No one cares about the Tarski Undefinability Theorem for practical purposes. If you're going to go that in depth, then you're going to have to be in depth in your analysis. Ok, that's likely the last response now. Good luck in your work! — Philosophim

I think that your criticism of my view has lots of merit. You do seem to be describing
more accurately how people actually use knowledge. When I cut out the stochastic
aspects of this it makes it a less accurate model of knowledge.

So, your point relies on radical skepticism, and I think we can rule that out just by accepting the phenomenal world as it appears and making and thinking of the truth or falsity of knowledge claims only within that context.
— Janus

Only when one fully comprehends the actual limits of logically justified certainty is one's mind forced open enough to see reality for what it truly is as opposed to and contrast with the brainwashing of conditioning of the socialization process. (This is Eastern religion stuff). — PL Olcott

Was your response meant to address—that is agree or disagree—with what I had said, or is it more of an aside?

All that said, I'd be happy enough to stop talking about knowledge altogether and instead talk about more or less justified belief, while acknowledging that we have no absolutely precise measure of justification.
— Janus

I have been studying and pondering the mathematical foundation of the notion of analytical truth for many years. I just recently discovered that this is anchored in truthmaker theory. — PL Olcott

Same question here.

So, your point relies on radical skepticism, and I think we can rule that out just by accepting the phenomenal world as it appears and making and thinking of the truth or falsity of knowledge claims only within that context. — Janus

Was your response meant to address—that is agree or disagree—with what I had said, or is it more of an aside? — Janus

After reading this again I agree.
I was also trying to show why knowing the limits of logically justified certainty is important.

I was also trying to show why knowing the limits of logically justified certainty is important. — PL Olcott

I agree it is important. Logical and mathematical certainty seem to be the only full-blown certainties we have, given that they do not seem to rely on the empirical context of the phenomenal world. I would say that direct observations of the empirical world, such as "it is raining, right here right now, can be all but absolutely certain, provided our thinking doesn't slip into radical skepticism, wherein we might think the rain we see is a simulation, illusion or elaborate hoax.

I tend to favour refraining from speaking in terms of belief in such cases but rather speaking in terms of simply seeing what the case is. So not per the old adage "seeing is believing" but rather "seeing is knowing". For example, I might have very good reason, I might even say I know, my wife is having an affair if I find used condoms under our bed, and we don't use condoms, but if I come home and see her with another man then I know, for all intents and purposes, that she is having an affair.

The Getter cases don't impress me: for example, think of the cardboard cutout sheep in the field. I see what looks like a sheep and form the purportedly justified true belief, on account of there being an actual sheep behind a bush that I cannot see, that there is a sheep in that field. But this belief is too indeterminate: my belief is really that what I see, the cardboard cutout, is an actual sheep. Can I say this belief is justified if I am at such a distance from the cutout that it is indistinguishable from a real sheep? I would say not.

I would say that direct observations of the empirical world, such as "it is raining, right here right now, can be all but absolutely certain, provided our thinking doesn't slip into radical skepticism, wherein we might think the rain we see is a simulation, illusion or elaborate hoax. — Janus

It may be best to keep the radical skepticism in the back of our mind just to force a little more humility so that we don't excessively trust the merit of our own opinion.

:up: