I disagree that Wittgenstein would agree that words, such as, right, accurate, judgment, etc lose their sense, if that's what you're indeed saying. — Sam26
In fact he does not even support indirect realism, consider PI 304, “The conclusion was only that nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.” An indirect realist would not say this. They would say that there are “somethings” and these somethings are private sensations and we have much to say. — Richard B
To be clear, the "something" in question at §304 is not a meaning or anything linguistic, but a private sensation; a feeling. However, I assume this is what you meant. — Luke
It seems to me that the sensation of colour has no colour; it takes place in the dark. — unenlightened
In my dreams, which take place in the dark, I can have the sensation of colour. — RussellA
But if I were to ask you what colour the sensation of colour was, you might wonder what I meant — unenlightened
Therefore, the sensation of green is green. — RussellA
In the world are two objects. One has been named "red" and the other has been named "blue". No-one knows the true colours of these two objects. However, let them be green and orange for the sake of argument. — RussellA
I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. — unenlightened
Yet this cannot be the case, as "I" am no more than the set of my sensations. My sensations are what comprise "me". — RussellA
I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. The sensation of green is no more green than the sensation of big is big, or the sensation of having made a mistake is a mistake. — unenlightened
I am a good deal more than the set of my sensations. — unenlightened
But do you see the difficulty of your diagram, that recreates colours 'in the mind'; it would require someone to be looking at the mind, to see what colour things were in there. That is the recursion we really need to avoid — unenlightened
And the way to do it is to leave colours where they are, in leaves and flowers and stuff, and let all the 'mind-stuff' including sensations be colourless and featureless electrochemical shenanigans, or moving spirit, or some such. — unenlightened
I think Wittgenstein would say that recognizing a private sensation does not assist in using a word appropriately. Think of PI 265, the train time-table example. He might say using language correctly shows we recognize the private sensation (or maybe ….we experience the private sensation). — Richard B
If a sensation is colourless, then how do we know that objects in the world, such as leaves and flowers, have colours at all. — RussellA
I use my eyes, personally. The runner beans I can see through the window here are green with orange-red flowers. The runner beans are in the garden. What I cannot see, because my eyes do not point the right way, is into my mind. So I confess I do not know how my mind distinguishes things. I distinguish colours using my eyes, though; I'm fairly sure of that. — unenlightened
I'm also pretty sure I do not look at my sensations to see what colour they are, because I would need special eyes in my my mind that I do not think I have. And even supposing I did, they would surely require eyes in the mind's eye to examine the sensations produced, and those eyes would also need eyes to look at their sensations etc, ad infinitum. — unenlightened
Science tells us that a wavelength of 550nm travels from the runner beans to our eyes, where an electromagnetic wave is an oscillation of electric and magnetic fields and its wavelength is the distance between two adjacent crests.
How can a wavelength of 550nm have an intrinsic colour, and if wavelengths have an intrinsic colour, what would be the intrinsic colour of a radio wave having a wavelength of 3 metres ? — RussellA
In the meantime, I will stick with the runner beans that are green, and maintain that they and their greenness are in the garden and not in my eyes which are greyish blue, nor in my mind which is quite clear — unenlightened
The observer sees green light ( — RussellA
The observer directly sees the green light as it enters the eye, — RussellA
No one sees light, it is not visible. — unenlightened
BBC: "Everything we can see is because of how our eyes detect the light around us." — RussellA
We use the same word for the radiation and its source; perhaps that observation might help folk see the light? — unenlightened
This is why I wrote "The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?" — RussellA
Another problem for the Direct Realist is, if it is true that the object has an the intrinsic colour of green, how does the information that the object is green get to the observer, if the means of getting the information to the observer, the wavelength of 550nm, carries no information about colour. — RussellA
I passed it by, because you have just explained perfectly precisely how an observer sees a past event, which any astronomer can confirm as perfectly normal and universal.. — unenlightened
The eye detects light and distinguishes the wavelength and this is how the information is 'conveyed'. — unenlightened
The colour green exists in the mind, not the world, — RussellA
Not so. The colour green is the propensity of an object to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm approx. — unenlightened
some objects in the world have the propensity to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm. — RussellA
As the colour of the wavelength 550nm can only be determined by the mind, the colour green can only exist in the mind. — RussellA
Green things. — unenlightened
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