I would consider "Yes, but all the same..." to be a reaction or response to Wittgenstein's unbolded remarks that immediately precede it, which I believe are made in a different voice — Luke
This all hangs on your assumption that he is linking certainty with knowing in PI 246. — Luke
Wittgenstein indicates that it does not make any sense to say "I know I am in pain". — Luke
Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"? — Fooloso4
My reading of PI 246, where Wittgenstein is unbolded and the interlocutor is bolded
2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
[...]
5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA
In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". — RussellA
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
It is more likely that the second sentence is not the interlocutor's...5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — Luke
As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. — Fooloso4
If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. — Fooloso4
If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain. — Fooloso4
the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language. — RussellA
"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game — RussellA
Why do you think the interlocutor would contradict himself? — Luke
4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself
It is not immediately obvious whether Wittgenstein is referring to 2) or 3). — RussellA
As regards my private language, — RussellA
As regards my private language, the word "know" in the phrase "I know I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose, and therefore would only make sense if said as a joke. — RussellA
The problem within 7) is that Wittgenstein seems to be mixing up references on the one hand to a private language, ie, "myself", and on the other hand to other people and the language game, ie "other people". — RussellA
But the phrase "but not to say it about myself" initially seems to be within a private language — RussellA
We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. — Fooloso4
Do you acknowledge that your numbered sections 2 and 5 contradict each other? — Luke
I don't understand what you mean by "a private language, ie. "myself"". — Luke
How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour? — RussellA
You believe that 5) is Wittgenstein. I am unsure.
As I wrote in my last post:
If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.
As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's — RussellA
He is not just saying that a private language understood only by the speaker is impossible, but that the very existence of a private language is impossible. — RussellA
Wittgenstein agrees in PI 304 that we can have private inchoate feelings, ie, sensations, but argues that no one else can ever know what these private feelings are... These private inchoate feelings can only be given form within a community of other minds using a language game, thereby breaking the problem of solipsism. Within the language game, when I say "I am in pain", I am not taking about my private personal experience, but rather talking about the concept of pain that exists in the minds of the community of which I am part. — RussellA
In a private language, to say "I am in pain" requires no justification, other than "I know I am in pain because I am in pain", in which event the word "know" has no function. — RussellA
However, in the language game, to say "I am in pain" does require a justification. — RussellA
For example, "I know I am in pain because I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress". — RussellA
In the language game, the word "know" does have a definite function. — RussellA
But the only situation where to say "I know I am in pain" requires no justification is in a private language, — RussellA
as Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the possibility of a private language, 5) cannot be Wittgenstein's position but that of an interlocutor. — RussellA
I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain — Fooloso4
The second statement was intended to be ironic. — Fooloso4
If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then
other people very often know if I’m in pain. (PI 246)
I read the following as a statement of fact.........PI 246 If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain — Fooloso4
Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour. — RussellA
Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour. — RussellA
(293)...if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
What does 5) have to do with a private language? — Luke
There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language. — Luke
The point of 304 (and elsewhere) - at least, on my reading - is that the concept of "pain" is not based on the private feeling that nobody else can perceive, but on the expression of the sensation; on the behaviour (that others can perceive). — Luke
If a private language can be understood only by the speaker, then to whom is one saying "I am in pain" (in English)? — Luke
I don't believe that it always, or even often, requires a justification. I think the only time it might require justification is if others didn't believe you were actually in pain or if you had to prove it for some reason. — Luke
5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain". — RussellA
But this is the same idea as expressed in item 5), inferring that item 5) is referring to one's inner thoughts rather than any public language game. In other words, to one's private language. — RussellA
There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language.
— Luke
It is the difference between keeping a diary in PI 258 and the beetle in the box in PI 293. — RussellA
As no one else can know my inner thoughts, no one else can know my inner language. This inner language is a type of a private language. If I am saying "I am in pain" in my inner language, only I can hear it. — RussellA
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 243
One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain. — Fooloso4
When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain. — Fooloso4
That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic..........This is why it can't be said of me at all that "I know I am in pain", and that all it could possibly mean is that I am in pain. — Luke
So we are left with the quandary of how to talk about a private language, something that is outside the scope of knowledge, something non-epistemic, using language, a language game, that is by its nature inside the scope of knowledge, something epistemic. — RussellA
If that one is pain is outside the scope of knowledge, something that cannot be talked about in the language game, does that mean that item 5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? is a meaningless statement? — RussellA
That I am in pain can be talked about in the language game. That I am in pain can also be known by others. It is just something that I cannot know. I don't learn of, or doubt, or know my pains. I have them. — Luke
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