For Plato, that world is analogised as the cave wall, a realm of shadows that is the illusory world of matter and bodies, as distinct from the real world of forms, the concern of the philosopher. Your project, as I understand it through many threads, is to marry the two worlds. — unenlightened

But they are always already married. I'm with Husserl on categorial intuition. I'm anti-philosophical in the sense that I insist on the naked reality of the Lifeworld. I have to call the ordinary world the lifeworld just to avoid confusing philosophers who assume from the beginning that they are in unbreakable bubbles of magical sensation stuff.

Whatever rationality is going to be in the scheme of things, if you want a monism, it is going to be problematic. — unenlightened

I could have called what I'm about a radical pluralism. I admit every kind of entity with every kind of access to that entity. Even round squares. I merely point out that as philosophers we have to grab these entities by their inferential roles. So I am not celebrating the glories of rationality (except that I must do so implicitly in my friendly critical discussion with you) so much as (re-)presenting a stage of reason's self-explication. I'm probably just catching up with Hegel.

Tornados and mother's love and the axiom of choice and the ghost of William James in a story by a a fictional author are all very different 'intentional objects' that are equally welcome in my ontology. Your memory of a toothache is welcome, even though it's your toothache, because maybe you use it to make a case for some thesis. Even the ghost or purple alien somebody swears they saw is welcome, thought the nature or style or character of its existence is up for debate.

Is it so shocking to recognize humans as conceptmongers ? Have you looked into Husserl ? I used to try to reduce concepts to language, bu

You already have assumed both the body, and a moral and rational robe. And these garments cannot then be reduced to bodily functions, on pain of ceasing to be fundamental and disappearing into epiphenomena. So it looks like you need a non-physical realm, of forms, if not of gods and angels. — unenlightened

I think I've went out of my way in many posts to stress the irreducibility (for philosophers) of normativity. For any such reduction must be justified.

I've also stressed that disembodied subjectivity makes no sense.

I give, as a 'phenomenologist' who wants to describe more than speculate, a dramaturgical ontology with enworlded conceptmongering flesh at its center. The world has a conceptual aspect. It's just there, presumably because we are, given the ways of rabbits and insects.

If you are trying to get me to say I am not a physicalist, I've explicitly rejected scientific realism. The pure object is as semantically questionable as the pure subject. But it doesn't matter practically. Philosophers are fools who care more than worldlywise people about keeping their stories straight. They are the oracular-poetic cousins of the pure mathematicians.

Or else this whole thread amounts to no more than 'we have to talk in language, get used to it.' And that certainly does not rule out afterlives and much else, except procedurally and dictatorially. — unenlightened

That's a very strange reduction. Respectfully, I think you are reading it only for what interests you at the moment.

Let me summarize it:

The very idea or project of [critical / rational] ontology already tacitly involves some nonobvious ontological commitments. The ontologist as such does not start with a blank slate. This constrains any skepticism that 'earnestly' justifies itself through claims about the knowing subject --- through ontological claims, which are typically performative contradictions.

A different skeptic 'wins' by not playing the game. One does not reason against reason except as a troll perhaps. Or a zen clown.

This project might not interest you. But reading about Husserl's critique of psychologism got me thinking. When does humility become false ? When is 'Kant' a paradoxical dogmatist about what others can and can't know ? And the deeper motive is an aspiration toward integrity, toward the coherence of my personality, in particular in the conceptual dimension of the claims I make about the world.

I think I've went out of my way in many posts to stress the irreducibility (for philosophers) of normativity. — plaque flag

Indeed. A brute fact then of the human world? It's necessary to our discourse. It's necessary probably to our social life.

Respectfully, I think you are reading it only for what interests you at the moment. — plaque flag

Well in a sense, yes. I am trying to make sense of something that sounds at times interesting, and then at other times seems a bit thin. I have myself argued very simply here many times that language functions as communication and depends on the prevalence of truth. Aesop illustrated this very clearly with the fable of the boy who cried "Wolf". without a commitment to truth language loses meaning and function and becomes empty 'sound and fury'.

But how do I, or you, get from there to an ontology? It seems to me that nothing in what you have said here entails anything ontological. What am I missing?

Am I not supposed to assume that what there is (apart from our dialogue) does not depend on our dialogue taking place or coming to a conclusion?

Indeed. A brute fact then of the human world? It's necessary to our discourse. It's necessary probably to our social life. — unenlightened

:up:

I'd say we only have 'practical fictions' (reductive maps) within the normative lifeworld that abstract/ignore this normative dimension. We tend to forget ourselves, lose ourselves in the object, become transparent as subjectivity.

I read Husserl's bracketing as an attempt to remind us of the way the objects are given, so that we can see [notice] our seeing of them. But we are still seeing the world and not the inside of the bubblescreen. We lose the way in the what, because the what is more practical.

language functions as communication and depends on the prevalence of truth. Aesop illustrated this very clearly with the fable of the boy who cried "Wolf". Without a commitment to truth language loses meaning and function and becomes empty 'sound and fury'.

But how do I, or you, get from there to an ontology? It seems to me that nothing in what you have said here entails anything ontological. What am I missing?

Am I not supposed to assume that what there is (apart from our dialogue) does not depend on our dialogue taking place or coming to a conclusion? — unenlightened

Our commitment to the truth is not quite enough. The prophet also intends the truth. Gods can whisper truths in the ear of the chosen. The missing ingredient is justification, which is implicitly about Enlightenment autonomy, at both the personal and communal level. The critical-rational ontologist embraces a second-order critical-synthetic oracular tradition. 'We the rational' articulate the real together, fallibly, against a kind of horizon. It's implicitly adversarially cooperative. We each ideally see around the other's biases. I can disagree with you but not with me. At least I am ideally or aspirationally coherent. Our community as a whole is also ideally coherent, for sure enough we work toward a consensus in our co-articulation of the conceptual aspect of the lifeworld.

I can of course be challenged on my unfolding of the concept of rationality, but it's likely that such a challenger will ask me to justify my claims in terms of communal inferential standards.

So we've already got persons in a world and language together. And they can be wrong about this world individually. Is it funny to work so hard to end up with common sense ? Yes. But methodological skepticism was on to something. It works (maybe) at the species level, which was probably the confused intention anyway, given the assumption that subjectivity had a trans-personal structure. [ Your bubble was supposed to be structurally just like my bubble. So Kant could magically talk about my bubble from within his. ]

What is bare reason? — Mww

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1793.pdf

It's been a minute since I read it, but that's the text I was referencing.

Place of reason. Is that supposed to indicate a condition wherein the faculty of reason is suited to be employed?

Yup! That sounds about right to me.

So Kant's place of reason means it is suitable for employment universally with respect to all experience, but not suitable for employment universally with respect to all reality?

Exactly!

So what grounds a universal reason in Hegel’s sense, such that its place is both with respect to all experience and with all reality?

The dialectic. He makes some, what I consider to be, off-hand remarks on Kant's philosophy, but it's his invention of the dialectic which overcomes Kant (at least, this is how I read Hegel's intent)

And if all reality is a possible experience, and in Kant there is a place for reason with respect to possible experience, isn’t that synonymous with Hegel’s sense of a universal reason?

“….. in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate à priori to objects.…we form to ourselves…the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely à priori. A science of this kind….must be called transcendental logic, because it has….to do with the laws of understanding and reason…..only in an à priori relation to objects.

I think the big conceptual difference between Kant and Hegel is their respective use of the concept "time". Hegel challenges the law of the excluded middle on the basis of time, where Kant accepts it because he believes Aristotle started a science of logic, and he's picking up that torch to further the project of a science of logic. Hegel builds a logic which "contains" or at least allows contradiction at certain points of time in the name of sublation, due to his reading of the history of philosophy (which, in its expression in The Phenomology of Mind/Spirit, isn't even chronological!)

I'd emphasize the popular quote "The rational is real, and the real is rational" -- where Kant would deny our knowledge of the real in certain respects (explicitly: God, Freedom, and Immortality).

Which is not to disbelieve in the pure thought that there may be conceptions which relate a priori to objects, but only disbelieve in the relating the conceptions to the objects, or, which is the same thing, disbelieve in cognizing objects entirely a priori given their antecedent conceptions.

Without a Kantian transcendental logic, how do space and time, purely transcendental conceptions, relate entirely a priori to objects? Apparently, Hegel has a way, himself a transcendental philosopher, so I’m led to think. Or at least a German idealist in some strict sense.\

Hegel: the categories define what it is to be an object in general, such that it can be given, separating the immanent from the transcendent;
Kant: the categories define** the conditions for knowing what an object in general is, its being already given, separating experience from illusion.
(**not really, but for the sake of consistency…..)

So….it’s fine to disbelieve in Kantian transcendental logic, which presupposes a fair understanding of what it is, but how is Hegel’s logic any less transcendental?

Heh. You're asking the wrong person. @Tobias would be a much more sympathetic voice if he's willing to pipe up on Hegel.

Hegel is certainly a German Idealist.

Rhetorical. Again…..I just had nothing better to do.

I'm flattered and glad to have you along :)

Yes, of course fictions have functions too and speculation and even deliberate nonsense, in the appropriate setting, and so on.We don't need to go into that do we? I think there is agreement.

Oh wait!

'practical fictions' (reductive maps) — plaque flag

What is this? A map the size of the territory with every feature marked would be unwieldy. Sometimes one draws a map of a cell, maybe, larger than life, and sometimes one draws a map of Narnia. We, I hope, but now I am worried, understand that the word is not the thing, the map is not the territory... Don't we? In general a map is reduced to "salient features". The reduction is not a fiction any more than the failure to say everything that is true all at once is a fiction

So we've already got persons in a world and language together. And they can be wrong about this world individually. — plaque flag

Yes moral and rational beings with language in a world together. So ontology has to account for all that in some way.

The critical-rational ontologist embraces a second-order critical-synthetic oracular tradition. 'We the rational' articulate the real together, fallibly, against a kind of horizon. It's implicitly adversarially cooperative. — plaque flag

But here, I think is where I start to become deviant. Because this is exactly what science has claimed to be doing since Descartes or Newton or thereabouts, that arrived at a mechanical world devoid of meaning. Fallibly, indeed! And what they have left out is what you are still leaving out, which is the tradition of meaning.

To be a bit more specific, critical-rational ontologists do not appear fully formed, but arise out of that tradition that questions its own moral worth, which is the religious tradition. That aspiration to the ideal community is the religious aspiration in modern dress.


.

What is this? A map the size of the territory with every feature marked would be unwieldy. — unenlightened

Yes. Of course. But fundamental ontology is where we finally tell the essence of the whole truth. Others can sweep the embarrassing/difficult aspects of subjectivity under the rug. But unworldly ontologists aren't satisfied with the usual shortcuts. Hilarious pompous word: 'ontologist.' Pure 'mathematicians' of the big picture, laughed at by 'chambermaids' ( nursing students ?) who hear their big words and see their 'economical' lifestyle. Actually some of us know better than to talk about Hegel with regular folks. But if we did, we'd be clowns. Maybe lovable, but clownish.

We, I hope, but now I am worried, understand that the word is not the thing, the map is not the territory... Don't we? In general a map is reduced to "salient features". The reduction is not a fiction any more than the failure to say everything that is true all at once is a fiction — unenlightened

Conceptuality is not sound or shape or smell. I can see the mountain and not just reason about it. The mountain as mountain is 'organized' perhaps by my 'conceptual' (sensory 'transcendent') intention. I can see the same mountain from many perspectives. I can step in the same river day after day, though never the same water.

I would personally not equate the the failure to say everything at once to inferior ontologies that, while taking their time, still leave out something crucial. Note that I've already indicated the horizonal-infinite nature of the project. We are never done clarifying. But part of that clarification is the recognition that early versions of our story of HOW IT IS are inadequate.

the map is not the territory... — unenlightened

This gets a little more complicated maybe. Concepts intend the world. The map is not the territory.. is presumably about the territory ?

If say there are apples on the table, I intend apples that I can go see and pick up. Husserl is great on this issue. Categorial intuition. An empty intention occurs when the apple is not around and we make the claim, but it can be fulfilled by the apples being on the table when we go check. We see that-apples-are-on-the-table.

Yes moral and rational beings with language in a world together. So ontology has to account for all that in some way. — unenlightened

Actually ontology (I claim) takes that for granted. But then goes on to clarify that blurry taking-for-granted. Actually ontology often has to first figure out, painfully slowly, what it's already committed itself to. Hence Brandom's title : Making It Explicit.

But here, I think is where I start to become deviant. Because this is exactly what science has claimed to be doing since Descartes or Newton or thereabouts, that arrived at a mechanical world devoid of meaning. — unenlightened

Newton said : fuck it ! I make no hypothesis ! A mere mathematical pattern is good enough for me.

That mechanical world devoid of meaning is (I hope you see) a big part of what I'm challenging in all of my recent threads. It's a reductive 'fiction.' As fundamental ontology, it sucks. But we are practical primates dazzled by gadgets. Whatever smells of tech must be right. Hence my futile critique of a pragmatic irrationalism that'll always be with us.

Funny thing is I'll be misread initially by scientistic 'rationalists' who'll think I'm selling Mystic Kool-Aid when I'm trying to tell the minimal internally coherent beginning of the truth. Explicating the mere starting point. Some of 'em don't even see the 'field of normativity' yet that gives their 'skepticism' meaning.

I think the big conceptual difference between Kant and Hegel is their respective use of the concept "time". Hegel challenges the law of the excluded middle on the basis of time, where Kant accepts it because he believes Aristotle started a science of logic, and he's picking up that torch to further the project of a science of logic. Hegel builds a logic which "contains" or at least allows contradiction at certain points of time in the name of sublation, due to his reading of the history of philosophy — Moliere

Good. Thank you. A response not loaded with useless metaphors, just straight answers to direct questions. ‘Preciate it.

On “Religion Within the Limits….”, I must confess to not including it in my favored field of study. Religion, donchaknow. (shudder).

But I do have it already under the title “…Limits of Reason Alone”, Greene, 1934, which might explain why I didn’t recognize “bare reason”: re: the limit of religion in Bennet 2017, among others. Despite all that, I’ll look for a dedicated reference to it, see what all the fuss is about.

Carry on.

To be a bit more specific, critical-rational ontologists do not appear fully formed, but arise out of that tradition that questions its own moral worth, which is the religious tradition. That aspiration to the ideal community is the religious aspiration in modern dress. — unenlightened

:up:
Yes !

Hence my love for Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec00.htm

The reproach that according to my book religion is an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion, would be well founded only if...that into which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, namely...anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion. But so far from giving a trivial or even a subordinate significance to anthropology... I, on the contrary, while reducing theology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into theology, very much as Christianity, while lowering God into man, made man into God; though, it is true, this human God was by a further process made a transcendental, imaginary God, remote from man.
...
Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion – and to speculative philosophy and theology also – than to open its eyes, or rather to turn its gaze from the internal towards the external, i.e., I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality.
...
But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence, this change, inasmuch as it does away with illusion, is an absolute annihilation, or at least a reckless profanation; for in these days illusion only is sacred, truth profane.

I'm not endorsing every ounce of tone, etc., but showing him as a self-consciously transitional figure.

But I do have it already under the title “…Limits of Reason Alone”, Greene, 1934, which might explain why I didn’t recognize “bare reason”: re: the limit of religion in Bennet 2017, among others. Despite all that, I’ll look for a dedicated reference to it, see what all the fuss is about. — Mww

OK I thought I was crazy. That's originally what I wanted to say and then I wanted to check myself on google, and so I changed my phrasing to match what google would say. "Limits of reason alone" is the phrase that I wanted to express before checking myself.

Ahhh. All’s well that ends in reason alone.

Still….bone of contention, due to my lack of sufficient study perhaps….seems odd Kant would declare it rational to behave in accordance with the old ways, but declare sapere aude in keeping with the new-fangled Enlightenment philosophy in which behavior would definitely not be in such accordance.

Heh. I agree it's odd! :D

I'm at least earnest so I think I'm saying true things of Kant. Though I'd read his answer to What is Enlightenment? as a challenge to the traditionalists. He's an interesting philosopher because he engages so many perspectives and then goes on to invent a logical form which justifies and denies the two sides he perceived as being in error -- the rationalists and the empiricists, with an emphasis on Hume because Kant thought Hume a really good philosopher.

Kant thought Hume a really good philosopher. — Moliere

Acute. Celebrated. Ablest, most ingenious, of skeptical philosophers. A few of one’s accolades for the other.

If only he’d taken that one last step……

Some of 'em don't even see the 'field of normativity' yet that gives their 'skepticism' meaning. — plaque flag

I cannot see "the field of normativity" as consisting in anything more than the principle of consistency. This applies as much in theology as it does in science. in metaphysical speculation as it does in psychology. There really is no one "field of normativity" beyond that; there are, rather fields of normativity, as many as there are fields of enquiry, sense and ideas, and the normativity governing those fields seems to consist primarily in the principle of consistency coupled with the demand that if you are going to participate you must be minimally acquainted with the current state of the art, or risk being irrelevant.

I said earlier I thought we had reached the "end" of our disagreement, by which I didn't mean there was no remainder, but rather that the remainder had become crystal clear. I want to repeat that I think that disagreement is over the "in itself' that dialectical counterpart to the "for us" that you seem intent on restricting us to in all domains.

I come back to this because I think the only publicly available "for us" lies in the fields of empirical inquiry, where publicly available and confirmable observations are possible, and in the domains of mathematics and logic. But there are many other fields of inquiry, where the more or less indeterminate nature of the subject matters of speculation only exist because they stand in the shadow of the "in itself".

These are the fields of sense, realms of discourse, where ignorance, unknowing, tears open the horizons for the imagination and intuition to play at will. Fields of faith, if you like. More could be said, and no doubt will be.

I cannot see "the field of normativity" as consisting in anything more than the principle of consistency. — Janus

No doubt that's a crucial part of it, but we can't forget the attitude of fallibility and a willingness to learn from others --- the second-order synthetic-critical tradition. I mean we can't do so as philosophers.* Humans have proven themselves very capable of burning witches. The 'rule' (the monster child in us and our heritage) is a dogmatic refusal to debate. Internal consistency is a tribal norm. One is one around here. If a superbaby from Krypton could materialize its own food and vaporize whatever annoyed it with an angry glance, it might never develop a coherent personality. It would never have to negotiate or compromise.

* As individuals in the larger sense we can 'consistently' be mystics, ironists, quietists, thugs...

coupled with the demand that if you are going to participate you must be minimally acquainted with the current state of the art, or risk being irrelevant. — Janus

And, I'd think, with a willingness to meet challenges, elaborate, edit, comment on others' work. A young Wittgenstein may occasionally get away with oracular bad manners, but that's against a background of 'non-geniuses' adversarially cooperating, putting in the time.

I think that disagreement is over the "in itself' that dialectical counterpart to the "for us" that you seem intent on restricting us to in all domains. — Janus

I insist tho that I am 'existentially' humble. Maybe the mystic is on a better path. I don't preach my suffocating & claustrophobic* ontology to anyone who isn't preaching their own brand, looking to criticize and synthesize with me.

But within the serious game or foolish science of 'ontology,' I take a strongly anthropomorphic position, perhaps (if I may reduce/ignore/subvert my responsibility for a moment ) because of a sense of duty to know what I'm talking about. My 'ego ideal' is a certain kind of cognitive hero. I tend to dig for the cognitive treasure. My mystical tendencies have always been more psychoanalytical and immanent than transhuman or astral. I love thinkers who make the mundane glow, who unveil the 'miraculous' in the rule rather than the exception.

*I had a friend once react as if mildly suffocated by my way seeing things.

These are the fields of sense, realms of discourse, where ignorance, unknowing, tears open the horizons for the imagination and intuition to play at will. Fields of faith, if you like. — Janus

:up:

I don't stand opposed to that stuff. In fact, I think anything potentially experienceable is part of the lifeworld, which is essentially 'horizonal' and infinite. My ontology includes anything that could possibly be discussed, given the minimum grip of some kind of inferential role.

I'm not even opposed to intense investment in esoteric mysteries. I do criticize the performative contradiction of those who can't make up their mind about whether they are transrational or not. If it's beyond mundane reasoning and open critical-synthetic discussion, then so be it. Seriously. But some people argue that logic is spiritually futile --- that they have nothing to learn from others, in other words. They show up anyway presumably because humans crave recognition, which is maybe one reason why the critical-synthetic tradition was born. Some of the prophets got bored of being ignored by one another and decided to work together on something that they could all find themselves in.

No doubt that's a crucial part of it, but we can't forget the attitude of fallibility and a willingness to learn from others --- the second-order synthetic-critical tradition. I mean we can't do so as philosophers.* — plaque flag

I agree with that. Part of the challenge is attaining the self-knowledge we spoke about earlier; seeing if an attitude or belief I hold is on account of what I want to be true rather than motivated by what I believe to be, in a disinterested fashion, most plausible. I think it also must be acknowledged that the assessment of what seems most plausible to different individuals, assuming that they have equal access to all the facts that bear on the case, is always an individual matter.

I don't stand opposed to that stuff. In fact, I think anything potentially experienceable is part of the lifeworld, which is essentially 'horizonal' and infinite. — plaque flag

I agree with this in the sense that anyone who experiences anything is obviously a part of the lifeworld, but I don't think it follows that everything experienced is available for public scrutiny and assessment in the way that. for example, the observations of the natural sciences, mathematics and logic are.

I insist tho that I am 'existentially' humble. Maybe the mystic is on a better path. I don't preach my suffocating & claustrophobic* ontology to anyone who isn't preaching their own brand, looking to criticize and synthesize with me. — plaque flag

I think one of the problems is that some think that their own faith-based beliefs must be amenable to being rationally argued for. If someone comes on a philosophy forum and tries to argue for such beliefs, they commit a category error and are fair game for rigorous critique. On the other hand, if people come on just to express their own personal beliefs without providing anything resembling a rigorous argument, well, that quickly becomes uninteresting, and such people usually double-down and start to interpret their interlocutors tendentiously or simply flee the discussion when they feel the heat.



I agree except I don't hold with the idea of "genius" especially the stink of authority it always seems to carry. I think so-called geniuses are often simply suitably obsessed people who put in much more thought and effort into their pet subjects, and they are no less, simply on account of the complexity of their thought, prone to error than the rest of us. I think the cult of the "genius" is something that we can do without, and arguably often holds back progress.

the assessment of what seems most plausible ...i s always an individual matter. — Janus

Absolutely. So rationality is just a way of harnessing collision the collision variety.

I don't think it follows that everything experienced is available for public scrutiny and assessment in the way that. for example, the observations of the natural sciences, mathematics and logic are. — Janus

Just to be clear, I agree. My ontological inclusion of anything we can talk about only works by acknowledging an infinite variety in the way such entities are accessed. In the mundane case, we can both talk about your pain, but you have different access to that pain. You suffer it.

A profound spiritual experience might also come up in a conversation as an explanation for why someone quit drinking or got rid of most of their property. A listener would not have the same access to that experience, but they could still discuss it in the space of reasons. 'My friend had a realization , so he got rid of all his stuff.'

some think that their own faith-based beliefs must be amenable to being rationally argued for. If someone comes on a philosophy forum and tries to argue for such beliefs, they commit a category error and are fair game for rigorous critique. — Janus

To me the 'real' esoteric stuff, which is important to me, is properly a secret in a circle of trust. I find clues and hints in certain texts, as if the authors were (maybe) leaving a trace for those who could read between their lines. I'm not at all against an extra esoteric layer, even here, but I think we should mostly decide what game we're playing.

The Crying of Lot 49 is good on this stuff. Undecidable conspiracy theory of an alternative postal system.

I agree except I don't hold with the idea of "genius" especially the stink of authority it always seems to carry. — Janus

I agree there's a dark side of the concept. To me thought it's also a pretty good label especially for people who are way too young to be so good at what they do. Blake wrote that true religion was the 'worship' of great human beings. But where we probably agree very much is that this 'worship' cannot be 'alienated.' If I truly appreciate and value Einstein, then I seek to understand him by becoming him.

You can probably see how this fits with my general rejection of what I can't experience and therefore can't give definite meaning to. The genius for the alienated beginner is a vague hope, a promise shining in the distance, a magical father figure, a gleaming token in the fallacy of argument from authority. But we hopefully grow out of this vain and confused game (which I'd say is conceptually close to Heidegger's idletalk, a gossip from the outside .) [ Hopefully I've demonstrated how much I also dislike cheap appeals to fame and mystique. ]