I disagree that Wittgenstein would agree that words, such as, right, accurate, judgment, etc lose their sense, if that's what you're indeed saying. — Sam26

They lose their sense in terms of talking about private sensations like they are public objects. For example, “I correctly recognize my past sensation is the same one as my current sensation” vs “I correctly recognize the person in the picture is my neighbor.”

In fact he does not even support indirect realism, consider PI 304, “The conclusion was only that nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.” An indirect realist would not say this. They would say that there are “somethings” and these somethings are private sensations and we have much to say. — Richard B

Wittgenstein is not saying that there is a "nothing". He is saying that there is a "something", but within the language game, this "something" drops out of consideration.

As regards "object and designation", the object is the intentional content, the private subjective feeling, such as pain and the designation is the public name used in a language game, such as the word "pain"

Wittgenstein in PI 304 writes that the sensation of pain is a definite "something" and attacks those who say that the sensation of pain is a "nothing". He writes that it is only within the context of a language game that this "something", this pain, drops out of consideration.

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!"

Wittgenstein PI 304 continues that within the language game, as this "something", the object of pain, drops out of consideration, then "nothing" would serve just as well. This is obviously nonsense, because if there was "nothing" in the first place, then there wouldn't be anything to drop out of consideration. If there was "nothing" in the mind, there would be no language. In fact, there would be no humans as we know them.

"The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."

Wittgenstein continues in PI 304 that language doesn't function by directly linking object with designation, by directly linking the private sensation of pain with the public name of "pain", which happens to be the Direct Realist's position.

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please."

Wittgenstein writes in PI 293 that language functions by publicly naming things in the world, and it may well be the case that everyone has a different private subjective feeling, a different "beetle" in their box.

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box."

I agree that Wittgenstein studiously avoids taking any philosophical position, however, his Beetle in the Box analogy is a good argument against Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism.

To be clear, the "something" in question at §304 is not a meaning or anything linguistic, but a private sensation; a feeling. However, I assume this is what you meant. — Luke

As I read through these paragraphs, I find that I'm not actually disagreeing with Witt, so my wording is not as accurate as it should be.

It seems to me that the sensation of colour has no colour; it takes place in the dark.

It seems to me that the sensation of colour has no colour; it takes place in the dark. — unenlightened

In my dreams, which take place in the dark, I can have the sensation of colour.

Whether in a dream or waking, if there is nothing to sense then there cannot be a sensation, ie, a sensation cannot be of nothing.

As a sensation cannot be of nothing, the sensation cannot be independent of what is being sensed, ie, the sensation is what is being sensed.

Therefore, if what is being sensed is colour, as the sensation is what is being sensed, then the sensation itself is colour.

In my dreams, which take place in the dark, I can have the sensation of colour. — RussellA

Exactly. But if I were to ask you what colour the sensation of colour was, you might wonder what I meant.

You might want to say that the sensation of each colour is the colour of the sensation it is, or that the colour of the sensation is different from the colour it is a sensation of. Whichever you said, I would be wondering what you could possibly mean.

But if I were to ask you what colour the sensation of colour was, you might wonder what I meant — unenlightened

A large object is large. A circular object is circular. A green sensation is green.

As being circular is not independent of a circular object, being green is not independent of a green sensation.

Therefore, the sensation of green is green.

Therefore, the sensation of green is green. — RussellA

Then what Is anyone supposed to understand by this, and the accompanying diagram?

In the world are two objects. One has been named "red" and the other has been named "blue". No-one knows the true colours of these two objects. However, let them be green and orange for the sake of argument. — RussellA

I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. The sensation of green is no more green than the sensation of big is big, or the sensation of having made a mistake is a mistake.

I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. — unenlightened

It is normal to say "I have the sensation of green", as it is normal to say "I have a book"

But "I have a book" means that "I" and the "book" are independent of each other, in that the "book" exists independently of "me".

Grammatically, as "I" and the "book" are independent of each other, then it would follow that "I" and "the sensation of green" are independent of each other.

Yet this cannot be the case, as "I" am no more than the set of my sensations. My sensations are what comprise "me".

It would follow that it would be more correct to say that "I am the sensation of green".

This avoids the infinite regression problem which would happen if "I" am separate from my sensations, yet my sensations exist within "me".

Yet this cannot be the case, as "I" am no more than the set of my sensations. My sensations are what comprise "me". — RussellA

Well speak for yourself; I am a good deal more than the set of my sensations.

But do you see the difficulty of your diagram, that recreates colours 'in the mind'; it would require someone to be looking at the mind, to see what colour things were in there. That is the recursion we really need to avoid. And the way to do it is to leave colours where they are, in leaves and flowers and stuff, and let all the 'mind-stuff' including sensations be colourless and featureless electrochemical shenanigans, or moving spirit, or some such.

I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. The sensation of green is no more green than the sensation of big is big, or the sensation of having made a mistake is a mistake. — unenlightened

The sensation of green is a different thing to the sensation of big, so the expressions "the sensation of green is green" and "the sensation of big is big" cannot be equated. We directly sense the colour "green", but we don't directly sense the adjective "big". Whereas "green " is a direct sensation, "big" is not a direct sensation.

In the mind are sensations. The question is, how does the mind relate to its sensations. Either the mind is separate to its sensations, such that "I have sensations" or the mind is its sensations, such that "I am my sensations".

You say "I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour.", then how do you explain the relationship between the mind and its sensations.

I am a good deal more than the set of my sensations. — unenlightened

It may well be that you are a Substance Dualist, having the belief that the mind and body are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances. If so, what kind of substance do you think the mind is, and how does it causally affect the body, a different substance altogether.

But do you see the difficulty of your diagram, that recreates colours 'in the mind'; it would require someone to be looking at the mind, to see what colour things were in there. That is the recursion we really need to avoid — unenlightened

Yes, that someone is the person having the mind in the first place.

And the way to do it is to leave colours where they are, in leaves and flowers and stuff, and let all the 'mind-stuff' including sensations be colourless and featureless electrochemical shenanigans, or moving spirit, or some such. — unenlightened

If a sensation is colourless, then how do we know that objects in the world, such as leaves and flowers, have colours at all.

I think Wittgenstein would say that recognizing a private sensation does not assist in using a word appropriately. Think of PI 265, the train time-table example. He might say using language correctly shows we recognize the private sensation (or maybe ….we experience the private sensation). — Richard B

Yes, you're probably right.

As I read through these paragraphs, I find that I'm not actually disagreeing with Witt, so my wording is not as accurate as it should be. — Sam26

:up:

If a sensation is colourless, then how do we know that objects in the world, such as leaves and flowers, have colours at all. — RussellA

I use my eyes, personally. The runner beans I can see through the window here are green with orange-red flowers. The runner beans are in the garden. What I cannot see, because my eyes do not point the right way, is into my mind. So I confess I do not know how my mind distinguishes things. I distinguish colours using my eyes, though; I'm fairly sure of that.

I'm also pretty sure I do not look at my sensations to see what colour they are, because I would need special eyes in my my mind that I do not think I have. And even supposing I did, they would surely require eyes in the mind's eye to examine the sensations produced, and those eyes would also need eyes to look at their sensations etc, ad infinitum.

I use my eyes, personally. The runner beans I can see through the window here are green with orange-red flowers. The runner beans are in the garden. What I cannot see, because my eyes do not point the right way, is into my mind. So I confess I do not know how my mind distinguishes things. I distinguish colours using my eyes, though; I'm fairly sure of that. — unenlightened

In perceiving runner beans, the Direct Realist would say that what we see exists in the world, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence. The Indirect Realist would say that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, where our ideas of the world are interpretations of sensory input derived from a real external world.

Science tells us that a wavelength of 550nm travels from the runner beans to our eyes, where an electromagnetic wave is an oscillation of electric and magnetic fields and its wavelength is the distance between two adjacent crests.

How can a wavelength of 550nm have an intrinsic colour, and if wavelengths have an intrinsic colour, what would be the intrinsic colour of a radio wave having a wavelength of 3 metres ?

I'm also pretty sure I do not look at my sensations to see what colour they are, because I would need special eyes in my my mind that I do not think I have. And even supposing I did, they would surely require eyes in the mind's eye to examine the sensations produced, and those eyes would also need eyes to look at their sensations etc, ad infinitum. — unenlightened

I agree, which is my argument that it is more the case that "I am sensations" rather than "I have sensations".

From Wikipedia Homunculus Argument

If there is a homunculus looking at sensations, these sensations must be in the homuncules' head. But how does the homunculus see sensations inside its own head. It can only be if there is a second homunculus within the first homuncules head looking at the sensations within the first homuncules head. But then we have the same problem, how does the second homuncules see sensations inside its own head.

A dualist might argue that the homunculus inside the brain is an immaterial one, such as the Cartesian soul. A non-dualist might argue that a life form is indivisible from its environment, such that the mind is not separate from its sensations, but rather the mind is the set of its sensations.

A dualist would need to explain how a mind separate to the body can affect the body.

Science tells us that a wavelength of 550nm travels from the runner beans to our eyes, where an electromagnetic wave is an oscillation of electric and magnetic fields and its wavelength is the distance between two adjacent crests.

How can a wavelength of 550nm have an intrinsic colour, and if wavelengths have an intrinsic colour, what would be the intrinsic colour of a radio wave having a wavelength of 3 metres ? — RussellA

Yes scientists have explained in some detail how we see colour. And then philosophers persist in suggesting that something else has colour than the things we see. First the mind, and now wavelengths.

If ever I see a wavelength, I will be sure to let folks know what colour it is. In the meantime, I will stick with the runner beans that are green, and maintain that they and their greenness are in the garden and not in my eyes which are greyish blue, nor in my mind which is quite clear. And if I imagine runner beans in the winter time, and someone asks where the green is in my dreams and imagination, I will tell them "in the summer, in the garden, of course" because I have a realistic imagination.

In the meantime, I will stick with the runner beans that are green, and maintain that they and their greenness are in the garden and not in my eyes which are greyish blue, nor in my mind which is quite clear — unenlightened

The observer sees green light (ignoring for the sake of argument that this wavelength after entering the eye becomes an electrical signal that travels up the optic nerve to the brain).

This green light has been caused by something in the world. The light left the object before being seen by the observer.



The observer directly sees the green light as it enters the eye, and not the green light as it was emitted from the object, as the light emitted from the object was emitted at a time prior to entering the eye. An observer cannot directly see an event that happened in the past, only an event in the present.

As many causes of green light are possible, and as the observer has no direct knowledge of the cause of the green light, the observer's belief that the cause were runner beans can only be indirectly inferred from the other senses, such as touch, smell and taste.

We understand reality by using multiple measurements to abstract out the same pattern. This is known as Construct Validation in psychology. This raises the question as to how we know when a concept is real, how do we know the nature of reality. To establish something as real, we need a set of qualitatively different measurements which converge, which is what the senses do. The senses provide five qualitatively distinct reports, and if they converge one presumes that this constitutes reality. This convergence of the senses is how we define reality.

That the cause of the green light were runner beans cannot be directly known by sight alone. All that is possible is a justified belief from the rational combination of different senses that the cause of one's seeing green light were green runner beans.

The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?

The observer sees green light ( — RussellA

The observer directly sees the green light as it enters the eye, — RussellA

Maybe stop trying to teach me schoolboy optics, and think about the philosophy, and particularly the language with which you are confusing yourself. No one sees light, it is not visible. Rather, when light enters the eye, one sees the source of the light. There is no such thing as green light because light is not visible; there are green sources of light and green reflectors of light. Just as there is no green in the mind, there is no green in the light, One speaks of a green light when one sees a green source, and out of that misunderstanding a whole metaphysics is developed. And Wittgenstein has carefully undone that knot for you, and you insist on retying it.

Consider for a moment, that you have sent me an image of seeing in order to show me that I cannot see what you have just put in front of me. Rather ambitious, I'd say.

No one sees light, it is not visible. — unenlightened

The general opinion is that humans can see light, for example:

Wikipedia: "Light or visible light is electromagnetic radiation that can be perceived by the human eye."
National Geographic Society: "Visible light waves are the only wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum that humans can see"
BBC: "Everything we can see is because of how our eyes detect the light around us."
NASA: "All electromagnetic radiation is light, but we can only see a small portion of this radiation—the portion we call visible light."

BBC: "Everything we can see is because of how our eyes detect the light around us." — RussellA

This one is correct. Our eyes detect 'visible' light. And that's why we call it "visible light" Seeing IS the detection of light by the eyes, but the light that enters the eyes is not seen but absorbed so that it is no more, in the process of seeing.

What you have produced above is not "the general opinion" but "the general way of talking". which is generally understood by anyone but a philosopher, who cannot see for looking.

We use the same word for the radiation and its source; perhaps that observation might help folk see the light?

We use the same word for the radiation and its source; perhaps that observation might help folk see the light? — unenlightened

Yes, that is the problem. If a wavelength of 550nm enters the eye originating from an object in the world, in common language we say "I see a green object".

As you said yourself "There is no such thing as green light because light is not visible; there are green sources of light and green reflectors of light."

This is the problem with Direct Realism, which believes that the world we see around us is the real world itself, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

This is why I wrote "The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?"

Another problem for the Direct Realist is, if it is true that the object has an the intrinsic colour of green, how does the information that the object is green get to the observer, if the means of getting the information to the observer, the wavelength of 550nm, carries no information about colour.

This is why I wrote "The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?" — RussellA

I passed it by, because you have just explained perfectly precisely how an observer sees a past event, which any astronomer can confirm as perfectly normal and universal..

Another problem for the Direct Realist is, if it is true that the object has an the intrinsic colour of green, how does the information that the object is green get to the observer, if the means of getting the information to the observer, the wavelength of 550nm, carries no information about colour. — RussellA

Again, the explanation creates the mystery. The eye detects light and distinguishes the wavelength and this is how the information is 'conveyed'. The "intrinsic colour of green" is nothing other than the propensity to preferentially reflect radiation of wavelength 550nm and that is the property that the eye is configured to remotely detect. It's called "seeing green stuff".

I passed it by, because you have just explained perfectly precisely how an observer sees a past event, which any astronomer can confirm as perfectly normal and universal.. — unenlightened

Exactly, the fact that the event is in the past means that the the observer cannot see the event directly, only indirectly, which is the position of Indirect Realism. Another argument against Direct Realism.

The eye detects light and distinguishes the wavelength and this is how the information is 'conveyed'. — unenlightened

Exactly, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". The colour green exists in the mind, not the world, which is the position of Indirect Realism. Yet another argument against Direct Realism.

The colour green exists in the mind, not the world, — RussellA

There's none so blind as them that will not see.

Not so. The colour green is the propensity of an object to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm approx.

Not so. The colour green is the propensity of an object to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm approx. — unenlightened

Yes, some objects in the world have the propensity to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm.

Humans have defined the wavelength of 550nm as green. Then where does green exist? Although a wavelength of 550nm can exist in the world, green can only exist as part of a human definition, and human definitions can only exist in the mind, not the world.

The wavelength of 550nm could equally well have been defined as violet. There is nothing in the world outside the mind that is able to determine whether a wavelength of 550nm is green or violet. Only in the human mind can it be determined that a wavelength of 550nm is green and not violet.

As the colour of the wavelength 550nm can only be determined by the mind, the colour green can only exist in the mind.

some objects in the world have the propensity to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm. — RussellA

Green things.

As the colour of the wavelength 550nm can only be determined by the mind, the colour green can only exist in the mind. — RussellA

We have devices that detect colors on a variety objects that will agree with human judgement. These devices are not detecting color in the minds of humans but on objects. Additionally, if you use the device on the human brain you will be getting the color of the brain not what the brain is sensing.

This simply shows this view colors only existing in the mind is confused and unfruitful.

Green things. — unenlightened

If the argument is that because we see green things then in the world exist green things,
then it would also follow that if we see a stick bent in water then in the world exist sticks bent in water.

Of course. If I have my keys in my pocket, it follows that my wallet is also in my pocket. Either i see everything entire, or I see nothing.