Joseph Rouse — Joshs

There are similarities between Rouse's postmodern view that we can never get outside our language and Wittgenstein's view, as a possible anti-realist or linguistic idealist, that the meaning of a word is determined by the language itself rather than any transcendent reality.

Wittgenstein wrote in PI 43 "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

As Joseph Rouse wrote about a postmodern view of science - "we can never get outside our language, experience, or methods to assess how well they correspond to a transcendent reality"

There are similarities between Rouse's postmodern view that we can never get outside our language and Wittgenstein's view, as a possible anti-realist or linguistic idealist, that the meaning of a word is determined by the language itself rather than any transcendent reality. — RussellA

Yes, Rouse was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein.

From Wittgenstein's Zettel:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts. We do not have the concepts we have because the facts are as they are, but if the facts were not as they are our concepts would not be as they are.

The closing remark refers to Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Elsewhere he says:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

If we look at species as kinds then we construct our picture of the world, or some aspect of it, in accordance to it, and attend to those facts that conform to this way of looking at things. But if we regard the differences between species as a matter of degree or variation then we begin to take into account facts that were previously overlooked or disregarded. We begin to see not only species but a great many other things differently. There is no fixed, unchanging order to life.

What are we to make of the following?:

Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).

Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging.

Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. — Fooloso4

:up:
Conceptual-categorical aspect (not the sound and color and music and ) of the lifeworld, for instance.

But if we regard the differences between species as a matter of degree or variation then we begin to take into account facts that were previously overlooked or disregarded. — Fooloso4

:up:

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts. We do not have the concepts we have because the facts are as they are, but if the facts were not as they are our concepts would not be as they are. — Fooloso4

:up:

FWIW, I think Husserl is right that we 'read off' facts from the way the world is given to us. We see that-the-door-was-left-unlocked both 'sensually' and 'conceptually' at once (the separation of sense and concept is this context is a useful but potentially misleading abstraction.) Yet much of this reading off depends on a form of life. I can only an aquarium from within a form of life where fish are kept in such things for amusement. And then (with Heid., as you know) there's also the circumspective 'seeing' of a couch as for sitting on manifest in plopping down on it unthinkingly, etc. But this too depends on a form of life where soft things are put in certain places with that use being obviously appropriate.

Wittgenstein wrote in PI 43 "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

As Joseph Rouse wrote about a postmodern view of science - "we can never get outside our language, experience, or methods to assess how well they correspond to a transcendent reality" — RussellA

Lately it looks to me that structuralist approaches to meaning (meaning as use, perhaps as inferential role) are illuminating but maybe leave something out. For instance, does 'red' mean more than its inferential role ? Those bornblind can use the concept, be knowledgable about redness. But this is exhaust the redness of red ? Does the structuralist insight rule out a private aspect of reference ?
I don't think it does, and I think a structuralist approach actually helps explain why a structuralist approach, albeit mostly correct, is so unintuitive for most people. I can't learn how to refer to 'pure pain' without membership in a inferential pragmatic culture, but this doesn't mean that I don't intend that pure private pain once I've learn how to structurally. In short, pain is more than the inferential aspect of its concept.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14582/sensational-conceptuality

Yes, Rouse was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein. — Joshs

It seems that the post-modernism of the French post-structuralists in the 1970's can also be traced back to the Wittgenstein's investigation into the limits of language and language in the 1950's.

What other ways are you thinking of, of how the subjective mind of colours, pains, fears and hopes relates to the objective world of rocks, mountains, supernova and gravity. — RussellA

From a phenomenological realist point of view, the world itself is colorful, noisy, painful. The rose is red. Its thorn hurts my careless finger.

Within this familiar (life-)world, we enrich our knowledge of everyday entities by adding scientific entities which are inferentially entangled and semantically dependent on those everyday entities. So the scientific image is just another 'layer' of the lifeworld -- though even this layer metaphor insufficiently emphasizes the entanglement.

Lately it looks to me that structuralist approaches to meaning (meaning as use, perhaps as inferential role) are illuminating but maybe leave something out — plaque flag

If Structuralism focuses on the way that human experience and behaviour is determined by various structures external to the individual, then it is suffers from the same problem as Behaviourism.

I don't learn how to feel pain as a result of the social world I may happen to live in, but suffer pain, am able to see the colour red, feel anger, etc because of Innatism, in that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs.

Meaning may be use within a form of life, as Wittgenstein said, but meaning is also in part determined by the fact that we are not born as blank slates.

If Structuralism focuses on the way that human experience and behaviour is determined by various structures external to the individual, then it is suffers from the same problem as Behaviourism. — RussellA

:up:
I agree. Not long ago, I was too structuralist. Reading some Husserl, who I thought of as 'too subjective' a thinker before closer examination, forced me to reconsider. The world is given only perspectively. This simple fact has huge implications. Just really noting how spatial objects are given to us is illuminating. We so easily take the theoretical posit of the object in Euclidean space (from no/any perspective) for granted as the real object -- because language is so profoundly social that the transparency of the subject is mostly useful --- until one is doing metaphysics.

I don't learn how to feel pain as a result of the social world I may happen to live in, but suffer pain, am able to see the colour red, feel anger, — RussellA

:up:

I'd say we learn how to conceptualize and discuss a pain and a color that is just there, mostly nonconceptually, as a kind of overflow of any mere intending or labeling of it. I agree that our evolved bodies have innate capacities that make pain and color possible for us. I don't think the dead see color, because I understand that perspectives on the colorful world are given only to creatures which I therefore call 'sentient.'

Within this familiar (life-)world, we enrich our knowledge of everyday entities by adding scientific entities which are inferentially entangled and semantically dependent on those everyday entities — plaque flag

A nice, almost poetic explanation of Indirect Realism.

I'd say we learn how to conceptualize and discuss a pain and a color that is just there, mostly nonconceptually, as a kind of overflow of any mere intending or labeling of it. — plaque flag

In Kant's terms, we conceptualize our intuitions.

A nice, almost poetic explanation of Indirect Realism. — RussellA

<smile>
Ah but I think you know it's just an enriched-sophisticated direct realism. Bu if we get into that, it should be on another thread, I suppose ?

In Kant's terms, we conceptualize our intuitions. — RussellA

Yes. But I'd say that's a theoretical posit. Not incorrect, but a thesis. If we just look at the world we find meaningful objects. Heidegger talks about how the world is grasped largely in terms of a network of 'tools' that we use unthinkingly, gliding through our daily routines. I mostly pre-theoretically even sub-conceptually flip the lightswitch. The screwdriver is invisible in my hand as I focus on the task. This is the real world which we as thematizing primate enrich with powerful maps, largely through a mathematical syntax and a tradition of careful measurement that grasps space in a new way.

In my view, the scientific image is valued because it describes this world and not something hidden under or behind it. As philosophers we are discursive subjects on the scientific 'stage' of a public space of reasons, making a case for this or that articulation of the world we share. The biological complexities of perception are secondary, for we as discursive subjects are not in our skulls behind our eyes --- though a functioning brain is indeed understood to be a condition of possibility for our participation in the drama of science. It makes no sense to rationally doubt the conditions of possibility for rational discussion. So we might as well talk directly about the worldly objects we need to make our cases.

A central question of concern when it comes to interpreting the late Wittgenstein and what he meant by "private language" is the following issue:

" ..Are certain norms valid, or in force, because certain things such as linguistic expressions and intentional states have certain meanings/contents? Or do such things have meaning/content because some norms are in force? We shall distinguish between meaning/content “engendered” (ME/CE) normativity and meaning/content determining (MD/CD) normativity (cf. Glüer & Wikforss 2009). MD/CD norms are such that they metaphysically determine, ground, or constitute meaning/content; here, the norms are prior. ME/CE normativity is normativity engendered by, or consequent upon, meaning/content, regardless of how the latter is determined. "


https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-normativity/

To understand this question, one must decide the extent to which they consider norms and intentional states are gramatically related, i.e to what extent are norms considered to be part of the very meaning of "intentional states" (or vice-versa)?

Take the following examples:

Suppose a zoologist asserts that a particular species of animal exhibits signs of intentionality. To what extent should the zoologist be interpreted as referring to the norms of zoology, as opposed to the actual "perspective" of the animal in question?

What if an AI engineer asserts that ChatGPT123 demonstrates intentionality. Is their answer more concerned with the norms of AI engineering than in the purportedly more descriptive zoological science example?

And what of our ordinary attribution of other minds? If Alice recognizes that Bob has a mind that is distinct from hers, to what extent should she be interpreted as referring to her personal state of empathy , as opposed to the state of Bob's actual behaviour?

In the case of Wittgenstein's "Beetle in the Box", the specific issue is the relationship between the customs of language that are invariant to personal circumstances and perspective and thus incapable of representing 'private objects' on the one hand, versus the language users who express their personal perspectives using such aperspectival customs. The analogy of a children's playground comes to mind. The function of swings, climbing frames and roundabouts are to accommodate the needs and perspectives of children, in a manner that abides by norms of health and safety. But obviously it would be a terrible category error if one attempted to explain why and how children used playgrounds by appealing to the design of the playground and the norms of the controlling adults. Likewise, the beetle-in the box argument wasn't made to deny the semantic importance of intentional content, but to stress how social customs, such as the custom of physical language, have evolved to facilitate the expression of intentional content.

In my view, the scientific image is valued because it describes this world and not something hidden under or behind it. — plaque flag

The language of science also has metaphorical value

An interesting topic that leads into the nature of language. It can be argued that language, including the language of science, is more metaphorical rather than literal.

The scientific image is also valued not because it is able to directly describe the reality of the world but because it allows humans a metaphorical understanding of what cannot be literally understood through the use of metaphor.

Metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor
"In his article on the use of metaphors in physics (November issue, page 17), Robert P Crease describes several interesting trees but fails to notice the wood all around him. What is a scientific theory if not a grand metaphor for the real world it aims to describe? Theories are generally formulated in mathematical terms, and it is difficult to see how it could be argued that, for example, F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense. Scientific metaphors possess uniquely powerful descriptive and predictive potential, but they are metaphors nonetheless. If scientific theories were as real as the world they describe, they would not change with time (which they do, occasionally). I would even go so far as to suggest that an equation like F = ma is a culturally specific metaphor, in that it can only have meaning in a society that practices mathematical quantification in the way that ours does. Before I'm dismissed as a loopy radical, I should point out that I'm a professional physicist who has been using mathematical metaphors to describe the real world for the last twenty years!"

As Nietzsche wrote “We believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snows, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities.”

Likewise, the beetle-in the box argument wasn't made to deny the semantic importance of intentional content, but to stress how social customs, such as the custom of physical language, have evolved to facilitate the expression of intentional content. — sime

As I understand the "Beetle in the Box" - in the world, suppose there is something that has been named by society a "beetle".

When looking at this "beetle", Bertrand actually has the private mental image of an ant, and Russell has the private mental image of a bee. Bertrand can never know Russell's private mental image, and vice versa.

Yet both Bertrand and Russell can have a sensible conversation about "beetles", even if their intentional contents, their private mental images, are different.

Within the language game, private mental images drop out of consideration as irrelevant.

Yet both Bertrand and Russell can have a sensible conversation about "beetles", even if their intentional contents, their private mental images, are different.

Within the language game, private mental images drop out of consideration as irrelevant. — RussellA

I think the intentional concept has to include the public structuralist aspect of meaning, but that their can be a private founded aspect of meaning made possible by this public aspect.

As Nietzsche wrote “We believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snows, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities.” — RussellA

Nietzsche in other passages gives Kant hell for making the real world (this one) an illusion.

I'd say that we should just look at the entire encompassing lifeworld and acknowledge its entanglement with our nervous system and our metaphors. In this lifeworld, marriages are as real an electrons. Science itself as a normative enterprise only makes sense on a stage of humans trying to be honest and less confused. So even value can't be wiped off like an illusion without paradox.

.Are certain norms valid, or in force, because certain things such as linguistic expressions and intentional states have certain meanings/contents? Or do such things have meaning/content because some norms are in force? — sime

I'd say it's both. Husserl's categorial intuition is helpful. Once we are 'in' a form of life, including its inferential norms and more basic ostensive norms, we can directly perceive states of affairs (not sense data). I see that my wife is coming in with a bag of groceries, all at once. The world is always meaningful like this. So this puts a constraint on what's intelligible. The meaningstructured world isn't whatever we want it to be, and I don't think we can ignore the structure of typical worldly objects when we are thinking about the meaning of more abstract and complex terms.

Note that I largely agree with inferentialism, so this is a balancing acknowledgement of how meaning is not only structural but also founded on direct perception of worldly objects in relationship.

I think the intentional concept has to include the public structuralist aspect of meaning, but that their can be a private founded aspect of meaning made possible by this public aspect. — plaque flag

Let's use the example in Wittgenstein's PI 1 of the colour red.

In the world is an object emitting a wavelength of 700 nm that society has named "red".

Bertrand's private mental image is unknown to us, but suppose when he sees an object emitting a wavelength of 700 nm his private mental image is of green. Similarly, Russell's private mental image is also unknown to us, but suppose when he sees an object emitting a wavelength of 700 nm his private mental image is of blue.

For both Bertrand and Russell, when seeing a wavelength of 700nm, there is a private meaning and a public meaning. For Bertrand, the private meaning is experiencing an intentional content of green and the public meaning is having seen a colour named "red". For Russell, the private meaning is experiencing an intentional content of blue, and the public meaning is having seen a colour named "red".

The private meaning is associated with the public meaning, but the private meaning is not included within the public meaning.

It is the same with Aristotle's Categories, where the categories may be associated with each other even though independent of each other. For example, in the sentence "there are four rocks", where "four" is quantity and rocks is substance.

Private meaning is not made possible by public meaning.

Nietzsche in other passages gives Kant hell for making the real world (this one) an illusion. — plaque flag

However, one also reads in the Edinburgh Research Archive that Nietzsche was probably an anti-realist, whereby any external reality is hypothetical and not assumed.

Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche often suggest that he is some form of anti-realist, i.e. he does not affirm objective scientific truth or understanding of the world. Nietzsche advocates a viewpoint known as perspectivism, which may seem to cement this anti-realist interpretation, insofar as it emphasises the perspectival nature of understanding. Similarly, Justin Remhof interprets Nietzsche as an object constructivist, i.e. that objects within the world are constructed by human concepts, and this also seems to align neatly with anti-realist interpretations.

Private meaning is not made possible by public meaning. — RussellA

Do not agree. Public meaning makes private meaning incomprehensible.

We learn what “red” is by being expose to red objects and judging similarly. What goes on inside is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept “red”.
You ask someone to imagine a red object that is experienced by one person as “blue”, another “green”, and another “yellow”. For example, if I experience a red object as “blue” and blue object as “red” and another person experiences a red object as “red” and a blue object as “blue”, what has established the use of “red object” and “blue object” amongst language users? Private experiences of “blue” and “red”? No. Common color judgments of objects with other language users? Yes. In this example, everyone could be experiencing something different, but what holds it together is the shared judgment when exposed to a particular colored object.

Could it be that I have no experience of what we would call “color” but some other experience of a “private” kind? But what could that be and could it ever be communicated? Just saying it is different is not saying anything at all. This idea of “private meaning” is tempting but ultimately vacuous compared to where that idea of “meaning” has its life, among a group of language users talking about a shared reality.

Public meaning makes private meaning incomprehensible. — Richard B

What about pre-linguistic perceptual meanings? Do pre-verbal infants not construct meaning from their surroundings through the use of perceptual-motor schemes?

What about pre-linguistic perceptual meanings? Do pre-verbal infants not construct meaning from their surroundings through the use of perceptual-motor schemes? — Joshs

As human being, we have many primitive reactions that serve us well, like thirst, hunger, pain to name a few. But would we say that an infant has the meaning or the concept of “thirst”, “hunger”, or “pain” before they even learn these words from an adult. No, but they do experience these things and later, adults teach the infant to replace this behavior with language.

As human being, we have many primitive reactions that serve us well, like thirst, hunger, pain to name a few. But would we say that an infant has the meaning or the concept of “thirst”, “hunger”, or “pain” before they even learn these words from an adult. No, but they do experience these things and later, adults teach the infant to replace this behavior with language. — Richard B

There is quite a bit of research in developmental and perceptual psychology indicating that what you are calling primitive reactions is in fact complex conceptual understanding.

perceptual psychology indicating that what you are calling primitive reactions is in fact complex conceptual understanding. — Joshs

Long live theorizing, may you find some pragmatic benefit.

What about pre-linguistic perceptual meanings? Do pre-verbal infants not construct meaning from their surroundings through the use of perceptual-motor schemes? — Joshs

:up:
I think we can also just look at our dogs and cats.

The private meaning is associated with the public meaning, but the private meaning is not included within the public meaning. — RussellA

:up:

Private meaning is not made possible by public meaning. — RussellA

I think it's more like two sides of the same coin. You talk of wavelengths a moment ago, and I presume you rely on the public inferential aspect of the concept. But it's hard to imagine how you could have a private sense of wavelengths without being immersed in a culture that uses this meaningful token in inferences (explanations.)

We learn what “red” is by being expose to red objects and judging similarly. What goes on inside is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept “red”. — Richard B

I understand why someone would claim this, and I readily agree that the social aspect is necessary. But I don't think it's exhaustive. Ought we deny our experience of intending an object ? Or intending a state of affairs ? Something like the direct experience of meaning ? I think training is crucial for the linguistic version of this, but once trained we have a certain independence and ability to introspect.

However, one also reads in the Edinburgh Research Archive that Nietzsche was probably an anti-realist, whereby any external reality is hypothetical and not assumed. — RussellA

I love Nietzsche, so I don't mind the detour, but keeping the function of the author in mind, along with our diligent avoidance of arguing from the fame of the mighty dead, especially one who told us he wore many masks, I present to you what I had in mind originally.

1. The true world — attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")

2. The true world — unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents"). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)

3. The true world — unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it — a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)

4. The true world — unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us (Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)

5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating — an idea which has become useless and superfluous — consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of good sense and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)

https://www.austincc.edu/adechene/Nietzsche%20true%20world.pdf

Note that Nietzsche also mocked the idea of the sense organs being understood as their own product.

To be clear, I think all kinds of interpretations of Nietzsche can be supported, with none of them, including mine, resolving the issue.