People disagree immensely on all the above factors, there's no consensus whatsoever. — Judaka
I would like to hear how you understand the idea of "truth" since you've heard mine and offered no counterargument, — Judaka
Useful fictions are far more tenacious than you're making it out, and they're tied to things that matter to people. They're practically inseparable from each other, truth and useful fiction, they're one and the same. There's no truth without useful fictions and no useful fictions without truth. — Judaka
I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag
I wasn't speaking in my own voice, but from within the perspective that I am indeed criticizing. My use of 'I' was rhetorical, in other words. — plaque flag
Yes, and that of course is part of the ideal of rationality --- autonomy of the individual and of the community at large. So we work together to decide what to believe and do as a whole ---without dissolving completely into the crowd. — plaque flag
That is the question. But if you say that nothing makes them true, where does that leave your claims ? Are sentences 'really' as meaningless but somehow as useful as teeth ? — plaque flag
I think you are seeing the community from the outside in Darwinian terms and forgetting your own position as a speaker about the world interpreted through this vision. The issue is whether you believe what you say, whether you really think the world is one way or another way. — plaque flag
There's enough consensus for you to say so. 'Communication is impossible' is a performative contradiction. One can also not prove the untrustworthiness of logic. — plaque flag
The world is conceptually articulated. So I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag
I think pragmatic versions of truth are inspired by a questionable imaginary perspective on communities from above. We look down on them and see their beliefs as tools. But we gaze on this vision and describe it in a 'naive' way, forgetting to apply the insight to ourselves. — plaque flag
A consistent pragmatist is a potentially dangerous character. Judge Holden from Blood Meridian, who takes War for his deciding god, is happy to 'argue' the finer points with you. — plaque flag
Just a sense of "Yeah, that makes sense" would suffice for most. — Judaka
You've brought up the truth a lot, so I respond, as befits my understanding, I don't really care about it. Truth is abundant, overwhelmingly so, I don't seek it, I'm interested in power, useful knowledge, and useful understanding. I think "seeking truth" is asinine, and anyone who says they are, always remains guided by biases that end up resulting in the search for power and utility. — Judaka
Is it now ?Of course, I can prove the untrustworthiness of logic, it is easy. — Judaka
I'm struggling when you start talking about "pragmatic versions of truth" because I still have no idea where we disagree on the topic of it. — Judaka
I'm a nihilist and a pragmatist, I know very well. Had I sufficient power, so much of my philosophical ideals would lose their usefulness to me, and I would abandon them for that. — Judaka
Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth.I believe philosophers should take this to heart, systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — Judaka
That's what Trump believes too. If you are so smart, why aren't you a billionaire ? But I think this is an insincere pose, at least for those who aren't sociopaths. — plaque flag
But it's not only an insincere pose in my opinion: it's also self-cancelling. If we are all just rationalizing monkeys, then the claim that we are such rationalizers is itself a rationalization --- flattering the 'sophistication' of its confused or (best case) ironic purveyors. — plaque flag
I'm not a pragmatist. P is not true because it's useful to believe P. Though it is often useful to believe the truth. To say that P is true is primarily (ignoring the metacognitive extras) just asserting P. — plaque flag
You haven't addressed my Husserlian approach yet. — plaque flag
Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth. — plaque flag
You are blunt, so I'm being blunt, but not out of a lack of respect. This is good conversation on a crucial topic. — plaque flag
I don't think P is true because it's useful to believe P either. I think whether P is true depends on whether it's correct to reference it as true, which depends on what it's being referenced as, and the rules of the reference. — Judaka
I told you useful fictions and truth are one and the same, — Judaka
I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory.Usefulness is truth because it's true that it's useful. — Judaka
A dog is a dog, that's true, I don't believe it's true because it's useful, it's merely true. But what's a dog? That's just made up, a useful fiction. — Judaka
For example, my claim about "systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", what would make that true? Explain it. — Judaka
To me it's like you are saying the world makes statements true (true statements 'refer' correctly to states of the world? ) and then that truth is just useful fiction. — plaque flag
I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory. — plaque flag
It's one thing to point out the historical contingency of concepts, but I think you are assuming a radical split between human concepts and some 'pure' preconceptualized world. But that itself is 'just made up,' in my view, a mere philosophers fiction. Just look around the room your in. You see familiar objects, the tools of life. This is what's truly given, not sense-data, etc. The concept of the dog is just part of our recognition of a dog as such. — plaque flag
That statement would be true if indeed systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — plaque flag
Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. — Judaka
"If a human being has less than 10 fingers then they're a 0d0f0fj, and all 0d0f0fj should receive 1000 dollars from the government every week", then whether you're a 0d0f0fj or not is simple, we check how many fingers you've got. It wouldn't be true that I'm a 0d0f0fj, there's no arguing about it, I don't meet the prerequisites, since I've got 10 fingers. It's part of "truth" now, but it's also a useful (or not very useful) fiction. — Judaka
Also, you could just reject the claim as vague, since without guessing what I'm referring to, there's not enough information to go on. — Judaka
Thanks for stopping in and asking a good question !I agree with the spirit of your OP, but then what do you make of the all too common opposition to correspondence theories of truth? Do you think the objections have merit? Do you hold to a correspondence theory? Thanks. — Leontiskos
:up:Okay, thanks, that makes sense. I have had only limited exposure to Husserl, but maybe I will try to find an entry point when I have some extra time. — Leontiskos
For what it's worth, I think your views are quite reasonable on an existential level. So I'm just being a stickler on a few technical issues that interest me. — plaque flag
Habermas now proposes instead a “pragmatic epistemological realism” (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources. — plaque flag
It's not a fiction. A fiction is a claim, a story. It's just a created category or status. It exists in the world like being-married and being-baptized. — plaque flag
The point is your intention to articulate the truth. God is love is also vague, but people who say it are trying to tell me about the world — plaque flag
:up:This is at minimum, very close to my view, and has the possibility of being the exact same. — Judaka
If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs — plaque flag
If it's correct to refer to a thing as beautiful, then it's true that thing is beautiful. To clarify, by "correct" I mean, one agrees it's beautiful, not just agrees it's a correct use of the word grammatically. — Judaka
It doesn't make sense to me to talk about "articulating the truth", I don't know what that means, especially in the way you're using it. — Judaka
Truth isn't just about the world, it's a function of logic, and without pointing out a single new thing about the world, one can change their logic, concepts or created categories and reach a different conclusion. — Judaka
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