I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good? — Agent Smith

I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happiness.

:up:

I suspected as much. Danke!

I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happiness — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: Read Banno's reply to me here:

Why is happiness good?
— Agent Smith

Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing. — Banno

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good". It's pragmatic to address disvalue by preventing or reducing disvalue (e.g. harm to h. sapiens); however, we can only aspire to value because value tautologically transcends (in "platonic heaven") our condition such that "moral value" judgments / actions are arbitrary in practice (à la nihilism). Moore seems half-right but wholly for the wrong reasons. Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal). Epicureans / Stoics rather than Bentham-Mill / Kant. — 180 Proof

In line with your via negativa approach to many things - let's deal with what is not good first; our intuitions tend to be less at odds with each other in re disvalue than in re value and before I forget, reducing harm is more actionable than increasing benefit. The Epicureans were of the view that happiness is the absence of suffering and the highest happiness is the complete cessation of suffering (aponia).

Why is happiness good?
— Agent Smith

Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing. — Banno

That's part of the reason why I disagree with Aristotle on that point. However, the argument is not as simple as Banno makes it look. To prove that point one would have to show how something is better than happiness. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness doesn't prove the point. That is the problem which Plato had with those who equated good with pleasure. You can't just stipulate that good is something different from pleasure, and leave it at that. That does not convince anyone. You need to produce descriptive premises concerning "good", and descriptive premises concerning "pleasure", and show how the nature of each of these differs from the other. As Plato found out, it's not an easy task to convince someone who already believes that good is pleasure.

The point though, was how Aristotle moved to put an end to the infinite regress you noted. The thing he named as the ultimate end (wanted for the sake of itself), was perhaps not the correct solution, but he showed a way toward that solution. We could name "the good" as the ultimate end, but that's completely intangible. Swapping "the good" for "happiness" provides us with something tangible, while being slightly more palatable than "pleasure".

I'm inclined to agree with @Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact.

The other issue is that we can ask the question why is happiness good?. To me the infinite regress doesn't terminate.

I'm inclined to agree with Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact. — Agent Smith

As I said, this would require proving that there is something better than happiness, to show that one ought to sacrifice happiness for this better good. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness, therefore you ought to sacrifice your happiness for X does not suffice.

But the very existence of the word "sacrifice" is the proof you seek.

I don't see the point. That "sacrifice" exists doesn't mean that sacrifice is good. In fact, an examination of most instances of sacrifices will probably show that they are generally misguided, and very often far from good.

Perhaps we're conflating equality with predication.

1. Good = Happiness (g = h)
2. Good is happiness (Hg)

In the former case, happiness and good are the same thing, but in the latter case, happiness is a property of good. The question why is happiness good? makes less sense in re 1 than 2.

Also ...

The word "sacrifice" has a positive connotation of a kind such that even if the devil sacrifices, it doesn't affect the word's positive valence. :lol:

And ...

Moore's question, as @Banno pointed out, is a bit weird.

It amounts to asking, if I told you that water is transparent (good is a beneficial act), why is transparent water? (why is a beneficial act good?) The question makes zero sense (to me). I dunno, it feels odd.

What are you looking for when you ask the question, "What is good?" I assume you'll say, "A definition," but there is no one definition that will satisfy every use of this word. It depends on how it's being used in a particular context (or language-game). It's the same for many of our words, you seem to be looking for some precision where there is none.

Indefinable for every context, definable when used?

Maybe the reason I can not answer the original question is because I (we?) don’t know the language game it’s being used in.

There's no definition of good that will satisfy every context, and probably not one that will satisfy most contexts. The best way to answer the question is to ask, "How are you using good, in this context?" So, if I say "Joe is a good husband," what does good here mean? It means Joe is faithful, truthful, kind, excellent provider, etc. In this case we can see what good means, i.e., we're talking about specific things. In another culture, or in a different time, it may mean something a bit different. So, how we use the word tells us much about what it means in a particular context or a particular use.

And yes, if you aren't looking at a particular use, then how can you define it? So, maybe you just have to ask the question a bit differently, then your answer will be less fuzzy. There are word definitions that are much more precise, but many definitions aren't precise.

Wittgenstein wrote in “most cases the meaning of a word is “ maybe this is an example of a time when a word is used within a sentence and meaning is not use. It seems we (I) like to wait around for a playable language game when we are looking at the unplayable one.

Is “good” indefinable? Why not answer yes?

G.E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica has claimed that good is a simple and indefinable. — Shawn

A good Aristotelian-Thomistic response to this comes from Dr. Peter L. P. Simpson's freely available article, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas." Here is an excerpt:

As Moore first coined the name ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and initiated the debate about it, one should begin with him. According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy concerning the idea of goodness. Goodness, he said, is a simple, indefinable notion, like yellow or red, and the fallacy is committed when people try to define or analyze it. For when they do try to define it they always identify it with some natural or observable property (as pleasure, say). But good is not such an object. It is a nonnatural property that is unique and peculiar to itself.

There are two parts to this claim. The first is that good is indefinable; the second is that it is something nonnatural. Moore endeavored to establish the first part by means of the so-called open-question argument. Whatever definition one proposes for good, he said, it is always possible to ask of the definition whether it is itself good. For instance, if one defines good as pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness, it is always possible to ask, with significance, whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is after all good. But this would be impossible if the proposed definition really were a definition. The question would then not be significant. Good would just mean ‘pleasure’ or ‘what promotes the greatest happiness,’ and the question whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is good would not be a significant or open one. It would be answered in the asking. This result will always happen whatever definition one proposes for good. Hence good must be indefinable. — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 2-3

Moore endeavored to establish the first part by means of the so-called open-question argument. Whatever definition one proposes for good, he said, it is always possible to ask of the definition whether it is itself good. For instance, if one defines good as pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness, it is always possible to ask, with significance, whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is after all good. But this would be impossible if the proposed definition really were a definition. The question would then not be significant. Good would just mean ‘pleasure’ or ‘what promotes the greatest happiness,’ and the question whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is good would not be a significant or open one. It would be answered in the asking. This result will always happen whatever definition one proposes for good. Hence good must be indefinable. — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 2-3

Moore's reasoning is inductive, not deductive, and it implicitly begs the question. He takes just two suggested definitions (that 'good' means the same as 'pleasure' or 'what promotes the greatest happiness'), finds these implausible (which is what he means when he says we can ask 'with significance' whether they are good), and then infers, simply on the basis of these two failed suggestions, that 'this result will always happen whatever definition one proposes' (my underlining). He does not justify this inference from the particular to the universal in any way; the inference rests on nothing more than Moore's own prior conviction that good is indefinable, and thus begs the question. Moore's conclusion would only be justified if he had considered all possible suggested definitions of 'good' and found them wanting.

A plausible definition of 'good' is given by A.C.Ewing:
"'We may... define "good" as "fitting object of a pro attitude"... it will [then] be easy enough to analyse bad as "fitting object of an anti attitude", this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.' (The Definition of Good, pp. 152 and 168)

This kind of definition is characteristic of fitting attitude theories. I think it needs further refinement, but it is a step in the right direction, a direction that never occurred to Moore.

That sounds fair to me. But then suppose Moore said, "Because it makes sense to ask whether 'fitting object of a pro attitude' is good, therefore it must not be the definition of good." How would you answer?

Further on in the article:

The solution adopted by emotivists and prescriptivists (the two main schools that followed Moore) was that good was not a property at all, or not an object of cognition. It served rather to express attitudes or volitions or prescriptions. To say something was good was not a way of asserting something about it; it was a way of expressing one’s approval of it, or of commending it. Good was more properly a volitional than a cognitive term. According to this theory the naturalistic fallacy is committed when one tries to analyze value-judgments in factual or cognitive terms.

The advantage of this solution was that it met at once all the objections raised against Moore. The ‘something more’ was explained, not as an independent property, but as an attitude to or a commendation of certain other properties. The connection with action was immediate because good already expressed a volitional commitment. The unexplained kind of knowing was avoided because there was nothing to know—making predications of goodness was all a question of willing, not knowing. This solution also had the advantage of leaving intact the claim that the natural and real are the province of value-free science. The facts of a thing never include goodness. Goodness is an attitude towards or a commendation of facts and not itself a fact.

Such is an account of the naturalistic fallacy as it appears in the principal protagonists... — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 5-6 (footnotes omitted)