what the relations may be between these variables….
The world without a time variable is not a complicated one. It’s a net of interconnected events, where the variables in play adhere to probabilistic rules which, incredibly, we know for a good part how to write. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’
Kant does not include the human, experiencing ‘agent’, within the phenomenon - which is also a necessary condition for the existence of phenomena. This is an important distinction. — Possibility
I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…? — Possibility
If you look at Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of relational quantum mechanics, it’s not so problematic. First of all, there is no ‘division of reality into distinct events’ - this is a misunderstanding of the structure of spacetime. If you’ve ever watched the interaction of ocean waves, you might have some understanding as to why this notion of ‘distinct events’ is the wrong way to even begin to explain the relational structure of four-dimensional reality. — Possibility
‘Intra’ as opposed to ‘inter’ action implies that the action happens within, rather than between.
But it’s Barad neologism, so I’ll let them explain it:
In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements.
— Karen Barad — Possibility
This is why I recommended Rovelli. It’s not a deficient understanding of reality at all - it’s just not a global, externally imposed order. It’s a local, internal one. And there is no aspect of reality that is entirely ‘passive’. — Possibility
The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time…. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’
To describe the world, the time variable is not required. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’
I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…?
— Possibility
Of course it's deliberate. I am a philosopher, not a physicist. I am here to discuss philosophy not physics. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider the following "the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action".
What is being criticized by Barad here, is the notion of distinct entities interacting. This would imply that the entities preexist the activities which are described as interactions. So Barad replaces interaction with intra-action, and says that "intra-action" is responsible for, or the cause of existence of the entities. But where does that leave "intra-action"? It cannot be an activity which involves the mentioned entities, because it is prior to them, as the cause of their existence. So what kind of activity is this? It cannot be within the objects, because it's prior to the objects' very existence. Therefore it must be activity of some other sort, which is the cause of the existence of the entities. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that the idea of "global, externally imposed order" is not sufficient. However, I believe that the "local internal one" as described, is also deficient. I agree with many of the principles here, but there is a difficulty with language, and also a difficulty with the concept of space-time.
The existing concept of space does not allow that there is anything internal to a non-dimensional point. and this is what denies the reality of the concept of a local, internally imposed order. By our current spatial-temporal conceptions, all activity must be within space-time. This is because time is conceived of as logically posterior to space, it is the fourth dimension, and time is required for activity. So all activity is represented as spatial activity because time, which is essential to activity, follows from spatial existence.
What is required in order to understand any proposed "internal order", is to allow that time is prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, because this allows for temporal activity which is non-spatial, as prior to spatial activity. Then we can conceive of activity within the non-dimensional point. — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by ‘pre-exist’? Do you mean outside of time? What is being criticised is the notion of distinct entities ‘pre-existing’ their material-discursive involvement in reality. Intra-actions are causal but non-deterministic - the entities only ever exist as such within intra-actions. The assumption that potential and actual must exist as temporally ordered notions is false. — Possibility
Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering. — Possibility
My own understanding of physics suggests that spacetime emerged through differentiation or diffraction, rather than as a geometric rendering. That is, in a 4-3-2-1 progression. But if you refuse to discuss physics, then I’m at a loss as to how to present evidence of this. — Possibility
What I mean by pre-exist is to exist before, prior in time. So, for instance, two objects can exist without interacting if there is the required spatial-temporal separation between them. These objects would pre-exist any interaction which later developed. Common conceptions of "interaction" assume that objects pre-exist their interactions, in this way. That's expressed by Newton's laws. The first law makes a claim about the existence of an object which is not interacting, then the other laws bring in interaction. So non-interacting is assumed as the pre-existing condition. — Metaphysician Undercover
To restate the problem in a different way, "intra-action" as described by Barad, suggests activity which is prior in time to the objects which are engaged in the activity. This is why it is not "interactivity", it is proposed as some sort of activity from which the objects which are described by Newton's laws, come into existence (emerge). The exact problem is that the passage of time is understood and measured relative to the physical objects which are supposed to come into existence through intra-activity, and whose interactions are understood by Newton's laws. Therefore this proposed activity is incoherent because there is no time in which it takes place. The Newtonian movements of physical objects, in conjubction with the boundary, or limit of electromagnetism are the principles by which time is understood and measured, so prior to physical objects there is not time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, if intra-action is proposed as an activity which is prior to, as cause of , the existence of physical objects, then we have np principles to understand this causal force, this supposed type of activity, because it is a type of activity which is outside of time, by our current conceptions of time, hence Rovelli's description of "the absence of time" as "a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events". What Rovelli means, is exactly as I say above, prior to the existence of physical objects there is an absence of time (by the precepts of our current conception of time) and this renders all activity, or events as unintelligible, "boundless and disorderly".[/i]
No, Rovelli is not referring to a ‘prior to the existence of physical objects’ at all. He’s referring to an absence of independent linear conceptions of time; to an understanding of reality in which everything is intra-action, occurring within the variable value configurations of spacetime.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly, what this indicates is that our current conception of time is inadequate for understanding this realm of activity which has been dubbed as "intra-action". It leaves this activity as appearing to be occurring in the absence of time, activity from which time emerges along with physical objects, therefore the activity appears as boundless and disorderly, completely unintelligible to us as "activity", activity being something we understand as occurring within time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering.
— Possibility
It is in a way, a sequential ordering, because it makes time an attribute of space. So conceptually, time follows from space as space is logically prior to time. That is why time is understood as an attribute of space, and space cannot be understood as an attribute of time, by the conventional conception of space-time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Newton’s first law makes a claim about the existence of an object that is assumed to not be interacting, but there are, in fact, measurement interactions going on. — Possibility
Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime. — Possibility
The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. — Possibility
The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. This is not Newton’s ‘object’-in-time assumed as a pre-existing individual entity with inherent boundaries and properties. — Possibility
Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’. — Possibility
We need to recognise that ‘activity’ occurs within spacetime - how one activity relates to another. — Possibility
“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time. — Possibility
Time is not an attribute of space - both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are attributes of spacetime. When you’re speaking of ‘time’ here, you’re referring to a linear conception of time. Yet time is localised not just in space, but in spacetime. There is no evidence that space is prior to time, and plenty of evidence that events in nature occur without first being attributed to boundaried and propertied objects. — Possibility
As a ‘logical’ sequence these numbered dimensions correspond to how WE construct our representations of space and time - not how spacetime exists, or even how we come to distinguish ‘dimensions’ as such. — Possibility
Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime.
— Possibility
You still have not provided me with a good explanation as to what "intra-action" means, so why can't we just call the measurement process Interaction? — Metaphysician Undercover
The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another.
— Possibility
I don't think that this is the case. The independent existence of the objects, which provide the basis for the measurement of time is taken for granted, as a given, like I explained is the case with Newton's first law. So it does not matter if it's the earth and sun, quartz crystal, or cesium atoms which provide the basis for measurement, they are all objects whose spatial presence is taken for granted.
And again, I do not see the need for "intra-action" here. Why not just describe the measurement of time as an interaction between the human beings doing the measurement, and the object (sun, quartz crystal, cesium atom) which is being used to provide the temporal stability. — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree. As I explained, we need to understand activity as prior to space. And since activity requires time, time must be prior to space as well. And, since the concept of "spacetime" does not allow for this conception, it must be dismissed as inadequate. — Metaphysician Undercover
But these objects which we use for the measurement of time are Newtonian objects. I don't think that this can be denied. It is the stability of mass, in its temporal extension (inertia), which gives us the capacity to measure time. I don't think we can pretend that it is anything other than this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’.
— Possibility
This appears self-contradicting to me. If the object emerges from the activity then the activity is necessarily prior to the object. That's what "emerges" means. — Metaphysician Undercover
“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time.
— Possibility
As I explained, this is incoherent. "An event" is itself necessarily ordered in time, that's what "an event" is. It's incoherent to speak of events which are not ordered in time. — Metaphysician Undercover
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