We have devices that detect colors on a variety objects that will agree with human judgement. These devices are not detecting color in the minds of humans but on objects — Richard B
Additionally, if you use the device on the human brain you will be getting the color of the brain not what the brain is sensing. — Richard B
We have devices that can detect the wavelength of 550nm emitted by a variety of objects. The device doesn't know the name of the wavelength of 550nm prior to it being named green by a human. — RussellA
3. If I want to determine a particular color of a swatch, I may send it out to a company who has sensitive device that can provide a very nuance color determination. So I put it in an envelop and mail it in and in a few days get a report on its color. I am not sending a color that exists in my mind in the mail. — Richard B
1. Scientists are not naming the color green "550 nm — Richard B
2. We need the device to detect the color of an object that is independent of a human but will detect and report the color as humans do. — Richard B
3. I am not sending a color that exists in my mind in the mail. — Richard B
4. The human brain is like the device that detects color. — Richard B
5. If colors exist in the mind, why did scientist study light and color that is independent of the human? — Richard B
But as a story of entertaining fiction, I do get a good laugh. — Richard B
If green exists in the world independent of the mind, then what exactly has science discovered in such a world that relates 500nm to 550nm but not to 580nm ? — RussellA
Science discovers that the green light has a wavelength of 550nm — Richard B
Science discovers that the green light has a wavelength of 550nm — Richard B
2. If you have no problems with a device that detects color by utilizing scientific theories of light and not positing the device having private color sensations, why not humans that have evolved biological apparatuses to do the same without private color sensations? — Richard B
I like to be optimistic and believe we are seeing the same thing — Richard B
I agree. But to avoid any ambiguity, does the sentence mean i) what appears green to us science has discovered has a wavelength of 550nm or ii) science has discovered that a wavelength of 550nm is green independent of any observer ? — RussellA
By the sentence "a device that detects colour", do you mean i) a device that is able to directly detect the colour green independent of any observer or ii) a device that is able to detect the wavelength 550nm, and has been programmed by a human that a wavelength of 550nm is named green ? — RussellA
I am sure we do. I agree that because humans have similar biologies we judge colour the same, and I am sure that your subjective green is the same as my subjective green. I believe this, but I don't know it, as I cannot see into another person's mind — RussellA
It then comes down to arguments for and against Indirect and Direct Realism. — RussellA
Many philosophers believe that the first task is finding a theory of meaning in language. Given such a theory, they can then turn to the problems of philosophy. However, for Wittgenstein, whose first interest is in philosophy, it is this interest in philosophy that makes him then interested in language, but concludes that there is no theory of meaning in language that will enable the solving of philosophical problems. It is incorrect to say that Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher in the sense that JL Austin is.
Wittgenstein urges throughout his later work that mistaking a grammatical claim for a philosophical one is a common source of philosophical confusion, Wittgenstein says that the philosophical problems that concern him are not empirical problems, but are problems solved by looking into and recognizing the workings of our language.
Wittgenstein often insists that he is not presenting a philosophical argument. In PI 109 he writes "We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place", whereby such descriptions get that purpose from philosophical problems.
For Wittgenstein, a standing source of philosophical confusion is the tendency to transpose a remark concerning the grammar of an expression into a substantive claim about the things referred to in the expression. For example, from PI 246 is the sentence “Only I can know that I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it”. This is clearly false, as that on many occasions we can know full well that someone else is in pain, there is no surmising about it. The grammatical difference between the first person "I have a pain" and the third person "he has a pain" wrongly becomes a substantive philosophical problem
For Wittgenstein the first step is to acknowledge the confusion between statements of grammatical fact and the use of them in the search for substantive philosophical meaning. — RussellA
What it means is a device that can detect light with a wavelength of 550 nm light, and humans collectively has established that light of such a wavelength is called "green", and the device can be programmed to report out the name of the color. — Richard B
I would say Wittgenstein is not supporting either Indirect or Direct Realism since both are philosophical theories in which language goes on a holiday. — Richard B
I hope this doesn’t mean you’re just going to plagiarize more skilfully. :wink: — Jamal
am sure we do. I agree that because humans have similar biologies we judge colour the same, and I am sure that your subjective green is the same as my subjective green. I believe this, but I don't know it, as I cannot see into another person's mind — RussellA
In today's terms, Wittgenstein's approach in PI is that of an Indirect Realist rather than a Direct Realist, whereby a name is a label for an object in the world than rather than a description of it. — RussellA
Consider On Certainty (OC) 504, "Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contracts me. For to say one knows one has pain means nothing. " — Richard B
Or, OC 548, "A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour." Again, the emphasis here is language use, not recognition of color sensations. — Richard B
Consider OC 505, "It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something." Notice he is not saying it is by the favor of our awareness of private sensations that one knows something. This is evidence he would not support Indirect Realism. — Richard B
I will leave this discussion with one more quote from Wittgenstein from "Culture and Value" which suggest the importance of what can and cannot be said, "Couldn't one actually say equally well that the essence of colour guarantees its existence? — Richard B
Wittgenstein in PI 246 writes that we know our private sensations:
In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. — RussellA
I don’t believe that the quote supports your reading. — Luke
n PI 246, Wittgenstein writes that he knows his private sensations with certainty, whereas other people only know his private sensations with less certainty. — RussellA
In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. — RussellA
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that we can know our private sensations. — Luke
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
The word "know" seems to be redundant in the two propositions "I know I am in pain" and "I am in pain". Does that mean we can reject the idea that we can know our private sensations. — RussellA
I don’t believe redundancy is the reason why “it can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.” What sort of joke would it be to redundantly say “I know I’m in pain”? — Luke
PI 246 is contradictory in that it doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept — RussellA
246. In what sense are my sensations private? —
Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —
In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. —
Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! —
It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain? Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein is saying that it is said that only I know that I am in pain, whereas others can only surmise it. But he is surely saying that this is wrong because others also know that I am in pain. — RussellA
Wittgenstein is saying that others know I am in pain, but not with the same certainty that I know when I am in pain. — RussellA
Wittgenstein is saying that when others say "he knows he is in pain", this is grammatically incorrect and means no more that "he is in pain". It is possible that someone could use a grammatically incorrect phrase as a joke. — RussellA
However, in order to say "I am in pain", this presupposes that not only "I am having the sensation of pain" but also "I know the concept of pain". For example, if I didn't know the concept of pain, I wouldn't be able to distinguish between "I am in pain" and "I am hungry". Therefore the proposition "I am in pain" is shorthand for "I am having the sensation of pain and I know the concept of pain". — RussellA
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
The key word is "only". It is true that other people cannot learn of another's sensations purely from that person's behaviour if they didn't have their own sensations that produced the same behaviour in themselves. — RussellA
Wittgenstein is saying that although it makes sense for others to doubt that I am in pain, it makes no sense for me to doubt that I am in pain. — RussellA
309. “I know what I want, wish, believe, feel, . . .” (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers’ nonsense or, at any rate, not a judgement a priori.
310. “I know . . .” may mean “I do not doubt . . .” — but does not mean that the words “I doubt . . .” are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded.
311. One says “I know” where one can also say “I believe” or “I suppose”; where one can satisfy oneself... — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations - PPF/PI II
PI 246 is contradictory in that Wittgenstein doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept. On the one hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a concept: If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself and on the other hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a sensation: It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA
It's unclear what distinction you think there should be between sensation and concept, or how you think this distinction would help — Luke
I imagine that only a very small percentage of discussion (or language use) is about our knowledge of concepts — Luke
If 246 seems contradictory, it may be because Wittgenstein speaks in more than one voice — Luke
He says that others (often) know when he is in pain. He does not say that he (also) knows when he is in pain. As he states later in the passage, it can't be said of him at all that he knows he is in pain. — Luke
I agree that his sentence "Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it." is that of the interlocutor.
However, I am not so sure that his sentence"Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!" is that of the interlocutor or his own position. — RussellA
Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —
In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. —
Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! — — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
For example, Wittgenstein writes that he has sensations
PI 246 Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them
He also writes that he doesn't doubt his sensations
PI 246 - The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
He also links indubitability with certainty.
From the SEP article on Certainty: Ludwig Wittgenstein also seems to connect certainty with indubitability.
From OC 115: If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.
In PI 246 he is linking certainty with knowing.
Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself
As the trail leads from his having sensation that he doesn't doubt, to linking indubitability with certainty and then linking certainty with knowing, this suggests that this statement is his own position rather than that of an interlocutor. — RussellA
If I said "I don't know I am in pain", this means that I don't know the meaning of the concept "pain", — RussellA
Therefore, it is allowable within the language game to say "I know I am in pain", as it has the same meaning as "I am in pain". — RussellA
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.