and talk of shit-throwing superstitious monkeys. — Judaka

I really didn't mean that to come off as shrill. I was just trying to be vivid about the implications of irrationalism. The culture of personal responsibility and freedom is 'based on' or 'equivalent to' a normative conception of rationality. An instrumentalist concept has us confusing ourselves with optimization algorithms. And this confusion is tempting because it looks daring and openminded and unsentimental. And my harping on the normativity of rationality looks sentimental. But my motives are primarily logical. I want to tell the unsentimental and 'embarrassing' truth --- that ethics is first philosophy.

I really did mean in all in a friendly tone. I paraphrased part of an argument I found in a book that changed my mind about certain relativistic positions I once found convincing. — plaque flag

No worries.

I think we 'have' to separate logic in its ideal / normative sense from logic as a mere description of our fallible often illogical (in a normative sense) thinking process. I'd say that truly logical thinking ought to compel us. — plaque flag

English is cunning, the way logical refers to logic-based thinking but also just "clear and good" thinking I find intentionally deceptive. By "logical" thinking, you mean "good", including where logical implies good because it must be good, right? We refer to thinking as good thinking to call it good. If you'd never refer to bad thinking as "truly logical", why is it wrong to think of "truly logical thinking" as just "good thinking"? If "truly logical thinking" includes bad thinking, then give me an example.

You call it a strawman, but I don't see why it's a strawman. Pragmatism is close to instrumentalism and the idea of useful fictions. In some version of prag/inst, the claims/beliefs are more like shovels, neither truth nor false, — plaque flag

I'll reiterate that my view is that truth is created when it is correct to reference something as something. Which includes things that are subjective, such as that something is "overpriced". That's just how language and thought work, I don't know of an alternative.

The issue is that psychological claims are only authoritative if logic is. In our context, I tried to use logic to show that pragmatism has serious issues. We seem to agree that truth is about assertion. But this means truth transcends utility. — plaque flag

I don't find the involvement of these terms helpful, but I do find your critique of pragmatism to be a straw man. Logic and truth are necessary for language, and just thinking, that's part of why they're fickle, they have to be, otherwise, people wouldn't be able to express themselves. I would disagree with you also by saying that truth isn't "about" assertion, while there's an implicit assertion, it's about a correct reference, and the intention is in that.

The reason why P is true isn't because I "assert it", it's true because the necessary prerequisites to be true have been met, whatever they may be. This is to say, things aren't "overpriced" just whenever I feel like it, I have an understanding of what it means for something to be overpriced that must be qualified for, my understanding is influenced by a myriad of factors, cultural, social, and economic. It can be contested, and you could show my thinking to be unreasonable using a variety of tools and arguments.

Therefore, truth isn't influenced by "consensus", ironically, it's instead your precious concepts that are influenced by consensus. The very idea of rationality is a useful fiction, and the idea of logic is a useful fiction. I could take your critiques of pragmatism, and apply them to your concepts, though, it's not a critique I want to make. As surely, any pragmatist would defend the ideas of logic and rationality using the merits of their usefulness, I wonder if that doesn't describe you as well.

The reason why P is true isn't because I "assert it", it's true because the necessary prerequisites to be true have been met, whatever they may be. — Judaka

Of course. That's so obvious that I'm surprised you'd misunderstand me like that. The point I was making is that calling P true is different than calling P useful.

it's about a correct reference, and the intention is in that. — Judaka

I agree that the world is intended. There's all kinds of philosophy written about the relationship of true statements (linguistic and/or conceptual) and the world. I think Husserl's idea of a fulfilling intuition is pretty good on this matter. I can claim there are plums in the icebox from the back yard. That's an 'empty' intention. But I can go look in the icebox and have my intention fulfilled by seeing the plums. 'Categorial intuition' might be a necessary posit here, but I'm OK with that as a phenomenological direct realist.

The very idea of rationality is a useful fiction, and the idea of logic is a useful fiction. — Judaka

I think I've made a case already that that's just confused unjustifiable irrationalism. How could you begin to make a case for the unreality or impossibility of making a case ? Are we back to utility being truth ? Because I'll grant that philosophy is foolish in worldly terms.

Of course. That's so obvious that I'm surprised you'd misunderstand me like that. The point I was making is that calling P true is different than calling P useful. — plaque flag

Fair enough, I suppose I don't understand your point. I don't think we can just use the word "true" by itself without context. I want to know what is true, and depending on what is true and why, I'd compare that to calling something useful. Otherwise, I don't think any comparison could be made.

I think I've lost track of what we're talking about, I'm just responding to comments at this point, sorry. I don't have a clear picture of what I'm currently arguing against or what I'm arguing for.

I think I've lost track of what we're talking about, I'm just responding to comments at this point, sorry. I don't have a clear picture of what I'm currently arguing against or what I'm arguing for. — Judaka

I respect the honesty, and I'm sorry that I wasn't more careful with my words. If you feel like it, what do you make of the OP ? I think we moved from that quickly of right away. But I'd like to hear your opinion on it.

If you feel like it, what do you make of the OP ? — plaque flag

I'm not sure. My main criticism was that it seems like you're conflating perception and understanding. You talk about the reports of your acquaintance being biased to set up "subjectivity", but then start talking about the perceiving of apples. So, I don't really get it, but I do find it hard to understand, so maybe that's the issue.

Ah, I see. I was trying to explain how some ordinary situations inspired some philosophers to think that we don't see real objects at all but only representations of them.

Basically they went from us seeing the same actual world differently to us each seeing our own private 'internal' world and not seeing the common real world at all.

talking about the perceiving of apples. — Judaka

I'd say we all see actual worldly real apples when we see, even if we see them from different angles, and even if I'm colorblind and you are nearsighted. We look at and talk about the same apple that is out there in the world. We aren't trapped in a dreambubble.

The differentiation might be "agential" in the sense that it is a feature of the agent's sensibility, and carried out through the process of sensation combined with other agential processes, memory anticipation, etc., therefore be inherent within the phenomena, or, it might be performed by the agent's application of logical processes. The application of logic to the sense appearances (phenomena) produces a differentiation which is distinct from the differentiation which inheres within the phenomena, produced by the agent's pre-conscious systems. The application of logic toward understanding any phenomenon as actually different from how it appears in sense perception is what Plato strongly argued for when he insisted that the senses deceive us.

Because of this, the proposed agential separation must be understood as complex and multi-faceted. Consequently, restrictions to differentiation, which are fundamentally within the phenomena, making some aspects of separability of the phenomena appear to be impossible, are not really impossible with the appropriate application of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

The distinction you’re referring to here is between two different phenomena: in the first, ‘the agent’ is involved in producing their ‘sense appearances’, but in the second ‘the agent’ is thinking about the production of sense appearances (the first phenomenon) - in which case ‘the agent’ from the first is bounded and propertied differently to ‘the agent’ from the second, and the distinction between sensation and memory in the second is probabilistic at best.

But perhaps I need to clarify a couple of things before we continue:

Bohr’s phenomena is more complex than Kant’s phenomena (‘sense appearances’), in that they include ‘all relevant features of the experimental arrangement’. That is, phenomena as I’m referring to here would also incorporate ‘the agent’, their ‘processes’ and ‘systems’ as you’ve described here, as well as the ‘object’ of their sensibility.

Agency is not a property of certain ‘agents’ to varying degrees. The inherent dynamism of a reality that consists not of objects in time but of interrelating events (Rovelli) / intra-acting phenomena (Barad) IS agency.

According to what I stated above, you need reference to a transcendental reality in order to justify the perspective of "outside". The "new phenomenon" which you propose is not a phenomenon at all, being independent, or "outside" all sense appearances, and simply the basis for propositions or premises for logical proceedings. But unless the propositions can be justified, they are nothing other than imaginary, fictitious fantasies. We might consider the axioms of pure mathematics as an example. These axioms are not "new phenomenon", nor are they grounded in any sort of phenomenon, they are taken to be prior to phenomenon, and this is the way that mathematics gets "outside" phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

The new phenomenon isn’t independent, though. ‘Outside’ is in scare quotes precisely because being ‘outside’ one phenomenon is necessarily described (quantum mechanically) from ‘inside’ another. We’re not talking about objects or passive observing instruments here, but relational configurations as 4D events/phenomena, each with their own time relativity, entanglements and superpositioning.

I do get what you’re saying, though - there needs to be logical structure to understanding phenomena from the ‘outside’. As far as I can see, that’s quantum mechanics. The ongoing issues physicists have with using words to describe a reality that aligns with quantum mechanics, are the same ones we’re running into here. Newtonian assumptions are embedded in our language use.

Let’s see if we agree on the following:

• Reality consists of events/phenomena, not objects; material-discursive practices, not words.
• Events/phenomena are not sequentially ordered in a fixed linear temporality, but intra-act as 4D systems, with their own time relativity.

There very clearly is a meaningful distinction to be made between the object and instrument, as there clearly is a distinction to be made between the act of operating, and the thing being operated on. To deny this distinction is simply to deny the reality of the distinction between active and passive. And if we deny this then all things become equally active and passive, such that we rob ourselves of any principles of causation, along with any hope of understanding temporal reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality.

Ah, I see. I was trying to explain how some ordinary situations inspired some philosophers to think that we don't see real objects at all but only representations of them. — plaque flag

Ah, I see, so I guess I was right when I thought your OP was talking about something I'd consider common sense. As our discussion progressed, my criticism of the OP was quickly resolved, but I still didn't fully understand it, I have a better understanding now, but yeah, I've got nothing to add.

Ah, I see, so I guess I was right when I thought your OP was talking about something I'd consider common sense — Judaka

I think it is a defense of common sense against the rampant indirect realism found among philosophers.

But I do reject scientific realism ('mind-independent objects'), and that part probably goes against commonsense.

This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.” — Possibility

:up:
I relate to this. People tend to forget the crucial 'contribution' of the 'subject.' This subject is
the 'ontological community' or 'the Conversation,' which is not outside of the reality it articulates but arguably its necessary center.

But I do reject scientific realism ('mind-independent objects'), and that part probably goes against commonsense. — plaque flag

What do you reject about scientific realism?

What do you reject about scientific realism? — Judaka

It's a vague term, so let me specify what I reject.

Metaphysically, realism is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

Note that I am still a phenomenological direct realist. The world is real, but I anthropomorphically insist that we pretty much tautologically can only talk meaningfully about the world as it is entangled with the human nervous system.

Has anyone ever seen the world without eyes and a brain ? The world is given, so far as we know, perspectively, through this or that pair of eyes. Consciousness is just the being of the world from a perspective.

Note that this nervous system is part of the world, so it's a bit like the world looking at itself, but that looking can't be removed except within a potentially useful fiction.

What are the significant characteristics involved with being reliant on the human nervous system?

To tell you what you already know, we have a lot of corroborating factors involved, for example, I see a table in front of me, I then reach out and I can touch it in the place I saw it, and then I put my water bottle on top of it. All of that seemingly validates my vision. Hence our ability to know about hallucinations and illusions, where corroborating factors are scarce or contradictory.

Can you provide an example of an issue that convinced you to reject scientific realism? Or do you just take it to be semantically inaccurate?

Can you provide an example of an issue that convinced you to reject scientific realism? Or do you just take it to be semantically inaccurate? — Judaka

Mostly the second. Let me explain why I find it problematic. If we [try to] imagine what the world is like without us looking at it, we are just using our living brain to remember what the world looks through our human eyes while pretending we aren't there ---- but we are still there, doing the imagining.

What makes scientific realism so tempting is that we people come and go in this world that endures as a stage for this coming and going. And yet this universal stage is still, as far as we know from experience, given only perspectively ---to and through the actors on this same stage. Entangled.

The semantic issue is that we can't give any meaning to the world-in-itself that isn't stolen from the world-for-us.

To tell you what you already know, we have a lot of corroborating factors involved, for example, I see a table in front of me, I then reach out and I can touch it in the place I saw it, and then I put my water bottle on top of it. All of that seemingly validates my vision. Hence our ability to know about hallucinations and illusions, where corroborating factors are scarce or contradictory. — Judaka

I'm a direct realist. The world is real and we look at it and not at some representation of it. Consciousness is just the being of the world for you or me. But we are entangled with it. It's not a dream, but it's also not a thing that's part from us ---or at least I can't make sense of such a claim.

Your hallucination is real and it exists in our shared world. You just have different access to that particular entity. It's still inferentially linked to all other entities, or it'd be meaningless. No dualism needed. Different kinds of entities in the world. Toothaches are as real as pennies. You can't see my lamp. I can't see your toothache. We can both see $\sqrt{2}$ according to our preparedness to look at it (with different intensities of understanding, because maybe one of us knows more math).

The semantic issue is that we can't give any meaning to the world-in-itself that isn't stolen from the world-for-us. — plaque flag

I'll give that there's some faith involved in thinking of a mind-independent world, I don't experience it, but I believe it's there. On the other hand, I live as a consciousness, and that's my reality, the world began when I was born, and will end when I die. I'd need a reason to care, and some pros and cons before I could begin thinking about it. Not that I expect you to provide me with that, by the way.

On the other hand, I live as a consciousness, and that's my reality, the world began when I was born, and will end when I die. — Judaka

:up:

I'd just say that the world you live in is also my world --- but from a different perspective. The world that we can reason about together must be the world we share.

I'd need a reason to care, and some pros and cons before I could begin thinking about it. Not that I expect you to provide me with that, by the way. — Judaka

This is connected to my thread about the foolishness of philosophy. Some issues have no obvious practical relevance, and yet some of us sometimes really like trying to get clear on such issues. Maybe (I don't know) some of this could help with interpretations of theories in physics, but that's not why I do it. It's the challenge of telling the most coherent story.

What I am suggesting is that there are strong indications that it must be possible to objectively determine 'the past'. And, the reason why we cannot, at the current position of human evolution is that we have not established the necessary logical premises. I would also propose that the only way to "objectively determine 'the past'" is to establish a very clear and unambiguous understanding of "the present". "The present" is where the future and past meet. The required principles (premises) are not as you propose, a clear distinction between past and present, and future and present, because this would leave the entirety of "the present" as inconsistent with both the past and the future, rendering "the present" as completely unintelligible from any temporal, empirically derived principles. This sense of "the present" gives us eternal immutable Platonic Forms, along with the so-called "interaction problem", and it validates the realm of imaginary, fictitious and fantastic mathematical axioms So the required principles are not as such, but I propose that they are those which establish a clear distinction between past and future.

So the problem which is now arising, is that Newtonian physics, and the physics of "objects" in general are based in a faulty understanding of "the present". The object is represented by Newton's first law as a static continuity of being, staying the same through time, eternally, unless caused by a force to change. The object is then represented by its past existence, and the cause of change to it, is generally represented as the past existence of another object which exerts a force. The consequence of this model is determinism.

The problem which I mentioned is that this is not a proper representation of the object's past existence, because it is actually produced with a view toward the future. The purpose or intent is to model the continued existence of the the object, into the future, for the sake of prediction. Generally speaking, this is the purpose of the conception of "mass" to show a continuity of the object from past into future through inertia. The issue is that this supposed continuity between past and future, is not real. It has been created just for that purpose of prediction. And this presupposes that eternal continuous existence of the object, at the present, unless caused to change. That is temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read this far too late at night, and am now re-reading it after some sleep. The clearest distinction between past and future is an understanding of ‘the present’ not as an object, but as a phenomenon, or quantum mechanical system. Forget objects - you’re not going to get anywhere with those. So, it’s not just about coming up with principles, but recognising that the structure of reality as we describe it has to change.

The conception of ‘mass’ is more clearly understood as a measurement process - that is, a phenomenon in Bohr’s sense of the entirety of an experimental arrangement. You’re still looking for this linear continuity that you can call ‘time’, but the very concept of ‘time’ as we commonly understand it is also a measurement process in itself.

Quantum physics requires a new logical framework that understands the constitutive role of the measurement process in the construction of knowledge. — Barad

We need to stop assuming that nouns in our use of language are observer-independent objects, and start seeing them as material-discursive practices instead. All of them. As quantum mechanical systems whose values, boundaries and properties are relative to an embodied (temporal) intra-action. This doesn’t render ‘the present’ unintelligible, and doesn’t imply the existence of “eternal immutable Platonic Forms”. Quite the opposite. It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved.

This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.”
— Possibility
:up:
I relate to this. People tend to forget the crucial 'contribution' of the 'subject.' This subject is
the 'ontological community' or 'the Conversation,' which is not outside of the reality it articulates but arguably its necessary center. — plaque flag

I think the difference between your position and mine (or Barad’s), though, is that we don’t believe there is an inherent distinction of the ‘subject’ - certainly not as necessarily central to the reality it articulates. There’s a ‘Copernican Turn’ of sorts required here, to decentralise language, if we are to more accurately understand reality and our role in it.

In ironic contrast to the misconception that would equate performativity with a form of linguistic monism that takes language to be the stuff of reality, performativity is properly understood as a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve. — Barad

I think the difference between your position and mine (or Barad’s), though, is that we don’t believe there is an inherent distinction of the ‘subject’ - certainly not as necessarily central to the reality it articulates. There’s a ‘Copernican Turn’ of sorts required here, to decentralise language, if we are to more accurately understand reality and our role in it. — Possibility

Perhaps you are making some anti-logocentric point about 'knowing' reality nondiscursively. I readily grant that conceptuality is merely one 'dimension' or 'aspect' of a reality is also colorful and loud and feelingful and smells like beer or cotton candy. If that's the case, it's a basically Romantic point I can relate to.

But our own central contribution to the world's conceptual aspect looks hard to deny, especially given the role of thinkers in determining/articulating precisely that --- even to say such is not the case. What else could we be doing here ? And the more radical our intentions, the more radically the world's 'meaningstructure' is potentially shaken by us.

Bohr’s phenomena is more complex than Kant’s phenomena (‘sense appearances’), in that they include ‘all relevant features of the experimental arrangement’. That is, phenomena as I’m referring to here would also incorporate ‘the agent’, their ‘processes’ and ‘systems’ as you’ve described here, as well as the ‘object’ of their sensibility. — Possibility

In my interpretation of Kant, the agent is incorporated into the phenomena though the means of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. These are necessary conditions for the existence of phenomena. The exact status of any 'object' might be somewhat ambiguous, because there is a distinction between the object as phenomenal, and the thing in itself.

Agency is not a property of certain ‘agents’ to varying degrees. The inherent dynamism of a reality that consists not of objects in time but of interrelating events (Rovelli) / intra-acting phenomena (Barad) IS agency. — Possibility

"Interrelating events" is the terminology of process philosophy. What Whitehead demonstrated with his process philosophy is that this perspective runs into a very real problem with the issue of how events are related to one another. To begin with, the division of reality into distinct events is somewhat problematic, because the divisions are to a degree arbitrary. But if there is real distinctions, then "an event" takes the place of an object, as a distinct entity, but such assumed "occasions" require relational principles for their existential reality and presentation as phenomena. So Whitehead uses the concepts of prehension, and concrescence to explain relations between events.

The relevant point here is that if reality is broken down into events, then the need for relations between events, to produce a model of continuity as we experience in phenomena, causes the positing of subjective principles (agential activities of creation) to account for the reality of these relations. The result is a panpsychism, because these subjective principles are a requirement for reality as we experience it.

The issue I believe, is that the "event" incorporates space and time into its conception as necessary preconditions for its reality. So, while Kant places space and time as intuitions proper to the human agent, here space and time are already presumed as inherent within the fabric of the universe, as necessary conditions for the fundament feature, the event. Now space and time are external to the human agent, but external agential concepts are now required to explain the reality of phenomenal appearances. This is why Whitehead ultimately turned to God, having no other way to account for the existence of the panpsychic elements which he found necessary to posit, in order to hold his reality together, in the unified form which we experience..

I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality. — Possibility

As I said, I think that the passive/active distinction is necessary in order to understand causation, and this is necessary in order to understand temporal reality. Without this, two distinct events cannot be ordered in time, because it is necessary to understand how one acts one the other, to produce a causal understanding, and therefore a temporal order. Without this distinction, events would be interacting, but there would be no way to order them temporally without determining what part of which event is causing what part of the other event. There is just interaction, and this provides no information for temporal order therefore a deficient understanding of reality..

It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

Can you explain to me in clear and unambiguous terms, just what "intra-action" means?

In my interpretation of Kant, the agent is incorporated into the phenomena though the means of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. These are necessary conditions for the existence of phenomena. The exact status of any 'object' might be somewhat ambiguous, because there is a distinction between the object as phenomenal, and the thing in itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant does not include the human, experiencing ‘agent’, within the phenomenon - which is also a necessary condition for the existence of phenomena. This is an important distinction.

"Interrelating events" is the terminology of process philosophy. What Whitehead demonstrated with his process philosophy is that this perspective runs into a very real problem with the issue of how events are related to one another. To begin with, the division of reality into distinct events is somewhat problematic, because the divisions are to a degree arbitrary. But if there is real distinctions, then "an event" takes the place of an object, as a distinct entity, but such assumed "occasions" require relational principles for their existential reality and presentation as phenomena. So Whitehead uses the concepts of prehension, and concrescence to explain relations between events.

The relevant point here is that if reality is broken down into events, then the need for relations between events, to produce a model of continuity as we experience in phenomena, causes the positing of subjective principles (agential activities of creation) to account for the reality of these relations. The result is a panpsychism, because these subjective principles are a requirement for reality as we experience it.

The issue I believe, is that the "event" incorporates space and time into its conception as necessary preconditions for its reality. So, while Kant places space and time as intuitions proper to the human agent, here space and time are already presumed as inherent within the fabric of the universe, as necessary conditions for the fundament feature, the event. Now space and time are external to the human agent, but external agential concepts are now required to explain the reality of phenomenal appearances. This is why Whitehead ultimately turned to God, having no other way to account for the existence of the panpsychic elements which he found necessary to posit, in order to hold his reality together, in the unified form which we experience.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…?

If you look at Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of relational quantum mechanics, it’s not so problematic. First of all, there is no ‘division of reality into distinct events’ - this is a misunderstanding of the structure of spacetime. If you’ve ever watched the interaction of ocean waves, you might have some understanding as to why this notion of ‘distinct events’ is the wrong way to even begin to explain the relational structure of four-dimensional reality.

Elementary particles, photons and quanta of gravity - or rather ‘quanta of space’… do not exist immersed in space; rather, they themselves form that space. The spatiality of the world consists of the web of their interactions. They do not dwell in time: they interact incessantly with each other, and indeed exist only in terms of their incessant interactions. — Carlo Rovelli

As I said before, it’s a paradigm shift, not a matter of simply replacing ‘objects’ with ‘events’. The result is not panpsychism - it’s post-humanist performativity. Matter is agentive - not in the sense of ‘feeling’, but rather mattering as differentiating: “and which differences come to matter, matter in the iterative production of different differences.” Events are intra-actions of intra-actions of intra-actions, and the differences produced are what matters.

It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved.
— Possibility

Can you explain to me in clear and unambiguous terms, just what "intra-action" means? — Metaphysician Undercover

‘Intra’ as opposed to ‘inter’ action implies that the action happens within, rather than between.

But it’s Barad neologism, so I’ll let them explain it:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements. — Karen Barad

Distinct does not mean discrete.

I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality.
— Possibility

As I said, I think that the passive/active distinction is necessary in order to understand causation, and this is necessary in order to understand temporal reality. Without this, two distinct events cannot be ordered in time, because it is necessary to understand how one acts one the other, to produce a causal understanding, and therefore a temporal order. Without this distinction, events would be interacting, but there would be no way to order them temporally without determining what part of which event is causing what part of the other event. There is just interaction, and this provides no information for temporal order therefore a deficient understanding of reality.. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why I recommended Rovelli. It’s not a deficient understanding of reality at all - it’s just not a global, externally imposed order. It’s a local, internal one. And there is no aspect of reality that is entirely ‘passive’.

There is no single time: there is a different duration for every trajectory; and time passes at different rhythms according to place and according to speed.
It is not directional: the difference between past and future does not exist in the elemental equations of the world. Its orientation is merely a contingent aspect that appears when we look at things and neglect the details.
The notion of the ‘present’ does not work: in the vast universe there is nothing that we can reasonably call ‘present’.
The substratum that determines the duration of time is not an independent entity, different from the others that make up the world; it is an aspect of a dynamic field. It jumps, fluctuates, materialises only by interacting, and is not found beneath a minimum scale….

The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time….

The temporal relations between events are more complex than we previously thought, but they do not cease to exist on account of this. The relations of filiation do not establish a global order, but this does not make them illusory. If we are not all in single file, it does not follow that there are no relations between us. Change, what happens - this is not an illusion….

To describe the world, the time variable is not required. What is required are variables that actually describe it: quantities we can perceive, observe and eventually measure…If we find a sufficient number of variables that remain synchronised enough in relation to each other, it is convenient to speak of when.
There is no need in any of this to choose a privileged variable and call it ‘time’. What we need, if we want to do science, is a theory that tells us how variables change with respect to each other. That is to say, how one changes when others change. The fundamental theory of the world use be constructed in this way; it does not need a time variable: it needs to tell us only how things that we see in the world vary with respect to each other. That is to say, what the relations may be between these variables….

The world without a time variable is not a complicated one. It’s a net of interconnected events, where the variables in play adhere to probabilistic rules which, incredibly, we know for a good part how to write. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Kant does not include the human, experiencing ‘agent’, within the phenomenon - which is also a necessary condition for the existence of phenomena. This is an important distinction. — Possibility

Phenomena are a product of the human experiencing agent. Therefore the human agent is implied necessarily by "phenomenon", and "human agent" is included within the concept of "phenomenon".

I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…? — Possibility

Of course it's deliberate. I am a philosopher, not a physicist. I am here to discuss philosophy not physics.

If you look at Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of relational quantum mechanics, it’s not so problematic. First of all, there is no ‘division of reality into distinct events’ - this is a misunderstanding of the structure of spacetime. If you’ve ever watched the interaction of ocean waves, you might have some understanding as to why this notion of ‘distinct events’ is the wrong way to even begin to explain the relational structure of four-dimensional reality. — Possibility

Your analogy of waves does not work. Wave action in water is a feature of particles, water molecules. So wave activity assumes objects, entities, as fundamental, the particles which produce the wave motion. Since you are talking about events as fundamental, rather than objects such as water molecules or other particles, then you need some principles whereby you can talk about "events", in the plural, rather than all of reality as one event. Sure, it's fine to say that distinct events are not real, but then you are being hypocritical when you talk about waves and other distinct distinct events.

‘Intra’ as opposed to ‘inter’ action implies that the action happens within, rather than between.

But it’s Barad neologism, so I’ll let them explain it:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements.
— Karen Barad — Possibility

As I explained in my last post, this way of looking at things blurs the reality of temporal priority, leaving causation, and therefore a large part of reality as unintelligible. Consider the following "the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action".

What is being criticized by Barad here, is the notion of distinct entities interacting. This would imply that the entities preexist the activities which are described as interactions. So Barad replaces interaction with intra-action, and says that "intra-action" is responsible for, or the cause of existence of the entities. But where does that leave "intra-action"? It cannot be an activity which involves the mentioned entities, because it is prior to them, as the cause of their existence. So what kind of activity is this? It cannot be within the objects, because it's prior to the objects' very existence. Therefore it must be activity of some other sort, which is the cause of the existence of the entities.

This is why I recommended Rovelli. It’s not a deficient understanding of reality at all - it’s just not a global, externally imposed order. It’s a local, internal one. And there is no aspect of reality that is entirely ‘passive’. — Possibility

I agree that the idea of "global, externally imposed order" is not sufficient. However, I believe that the "local internal one" as described, is also deficient. I agree with many of the principles here, but there is a difficulty with language, and also a difficulty with the concept of space-time.

The existing concept of space does not allow that there is anything internal to a non-dimensional point. and this is what denies the reality of the concept of a local, internally imposed order. By our current spatial-temporal conceptions, all activity must be within space-time. This is because time is conceived of as logically posterior to space, it is the fourth dimension, and time is required for activity. So all activity is represented as spatial activity because time, which is essential to activity, follows from spatial existence.

What is required in order to understand any proposed "internal order", is to allow that time is prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, because this allows for temporal activity which is non-spatial, as prior to spatial activity. Then we can conceive of activity within the non-dimensional point.

The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time…. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

This is evidence that Rovelli's perspective is backward, and leaves a vast part of reality as unintelligible. Instead of putting time as prior to space, in which case there could be activity prior to spatial activity, and this activity could be understood as the cause of spatial activity, Rovelli uses the traditional conception of space-time, which puts space as prior to time. This leaves the origin of spatial existence as fundamentally unintelligible. This paragraph is completely contradictory, because "the absence of time" (which is the origin, the beginning) is described as disorderly "quantum events" happening without a timeline . But any event requires time, that's what "an event" is, temporal extension. So this whole paragraph is self-contradicting, and demonstrates the problem with the common metaphysical proposition, that time emerges.

Instead, we need to position time as prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, so that there is true activity within the non-dimensional, (what is known traditionally as the immaterial), then the emergence of space and its attributes, material objects, can become intelligible.

To describe the world, the time variable is not required. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Again, this is more evidence that the perspective is mistaken. Without the time variable we cannot understand the cause of the world. And without this our understanding of the world is incomplete.

I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…?
— Possibility

Of course it's deliberate. I am a philosopher, not a physicist. I am here to discuss philosophy not physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

“Philosophy without any understanding of the physical world can only be an exercise in making meaning about symbols and things that have no basis in the world” (Barad). I believe that your current understanding of the logical structure of reality is flawed. I’m trying to help clear out the Newtonian assumptions that continue to distort this philosophical discussion. And I need to present quantum mechanics based evidence in order to do that, otherwise we’re going to continue to talk past each other. I’m not a physicist either - I can’t do the math, but I can grasp the importance of an accurate logical structure to any discussion of philosophy.

Consider the following "the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action".

What is being criticized by Barad here, is the notion of distinct entities interacting. This would imply that the entities preexist the activities which are described as interactions. So Barad replaces interaction with intra-action, and says that "intra-action" is responsible for, or the cause of existence of the entities. But where does that leave "intra-action"? It cannot be an activity which involves the mentioned entities, because it is prior to them, as the cause of their existence. So what kind of activity is this? It cannot be within the objects, because it's prior to the objects' very existence. Therefore it must be activity of some other sort, which is the cause of the existence of the entities. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by ‘pre-exist’? Do you mean outside of time? What is being criticised is the notion of distinct entities ‘pre-existing’ their material-discursive involvement in reality. Intra-actions are causal but non-deterministic - the entities only ever exist as such within intra-actions. The assumption that potential and actual must exist as temporally ordered notions is false.

I agree that the idea of "global, externally imposed order" is not sufficient. However, I believe that the "local internal one" as described, is also deficient. I agree with many of the principles here, but there is a difficulty with language, and also a difficulty with the concept of space-time.

The existing concept of space does not allow that there is anything internal to a non-dimensional point. and this is what denies the reality of the concept of a local, internally imposed order. By our current spatial-temporal conceptions, all activity must be within space-time. This is because time is conceived of as logically posterior to space, it is the fourth dimension, and time is required for activity. So all activity is represented as spatial activity because time, which is essential to activity, follows from spatial existence.

What is required in order to understand any proposed "internal order", is to allow that time is prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, because this allows for temporal activity which is non-spatial, as prior to spatial activity. Then we can conceive of activity within the non-dimensional point. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that there is a difficulty with language. Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering. My own understanding of physics suggests that spacetime emerged through differentiation or diffraction, rather than as a geometric rendering. That is, in a 4-3-2-1 progression. But if you refuse to discuss physics, then I’m at a loss as to how to present evidence of this.

What do you mean by ‘pre-exist’? Do you mean outside of time? What is being criticised is the notion of distinct entities ‘pre-existing’ their material-discursive involvement in reality. Intra-actions are causal but non-deterministic - the entities only ever exist as such within intra-actions. The assumption that potential and actual must exist as temporally ordered notions is false. — Possibility

What I mean by pre-exist is to exist before, prior in time. So, for instance, two objects can exist without interacting if there is the required spatial-temporal separation between them. These objects would pre-exist any interaction which later developed. Common conceptions of "interaction" assume that objects pre-exist their interactions, in this way. That's expressed by Newton's laws. The first law makes a claim about the existence of an object which is not interacting, then the other laws bring in interaction. So non-interacting is assumed as the pre-existing condition.

Barad suggests that objects "emerge" from intra-action, therefore intra-action is the cause of existence of an object. This claim requires a description of intra-action, which could replace Newton's first law. The problem which I explained in the last post, is that you provide no description of intra-action, just an incoherent mention of quantum events in the "absence of time", by Rovelli.

To restate the problem in a different way, "intra-action" as described by Barad, suggests activity which is prior in time to the objects which are engaged in the activity. This is why it is not "interactivity", it is proposed as some sort of activity from which the objects which are described by Newton's laws, come into existence (emerge). The exact problem is that the passage of time is understood and measured relative to the physical objects which are supposed to come into existence through intra-activity, and whose interactions are understood by Newton's laws. Therefore this proposed activity is incoherent because there is no time in which it takes place. The Newtonian movements of physical objects, in conjubction with the boundary, or limit of electromagnetism are the principles by which time is understood and measured, so prior to physical objects there is not time.

Now, if intra-action is proposed as an activity which is prior to, as cause of , the existence of physical objects, then we have np principles to understand this causal force, this supposed type of activity, because it is a type of activity which is outside of time, by our current conceptions of time, hence Rovelli's description of "the absence of time" as "a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events". What Rovelli means, is exactly as I say above, prior to the existence of physical objects there is an absence of time (by the precepts of our current conception of time) and this renders all activity, or events as unintelligible, "boundless and disorderly".

Clearly, what this indicates is that our current conception of time is inadequate for understanding this realm of activity which has been dubbed as "intra-action". It leaves this activity as appearing to be occurring in the absence of time, activity from which time emerges along with physical objects, therefore the activity appears as boundless and disorderly, completely unintelligible to us as "activity", activity being something we understand as occurring within time.

Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering. — Possibility

It is in a way, a sequential ordering, because it makes time an attribute of space. So conceptually, time follows from space as space is logically prior to time. That is why time is understood as an attribute of space, and space cannot be understood as an attribute of time, by the conventional conception of space-time.

My own understanding of physics suggests that spacetime emerged through differentiation or diffraction, rather than as a geometric rendering. That is, in a 4-3-2-1 progression. But if you refuse to discuss physics, then I’m at a loss as to how to present evidence of this. — Possibility

I have no idea what you mean by "a 4-3-2-1 progression" but if you explain, I will pay attention.

What I mean by pre-exist is to exist before, prior in time. So, for instance, two objects can exist without interacting if there is the required spatial-temporal separation between them. These objects would pre-exist any interaction which later developed. Common conceptions of "interaction" assume that objects pre-exist their interactions, in this way. That's expressed by Newton's laws. The first law makes a claim about the existence of an object which is not interacting, then the other laws bring in interaction. So non-interacting is assumed as the pre-existing condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re still trying to describe objects from some external perspective, a passive observer of two objects not interacting. But there is no outside. Newton’s first law makes a claim about the existence of an object that is assumed to not be interacting, but there are, in fact, measurement interactions going on. This pertains to the OP’s notion of entangled embodied subjectivity. With this first law, one must measure or at least observe the ‘object’ at multiple points in spacetime. And Planck’s constant places a lower bound on how small the disturbance caused by these measurement interactions can be. Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime.

To restate the problem in a different way, "intra-action" as described by Barad, suggests activity which is prior in time to the objects which are engaged in the activity. This is why it is not "interactivity", it is proposed as some sort of activity from which the objects which are described by Newton's laws, come into existence (emerge). The exact problem is that the passage of time is understood and measured relative to the physical objects which are supposed to come into existence through intra-activity, and whose interactions are understood by Newton's laws. Therefore this proposed activity is incoherent because there is no time in which it takes place. The Newtonian movements of physical objects, in conjubction with the boundary, or limit of electromagnetism are the principles by which time is understood and measured, so prior to physical objects there is not time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. This is not Newton’s ‘object’-in-time assumed as a pre-existing individual entity with inherent boundaries and properties. Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’. As I explained before, you are either involved in the intra-action (measuring the passage of time as change in the ‘object’), or you are viewing the quantum mechanical system, the spacetime intra-action, from within another intra-action in spacetime (understanding ‘time’ as a variable value, relative to the internal configuration of the system).

Even Newton himself said: “Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature flows equably without relation to anything external.” What he was referring to here is the idea of time as an underlying variable in the order of the world. He assumed it was purely logical, but Einstein has demonstrated that it’s qualitative and dynamic as well: time is a variable aspect of spacetime.

Now, if intra-action is proposed as an activity which is prior to, as cause of , the existence of physical objects, then we have np principles to understand this causal force, this supposed type of activity, because it is a type of activity which is outside of time, by our current conceptions of time, hence Rovelli's description of "the absence of time" as "a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events". What Rovelli means, is exactly as I say above, prior to the existence of physical objects there is an absence of time (by the precepts of our current conception of time) and this renders all activity, or events as unintelligible, "boundless and disorderly".[/i]

No, Rovelli is not referring to a ‘prior to the existence of physical objects’ at all. He’s referring to an absence of independent linear conceptions of time; to an understanding of reality in which everything is intra-action, occurring within the variable value configurations of spacetime.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, what this indicates is that our current conception of time is inadequate for understanding this realm of activity which has been dubbed as "intra-action". It leaves this activity as appearing to be occurring in the absence of time, activity from which time emerges along with physical objects, therefore the activity appears as boundless and disorderly, completely unintelligible to us as "activity", activity being something we understand as occurring within time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is inadequate. We need to recognise that ‘activity’ occurs within spacetime - how one activity relates to another. And quantum mechanics shows us that when we look for the fundamental ‘objects’ of the world, we find only localised interrelational activity - with the ‘looking’ necessarily included in that. Not prior to, but constitutive of, the physical existence, (ie. particular boundaries and properties), of ‘objects’.

“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time. These events manifest relations between physical variables that are, a priori, on the same level. Each part of the world interacts with a small part of all the variables, the value of which determines ‘the state of the world with regard to that particular subsystem’.”

Rovelli also acknowledges the inadequacy of our grammar - similar to the inadequacy of ‘up’ and ‘down’ once it became undeniable that the earth was round. “We are struggling to adapt our language and our intuition to a new discovery: the fact that ‘past’ and ‘future’ do not have a universal meaning. Instead, they have a meaning which changes between here and there. That’s all there is to it.” (Rovelli)

Our experience of ‘time’ still rings true - it just exists as such within a particular subsystem of local intra-activity or spacetime, rather than being assumed as a universal linear conception.

Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering.
— Possibility

It is in a way, a sequential ordering, because it makes time an attribute of space. So conceptually, time follows from space as space is logically prior to time. That is why time is understood as an attribute of space, and space cannot be understood as an attribute of time, by the conventional conception of space-time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time is not an attribute of space - both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are attributes of spacetime. When you’re speaking of ‘time’ here, you’re referring to a linear conception of time. Yet time is localised not just in space, but in spacetime. There is no evidence that space is prior to time, and plenty of evidence that events in nature occur without first being attributed to boundaried and propertied objects.

As a ‘logical’ sequence these numbered dimensions correspond to how WE construct our representations of space and time - not how spacetime exists, or even how we come to distinguish ‘dimensions’ as such. We assume they’re constructs: that reality began in a single point of ‘matter’, and logically ‘builds’ the dimensionality of space around it in one, two and then three dimensions, like drawing a cube. And then time begins…?

Consider, alternatively, that dimensionality is purely relational - that reality as a singular ‘absolute’ diffracts into relational possibility with a logical-qualitative-dynamic relational symmetry of variable values, through which the universe emerges as spacetime intra-action, differentiating into localised variable events in spacetime, then volume/space, then size/distance and then matter. This is what I mean by a 4-3-2-1 progression: differentiating four-dimensional reality - the variable intra-activity within which space, volume and objects are differentiated. This, at least, is consistent with what is undeniable in quantum mechanics, challenging the assumption that space is logically prior to time rather than simply represented or rendered that way.

But it is my ‘logical-qualitative-dynamic relational symmetry of variable values’ that is a somewhat speculative ontological structure. This is just how it makes sense to me, because while I intuitively agree with quantum field theory and relational quantum mechanics, the maths of it is almost entirely lost on me. For me, it’s a fifth dimension of variable value structures, referring to probabilistic (potential) internal configurations of local spacetime systems. Quantum mechanics presents these configurations as mathematical equations (dynamic-logical structures), the mind presents them to the body’s physical systems (and vice versa) as affect (dynamic-qualitative structures). In the same way that DNA renders a 4D ‘plan’ as an incomplete 3D structure.

Newton’s first law makes a claim about the existence of an object that is assumed to not be interacting, but there are, in fact, measurement interactions going on. — Possibility

I think that Newton's claim is supposed to state something independent of measurement. It is what is supposed to be given, without any measurement. To verify, or to apply this law would require measurements, but the law is supposed to represent what is the case regardless of whether the object is measured. That's why It's taken as a given.

Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime. — Possibility

You still have not provided me with a good explanation as to what "intra-action" means, so why can't we just call the measurement process Interaction?

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. — Possibility

I don't think that this is the case. The independent existence of the objects, which provide the basis for the measurement of time is taken for granted, as a given, like I explained is the case with Newton's first law. So it does not matter if it's the earth and sun, quartz crystal, or cesium atoms which provide the basis for measurement, they are all objects whose spatial presence is taken for granted.

And again, I do not see the need for "intra-action" here. Why not just describe the measurement of time as an interaction between the human beings doing the measurement, and the object (sun, quartz crystal, cesium atom) which is being used to provide the temporal stability.

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. This is not Newton’s ‘object’-in-time assumed as a pre-existing individual entity with inherent boundaries and properties. — Possibility

But these objects which we use for the measurement of time are Newtonian objects. I don't think that this can be denied. It is the stability of mass, in its temporal extension (inertia), which gives us the capacity to measure time. I don't think we can pretend that it is anything other than this.

Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’. — Possibility

This appears self-contradicting to me. If the object emerges from the activity then the activity is necessarily prior to the object. That's what "emerges" means.

We need to recognise that ‘activity’ occurs within spacetime - how one activity relates to another. — Possibility

I disagree. As I explained, we need to understand activity as prior to space. And since activity requires time, time must be prior to space as well. And, since the concept of "spacetime" does not allow for this conception, it must be dismissed as inadequate.

“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time. — Possibility

As I explained, this is incoherent. "An event" is itself necessarily ordered in time, that's what "an event" is. It's incoherent to speak of events which are not ordered in time.

Time is not an attribute of space - both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are attributes of spacetime. When you’re speaking of ‘time’ here, you’re referring to a linear conception of time. Yet time is localised not just in space, but in spacetime. There is no evidence that space is prior to time, and plenty of evidence that events in nature occur without first being attributed to boundaried and propertied objects. — Possibility

This, that time is an attribute of "spacetime" is what I am saying is the problem. Time must be prior to space, in order to understand the reality of "events" (which are necessarily temporally ordered) which are not "propertied to objects" (consequentially not propertied to space which is the property of objects). So in other words, we need to conceive of time as prior to objects and space, in order to allow for the reality of events which occur without any objects or space, and the current conception of spacetime does not provide for this. It doesn't provide for this because the passing of time is understood, and measurable, only in relation to the movement of objects in space.

As a ‘logical’ sequence these numbered dimensions correspond to how WE construct our representations of space and time - not how spacetime exists, or even how we come to distinguish ‘dimensions’ as such. — Possibility

I really think that you need to consider that "spacetime" is a faulty concept in the way that it limits time to the constraints of objects moving in space. Once you recognize that spacetime is a faulty concept, you'll see that there is no such thing as "how spacetime exists", because there is no such thing as "spacetime". This word just represents a misunderstanding.

Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime.
— Possibility

You still have not provided me with a good explanation as to what "intra-action" means, so why can't we just call the measurement process Interaction? — Metaphysician Undercover

Define ‘good’. It may seem pedantic to insist on ‘intra-action’, but for me it’s about being honest, acknowledging the involvement and variability of all aspects of the measurement setup in the process. The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities - despite what Newton assumes to be the case.

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another.
— Possibility

I don't think that this is the case. The independent existence of the objects, which provide the basis for the measurement of time is taken for granted, as a given, like I explained is the case with Newton's first law. So it does not matter if it's the earth and sun, quartz crystal, or cesium atoms which provide the basis for measurement, they are all objects whose spatial presence is taken for granted.

And again, I do not see the need for "intra-action" here. Why not just describe the measurement of time as an interaction between the human beings doing the measurement, and the object (sun, quartz crystal, cesium atom) which is being used to provide the temporal stability. — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot tell time from the spatial presence of a quartz crystal. Each of these three ‘objects’ provides a different set of values as its relative temporal stability, and where the quartz crystal and caesium electron differ from the sun is that there is no human being ‘doing the measurement’ at the level of the ‘object’. Once the timepiece is set up, we ignore the fact that we have created elaborate conditions for a particular, stable and recurring temporal measurement. These properties are not inherent in the ‘object’, but in the entire measurement setup. Alter one part of this apparatus, and the measurement changes. The warmth of the human wrist is responsible for up to half a second clock drift per day on a quartz timepiece, by altering the oscillation frequency of the crystal.

We call these measurements of ‘time’ by ignoring the variability inherent within the measurement process, including the variability of the very ‘object’ being used to provide temporal stability.

I disagree. As I explained, we need to understand activity as prior to space. And since activity requires time, time must be prior to space as well. And, since the concept of "spacetime" does not allow for this conception, it must be dismissed as inadequate. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it does allow for it. Spacetime fuses the three dimensions of space and one of time, not into a 3+1 structure, but into a four-dimensional continuum. It’s no longer ‘time and space’, but simply four mathematical dimensions, without priority. So there is no set or assumed configuration of dimensional structure in spacetime, and that’s the point. How this spacetime is configured determines which value is measured first in any interaction (eg. position or momentum), which also determines the state of the ‘object’ measured. The momentum of a caesium electron is more important to a measurement of time than its spatial position - and we cannot measure both simultaneously. So we prioritise momentum, and this ‘object’ materialises as an event, with no inertia to speak of. And there’s certainly no inertia in the caesium atom itself, emitted in a vapour or in freefall (fountain).

But these objects which we use for the measurement of time are Newtonian objects. I don't think that this can be denied. It is the stability of mass, in its temporal extension (inertia), which gives us the capacity to measure time. I don't think we can pretend that it is anything other than this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except that mass is not really as stable or inert as it appears. Look closer, and you’ll find activity. The capacity to measure time with a caesium electron is dependent on measuring momentum regardless of its position (as above). Yet the macroscopic state of an atomic clock presents as apparent inertia, with one particular variable having the characteristics of time.

“A macroscopic state (which ignores the details) chooses a particular variable that has some characteristics of time.” (Rovelli)

So we can only say that it is apparent inertia (ie. our ignorance) which gives us the capacity to measure time in a macroscopic state.

Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’.
— Possibility

This appears self-contradicting to me. If the object emerges from the activity then the activity is necessarily prior to the object. That's what "emerges" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

‘To emerge’ means to become apparent or visible - there is no temporal order or actual separation implied. It is entirely possible for the emergence, the ‘object’, and the activity to BE or even become simultaneously.

“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time.
— Possibility

As I explained, this is incoherent. "An event" is itself necessarily ordered in time, that's what "an event" is. It's incoherent to speak of events which are not ordered in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not incoherent at all. Think partial ordering, filiation. We speak about ‘generations’ as events in time, but there is no point in time where one generation ends and another begins for everyone - only between two family members. An event, by definition, is something that occurs in time - has temporality - but that doesn’t mean all events fit into some universal linear order. It seems nice and logical, but doesn’t correspond to reality.