For Plato, that world is analogised as the cave wall, a realm of shadows that is the illusory world of matter and bodies, as distinct from the real world of forms, the concern of the philosopher. Your project, as I understand it through many threads, is to marry the two worlds. — unenlightened
Whatever rationality is going to be in the scheme of things, if you want a monism, it is going to be problematic. — unenlightened
You already have assumed both the body, and a moral and rational robe. And these garments cannot then be reduced to bodily functions, on pain of ceasing to be fundamental and disappearing into epiphenomena. So it looks like you need a non-physical realm, of forms, if not of gods and angels. — unenlightened
Or else this whole thread amounts to no more than 'we have to talk in language, get used to it.' And that certainly does not rule out afterlives and much else, except procedurally and dictatorially. — unenlightened
I think I've went out of my way in many posts to stress the irreducibility (for philosophers) of normativity. — plaque flag
Respectfully, I think you are reading it only for what interests you at the moment. — plaque flag
Indeed. A brute fact then of the human world? It's necessary to our discourse. It's necessary probably to our social life. — unenlightened
language functions as communication and depends on the prevalence of truth. Aesop illustrated this very clearly with the fable of the boy who cried "Wolf". Without a commitment to truth language loses meaning and function and becomes empty 'sound and fury'.
But how do I, or you, get from there to an ontology? It seems to me that nothing in what you have said here entails anything ontological. What am I missing?
Am I not supposed to assume that what there is (apart from our dialogue) does not depend on our dialogue taking place or coming to a conclusion? — unenlightened
What is bare reason? — Mww
Place of reason. Is that supposed to indicate a condition wherein the faculty of reason is suited to be employed?
So Kant's place of reason means it is suitable for employment universally with respect to all experience, but not suitable for employment universally with respect to all reality?
So what grounds a universal reason in Hegel’s sense, such that its place is both with respect to all experience and with all reality?
And if all reality is a possible experience, and in Kant there is a place for reason with respect to possible experience, isn’t that synonymous with Hegel’s sense of a universal reason?
“….. in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate à priori to objects.…we form to ourselves…the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely à priori. A science of this kind….must be called transcendental logic, because it has….to do with the laws of understanding and reason…..only in an à priori relation to objects.
Which is not to disbelieve in the pure thought that there may be conceptions which relate a priori to objects, but only disbelieve in the relating the conceptions to the objects, or, which is the same thing, disbelieve in cognizing objects entirely a priori given their antecedent conceptions.
Without a Kantian transcendental logic, how do space and time, purely transcendental conceptions, relate entirely a priori to objects? Apparently, Hegel has a way, himself a transcendental philosopher, so I’m led to think. Or at least a German idealist in some strict sense.\
Hegel: the categories define what it is to be an object in general, such that it can be given, separating the immanent from the transcendent;
Kant: the categories define** the conditions for knowing what an object in general is, its being already given, separating experience from illusion.
(**not really, but for the sake of consistency…..)
So….it’s fine to disbelieve in Kantian transcendental logic, which presupposes a fair understanding of what it is, but how is Hegel’s logic any less transcendental?
Rhetorical. Again…..I just had nothing better to do.
'practical fictions' (reductive maps) — plaque flag
So we've already got persons in a world and language together. And they can be wrong about this world individually. — plaque flag
The critical-rational ontologist embraces a second-order critical-synthetic oracular tradition. 'We the rational' articulate the real together, fallibly, against a kind of horizon. It's implicitly adversarially cooperative. — plaque flag
What is this? A map the size of the territory with every feature marked would be unwieldy. — unenlightened
We, I hope, but now I am worried, understand that the word is not the thing, the map is not the territory... Don't we? In general a map is reduced to "salient features". The reduction is not a fiction any more than the failure to say everything that is true all at once is a fiction — unenlightened
the map is not the territory... — unenlightened
Yes moral and rational beings with language in a world together. So ontology has to account for all that in some way. — unenlightened
But here, I think is where I start to become deviant. Because this is exactly what science has claimed to be doing since Descartes or Newton or thereabouts, that arrived at a mechanical world devoid of meaning. — unenlightened
I think the big conceptual difference between Kant and Hegel is their respective use of the concept "time". Hegel challenges the law of the excluded middle on the basis of time, where Kant accepts it because he believes Aristotle started a science of logic, and he's picking up that torch to further the project of a science of logic. Hegel builds a logic which "contains" or at least allows contradiction at certain points of time in the name of sublation, due to his reading of the history of philosophy — Moliere
To be a bit more specific, critical-rational ontologists do not appear fully formed, but arise out of that tradition that questions its own moral worth, which is the religious tradition. That aspiration to the ideal community is the religious aspiration in modern dress. — unenlightened
I'm not endorsing every ounce of tone, etc., but showing him as a self-consciously transitional figure.The reproach that according to my book religion is an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion, would be well founded only if...that into which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, namely...anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity, a pure illusion. But so far from giving a trivial or even a subordinate significance to anthropology... I, on the contrary, while reducing theology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into theology, very much as Christianity, while lowering God into man, made man into God; though, it is true, this human God was by a further process made a transcendental, imaginary God, remote from man.
...
Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion – and to speculative philosophy and theology also – than to open its eyes, or rather to turn its gaze from the internal towards the external, i.e., I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality.
...
But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence, this change, inasmuch as it does away with illusion, is an absolute annihilation, or at least a reckless profanation; for in these days illusion only is sacred, truth profane.
But I do have it already under the title “…Limits of Reason Alone”, Greene, 1934, which might explain why I didn’t recognize “bare reason”: re: the limit of religion in Bennet 2017, among others. Despite all that, I’ll look for a dedicated reference to it, see what all the fuss is about. — Mww
Some of 'em don't even see the 'field of normativity' yet that gives their 'skepticism' meaning. — plaque flag
I cannot see "the field of normativity" as consisting in anything more than the principle of consistency. — Janus
coupled with the demand that if you are going to participate you must be minimally acquainted with the current state of the art, or risk being irrelevant. — Janus
I think that disagreement is over the "in itself' that dialectical counterpart to the "for us" that you seem intent on restricting us to in all domains. — Janus
These are the fields of sense, realms of discourse, where ignorance, unknowing, tears open the horizons for the imagination and intuition to play at will. Fields of faith, if you like. — Janus
No doubt that's a crucial part of it, but we can't forget the attitude of fallibility and a willingness to learn from others --- the second-order synthetic-critical tradition. I mean we can't do so as philosophers.* — plaque flag
I don't stand opposed to that stuff. In fact, I think anything potentially experienceable is part of the lifeworld, which is essentially 'horizonal' and infinite. — plaque flag
I insist tho that I am 'existentially' humble. Maybe the mystic is on a better path. I don't preach my suffocating & claustrophobic* ontology to anyone who isn't preaching their own brand, looking to criticize and synthesize with me. — plaque flag
the assessment of what seems most plausible ...i s always an individual matter. — Janus
I don't think it follows that everything experienced is available for public scrutiny and assessment in the way that. for example, the observations of the natural sciences, mathematics and logic are. — Janus
some think that their own faith-based beliefs must be amenable to being rationally argued for. If someone comes on a philosophy forum and tries to argue for such beliefs, they commit a category error and are fair game for rigorous critique. — Janus
I agree except I don't hold with the idea of "genius" especially the stink of authority it always seems to carry. — Janus
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