People disagree immensely on all the above factors, there's no consensus whatsoever. — Judaka

There's enough consensus for you to say so. 'Communication is impossible' is a performative contradiction. I know you didn't say exactly that, but you are getting close.

One can also not prove the untrustworthiness of logic.

I would like to hear how you understand the idea of "truth" since you've heard mine and offered no counterargument, — Judaka

I think Husserl pretty much got it right. The world is conceptually articulated. So I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. Or at least we understand the meaning of the claim in terms of such a check which may be practically impossible at the moment.

Note that there's more to this : vision isn't perfect, language can be ambiguous, ...

Useful fictions are far more tenacious than you're making it out, and they're tied to things that matter to people. They're practically inseparable from each other, truth and useful fiction, they're one and the same. There's no truth without useful fictions and no useful fictions without truth. — Judaka

As a former 'radical' instrumentalist and ironist, I'm open to such claims. I used to argue for them, and I still find them to be important partial truths.

But P is true is not used in the same way that P is useful to believe is used.

I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag

I think pragmatic versions of truth are inspired by a questionable imaginary perspective on communities from above. We look down on them and see their beliefs as tools. But we gaze on this vision and describe it in a 'naive' way, forgetting to apply the insight to ourselves.

A consistent pragmatist is a potentially dangerous character. Judge Holden from Blood Meridian, who takes War for his deciding god, is happy to 'argue' the finer points with you. It's also easy to imagine a sophisticated esoteric fascism. Or a 'proletarian Logic' that justifies the cost-minimized extermination of counterrevolutionaries.

I wasn't speaking in my own voice, but from within the perspective that I am indeed criticizing. My use of 'I' was rhetorical, in other words. — plaque flag

:groan:

Yes, and that of course is part of the ideal of rationality --- autonomy of the individual and of the community at large. So we work together to decide what to believe and do as a whole ---without dissolving completely into the crowd. — plaque flag

I see this as largely tangential so I'll resist going into any more detail on it.

That is the question. But if you say that nothing makes them true, where does that leave your claims ? Are sentences 'really' as meaningless but somehow as useful as teeth ? — plaque flag

I'll tell you one thing for sure, whatever does make them true, it's certainly a relatively narrow perspective, and hardly stringent, well-thought-out rules. Just a sense of "Yeah, that makes sense" would suffice for most.

I think you are seeing the community from the outside in Darwinian terms and forgetting your own position as a speaker about the world interpreted through this vision. The issue is whether you believe what you say, whether you really think the world is one way or another way. — plaque flag

You've brought up the truth a lot, so I respond, as befits my understanding, I don't really care about it. Truth is abundant, overwhelmingly so, I don't seek it, I'm interested in power, useful knowledge, and useful understanding. I think "seeking truth" is asinine, and anyone who says they are, always remains guided by biases that end up resulting in the search for power and utility. Much of my interest falls outside the spectrum of philosophy, as I said, here, I play by those rules, but that doesn't mean my philosophical views represent me. But if that isn't a good answer, try explaining your point in greater detail and I'll try for a better response.

There's enough consensus for you to say so. 'Communication is impossible' is a performative contradiction. One can also not prove the untrustworthiness of logic. — plaque flag

Language is just a bunch of claims as words, there's sufficient freedom left for my claims. Of course, I can prove the untrustworthiness of logic, it is easy. If you hide behind "truly logical", I'm left stumped as to what you consider truly logical, and if you then say "Logic can be critiqued and improved upon as it's proven wrong", then I'm unable to critique any logic to prove my point, since even if I could find bad logic that was yet "truly logical", it'd just be part of the process of logic being improved. Give me something real, rather than a concept with "good" in it, and I'll show you how untrustworthy logic is, and how weak it is. If logic implies it is good logic, well, that's cheating.

The world is conceptually articulated. So I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag

What about a claim that can't be verified by perception alone?

I think pragmatic versions of truth are inspired by a questionable imaginary perspective on communities from above. We look down on them and see their beliefs as tools. But we gaze on this vision and describe it in a 'naive' way, forgetting to apply the insight to ourselves. — plaque flag

I'm struggling when you start talking about "pragmatic versions of truth" because I still have no idea where we disagree on the topic of it.

A consistent pragmatist is a potentially dangerous character. Judge Holden from Blood Meridian, who takes War for his deciding god, is happy to 'argue' the finer points with you. — plaque flag

I'm a nihilist and a pragmatist, I know very well. Had I sufficient power, so much of my philosophical ideals would lose their usefulness to me, and I would abandon them for that. I think it's a big part of why power corrupts, it invalidates the usefulness of the group logic of philosophy, to the powerful, they're a hindrance. I believe philosophers should take this to heart, systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful.

Just a sense of "Yeah, that makes sense" would suffice for most. — Judaka

Hey that's just my OP. Only foolish philosophers wipe their asses till their assholes bleed.

You've brought up the truth a lot, so I respond, as befits my understanding, I don't really care about it. Truth is abundant, overwhelmingly so, I don't seek it, I'm interested in power, useful knowledge, and useful understanding. I think "seeking truth" is asinine, and anyone who says they are, always remains guided by biases that end up resulting in the search for power and utility. — Judaka

Yes. I have written many OPs from just such a perspective. That's what Trump believes too. If you are so smart, why aren't you a billionaire ? But I think this is an insincere pose, at least for those who aren't sociopaths. Part of me is Hearst in Deadwood. Part of me understands why the judge in Blood Meridian dresses in white. Let's throw in some brutal social Darwinism, esoteric elitist bloodrites, the mystic horn sigil, whatever you like. But fortunately for the community and my own survival as an outnumbered individual, easily put down by the local Leviathan, I'm mostly 'indifferent honest' like Hamlet.

But it's not only an insincere pose in my opinion: it's also self-cancelling. If we are all just rationalizing monkeys, then the claim that we are such rationalizers is itself a rationalization --- flattering the 'sophistication' of its confused or (best case) ironic purveyors. Please note that I don't intend rudeness. You are blunt, so I'm being blunt, but not out of a lack of respect. This is good conversation on a crucial topic.

Of course, I can prove the untrustworthiness of logic, it is easy. — Judaka

Is it now ?

I'm struggling when you start talking about "pragmatic versions of truth" because I still have no idea where we disagree on the topic of it. — Judaka

I'm not a pragmatist. P is not true because it's useful to believe P. Though it is often useful to believe the truth. To say that P is true is primarily (ignoring the metacognitive extras) just asserting P.

The plums are in the icebox $\ne$ it's useful to believe that the plums are in the icebox.

You haven't addressed my Husserlian approach yet.

I'm a nihilist and a pragmatist, I know very well. Had I sufficient power, so much of my philosophical ideals would lose their usefulness to me, and I would abandon them for that. — Judaka

Yes. And the Englightment is to some degree what happens when folks wake up to the lack of a god to make sure they behave. On a practical level, I'm outnumbered. So I have to make a case. I can't just give orders.

Would a god study pure mathematics ? You imply maybe not. But I'm not so sure. I think we like to SEE. We have lots of other motives, but we also desire to know, to understand.

I believe philosophers should take this to heart, systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — Judaka

Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth.

That's what Trump believes too. If you are so smart, why aren't you a billionaire ? But I think this is an insincere pose, at least for those who aren't sociopaths. — plaque flag

As I argued previously, philosophy is thought funnelled through biases of justice, morality, group benefit, logic, rationality and so on. To me, it's absurd to call it impractical interest in truth, our biases show what we're aiming to do, and I call that utility. I look at a concept such as rationality and don't for a second bother to ask if it's true - a senseless question, I ask what it does, whether is it useful, useful to whom and under what conditions. Utility is defined by our ambitions and values, it's present for the noblest goals and the most self-serving, not just the latter.

But it's not only an insincere pose in my opinion: it's also self-cancelling. If we are all just rationalizing monkeys, then the claim that we are such rationalizers is itself a rationalization --- flattering the 'sophistication' of its confused or (best case) ironic purveyors. — plaque flag

Rationalising? We're talking about literal truth here, that's all it is. A correct reference. I don't understand your argument.

I'm not a pragmatist. P is not true because it's useful to believe P. Though it is often useful to believe the truth. To say that P is true is primarily (ignoring the metacognitive extras) just asserting P. — plaque flag

I don't think P is true because it's useful to believe P either. I think whether P is true depends on whether it's correct to reference it as true, which depends on what it's being referenced as, and the rules of the reference. It's these two latter things which are useful to believe, not P itself. A dog is a dog, that's true, I don't believe it's true because it's useful, it's merely true. But what's a dog? That's just made up, a useful fiction.

You haven't addressed my Husserlian approach yet. — plaque flag

It's the same as mine, except, much less. It's not dealing with the concepts themselves, or where their correct use requires more than just sense data. Tell me when it's true that something is useful, or when it's true that something is funny, something like that, or alternatively, something more vague, a question which might have an answer but testing it would be difficult. For example, my claim about "systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", what would make that true? Explain it.

Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth. — plaque flag

I told you useful fictions and truth are one and the same, you must be misunderstanding me, though, that might be my fault. Usefulness is truth because it's true that it's useful.

You are blunt, so I'm being blunt, but not out of a lack of respect. This is good conversation on a crucial topic. — plaque flag

I enjoy the discussions and I don't mind bluntness.

Perhaps you can clear up how this:

I don't think P is true because it's useful to believe P either. I think whether P is true depends on whether it's correct to reference it as true, which depends on what it's being referenced as, and the rules of the reference. — Judaka

goes with:

I told you useful fictions and truth are one and the same, — Judaka

To me it's like you are saying the world makes statements true (true statements 'refer' correctly to states of the world? ) and then that truth is just useful fiction.

Usefulness is truth because it's true that it's useful. — Judaka

I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory.

A dog is a dog, that's true, I don't believe it's true because it's useful, it's merely true. But what's a dog? That's just made up, a useful fiction. — Judaka

It's one thing to point out the historical contingency of concepts, but I think you are assuming a radical split between human concepts and some 'pure' preconceptualized world. But that itself is 'just made up' --- a classic philosophers' fiction or thesis. Just look around the room you are in. You see familiar objects, the tools of life. This is what's truly given, not sense-data, etc. The concept of the dog is just part of our recognition of a dog as such and of course of our justifications of claims involving dogs.

You are talking as if you can see around your own enculturation, as if you can strip dogs of their doghood without already understanding their doghood.

For example, my claim about "systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", what would make that true? Explain it. — Judaka

Assertion is irreducible. That statement would be true if indeed systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful.

Famously, 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is [actually] white.

That's the issue of meaning. Irreducible, no ? If I say it's true that the sky is blue, I just mean that the sky is blue. The articulation of reality is so fundamental that I'm not sure what else can be said, for whatever I say will also be an articulation of reality.

To be fair, more conceptual statements get more ambiguous, but I don't think that changes their reality-articulating intention.

Another issue is that of justification.

To me it's like you are saying the world makes statements true (true statements 'refer' correctly to states of the world? ) and then that truth is just useful fiction. — plaque flag

Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. If I make up some crap, for example, "If a human being has less than 10 fingers then they're a 0d0f0fj, and all 0d0f0fj should receive 1000 dollars from the government every week", then whether you're a 0d0f0fj or not is simple, we check how many fingers you've got. It wouldn't be true that I'm a 0d0f0fj, there's no arguing about it, I don't meet the prerequisites, since I've got 10 fingers. It's part of "truth" now, but it's also a useful (or not very useful) fiction.

I would love to hear an example that doesn't involve sense data, you keep giving me simple examples, which I don't want. How do we know when something is useful? Is it true that things can be useful? Give me an example like that, I'm uninterested in universally accepted statements like the sky is blue, such examples obscure the subjectivity of truth claims. It comes from the concepts and their application, so don't pick the most stable concepts with the most stable methods of verifying them.

I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory. — plaque flag

Truth is primarily a function of logic for me, it's not "that which is in accordance with reality", we're on the same page about that, right? I am feeling misunderstood.

It's one thing to point out the historical contingency of concepts, but I think you are assuming a radical split between human concepts and some 'pure' preconceptualized world. But that itself is 'just made up,' in my view, a mere philosophers fiction. Just look around the room your in. You see familiar objects, the tools of life. This is what's truly given, not sense-data, etc. The concept of the dog is just part of our recognition of a dog as such. — plaque flag

I'm not aiming to contrast human concepts and a pure pre-conceptualised world whatsoever.

That statement would be true if indeed systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — plaque flag

"Indeed"? As in, there's some objective truth on the matter? There are a hundred reasons why systems must not rely on them and hundred reasons why it might be fine for systems to rely on them. If I believe one of the hundred reasons that says we shouldn't or if I believe one of the hundred reasons that said it's fine, isn't that what matters? Also, you could just reject the claim as vague, since without guessing what I'm referring to, there's not enough information to go on. I don't know what "indeed" refers to here.

Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. — Judaka

That's not pragmatism or truth-as-utility. That's truth as truth.

"If a human being has less than 10 fingers then they're a 0d0f0fj, and all 0d0f0fj should receive 1000 dollars from the government every week", then whether you're a 0d0f0fj or not is simple, we check how many fingers you've got. It wouldn't be true that I'm a 0d0f0fj, there's no arguing about it, I don't meet the prerequisites, since I've got 10 fingers. It's part of "truth" now, but it's also a useful (or not very useful) fiction. — Judaka

It's not a fiction. A fiction is a claim, a story. It's just a created category or status. It exists in the world like being-married and being-baptized.

I would love to hear an example that doesn't involve sense data, — Judaka

$\sqrt{2} \notin \Bbb Q$

Also, you could just reject the claim as vague, since without guessing what I'm referring to, there's not enough information to go on. — Judaka

Sure, but didn't you yourself stress the dependence of meaning on context ? I have a rough idea of what you meant. The point is your intention to articulate the truth. God is love is also vague, but people who say it are trying to tell me about the world (in particular about God.)

Truth is primarily a function of logic for me, it's not "that which is in accordance with reality", we're on the same page about that, right? — Judaka

Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. — Judaka

?

For what it's worth, I think your views are quite reasonable on an existential level. So I'm just being a stickler on a few technical issues that interest me.

Maybe this is what you've been trying to say:

Habermas now proposes instead a “pragmatic epistemological realism” (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#TheComAct

If so, I agree. We choose categorizations for their utility, but we intend the state of the world in our assertions in terms of those categories.

I agree with the spirit of your OP, but then what do you make of the all too common opposition to correspondence theories of truth? Do you think the objections have merit? Do you hold to a correspondence theory? Thanks.

I agree with the spirit of your OP, but then what do you make of the all too common opposition to correspondence theories of truth? Do you think the objections have merit? Do you hold to a correspondence theory? Thanks. — Leontiskos

Thanks for stopping in and asking a good question !

At the moment, I'm impressed by Husserl. There's an empty intention that the a-sliced-apple-is-on-the-counter that I can mean/have when I'm out in the yard. This intention can be fulfilled or disappointed by my going on and looking at the counter. In this sense I probably embrace the correspondence theory. A meaningful 'signitive'/empty intention can 'correspond' with the world in the sense of such fulfillment.

As a phenomenological direct realist, I think the world as a lifeworld is always already meaningfully and conceptually structured. So I don't have to deal with the mess of pure meaning prestuff somehow being glued on to pure nonmeaning urstuff.

Note that a Husserl-influenced direct realism allows for every kind of falliblity, and I also include mental entities in my ontology with no need for dualism (the categories of mental and physical are not absolute or central, but just the usual fuzzy ordinary language distinction.)

Okay, thanks, that makes sense. I have had only limited exposure to Husserl, but maybe I will try to find an entry point when I have some extra time.

Okay, thanks, that makes sense. I have had only limited exposure to Husserl, but maybe I will try to find an entry point when I have some extra time. — Leontiskos

:up:
In case it's helpful: Zahavi's little intro book is pretty great. Also there's a cheap highquality paperback copy of Ideas.

Cool, thanks for the recommendations. :up:

For what it's worth, I think your views are quite reasonable on an existential level. So I'm just being a stickler on a few technical issues that interest me. — plaque flag

Glad to hear it. It's clear that some miscommunication occurred, I delayed my response so we'd have a chance to collect ourselves. Unlike in most conversations, our need for a precise understanding in discussing philosophy makes miscommunication easier, but also more problematic. On top of that, we lack the precise language other disciplines may have, so, I take it as part of the game, we try to avoid it, but alas, it's unavoidable. I'd like to not worry about who is responsible for the miscommunication, though if you want to address that, I'm okay with it, but I'll just cover some areas where I think it happened and hopefully, we can resolve it.

Habermas now proposes instead a “pragmatic epistemological realism” (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources. — plaque flag

This is at minimum, very close to my view, and has the possibility of being the exact same. I'll address some possible differences, but first, I'll address this:

It's not a fiction. A fiction is a claim, a story. It's just a created category or status. It exists in the world like being-married and being-baptized. — plaque flag

Marriage is a good example of something I was referring to as a "useful fiction", but from now on, I'll call it a "created category", as I like that. Although I thought calling marriage a useful fiction was normal use, I can see how it could include more than just "created categories", so this term is much better for me. You could re-read whenever I said "useful fiction" as "created category" instead, as that's what I was talking about.

Hopefully, that alone clears most things up.

I'd like to hear what you consider "useful fiction". Would "useful falsehood" work as an alternative? Perhaps give me some alternative names, that might help.

Returning to Habermas. If we're including any created category or concept, such as marriage or justice, then, while he's maybe not saying the exact same thing as me, I do 100% agree with him. This quote says "proposition/statement for which we claim truth", which could imply that we have to be intending to make a statement about what is true, and if that were the case, then I wouldn't go that far.

For me, a single word works just as well as a proposition/statement. I've made the example of "dog" which I consider a created category, if it's correct to refer to an animal as a dog, then it's true that it's a dog. This is what I meant by "useful fictions create truth", now replacing that to be "created categories create truth".

I include typically subjective categories such as "beautiful" or "just". If it's correct to refer to a thing as beautiful, then it's true that thing is beautiful. To clarify, by "correct" I mean, one agrees it's beautiful, not just agrees it's a correct use of the word grammatically.

All of this means that "truth" doesn't tell us how the world actually is, and one's interpretation, one's logic, and one's concepts, all matter in determining what's true and what isn't. In scientific disciplines, norms and rules attempt to limit the flexibility of interpretation, there's a specific and carefully selected logic that must be used, and concepts have a clear and specific meaning. In those contexts, "truth" has a specific meaning and weight to it, but in other contexts, the truth could just reflect a single person's whimsically formed opinion.

The point is your intention to articulate the truth. God is love is also vague, but people who say it are trying to tell me about the world — plaque flag

Where I've been struggling is in your usage of "truth" or "the truth". Truth is a correct reference, it requires two parts, the thing we're referring to, and the thing we're calling it - or the claim.

It doesn't make sense to me to talk about "articulating the truth", I don't know what that means, especially in the way you're using it. Here, if you think that God isn't love, then you assert it's untrue, if you agree that God is love, then you agree it's true. The reason you change your mind could be anything. A different perspective, a new argument, a revision in your understanding of God or love, or whatever else. Truth isn't just about the world, it's a function of logic, and without pointing out a single new thing about the world, one can change their logic, concepts or created categories and reach a different conclusion.

If I argue "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", for this to be true, only one thing needs to happen, you need to agree. You can pick any reason, any argument, it doesn't matter. Regardless of if you agree because of reason A or B or Z, all that matters is that your reason shows that systems shouldn't rely on the goodwill of the powerful, and then the statement is true.

But if the claim is specific and measurable such as "The population of Sweden is less than 5 million", then it's a completely different story.

Every example you've worked with while explaining truth has been extremely specific and measurable, such as whether plums are in a box or not. They're the most straightforward, clear-cut, specific and measurable claims we can talk about. They're not representative of the types of claims made in philosophy, which deal with complex concepts and objectives, and require sophisticated interpretation and thinking.

You might agree with a philosophical argument because "It's true that it represents the best option I've heard of". That would be perfectly reasonable. Philosophy is a set of biases, of things that must be true. There's a competition, where "It's true that this approach is likely to succeed at maximising the outcomes I care about" might decide which ideas are best. The "truth" part can be forcibly added, but it's trivial.

Let me know where you agree or disagree, or where more clarity is needed.

This is at minimum, very close to my view, and has the possibility of being the exact same. — Judaka

:up:

Here's a tricky part in bold.

If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs — plaque flag

How does one hold up a meaning (the meaning of an assertion) against the world to compare that meaning with a state of affairs right ? To me this is a deep question. An answer for the more mundane and concrete cases is IMO given by Husserl.

There's an empty intention (a 'belief' that might be more like an image) that a-sliced-apple-is-on-the-counter that I can mean/have when I'm out in the back yard. This intention can be fulfilled or disappointed by my going in and looking at the counter. It can be fulfilled because the world (the lifeworld, the nonabstract familiar emcompassing world) is always already meaningfully structured for us. I think we agree that once a 'form of life' [a culture ] adopts the category of dog, we can 'just see' a dog walking on the sidewalk as a dog, 'immediately.' Heidegger is great on this stuff. We can actually see 'peripherally' or 'circumspectively' a world that's full of useful things, so we plop down on a couch 'without thinking about it.' For him, this is more fundamental than sharp theoretical positing.

I'm trained in math, and this kind of thing happens in the mathematical world too. It's a function of training and experience. But the symbols are very much a meaningful hieroglyphics, even tho much of mathematics can in principle be automated (formal proofs, which 'nobody' actually writes, are machine checkable.) But people like it because they get insight into a virtual world of forms (even if these forms only exist within/for human cognition.)

If it's correct to refer to a thing as beautiful, then it's true that thing is beautiful. To clarify, by "correct" I mean, one agrees it's beautiful, not just agrees it's a correct use of the word grammatically. — Judaka

We may be on the same page.

I think there are two issues entangled.
When I call an assertion true, I am basically endorsing or repeating that assertion.
Bob : It's raining.
Alice : That's true.

So Alice might as well in this context have repeated Bob.

Bob : It's raining.
Alice : It's raining.

Do we agree up to here ? The use of 'true' doesn't do anything in this simple case that repetition can't do.

The next issue is whether it is raining.
Now I claim that --- 'it either is or it isn't raining.' But that weirdly is a claim about the state of affairs. It has to be an explication of a logic we mostly use transparently. So it's not totally unlike checking for that apple on the table. It's just a different kind of looking at our own conceptuality. You and I can debate the details, but we can strangely intend the 'object' of our own default conceptuality.

It doesn't make sense to me to talk about "articulating the truth", I don't know what that means, especially in the way you're using it. — Judaka

<I get a little speculative below. So it's more exploratory than assertive. >

I think that phrase of mine was awkward. I meant describing the world [accurately.] I 'intend a state of affairs' as 'actual.' I tell you Joe is a solid guy. Even tho this is ambiguous, I intend to let you see through my eyes something essential and relevant about Joe, albeit ambiguous or spare. As Feuerbach puts it, thinking is essentially social. I imagine early human tribes having 100 eyes, because as long as they trusted one another, each member could use the claims of another member as a kind of extended nervous system.

So the tribe as a whole (if the cry goes out) perceives a wolf -- perhaps mistakenly. But the mistake is only corrected by further reports and investigation. We can't get behind interpretative assertions. So we can say that P is true, but that should be interpreted perhaps as seeing the state of affairs in a certain way. I intend the state of affairs (that which is the case), but I might be persuaded to see the state of affairs in another way. The world (not the planet but all of logical space) is a bit like an infinite object that we can't help talking about, can't help looking at, perhaps mistakenly. But the mistake can only be 'cleared up' by another corrective seeing which could also turn about to be mistaken. So changing our beliefs is like seeing that infinite object from a different angle, getting what we now hope is a better look at it. It's the point at infinity that links up all of our talk. I hope some of this makes sense. It's a weird and fascinating issue.

Truth isn't just about the world, it's a function of logic, and without pointing out a single new thing about the world, one can change their logic, concepts or created categories and reach a different conclusion. — Judaka

:up:

I think I understand and mostly agree. It's like you are imaging holding the world fixed and changing the concept system. That violates my holism a little bit, but I get your intention well enough not to quibble.