They're not representative of the types of claims made in philosophy, which deal with complex concepts and objectives, and require sophisticated interpretation and thinking. — Judaka

:up:
Yes, it gets trickier up in the clouds. We can talk about our talking about our talking. We build new metacognitive self-referential concepts on the fly. So it's an infinite game. I still think there's the same intentional structure, but the objects involved are lost in deep fog.

I agree with Wittgenstein and Brandom that much of meaning is ground in public norms, especially inferential norms as in what claims are justified by what assumptions. But I think as individuals we can have genuinely new insights that are hard to express. So we reach for metaphors, abuse language suggestively. I'm inclined to say that good conversation involves a kind of 'seeing' where the other person is 'coming from.' Gadamer writes about a fusion of horizons. Basically I have to learn your lingo and you mine. One of my favorite of his insights is that I come to know my own self as listener by seeing what my prejudicial misunderstandings were as the situation is clarified. For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. We think they are the world, but they are glasses we can take off. To me that's beautiful. A big part of philosophy is converting false necessity into optional contingency ---a journey toward greater freedom and a wider view.

This is what I meant by "useful fictions create truth", now replacing that to be "created categories create truth". — Judaka

I probably make such a fuss because Brandom gets from Kant the big insight that statements / claims
/ complete thoughts are the minimal unit of responsibility. So I thought of a fiction as a complete thought and not just a category / concept by itself.

I will say that there are probably limits on our category choices as we get closer to the sensory world. We are almost bound to grasp the dog as a unity and not as 4 legs that live together in a little tribe under a brown cylinder umbrella. So it's the higher levels, etc., that look more flexible. Which, as you mention, things get ever trickier.

There's a competition, where "It's true that this approach is likely to succeed at maximising the outcomes I care about" might decide which ideas are best. The "truth" part can be forcibly added, but it's trivial. — Judaka

I think we agree, at least on ambiguous cases. We want the best beliefs. We tend to want them to be true without having a way to know finally and certainly whether they are. In fact I've argued in other threads that we probably never know exactly what we mean. So philosophy to me is as much about clarification and intensification of semantic grip as anything else.


You might like this essay on the topic. I do think Brandom is great in general.
Why Truth Is Not Important In Philosophy

Your response covers a lot of ground, and I am starting to lose track of what we're arguing for/against. I'll focus on debating what truth is for now, but I'm a bit unsure as to what your motivations are. To clarify, I am unhappy with philosophy being understood as an impractical interest in truth, or thinking of logic in philosophy as exemplary of what's "truly logical". I see it as having its particular biases and objectives, and I believe that's how it should be understood. There are advantages and disadvantages to its approach, and a philosopher can be understood as someone who believes in the project and its merits.

I think what I can offer in discussions can be rapidly diminished as I'm overwhelmed by different topics, contexts and objectives, and maybe I'm already overcapacity, so apologies in advance.

How does one hold up a meaning (the meaning of an assertion) against the world to compare that meaning with a state of affairs right ? — plaque flag

I'll just stick with what I've been saying, that truth is a correct reference. What that actually means is ambiguous, it depends on the word or claim. All of the rules for language use are invented, including for words such as "rain". The reference is correct when the conditions for it to be correct are met, and that's what truth is.

Words reference and nothing more, and what they're referencing is tied to the conditions of the reference being correct.

When I call an assertion true, I am basically endorsing or repeating that assertion. — plaque flag

You're agreeing the reference is correct in a linguistic sense.

It's only correct to reference the weather as raining under such strict conditions, the claim is very testable, and the meaning is quite specific. So, there are very few cases where one person would think it's correct to say it's raining, and another would disagree. Such simple examples can obscure the subjective nature of truth.

Just as with "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", you can agree it's correct to say this, but the assertion probably isn't the same. It's just too vague, who qualifies as powerful? What does it mean for a system to rely on the goodwill of the powerful? We can say the same words, but what we mean isn't the same, and I think the assertion is in what we mean, but let me stress, my reasons for saying this are definitely pragmatic.

To give an example close to the heart of philosophy, I criticise the way we agree to condemn moral terms such as oppression, racism, theft and so on. Since, generally the thing we're referring to needs to be immoral for it to be correct to reference that thing using one of these moral terms, the consensus is hollow. We can both agree that oppression is immoral, but it's a rather superficial agreement, especially if we refuse to reference the same conditions as "oppression".

I agree we don't "intend" to find things to be something like oppression, but I worry that you're trying to extrapolate from simple examples such as rain. I'm sure you're not extrapolating as though there's zero difference, but I'm unsure about the differences you do perceive.

The next issue is whether it is raining. — plaque flag

Just to clarify specifically, I disagree with this, it's just a matter of whether it's correct to reference the weather as raining. The nuances of this are far more apparent when dealing with a word such as oppression.

It has to be an explication of a logic we mostly use transparently. — plaque flag

Can you clarify what you mean? What & why?

I think that phrase of mine was awkward. I meant describing the world [accurately.] I 'intend a state of affairs' as 'actual.' — plaque flag

I don't think truth is a word about describing the world accurately. When you attempt to describe the world, it's only correct to reference that description as true when it's accurate, which is what creates this meaning of the word. So, it depends on the context. "God is love" is almost certainly not trying to accurately describe the world, if that's what you had meant, I thoroughly disagree. This claim is about interpretation and understanding, it's sophisticated thought.

For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. We think they are the world, but they are glasses we can take off. — plaque flag

I'd be interested to hear more about this, as I'm not quite sure what you're referring to here, but perhaps this represents our disagreement. What do you mean by "glasses we can take off"? How would "glasses we can take off and exchange for other pairs" work as an alternative?

A big part of philosophy is converting false necessity into optional contingency ---a journey toward greater freedom and a wider view. — plaque flag

Could you clarify what you mean?

You might like this essay on the topic. I do think Brandom is great in general. — plaque flag

I am ADHD and thus struggle to follow even small essays, but I am going through it. How much of this paper coincides with your understanding? Anywhere you notably disagree with it?

I'm sure you're not extrapolating as though there's zero difference, but I'm unsure about the differences you do perceive. — Judaka

I see the difference as massive, so it's largely a logical point about how language works. 'Oppression' has a role as a token in a 'game.' It's like a virtual object in conceptual space. People see this object differently. The word has different meanings for people. The argument is about how the token/word ought to be understood and used. It's my private perspective on this 'object' that I want foisted on everyone else. I want 'them' to see oppression as I do ('correctly.')

No one sees it apart from all perspectives. So the 'truth' about 'oppression' is what oppression looks like from an ideal subjectivity --- from a purified or unbiased or fully informed and rational perspective.

... it's just a matter of whether it's correct to reference the weather as raining. The nuances of this are far more apparent when dealing with a word such as oppression. — Judaka

If you clarify this I might agree.

But let me offer this:

Does
The assertion that it is raining is warranted.
mean
It is raining.
?

I don't think truth is a word about describing the world accurately. — Judaka

:up:

Yes. Tricky issue, but 'true' describes belief. To call a statement true is to tell you about my belief. If you trust me, it's also telling you about the world. From your perspective, the world is changed by the news I bring. You see the world differently, perhaps in a way you'll come to regret or further update.

For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. — plaque flag

What do you mean by "glasses we can take off"? — Judaka

Personality is a lens. We always project/expect as we interpret. We read in the light of these expectations. Our whole past, what we think of as behind us, leaps ahead in the form of prejudicial expectation.

These prejudices are at the same time, as a system, the organ of understanding itself.So doing away with all prejudice is doing away with the self altogether as a system of interpretive habits --- like understanding what a screwdriver is for. I 'am' my past in the mode of no longer being it. So prejudice is simultaneously enabling and limiting. Because I know without even thinking about it how this or that 'must' be used, what he or she 'must' mean. I always project my best guess of the total meaning of a person's message as I decode the details in terms of this projection. I have to continually revise this blurry total interpretation as the details confirm or threaten it.

I can remember how my total interpretations change and learn to see my own 'automatic' self in my only-now-visible 'assumptions.' I took certain aspects of reality to be necessary rather than optional. I assumed maybe, without even thinking about it, that all numbers are rational, but then someone shows me a proof that $\sqrt{2}$ is not.

Could you clarify what you mean? — Judaka

More of the above. People make 'assumptions' that they don't even realize they've made. Maybe there's a trapdoor under the rug, but no one has bothered to check, because it never occurred to anyone to postulate the possibility.

I am ADHD and thus struggle to follow even small essays, but I am going through it. How much of this paper coincides with your understanding? Anywhere you notably disagree with it? — Judaka

This might be the essence:

So long as we pay sufficiently close attention to the reasons that can be offered for and against various claims, their truth will take care of itself—or at least, we will have done everything we can do about it.

As philosophers we seek the best beliefs. I can tell you about my belief by saying that a claim is true. Or I can just make the claim. 'True' is useful for talking about beliefs in complicated situations. 'If that is true, then so is this other statement, which we thought was false.' As we talk to one another, we can only discuss beliefs ---sometimes using the word 'true.' Our duty is to be careful about the beliefs we hold and try to get others to adopt. That's all we can do. A warranted or justified belief tends to be acted upon. If I believe that it is raining, then I prepare for rain.

I see 'the way things are' to include the fact that it is raining. To believe something is to experience the world in a certain light. The world for me is structured by my beliefs.

I think there is a single world out there, but it's only seen from perspectives. So it's like an object that's seen imperfectly from billions of perspectives at once. I can persuade you to see the world differently than before, and you can change my perspective.

To me it's no small fact that the world is only given perspectively. We have the useful fiction of the scientific image which is a model of the world seen from nowhere or anywhere in Euclidean space. But this is just a highly important cultural product. A tool. Or it's fair to view at as an extra layer of beliefs that help us see tables as also lots of atoms and so on. But all of our beliefs exist in a single inferential network. Because we explain toothaches in terms of protons and protons in terms of experiments on roomsize instruments and scientific norms and university restrooms, etc.

If you clarify this I might agree.

But let me offer this:

Does
The assertion that it is raining is warranted.
mean
It is raining. — plaque flag

This question really shows a significant problem with truth in my opinion. The answer is, of course, yes. A correct reference is correct because it's correct or in other words because the conditions were met for the reference to be correct. If it's correct to say it's raining, then it's correct to say it's raining, which is what your question is asking.

This might also explain some of your usage of the words truth and the truth that I can't make any sense of. You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining". Let's explore some of the nuances here.

To borrow ChatGPT, I asked it : What must be true in order for us to say it's raining? It's reply:

For us to confidently say that "it's raining," certain conditions must be met:

Precipitation: Rain is a type of precipitation where water droplets fall from the atmosphere. So, for it to be raining, there must be a significant presence of falling water droplets.

Observation: Someone (or something) must have observed or detected the falling water droplets. This could be a person visually seeing and feeling the raindrops or a rain gauge measuring the amount of precipitation.

Consistency: The presence of falling water droplets must be consistent over a certain period of time. A brief drizzle or a few isolated drops might not qualify as "it's raining."

Not Other Forms of Precipitation: To distinguish rain from other forms of precipitation like snow, sleet, or hail, it's important to confirm that the falling precipitation is indeed liquid water droplets.

Corroborating Evidence: It's helpful to have corroborating evidence such as wet surfaces, the sound of rain hitting roofs or windows, or changes in visibility due to the falling precipitation.

Meteorological Criteria: In meteorology, there are specific criteria and instruments used to officially measure and record rainfall. These criteria might include a certain amount of water collected over a specific time period, which is often measured in millimeters or inches.

In essence, for us to confidently declare that "it's raining," we need to observe a consistent, significant presence of falling liquid water droplets that align with meteorological and observational standards. — ChatGPT

Without bothering to ask whether I agree with this or not, it's illustrative of a set of conditions that must be met for it to be correct to reference the weather as raining. We can assume these were met if it's correct to say it's raining.

We can also contrast, where although the conditions for saying it's "raining" were met, it could still be incorrect because "drizzling" better captures the kind of rainfall we're referring to. "it's incorrect to say it's raining because it's drizzling" and I'm sure the distinction between raining and drizzling has been made. What's reasonable to do or not do because it's raining isn't the same as what's reasonable to do or not because it's drizzling, and it's different again for "pouring" which implies heavy rain.

Thus, there are many arguments I can make for why "raining" is an incorrect reference, even if it's technically true. "Rain" is a straightforward concept, it obscures most of the subjectivity at play in language and truth, which is why it's wrong to extrapolate from them.

The effect isn't just produced because "rain" is closer to sense data, it's that examples using sense data are typically very straightforward. Is it correct to reference "rain" as a word that starts with the letter R? Is it correct to reference "rain" as a noun? They're just as obvious - because they're straightforward, simple and use stable concepts. The truth of the correct reference is so compelling, it's so inconceivable that anyone could disagree, but that's not what truth is. It's just an extreme on a spectrum, nothing more, unfortunately, I think it's a nameless spectrum, but maybe "objectiveness" is close.

So prejudice is simultaneously enabling and limiting. — plaque flag

I prefer the word bias to prejudice, though for some shitty reason, both words have negative connotations but nonetheless, I agree. Selecting good biases is essential, one of the most important aspects of thinking. Philosophy is its own pair of glasses, each pair has its own pros and cons.

'Oppression' has a role as a token in a 'game.' It's like a virtual object in conceptual space. People see this object differently. The word has different meanings for people. The argument is about how the token/word ought to be understood and used. It's my private perspective on this 'object' that I want foisted on everyone else. I want 'them' to see oppression as I do ('correctly.') — plaque flag

I see. I mostly agree with your characterisation, but for the sake of clarity, I'll explain that the word "oppression' is still true when it's correct as a reference. The difference between it and a word like "rain" is in the conditions. For it to be correct to reference something as oppression, it must be unfair, and that's why the word is so contentious. That the conditions for something to be "fair" are so vague and open to interpretation is part of why the word oppression is so contentious.

The conditions for a reference to be correct exist for all words, and truth is created when they're met. That tells us all we need to know about truth, it has only a single quality, that of correct reference. Which is my point, why should anyone care about a disorganised list of correct references?

It's trivially true that truth matters, it's so abundant, and self-asserting, just like logic. That's what makes truth & logic so fickle and worthless. The questions to which we want truth are value-laden, it's all about the conditions. I ask a question I want an answer to, "How can I get the best results in X" or "How can I most efficiently accomplish Y". My question and the conditions for knowing truth are what matters, the value of truth is entirely dependent upon their good qualities. To talk of my search for answers as a search for truth is asinine, it's misleading, my questions are pragmatic, they're about doing, about use. My conditions for truth aim to ensure its usefulness.

Truth and logic have as their primary qualities abundance and mixed and unreliable relevance and quality. I assume any thinker, and especially one as advanced as yourself understands this problem, the need for good questions, good truth conditions, good biases and objectives. Yet, I think it's wrong to only talk about truth & logic, assuming these things were done well, we're attributing our successes to the wrong things.

You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining" — Judaka

:up:
I basically agree with you. And I was trying to say something like this is my own way. The world is only given perspectively. It's like an object seen from many angles, through many pairs of eyes. But in this case the eyes are linguistic and conceptual, gazing at the intelligible structure of world.

'My' current beliefs about the world are how the world is for me at that time ---my view on the world and not some private image in my head. For this idea of the image 'only in my head' assumes some Real World apart from and behind the way it appears to discursive subjects ---literally nonsense. Belief articulates the world (not an image of the world) from a certain perspective, possibly very badly, very 'incorrectly' from someone else's perspective.

Direct realism with 'fallibility' [disagreement, revision of beliefs] and perspectival limitation is much better than indirect realism.

If 'you' tell me that I am wrong a belief, that 'I' am daydreaming, then you simply see the same world differently. You call one or my beliefs false. I call your own differing belief false. No one gets to look around their own linguistic perspective to see the world absurdly from no perspective at all.

All we ever have is belief. But we use 'true' and 'false' to endorse or dispute beliefs. Establishing which beliefs are warranted/ justified is where the real work happens, except that our discussion is valuable for making all of this clear to ourselves, getting the power cord untangled.

How does that sound ?

"Rain" is a straightforward concept, it obscures most of the subjectivity at play in language and truth, which is why it's wrong to extrapolate from them. — Judaka

I think we can use the transcendent intentional object approach and just emphasize that the object can be almost impossible to see with any clarity.

If we have a community that cares about God and believe in God, then someone saying 'God is love' is sharing their own conceptual view of this entity.

I include every possible entity that can be involved in inference in my ontology. I even let in round square and fictional characters, even pineal gland gremlins. Determining their actual nature is part of the conversation, but they are welcome from the beginning as 'tokens' that humans might use to explain themselves and justify claims.

So maybe I think God is only a concept. That's my view on this entity then. Another person now claims that God is love. This metaphor is bold and vague. We need not be happy with it. But I think it still has the structure of the description of a more mundane object. How well God can be seen at all is part of the conversation. Someone may believe that God is just a projection. Some will say that there is no God, but they aren't denying the entity as conceptually accessibly, just specifying it a certain way (only a concept, etc).

All we ever have is belief. But we use 'true' and 'false' to endorse or dispute beliefs. Establishing which beliefs are warranted/ justified is where the real work happens, except that our discussion is valuable for making all of this clear to ourselves, getting the power cord untangled.

How does that sound ? — plaque flag

I agree that all we ever have is belief, but truth is technically a function of logic, the term does not endorse or dispute but affirms or denies the conditions as being met. This allows us to talk about truth conceptually, as that which would meet the conditions, regardless of whether we know of it. Context helps us to guess what conditions are being employed, should be employed or are being referred to. "True" might not be an endorsement of a belief, but an assertion that the conditions were indeed met, and that one is sure of this.

To say that something can be correctly referenced as something is to say something about it, and the logic of what one should do if something is something is also part of the idea of truth.

A central idea in philosophy is fairness, but arguably, this term tells us absolutely nothing about the world. Also arguably, what matters more about the word fairness, isn't what it describes, but what it means must be done. If something is unfair, it's wrong, so it shouldn't be done. To me, this part of unfairness is entangled with the concept, as if I can provide a compelling justification for why something is beneficial or practical, we mightn't want to call it unfair, as it would mean we'd have to stop.

We could point out how unfair the capitalist business structure is, practically a dictatorship, characterised by an immense imbalance of power. Yet, the merits of the system would get brought up against this argument, the productivity, the efficiency and so on. This doesn't seem to make sense, until noting that pointing out how unfair and immoral it is would demand condemnation and cessation of the practice. If you can point out a good alternative, suddenly, people are happy to condemn it as unfair. I'd argue the same thing happened with the ramping up of industrialisation and the end of slavery.

The philosopher has their tools, for example, "rationality, "responsibility", "free will", "morality", and so on. How is a critique of these tools handled? What is the usual response? Your experience might be different, but for me, they start talking about consequence and utility. These ideas, and their truth, are as contingent upon their usefulness as anything else. A compelling argument against the utility of their understanding would suffice to convince them to change, and it's this I meant, though truth is not usefulness, usefulness is truth or a prerequisite to truth.

Essentially, it's important to note that the conditions for establishing truth are often selected for pragmatic reasons, the reference is made for pragmatic reasons and the term is defined pragmatically. On top of that, we may assert a reference as true or false for its implications, as a reason for doing something. Even in our summary of truth, you may resist mine and I may resist yours, not because of a flaw in the other's understanding but because we're paying attention to what serves our own ends best.

If we have a community that cares about God and believe in God, then someone saying 'God is love' is sharing their own conceptual view of this entity. — plaque flag

I think "God is love" is a good example of how truth is pragmatic, and I don't for a second believe such a vague claim inspires belief for any non-practical reason. The subtext of the claim is more important, what are they trying to get you to do because God is love? What are they trying to get you to think? Why is it important to them that God is love? Probably, the argument can be whatever suffices to convince belief, and if their objective was better served by some other argument then they'd use that instead. Well, I'm undoubtedly a cynic, but what's useful too often coincides with what's true, the two go hand-in-hand.

I agree that all we ever have is belief, but truth is technically a function of logic, the term does not endorse or dispute but affirms or denies the conditions as being met. — Judaka

I think you were more correct when you said something seemingly very different:

You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining. — Judaka

To me it seems like you are wavering between trying to explain what makes a true statement true and how 'true' is used. But I don't think the first mission is possible.

It does not work to talk about prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true. It gets paradoxical, because 'prelinguistic stuff' is linguistic stuff.

The world just HAS a conceptual aspect for human beings, in the same way that it has a color aspect. We have a 'conceptual' sense in the way we have eyes, but really all of our senses work together to give us a meaningfully structured lifeworld. Not an image of one, but the world itself, which depends on us as we on it.

To me it seems like you are wavering between trying to explain what makes a true statement true and how 'true' is used. But I don't think the first mission is possible.

It does not work to talk about prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true. It gets paradoxical, because 'prelinguistic stuff' is linguistic stuff. — plaque flag

I don't understand the criticism of "prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true". What is prelinguistic stuff?

To clarify, rain is a created category, as we agreed, it doesn't exist in reality, and there is no "actual raining". I understand truth as a correct reference, in other words, it can't be disentangled from language. Truth is a function of logic, but that isn't the "logic of reality", it's the logic of our language and concepts.

I understand truth as a correct reference, in other words, it can't be disentangled from language. — Judaka

What refers to what ? I thought you meant a word referring to nonword stuff.

A central idea in philosophy is fairness, but arguably, this term tells us absolutely nothing about the world. — Judaka

Our understanding of the word would, I claim, be an understanding of part of the world. As conceptual beings, we live not only in colorful objects but within meaningful institutions.

I thought you meant a word referring to nonword stuff. — plaque flag

The opposite. A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a pet, but not a building. It's not true that a dog is a building, it's an incorrect reference. Even if dogs went extinct, it changes nothing, the rules are all made up, and they only change if we change them.

Our understanding of the word would, I claim, be an understanding of part of the world. — plaque flag

I agree, the concept of fairness certainly is part of anyone's understanding of the world.

A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a pet, but not a building. It's not true that a dog is a building, it's an incorrect reference. Even if dogs went extinct, it changes nothing, the rules are all made up, and they only change if we change them. — Judaka

OK.

But my point is that all we have is belief. The world is grasped as meaningfully structured. Humans may make up languages over time, but for the most part a child learns a language & then 'has' the world in terms of it. So I see my-keys-on-the-table-ness immediately. I hear my-alarm-clock-going-off. I watch that-Karen-being-a-bitch.

I'm saying that belief is like this seeing of my-keys-on-the-table-ness. I could turn out to be wrong, but the world from my perspective, while I believe my keys are on the table, does indeed feature, in its conceptual aspect, my keys on the table. I may also know god-is-love-ness. The world for me has God who is love in it. I'm talking about the same world and even the same God when I tell you this. The intentional token in the game is what links us and allows us to compare beliefs. You have your own perspective on the world. You tell me God is not love or that shit's too vague. [ I'm being playful here. I don't myself claim that God is love, tho it's not a terrible definition -- at least it's friendly.]

The point is that we all just have a perspective on the world which includes a conceptual aspect which is the belief of whoever has this perspective on it. There is no need to paste language on the world because the world is always already meaningfully conceptually structured. All we can do is compare, discuss, and modify such structures ---seek for better beliefs. Seek to see the world from a more better 'place' in 'belief space' or 'personality space' or whatever we want to call it. It includes even normal space, like walking around a building to literally see the back door, or whether there is one.

I have agreed that all we have is belief, and I agree that our concepts are part of our understanding of the world. I can talk about dogs, but that's it, I can only refer to a concept, and think in terms of concepts.

I think your explanation of "true", as endorsing or disputing beliefs, risks misrepresenting the concept. I could dispute a belief for any number of reasons, but to call something untrue is a particular type of dispute. Truth has a particular quality given to it because it's a function of truth, it should be clearly distinguished from belief. I won't say more than that, I doubt I can tell you anything that you don't already know.

I could dispute a belief for any number of reasons, but to call something untrue is a particular type of dispute. — Judaka

How is me disagreeing with you more than me expressing my own belief ?
I think (?) your are implicitly picturing some naked reality (from no perspective, but really still yours) that MAKES a statement true or untrue. But I'm saying that reality is only give to/thru perspectives, and that beliefs just are that given reality in its 'conceptual essence.' In that sense, all beliefs are true, as an expression of how the world is seen by the mind by a person at that time --- but only about their view on the world.

Discussing is people working together toward better beliefs. [People might say 'truer,' but this leads to confusion, because 'true' is simply [mostly] used to agree with 'mere' belief.]

I think (?) your are implicitly picturing some naked reality (from no perspective, but really still yours) that MAKES a statement true or untrue. — plaque flag

Why?

In that sense, all beliefs are true, as an expression of how the world is seen by the mind by a person at that time --- but only about their view on the world. — plaque flag

When you have the concept of a plum, and the concept of a box, and the conceptual understanding of what it would mean for a box to contain a plum. And you then believe that a box has a plum in it, and you open it up, and it doesn't, then your belief is wrong, right?

As a function of logic, truth relies on concepts, it's an expression only possible in language (inclusive of mathematics/symbols). Logic works the same regardless of where the data comes from, and yes, our perspective is given to us, and the only data which gets inputted into my logic comes from my brain. Nonetheless, a specific claim can still be invalidated by new information, I can believe something that is false.

That new information can come from "naked reality", in so far as the plum does actually refer to something real, as does the box, and if the plum isn't there, maybe we could call that "naked reality', idk. As a word, reality has its uses, but it's vague, I'm not too interested in discussing what is or isn't in it.

I wonder, has your position changed since we first began speaking? How firm is your commitment to your current understanding? Do I need to reconcile what you say now with what you've said in the past?

Discussing is people working together toward better beliefs. [People might say 'truer,' but this leads to confusion, because 'true' is simply [mostly] used to agree with 'mere' belief.] — plaque flag

"True" validates correct reference, as for what makes a reference correct, that depends on the logic. This means that what's "true" could be unknown, such as if I ask which poster on this forum has the highest number of posts. I don't know the answer to that, but I believe there is an answer. I don't want a "better belief", I want to know the truth, and the true answer isn't just whatever I believe.

I figure I must be misrepresenting you somewhere, but at the same time, here you are telling me that "better beliefs" are equivalent to "truer beliefs". I'm a bit lost, and perhaps that's my fault, I have difficulty tracking long discussions. I do aspire for better beliefs, but what's better is guided by what's pragmatic, my objectives, what's the logic you're using to define "better'?